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 Abstract 
The aim of the dissertation is to challenge perceptions of Kafka’s work as 
negative by developing more constructive readings of the accounts of suffering 
and abandonment which form an undeniable feature of his writing. The term 
‘Kafkaesque’ is now in widespread use to indicate a situation or event 
characterised by frustration and torment, but this designation paints an 
unnecessarily bleak picture of Kafka’s fictional landscapes. 
One path towards a brighter view of his art is offered by Buddhism, 
which puts suffering at the centre of its philosophy and yet develops a positive 
spiritual outlook on life. It does so by giving clear reasons for suffering based 
on natural causes, leaving no room for mysterious or irresistible forces. From 
a Buddhist standpoint, the most formidable barrier to alleviating suffering is 
not presented by a powerful Court or an impregnable Castle, but by the 
human self or – more precisely – attachment to self. 
The Buddhist approach to Kafka reads his works in two complementary 
ways, for content (information) and form (expression). The first examines the 
close parallels between key Buddhist teachings (such as on suffering and 
emptiness) and predominant themes from Kafka’s writing (such as futile 
quests after recognition and justice); the second explores the gaps and 
paradoxes that confront Kafka’s characters and readers, and measures them 
against the absurd, nonsensical utterances (koans) used by Zen masters to 
nonplus their students and loosen their dependency on conventional modes of 
thinking. 
In this way, it will be shown that the suffering Kafka describes so 
relentlessly can be traced back to personal attachments rather than 
intervention by external agencies. 
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 Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Suffering and attachment  
Human beings’ intellectual side is very important for their lives. Descartes said, 
‘I think, therefore I am’. That is a human being. Originally, thinking is not good 
and not bad. But everybody becomes attached to their thinking, so they have a 
problem.1 
Kafka’s work has been viewed from many angles and associated with many 
ideas, but despite the rich variation of readings there has still been sufficient 
common ground to allow the term ‘Kafkaesque’ to gain widespread currency. A 
typical dictionary entry refers to the ‘nightmarish atmosphere or situations 
portrayed in his stories’.2 Accordingly, an event or account earns the 
description ‘Kafkaesque’ if it depicts a gloomy, sinister world where the 
individual struggles in vain against shadowy, inimical forces. 
Kafka’s fiction is undoubtedly concerned with suffering – its pages tell of 
persecution, frustration, torture, alienation, dislocation or death, and are 
characteristically pervaded with a suffocating atmosphere of failure. Few 
critics would argue with this overall evaluation, but Kafka’s writing still holds 
enough ambiguity to have spawned a multitude of different interpretations of 
why he explored with such consistency the troubles which befall and baffle the 
common man. This disagreement about how Kafka’s grim tales of despair 
could be read suggests that labelling Kafka’s work under ‘suffering’ leaves 
much ground uncovered, and the occasional outbreaks of more positive 
episodes, such as K.’s survival in Das Schloß, offer further cause to resist the 
bleak connotations which have taken hold of the Kafkaesque.  
The aim of this dissertation is to lift the sombre air that cloaks Kafka’s 
work and find a way of engaging with his texts which allows for a constructive 
1 Seung Sahn, The Compass of Zen (Boston: Shambhala, 1997), p. 29. 
2 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: OUP, 1993), p. 1469. 
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 reading of the undeniable feature of suffering in his writing. I would like to 
propose a Buddhist line of enquiry to re-evaluate Kafka and redress the 
negative images associated with his work. I will argue that there are significant 
similarities between Buddhist ideas and the view of the world which emerges 
from Kafka’s texts. The two key aspects of Buddhist thinking which support 
my thesis are the notions that the world is characterised by impermanence 
and that suffering derives from personal attachments: it is not the situation 
itself which is bleak, but our perception of it and reaction to it. 
Buddhism puts suffering at the forefront of its doctrine, and this stance 
has been labelled as pessimistic (like the Kafkaesque).3 On closer 
investigation, however, its guiding principles reveal a pragmatic philosophy 
which places salvation (or nirvana) within reach of all sentient beings under 
the right conditions. Buddhism handles suffering with positivity, and turns it 
into fertile ground from which enlightenment can sprout; the same 
transformation can be detected in Kafka’s work, to the extent that his 
unrelenting focus on pain resembles a physician’s concern to treat diseased 
parts of body and mind.  
There is no suggestion that Kafka was influenced by Buddhist thinking, 
but there appears to be a degree of spiritual attunement on the question of 
suffering, how it is caused by craving and attachment, and how it can be made 
to cease. This dissertation proposes therefore to undertake a Buddhist reading 
of Kafka’s work on the basis that their shared affinities will offer a different 
insight into the accounts of suffering that are often taken as expressions of 
hopelessness. The interpretation will follow two distinct but complementary 
approaches, considering what is presented as information (content, to be 
3 ‘Some critics argue that Buddhism is morbid, cynical, hovering on the dark and shadowy side 
of life […] They claim that Buddhism is pessimistic, fostering an attitude of hopelessness 
towards life, encouraging a vague, general feeling that pain and evil predominate in human 
affairs.’ K. Sri Dhammanada, What Buddhists Believe (Kuala Lumpur: Buddhist Missionary 
Society Malaysia, 2002), p. 181. 
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 understood intellectually), and what serves as demonstration (form, to be 
experienced intuitively).  
In the first approach, the themes, events and characterisations arising in 
Kafka’s work will be compared with the ideas presented in the basic precepts 
of Buddhist thought. Teachings such as The Three Universal Characteristics 
and The Four Noble Truths seek to describe the underlying truth of existence 
as impermanent and empty of fixed meaning, and explain human suffering as 
the consequence of our inability to see that all phenomena, including our own 
selves, are subject to constant change. In the second approach, the paradoxes, 
equivocations and ambiguities which are frequently used to deliver 
communication in Kafka’s texts will be compared with the linguistic 
techniques deployed by Zen masters to confound their students and catapult 
them into an unmediated experience of the emptiness which lies beneath the 
ordered surface reality perceived by the unawakened mind. Their use of koans 
and mondos (absurd and contradictory utterances which do not follow 
conventional rules of logic) bears a striking resemblance to significant 
passages in Kafka’s writing style, especially the aphorisms, suggesting a 
common purpose: to loosen attachment to meaning.4 
Before looking in greater detail at the ideas in Buddhism which find some 
resonance in Kafka’s work and make a positive reading possible, it is worth 
4 The following examples of (1) a koan and (2) a mondo (an exchange) are provided by Henry 
Rosemont Jr in ‘The Meaning is the Use: Koan and Mondo as Linguistic Tools of the Zen 
Masters’, in Philosophy East and West, Vol 20, No. 2 (Apr 1970), pp. 109-19. 
(1) A monk asked Tung-shan, ‘Who is the Buddha?’ 
‘Three pounds of flax.’ 
(2) Shobi: What is your given name? 
Kyozan: Ye-jaku. 
Shobi: What is ‘ye’? What is ‘jaku’? 
Kyozan: Right before you. 
Shobi: Still there is a before-and-after. 
Kyozan: Let us put aside the question of before-and-after. O master, what do you see? 
Shobi: Have a cup of tea. 
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 investigating the potential reasons why Kafka has tended to be associated with 
a pessimistic outlook on the world. 
1.1.1 Consensus: sentenced to suffering 
If we view life as somehow overpowering or trapping us, as in some way 
undermining our will to live as we wish, as strengthening the forces that wait 
malevolently for human endeavour to falter, then we enter Kafka’s world of the 
Kafkaesque.5 
If we accept the ingrained negativity of the Kafkaesque, Kafka depicts suffering 
as an unavoidable conclusion, an insurmountable obstacle which chokes off 
any growth or development in the human condition. The name Kafka has 
become shorthand for the ‘alienation of modern man’,6 and his work conjures 
up depressing images, from ‘a lonely and almost nihilist quality’7 to a ‘mighty 
juggernaut revving up in the distance, but whose purpose or function cannot 
be ascertained’.8 It is not surprising that Kafkaesque suggests suffering that is 
as crushing as it is meaningless and unjust.  
In order to readjust perceptions of Kafka, it would help to find common 
elements in definitions of the Kafkaesque, in case there is a pattern to the 
depictions of powerlessness which would indicate why predominantly negative 
connotations come to the fore. The typical Kafka hero is far from perfect, but 
the source of his troubles is often attributed to an inaccessible person or an 
inscrutable authority, and rarely traced back to character faults, ignorance or 
poor decision-making. The troubles arise as inevitable consequences of a 
person’s interaction with his society and environment, and appear as insoluble 
5 Frederick R. Karl, Franz Kafka: Representative Man (New York: Fromm International, 1991), 
pp. 758-59. 
6 Stanley Corngold and Benno Wagner, Franz Kafka: the Ghosts in the Machine (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2011), p. 35. 
7 Max Lerner, ‘The Human Voyage’ in Angel Flores, ed., The Kafka Problem (New York: Gordian 
Press, 1975), p. 45. 
8 Karl, p. 759. 
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 as they are overwhelming: in short, human beings are doomed.9 Just as Josef 
K.’s uncle foretells the inescapable outcome of his nephew’s trial, a Kafkaesque 
predicament is bound to end badly.10 
Kafka’s victims are overpowered by a superior force, either unknown or 
arbitrary in its judgments, or both.11 They are neither sinners nor saints, but 
despite their apparent flaws the punishment inflicted on them seems unjust: 
excessive and out of proportion with their misdemeanours. Moreover, Kafka’s 
customary economy of biographical detail about his characters contributes to 
the rise of enigmatic ‘everyman’ figures – part innocent, part guilty – with 
interest deflected away from the little that is known about the victim, towards 
what is unknown. 
As a result, much of what is puzzling and unsettling about the 
Kafkaesque concerns its ‘gaps’: what is not recounted is as much a feature of 
the Kafkaesque as what is. The reader’s attention lies not only with how the 
textual heroes suffer and how they react to their torments, but also with 
related issues that are not explicitly elaborated on, such as where exactly this 
suffering comes from (its origin), why it is inflicted (its meaning), and what can 
be done about it (its eradication). Hence, we read about the consequences of 
Josef K.’s arrest and his futile attempts to resist, but not of the cause of the 
arrest; we watch Gregor Samsa’s struggle to come to terms with his new insect 
form, but wonder why it happened in the first place; we witness K.’s battles 
with villagers and minor Castle officials, but we are ignorant of the greater 
power behind the scenes. 
9 ‘In Kafka, long before the sentence is executed […] something terrible has been done to the 
accused.’ Lionel Trilling, The Opposing Self (London: Secker and Warburg, 1955), p. 38. 
10 ‘Einen solchen Proceß haben, heisst ihn schon verloren haben.’ Franz Kafka, Der Proceß, ed. 
Malcolm Pasley (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1990), p. 126. 
11 Jane Bennett describes the Kafkaesque as ‘being subject to a will not one’s own whose 
source is unknowable or indeterminate’ in ‘Deceptive Comfort: The Power of Kafka’s Stories’, 
Political Theory, Vol 19, No. 1 (Feb 1991), p. 75. 
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 The lack of a ‘smoking gun’ to convict Kafka’s sufferers of wrongdoing, 
however much they might contribute to their own downfall, helps to shift 
suspicion on to the hidden ‘authorities’: Josef K. searches in vain for the cause 
of his arrest; K. finds no rationale for his exclusion from the Castle; Gregor 
Samsa metamorphoses for no clear reason; and Georg Bendemann is 
sentenced for an apparent bagatelle. If our lives are founded on the notion of 
justice, we are dismayed to conclude that Kafka’s texts leave the suspect 
parties at large and unpunished, while his heroes suffer the consequences.12 
The textual ‘blind spots’ which hinder definitive readings have been the 
subject of much speculation. Critics have probed Kafka’s personal 
background, diaries and contemporary history for material which might 
provide some answers. Many feel, for example, that Kafka’s difficult 
relationship with an overbearing father could explain the problems some of his 
characters have with authority: Georg Bendemann and Gregor Samsa, for 
instance, wilt under severe paternal disapproval. Similarly, Kafka’s ‘failure’ to 
settle down to a conventional family life with all its obligations (at the expense 
of his writing) has prompted much comparison with his more nightmarish 
creations, to the extent that K.’s trial with the Court mirrors Kafka’s 
tribulations with Felice Bauer.13 
As well as drawing on Kafka’s life, critics have drawn from their own 
political, religious and philosophical convictions in an attempt to locate the 
key to these narrative enigmas. This has given rise to a kaleidoscopic mix of 
readings of Kafka, ranging from the Freudian and the Marxist, the Christian 
and the Jewish, to the existentialist and the deconstructionist: 
12 Bluma Goldstein refers to Kafka’s ‘tragedies about those who suffer profound isolation and 
detachment’, in ‘Andy Warhol: His Kafka and “Jewish Geniuses”’, Jewish Social Studies, Vol 7, 
No. 1 (Fall 2000), p. 134. 
13 Elias Canetti discusses the ‘tribunal’ sparked by Kafka’s broken engagement in Der andere 
Prozess (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1969). 
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 Marxism wrote Kafka off as catering to a bourgeois society, claiming 
that as a purveyor of weakness Kafka offered nothing to a society or 
state attempting to achieve change through betterment of the masses. 
Freudian criticism […] tended to limit Kafka’s work to interpretations 
of the oedipal struggle between father and son.  
Poststructuralist criticism pointed to the lack of center in Kafka, the 
inability of the reader and critic to find precise meanings.14 
Further to – perhaps owing to – the focus on the gaps in Kafka’s texts, 
these different lines of enquiry often end up at similar conclusions: 
‘Kafkaesque at its most meaningful and exalted denotes a world that has its 
own rules, its own guidelines, its own forms of behavior that cannot be 
amenable to human will.’15 Unsurprisingly, Kafka’s message has come to 
define man’s hopeless earthly existence: unfathomable, futile, dark, 
threatened and doomed.16 
A common thread binding disparate Kafka interpretations in a critical 
consensus is their grounding in Western philosophical or spiritual traditions. 
The Kafkaesque suggests conflict between human will and the world, between 
that which lies within the self and that which lies without.17 It could be argued 
that there are certain principles within much Western thought that make 
Kafka’s texts appear in a more negative light. The self takes the central role, 
whether in a Judaeo-Christian production scripted by a superior being or in a 
deconstructionist piece stripped of stage directions. Jerrold Seigel notes this 
primacy of the person: ‘More than any other world culture, the modern West 
has made the debate about individuality and selfhood a central question – 
14 Karl, p. 758. 
15 Ibid., p. 757. 
16 Alberto Spaini talks of spiritual torture in Kafka, where ‘every attempt toward liberation 
ended fatally in a tragic catastrophe’, from ‘The Trial’ in Angel Flores, ed., The Kafka Problem 
(New York: Gordian Press, 1975), p. 148. 
17 Kafka’s writing helped to ‘define the reciprocally damaging relationship between society and 
the individual will’. Ronald Speirs and Beatrice Sandberg, Franz Kafka (London: Macmillan, 
1997), p. 137. 
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 perhaps the central question – of its collective attempts at self-definition.’ 18 
Kafka’s fiction of suffering sets self and creator on a collision course and, in an 
ironic twist, the positive assertion of selfhood which drives the search for 
fulfilment could in Kafka’s fictional world turn into a millstone which burdens 
the individual with suffering.  
Charles Taylor defines the self within ‘frameworks’, which set out the 
commitments and attachments we live by. He suggests it is impossible to live 
outside such a framework because ‘living within such strongly qualified 
horizons is constitutive of human agency’, and ‘stepping outside these limits 
would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, 
that is, undamaged human personhood’.19 In Buddhist thinking neither self 
nor creator exists in absolute form, but instead a world of impermanence 
holds sway. Because the integrity of the self is illusory, Buddhists would 
consider the pursuit of self-driven goals as futile and the reliance on self-
determined values as misguided.20 
Taylor also proposes the idea of a ‘buffered self’, which allows the modern 
Western individual the possibility of ‘taking a distance from, disengaging from 
everything outside the mind’.21 In contrast to the ‘porous self’ of centuries 
past, the ‘buffered self’ protects its boundaries, seeing itself ‘as invulnerable, 
as master of the meanings of things for it’.22 To a ‘buffered self’ accustomed to 
high levels of control and security, the challenges posed by the Kafkaesque 
can seem nightmarish, as the hitherto impregnable walls of selfhood show 
cracks which are exploited by hostile agents from Court, Castle and alike. To 
18 Jerrold E Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the 
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 4.  
19 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 27. 
20 It is perhaps the ‘non-personal’ aspect of Buddhist goals which perplexes the Western mind: 
‘Buddhism must ever remain a mystery to the Faustian striving of Western man’, from Thomas 
J. J. Altizer’s ‘Religion and Reality’ in The Journal of Religion, Vol 38, No. 4 (Oct 1958), p. 256. 
21 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 38. 
22 Ibid., p. 38. 
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 the Buddhist reader, however, any attempt to bolster the self is deemed 
misguided and ultimately futile, owing to the irresistible (impersonal) forces of 
change in the universe. Hence, when Josef K. and kindred characters 
staunchly defend (or buffer) their selfhood, it is not a heroic rearguard action 
against invasion, but a hopeless stand on the shore against an advancing tide: 
the individual must either prepare to get wet (and face the consequences, such 
as Josef K.’s execution) or retreat (and find another path, as does K. by 
relinquishing his quest). 
If the troubles of Kafka’s heroes are taken as representative of the 
inevitable defeat facing flawed humans in a hostile environment, then a 
pessimistic conclusion must be drawn from his writing. But if Kafka’s work is 
perceived as being in tune with the Buddhist treatment of suffering, his art 
could be recalibrated from ‘debilitating self-laceration’23 to a more constructive 
analysis of how the common individual habitually punishes himself. 
Buddhism’s focus on suffering derives from the compassionate wish to 
convey a realistic and objective assessment of the causes of suffering, such as 
ignorance and ego-fuelled desire, in order to propose a way to end it, through 
insight and awareness.24 Similarly, it can be argued that Kafka’s texts do not 
portray suffering to bemoan the misery of life, but they expose attachments 
and cravings to awaken the deluded self from its ignorance.  
1.1.2 Dissident voices: resisting suffering 
I would like to advance an unorthodox argument in the Kafka-debate, namely 
that there is a positive element of existential promise in Kafka’s works which, 
23 Richard T. Gray, Constructive Destruction. Kafka’s Aphorisms: Literary Tradition and Literary 
Transformation (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1987), p. 199. 
24 ‘[Critics] base their views on The First Noble Truth that all conditioned things are in a state 
of suffering. They do not see that not only had the Buddha taught the cause of Suffering, but He 
also taught the way to end Suffering.’ K. Sri Dhammanada, p. 181. 
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 because Kafka has so often been negatively and pessimistically interpreted, has 
been overlooked and obscured.25 
Some critics have already challenged the pessimistic connotations that come 
with the Kafkaesque, and their more encouraging views open the way to a 
more positive reception. No longer at the forefront of a lost generation of 
writers ‘incapable of any reasoned judgment’,26 Kafka receives a kinder verdict 
from readers who sense in his art the hand of ‘an existential saint’27 or ‘an 
intuitive Zen master’.28 The following commentators, for example, spy glimpses 
of hope and insight in Kafka’s portrayals of suffering, and it is telling that their 
constructive interpretations are often at odds with Judaeo-Christian 
traditions.  
To begin with, Hinrich Siefken argues that it is not necessary to interpret 
Kafka’s works negatively, and it is through ‘das Befremden des Lesers’ that 
‘eine andere “Entwicklung” der Handlung wünschenswert denkbar wird’.29 The 
suffering recounted sits in the mindsets of the main characters (and readers), 
and figures such as Josef K. and K. are blind to other possibilities owing to 
‘ihre Űberzeugung von der Sinnträchtigkeit ihrer Schritte, die das 
verhindert’.30 By loading the burden of suffering on to the protagonists 
themselves, and not on their situations or nemeses, Siefken approaches the 
Buddhist view that Kafka’s deluded heroes fall victim to their own 
attachments, though an element of the self-fuelled quest for a ‘better’ (i.e. 
more meaningful) outcome remains. 
25 Christian Goodden, ‘The Prospect of a Positive Existential Alternative’, in Angel Flores, ed., 
The Kafka Debate: New Perspectives For Our Time (New York: Gordian Press, 1977), p. 100. 
26 Edwin Berry Burgum, ‘The Bankruptcy of Faith’ in Angel Flores, ed., The Kafka Problem (New 
York: Gordian Press, 1975), p. 299. 
27 Van Meter Ames, ‘America, Existentialism, and Zen’ in Philosophy East and West, Vol 1,  
No. 1 (Apr 1951), p. 43. 
28 Dennis McCort, Going Beyond the Pairs: The Coincidence of Opposites in German 
Romanticism, Zen and Deconstruction (New York: SUNY, 2001), p. 15. 
29 Hinrich Siefken, Kafka: Ungeduld und Lässigkeit (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1977), p. 110. 
30 Ibid., p. 110. 
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 In similar vein, Christian Goodden’s appeal for a more positive way of 
reading Kafka stems from his observation that the main protagonist often 
makes poor decisions which lead to poor consequences. In other words, the 
individual is not destined to fail, and the suffering is not inevitable: it is of his 
own making. Goodden suggests we should focus on what the characters do 
incorrectly, rather than speculate on the supposedly cruel, arbitrary, 
mysterious authorities which confound them. Once more, this position has 
Buddhist elements, in that the prospect of a release from suffering is available 
to every person, through individual insight and action. Like Siefken, however, 
Goodden remains on Judaeo-Christian ground when he maintains that 
making the right choices would have led to successful outcomes. In contrast, 
the serial failings of Kafka’s characters would suggest to a Buddhist that their 
downfall does not stem from what they do, but from how they do it, with what 
‘mind’ or outlook. 
The views of Siefken and Goodden reflect some divergence from the 
Kafkaesque quicksands of meaningless suffering, because they contend that 
Kafka’s characters had better options, but this does not address the question 
why they suffer in the first place, or offer any guarantee of salvation. Dennis 
McCort takes a different approach by aligning Kafka with Zen, German 
Romanticism and deconstruction in a quest for the coincidentia oppositorum. 
This search is primarily religious in nature, and comes from man’s 
‘ineradicable yearning for ultimate reconciliation’,31 or the desire to escape the 
delusions and imperfections of the petty self, in exchange for access to the 
universal Self, or the ‘primordial interconnectedness of things’.32 
Despite the influence figures such as Meister Eckhart and Fechner had 
on Kafka, McCort suggests that these forerunners merely confirmed what 
31 McCort, p. 3.  
32 Ibid., p. 29.  
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 Kafka was already in the process of discovering for himself. His writing 
developed a ‘distinctly Zen flavor’, taking on characteristics reminiscent of the 
techniques used to aid meditation practice and awaken ‘a deeper level of the 
mind beyond the discursive intellect’.33 In other words, McCort senses in 
Kafka intuitive perceptions which are akin to Buddhist insights, and hence 
Kafka becomes a kind of ‘honorary’ Buddhist: ‘The renowned eighteenth-
century Zen master Hakuin once remarked that we must come to regard all of 
existence as one great koan. This, it seems to me, is what Franz Kafka did.’34 
It could be maintained, however, that McCort misrepresents Kafka’s 
attunement to Buddhist views when he involves Zen in the search for the 
coincidentia. The Romantic sensibility may have rejected the self as a ‘discrete 
conscious being or entity’, but McCort goes on to explain the Romantics’ desire 
for the ‘self as a relationship’, for Verbindung with the cosmos at large: God is 
everything, the being or the state in which all opposites merge into a blissful 
whole. Buddhism equally looks towards a realm beyond duality (nirvana), but 
it is a kind of non-place beyond self, bliss and pain. This represents a marked 
contrast in perception, for where the impassioned mystic longs to expand the 
self to infinity in order to be at one with the All (and still be around to marvel 
at the wonder of it), the enlightened Buddhist path diminishes the self to 
nothing, to the point where the division between individual and the All 
disappears.  
McCort sees in Kafka examples of a longing for existence beyond the 
separateness of the self, but according to Buddhist thinking any ‘longing’ is a 
reflection of the strong desires of the ego, and thus the distinctness of the self 
is simply reinforced. It could be argued that Kafka’s writing offers scepticism 
about such ‘yearnings’. Many of his characters display pronounced traits of 
33 McCort., p. 76.  
34 Ibid., p. 76. 
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 craving, attachment and tenacity, and all these features can be considered 
manifestations of an ego or a self beyond control. The failed quest that many 
critics have noted in Kafka’s work becomes then an indication of a character’s 
internal delusion. 
Like McCort, Patrick Bridgwater turns to non-Judaeo-Christian 
influences, discussing Kafka’s interest in Eastern philosophy by tracing a line 
back to Hinduism through Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.35 Hinduism shares 
some characteristics with Buddhism, but it is suggested that Kafka found it 
somewhat unsatisfying. Bridgwater refers to Kafka’s declaration (reportedly 
made to Janouch) that he was both repelled and attracted by the ‘indischen 
Religionsdokumente’, attributing to them ‘ein abgrundtiefer Pessimismus’ and 
‘einen unausgesprochenen, eisigen Haß des Lebens’.36 Bridgwater concludes 
that Kafka ultimately saw Eastern religions in a negative light because he had 
been exposed chiefly to Hinduism, and speculates that a closer familiarity with 
Buddhism instead might have resulted in a more positive assessment.37  
Although he does not elaborate on how Buddhism might have offered 
relevant insights into Kafka, Bridgwater does stress how important the 
prospect of hope was for Kafka: ‘[H]ad [Kafka] known more about Buddhism, 
especially Tibetan Buddhism, he would probably have been more deeply 
attracted to it, although this is mere speculation.’38 This dissertation argues 
that Buddhist ideas could lay the basis for a more hopeful reading of Kafka, as 
they offer the means to understand suffering and deal with it. 
Similarly opposed to ‘negative’ Kafka interpretations, Deleuze and 
Guattari posit a ‘joyous’ reading of his work, characterised by ‘the total 
35 Patrick Bridgwater, Kafka and Nietzsche (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974). 
36 Gustav Janouch, Gespräche mit Kafka (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1951), p. 49. 
37 Bridgwater, Kafka and Nietzsche, pp. 45-46. 
38 Ibid., p. 46. 
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 absence of negation’.39 They do this by underscoring ‘the importance and force 
of desire in Kafka’.40 Deleuze and Guattari celebrate in Kafka a life-affirming 
‘experimentation that is without interpretation or significance’.41 His writing 
side-steps the problem of ‘being free’ and instead offers accounts of ‘finding a 
way out, or even a way in’.42 Hence, potential ‘nightmarish’ scenarios 
presented by ‘the transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt, the 
subjectivity of enunciation’43 are dismantled as Kafka’s writing shows how it is 
possible to ‘effectively take a line of escape’.44  
Despite this championing of flight and movement in Kafka’s work, 
Deleuze and Guattari occupy a ‘self-centric’ position which to Buddhist eyes 
would still be exposed to suffering. The prominence of desire, channelled 
through the individual, is unlikely to lead to enlightenment, in the Buddhist 
sense, as it elects to indulge personality, rather than transcend it, in order to 
find escape/salvation. 
Christian Eschweiler rejects ‘das Bild undurchdringlicher Dunkelheit 
und völliger Verwirrung’ in Kafka’s writing,45 presenting a reworked version of 
Der Prozeß as an ‘einzigartiges und wegweisendes Kunstwerk’.46 Dismissing 
previous studies which maintain that ‘bei Kafka sei “der Sinn eigentlich der 
Sinnlosigkeit”,47 Eschweiler sees evidence of a clear message of hope: ‘Kafka 
39 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. xiii. 
40 Ibid., p. xx. 
41 Ibid., p. 7. 
42 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
43 Ibid., p. 45. 
44 Ibid., p. 59. 
45 Christian Eschweiler, Franz Kafka und sein Roman-Fragment: Der Prozess (Weilerswist: 
Verlag Landpresse, 2009), p. 11. Eschweiler’s views are explored in greater detail in chapter 
three. 
46 Ibid., p. 8. 
47 Christian Eschweiler, Kafkas Dichtung als Kosmos (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993), p. 77. 
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 ist der hellsichtige Wegweiser im Dunkel verirrter und verzweifelter Fragen, er 
ist der verantwortungsvolle Dichter und behutsame Künder der Hoffnung.’48   
Eschweiler’s texts abound with terms such as ‘Ziel’, ‘Richtung’, ‘Erlösung’ 
and ‘Hoffnung’ which conjure up positive images far removed from the bleak 
worlds usually associated with the Kafkaesque. His repeated use of ‘Sinn’, 
‘Bedeutung’, ‘Personlichkeit’ and ‘Geist’ suggests that the source of this 
‘Hoffnungsschimmer’ is located in a particular sense of self: ‘[Der Mensch] 
muβ sich deshalb als Persönlichkeit im Sinn seiner Bestimmung und 
Auszeichnung in allen Entscheidungen und im Unterschied zu allen anderen 
irdischen Lebewesen rechtfertigen und bewähren.’49 Each person has the 
responsibility ‘sein Leben mit Sinn zu erfüllen und dementsprechend bewuβt 
zu gestalten’.50 Without sanctioning suicide or murder, this existential view 
urges the individual to take control by heeding ‘dem Ruf des Geistes’51 and 
finding ‘in dem notwendigen Tod seine sinnvolle Erfüllung’.52  The Buddhist 
understanding of ‘Erlösung’, however, involves non-attachment to self and 
thus ‘self-driven’ pursuits after ‘den Sinn des Lebens’ are more likely to lead to 
further suffering than a release from it.53 
These alternative readings try to steer a positive course through Kafka’s 
work, but from a Buddhist viewpoint the self still acts as navigator. For a more 
radical transformation of the Kafkaesque, this thesis proposes that a reading 
influenced by the Buddhist preference for reflective self-detachment rather 
than active self-fulfilment opens up an alternative route to a more ‘positive’ 
evaluation of his work.  
48 Eschweiler, Kosmos, p. 18. 
49 Ibid., p. 14. 
50 Eschweiler, Roman-Fragment, p. 12. 
51 Christian Eschweiler, Der verborgene Hintergrund in Kafkas ‘Der Prozeß’ (Bonn: Bouvier, 
1990), p. 69. 
52 Eschweiler, Kosmos, pp. 12-13. 
53 Ibid., p. 11. 
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 1.1.3 Transformation: sleepwalking into suffering 
The Buddha called the untrained mind ‘being asleep while awake’. This means 
not understanding what we experience.54 
Although the preceding dissident voices do challenge ‘negative’ interpretations 
of Kafka’s work, this recalibration tends to be achieved by showing that the 
‘darker’ elements in Kafka’s work could be seen as ‘lighter’, thereby avoiding 
the need to rein in the supremacy of the self. In this way, suffering is not 
eradicated but ‘spun’ into something more palatable: death is not the ‘end’ or 
‘punishment’, but in fact ‘die erstrebte Erfüllung’.55  
From a Buddhist viewpoint, rendering Kafka’s work more ‘joyous’ in this 
way merely applies a gloss to the harsh realities of life, like wearing tinted 
lenses to ‘see’ objects in a more favourable light. This is a circuitous route to a 
‘positive’ reading because each instance of discontentment has to be mined for 
evidence of ‘Sinn’, in order to ‘displace’ suffering and leave a more aesthetically 
pleasing landscape. Buddhism takes a more direct path by leaving suffering as 
it is and acting on the perception of it: by working on attachment to self 
pressure is brought to bear internally on the root cause of suffering 
(ignorance) rather than focusing efforts externally on the effects.  
The Buddha stated that suffering is largely caused by our ignorance, 
rather than our misfortunes or misdemeanours, hence the notion of ‘being 
asleep while awake’. Taking a similar approach would help transform 
perceptions of Kafka’s work. By associating the suffering experienced by 
Kafka’s characters with their degree of attachment to self, a picture emerges 
that suggests Kafka had a view of enlightenment consistent with Buddhist 
thinking. 
54 Ayya Khema, Who is my Self? (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1997), p. 67. 
55 Eschweiler, Kosmos, p. 11. 
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 The sleepwalking metaphor is particularly apposite when reading Kafka 
for several reasons, and it is worth noting coincidentally that Janouch 
attributes to Kafka remarks which support the Buddhist view on how human 
beings slide inadvertently into suffering: ‘Die Menschen werden schlecht und 
schuldig dadurch, daß sie sprechen und handeln, ohne die Wirkung ihrer 
eigenen Worte und Taten sich vorzustellen. Es sind Traumwandler, nicht 
Bösewichte’.56 
First, the ubiquitous suffering in Kafka’s texts need not be interpreted as 
punishment (undeserved or otherwise) for sinful acts (known or unknown), but 
can be understood as the effect of unenlightened behaviour. The image of the 
sleepwalker suggests a person who is not aware of his actions and, from a 
Buddhist viewpoint, not awake. ‘Buddha’ means ‘awakened one’ and Buddhist 
teaching recommends addressing life with one’s eyes open. The Kafkaesque 
begins to shed its sinister overtones once Kafka’s troubled heroes are viewed 
as too wrapped up in their sense of self to notice that they are sleepwalking 
into discontent.  
Second, it is not necessary to reject as anomalies those instances where 
suffering is absent from Kafka’s texts, or where his characters deal skillfully 
with life’s challenges and disappointments; those accounts of equanimity fit 
seamlessly into the broad theme of (non-)awakening from clinging, by 
presenting the advantages of engaged detachment. 
Third, the image of the sleepwalker works well with the economy of 
background information provided for Kafka’s key figures because it sidesteps 
all the usual details that add ‘colour’ to a person’s life – the only thing that is 
important is the moment itself during which actions are undertaken. In a 
56 Janouch, p. 56. These comments could be taken from a Buddhist textbook explaining how 
karma, a natural energy generated by volition, shapes lives. Such a view neutralises the power 
of external forces and makes individuals responsible for their own suffering. A more detailed 
account of karma follows in chapter two. 
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 Judaeo-Christian reading, for example, the missing information about Josef 
K.’s past life is a distraction: it begs the question whether he is deserving of 
punishment, or whether the Court is a malevolent force. For the Buddhist 
reader, the minutiae of Josef K.’s life history are irrelevant and would serve as 
unnecessary diversions if they were included in the novel: it is sufficient to 
observe Josef K.’s immediate actions to evaluate his motivations.  
It is interesting to see how a Buddhist philosophy built on suffering and 
impermanence can offer a more positive reading of Kafka’s work than Judaeo-
Christian philosophies based on the ideals of justice and freedom. While 
emptiness is the definitive, ‘primary’ concept of the Buddhist universe, there is 
still room for notions such as selfhood, justice and freedom, but they are 
clearly designated as of secondary significance, and conditioned, not absolute: 
it is perfectly acceptable to steer one’s life in accordance with values based on 
justice and freedom, but it must be remembered that they are empty of real 
substance, and hence an unshakeable faith in them – or pursuit of them – will 
be tested and lead to suffering. 
The most difficult aspect of Buddhist philosophy is not its concepts, 
which follow a clear logic, but its application, because enlightenment depends 
on emerging from the fog of attachments which crystallise into an apparently 
permanent sense of self. For this reason, Kafka’s work has a distinctly 
Buddhist outlook, because it explores the human tendency to wander blindly 
into suffering: ‘[Buddhism is] concerned with how to step out of our usual 
sleepwalking and deal really with actual situations.’57 
57 Chögyam Trungpa, Glimpses of Abhidharma, (Boston: Shambhala, 2001), p. 3.  
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 1.2 A Buddhist approach 
Der wahre Weg geht über ein Seil, das nicht in der Höhe gespannt ist, sondern 
knapp über dem Boden. Es scheint mehr bestimmt stolpern zu machen, als 
begangen zu werden.58 
The key to creating a shift in perspective on Kafka lies in the way suffering is 
viewed and treated: as something alien to the self, a malignant foreign body 
dashing hopes and aims, which needs to be cut away like a tumour; or as an 
integral part of the self, reflecting those elements of character which build up 
deposits from desires and ideals, unable to let go. Buddhism adopts the latter 
view because it sees personal attachments and delusions as the portals 
through which suffering enters.59 
Taking a similar approach to Kafka helps lift the gloom from his work 
because the tortured souls in his writing are no longer victims of supernatural 
forces, but they reflect the unavoidable truth of how human beings contrive to 
trip themselves up with misguided values. Rather than look for hidden clues 
between the lines and outside the text to solve the mystery of suffering, the 
reader can find in the lines themselves evidence of the source of each 
character’s troubles, and his potential release from them. In this way, Kafka’s 
texts become less enigmatic and mystifying, because the problem and the 
solution can both be traced back to the same place: the individual’s deluded 
outlook on his world. As Zen master Seung Sahn indicated in his reference to 
Descartes, the problem is not that human beings think: it is that they get 
attached to their thinking.  
58 Aphorism 1 from Kafka’s Zürau aphorisms, in Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente (Vol. 
2), ed. Jost Schillemeit (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1992), p. 113. Chapter four focuses on the 
aphorisms in more detail.  
59 ‘Instead of trying to rationalize suffering, Buddhism takes suffering for granted and seeks the 
cause to eradicate it.’ Mahathera Narada, Buddhism in a Nutshell (Kandy: Buddhist Publication 
Society, 1982), p. 11. 
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 The Buddha likened the Dharma (meaning ‘teachings’, ‘truth’ or ‘natural 
law’) to a raft which helps us to cross a river: once safely on the other shore we 
no longer need to carry it on our backs.60 Thoughts such as these tell 
Buddhists that even the ‘Truth’ will become a burden if we grow attached to it. 
A similar sentiment emerges from Kafka’s first aphorism from Zürau (quoted 
above), in which the ‘true way’ appears as a tightrope and a tripwire, rather 
than a shining light. The Buddha’s raft and Kafka’s tightrope are useful tools 
which can help a person cross from ignorance to enlightenment, but they 
become worthless once the passage into the light has been completed: the raft-
out-of-the-water and the tightrope-turned-tripwire have outlived their original 
purpose, and now serve as a reminder of how uncomfortable and unbalanced 
life can be if we drag all our ideals and principles around with us. This is not 
to say that we should jettison our hopes, values and standards, but simply 
that we refrain from attaching to them.  
The raft conjures up a skillful image of interwoven salvation and 
suffering which encapsulates the Buddhist way of assessing the world around 
us. Kafka’s first aphorism can be viewed similarly, where the narrow tightrope 
signifies the lofty challenge of treading a steady, rational path, and the tripwire 
brings us back down to earth. In similar vein, this dissertation will read 
Kafka’s work using two methods: the first will approach the content of the 
texts by means of reason and explanation, looking for striking areas of 
consistency with Buddhist ideas; the second will set aside reason and 
explanation to consider how form in Kafka’s use of paradox and opaqueness 
evokes Zen techniques of illumination by striking at dependencies.  
60 ‘O Monks, I have taught a doctrine similar to a raft - it is for crossing over, and not for 
carrying. You who understand that the teaching is similar to a raft, should give up attachment 
to even the good Dharma; how much more then should you give up evil things.’ Edward Conze, 
ed., Buddhist Texts Through the Ages (Oxford: Cassirer, 1954), pp. 87-88. 
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 1.2.1 Content 
In the language of the Buddha, the word for fuel and for clinging is the same: 
upadana. The Buddha understood that suffering arises from and is fueled by 
clinging. When the fuel is removed, suffering is extinguished.61 
For the first approach to reading Kafka, it is necessary to establish the core 
philosophical tenets of the Dharma, or ‘Truth’. Buddhism covers different 
schools, such as Theravada, Mahayana and Zen, but the underlying ideas 
underpin them all through traditional teachings such as The Three Universal 
Characteristics, The Four Noble Truths, The Law of Dependent Origination 
and The Law of Karma.62 The doctrines, which will be considered in more 
detail in chapter two, derive from natural observation, rather than revelation: 
the aim is not to save a soul, but to point the way to an understanding of how 
the world works and how human lives unfold within it. There is no God, first 
cause or supreme power, and Buddhism does not pretend to have the answers 
to how or why the universe was created. It concentrates on the here-and-now 
and our relationship to it. The world comes first, and human beings are 
subject to the same physical laws that apply to every other constituent part of 
the universe – being a ‘person’ with the ability to think or reason does not 
come with the power to bend the rules. Buddhist teaching states squarely that 
the individual causes his own suffering through ignorance and attachment, 
but the same individual can tread a path towards release (salvation) by 
cultivating an enlightened detachment from cravings and desires. The key lies 
in clearsightedness, in ‘waking up’ to reality and breaking free from needs and 
wants. 
61 Gil Fronsdal in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/fuel-fires-suffering.  
62 In this dissertation, Buddhist terms from Pali (such as ‘kamma’, ‘dhamma’, and ‘nibbana’) 
are used alongside their Sanskrit equivalents (i.e. ‘karma’, ‘dharma’, and ‘nirvana’ respectively) 
to reflect variations in source material. 
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 In Theravada, which translates as ‘the way of the elders’, the focus is on 
alleviating suffering for the individual by leading him to awareness about the 
reality of existence. If Theravada is sometimes characterised as ‘dry’ in its 
teaching, Mahayana is more emotional and engaging: it follows the principles 
of Theravada practice, but places greater emphasis on compassion. This 
concern for the wellbeing of fellow human beings is exemplified in the figure of 
the ‘Bodhisattva’, representing the individual who has gained enlightenment 
and freed himself from the cycle of rebirth, but who has chosen not to enter 
nirvana in order to help those still suffering.63 It extends the teachings on 
suffering and not-self into the notion of emptiness (sunyata), which 
encompasses everything and nothing: all life is one.  
Zen is a rarefied form of Buddhism which takes on board all the main 
teachings of the Theravada and Mahayana – and rejects them all at the same 
time.64 Rather than teach or explain, it seeks to induce understanding through 
demonstration. The Zen master does not trust language or logic, using non-
sense and paradox to help practitioners detach themselves from delusions and 
propel them beyond dependencies. If the Mahayana puts a compassionate, 
human face on the cold-eyed facts of Theravada reasoning, Zen twists it into a 
gargoyle’s grimace.65 It eschews logic and doctrine to transmit the Dharma, 
based on the assumption that the possibility of explaining emptiness directly 
is slim. For Zen, the inherent nature of language, words and text is emptiness, 
as with everything else, and this message is hard to convey with conventional 
tools and practices: instead of trying to define the properties of water, a Zen 
master is more likely to throw his students into the lake. Zen prefers to 
63 The term is derived from bodhi (wisdom, supreme intelligence) and sattva (a state of being). A 
detailed definition is available in Christmas Humphreys’ work, Buddhism (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1981), p. 158. 
64 Humphreys calls Zen ‘the apotheosis of Buddhism’, Buddhism, p. 179. 
65 Zen’s confrontational style recalls the ‘Fratzengesicht’ dazzled by the truth in Kafka’s 
aphorism 63 (Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente (Vol. 2), p. 127). 
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 confound rather than expound, and this feature attracts comparisons with 
Kafka owing to his strategic deployment of ambiguities and paradoxes. 
The converse of finding echoes of Buddhist thinking in Kafka’s work is 
pointing up contrasts with Western (in particular Judaeo-Christian) principles, 
and the idea of selfhood casts these differences in the clearest relief. Where 
Buddhism treats ultimate and conventional reality as co-dimensional, Western 
thought works in terms of a single, limited here-and-now and an eternal 
afterlife placed in a linear continuum. This has implications for the degree of 
influence assumed by the self. Where existence progresses in linear fashion, 
the sense of self carries greater weight and momentum because the offsetting 
extra-conventional realm is only accessible post-here-and-now. 
The Judaeo-Christian traditions uphold the notion of a unique soul for 
every living being, created by God, with the potential either to return to God or 
suffer estrangement from Him. During their life on earth, human beings act as 
‘carriers’ for this divine essence, and they are judged on how well they take 
care of it. These terrestrial soul bearers become attached to these precious 
selves ‘on hire’ and assert ownership in the face of all threats and attacks. 
Earthly life unfolds based on a divine code which prepares for post-life 
eternity. The self is thus a key entity because access to the heavenly 
dimension depends on close compliance with the code, and it is the self which 
is measured to determine how well that has been achieved.  
Non-religious philosophies in the Western tradition also assume the 
existence of a self in essence, and defend it just as closely as their theistic 
cousins in the absence of an external principle of meaningfulness (God). It 
falls to each individual to look after himself, and failing to do so brings the 
criticism of ‘bad faith’, of living life according to false beliefs, because without 
God the only truth is that which we can affirm ourselves. The ‘mauvaise foi’ 
described by Sartre cannot, however, be equated with an understanding of the 
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 emptiness of ultimate reality. Removing a framework of belief creates a gap, 
but where Buddhism is content to leave it empty, Western thinking tends to 
abhor the vacuum and strives to fill it.66 
This is what Seigel means when he suggests that as much as the idea of 
selfhood is resisted, ‘radical’ modern Western figures, such as Foucault, 
Barthes and Derrida, or Nietzsche and Heidegger, inevitably re-introduced it 
by other means: ‘[They did so] on behalf of a vision of transcendent freedom 
that overwhelms the more modest visions of personal integration and 
regulated autonomy projected by the ideas and practices they sought to 
supersede.’ 67 While Buddhism aims at a ‘transparency’ of selfhood or a 
reduction in its influence, Western thought conceives of grander schemes: 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch, Heidegger’s authentic Dasein […] Derrida’s 
invocation of a condition beyond finitude where the promise of a 
wholly other existence is permanently maintained – all exemplify such 
aspirations. In other words, human beings must be all in order to 
escape being nothing.68 
The terms ‘transcendent freedom’ and ‘emptiness’ summarise 
respectively the contrast in its starkest form between the Judaeo-Christian 
(Western) self and its Buddhist counterpart, and this difference points the way 
towards a skillful interpretation of the Kafkaesque. The frustrated quests can 
be seen negatively as failed expansions of transcendent selfhood, or 
alternatively as misguided attempts to capture the mirage of the self. A similar 
difference in interpretation marks the second approach to reading Kafka, 
which evaluates the effects of consistently ambiguous and misleading 
narrative techniques. 
66 Joseph W. Cohen places ‘the agony of a Kafka’ in the Western tradition of secular idealism 
and subjectivism, alongside Descartes’ cogito and romanticism, Schopenhauer and 
existentialism. ‘The Role of Philosophy in Culture’ in Philosophy East and West, Vol 5, No. 2 (Jul 
1955), p. 108. 
67 Seigel, pp. 4-5. 
68 Ibid., p. 5. 
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 1.2.2 Delivery 
Actually we cannot attain enlightenment until we give up the notion of ‘me’ 
personally attaining it.69 
The second approach to Kafka moves from philosophical content to literary 
form and considers how the texts are presented, in terms of the impact that 
particular methods of expressions can have on the reader. The frequent use of 
paradox and contradiction means that an unsettling atmosphere of 
unreliability pervades Kafka’s writing, which would be assessed differently by 
readers from Western and Buddhist standpoints.  
In short, for the Judaeo-Christian reader for example, literature maps 
and defines, helping to broaden the mind and discover the self, thereby 
reinforcing the notion of individuality. Given such an outlook, Kafka’s 
disconcerting aporia prevent the reader and protagonist from making firm and 
meaningful connections with the world, and hence the texts take on a negative 
aspect. In contrast, for the Buddhist reader, literature just pours more words 
(beautiful or otherwise) into a bottomless universe, perpetuating the myth of 
the integrity of selfhood. In this case, the gaps and convolutions in Kafka’s 
work become the ‘tripwires’ which remind the individual how attachments in a 
world of essentially empty phenomena will lead to suffering, hence rendering 
possible a constructive interpretation. 
One influential approach to the act of reading which is underpinned by 
Judaeo-Christian thinking has been provided by Wolfgang Iser. In The Implied 
Reader Iser suggests how far a reader’s input shapes the ‘meaning’ of a text.70 
Each reading produces a different interpretation because the text resonates in 
different ways with the different experiences, moods, feelings and hopes of 
69 Chögyam Trungpa, The Myth of Freedom and the Way of Meditation (Boston: Shambhala, 
2002), p. 104. 
70 ‘The reader […] causes the text to reveal its potential multiplicity of connections.’ Wolfgang 
Iser, The Implied Reader (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 278. 
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 each reader. It is as if the reader is invited to shape a message into a coherent 
whole by assembling a jumble of jigsaw pieces from the text and his reactions 
to it: this reading will have a meaning, but it will differ from the jigsaw 
compiled by another reader, who adds his own pieces to the mix. Also, the 
same reader produces a different reading of the same text on another 
occasion, because the reader is in effect not the same person as before. 
On one level this echoes Buddhist thinking, as it rules out retrieving a 
fixed, absolute or ‘true’ meaning from a text. There is not a trail of clues which 
the reader has to follow to find the ‘correct’ interpretation. The notion of such 
variations in readings agrees with the Buddhist idea of impermanence, but it 
stumbles over the obstacle of not-self. This idea of the act of reading, despite 
the inherent ‘play’ and infinite possibilities, still constitutes a technique 
designed to extract a ‘meaning’ from the text, which is unique and not 
repeatable. It is as if the text holds access to a treasure chest of meaning, but 
each reading produces a different combination, each of which in turn can open 
the lock, but to a different meaning each time. Iser’s ideas about reading wrest 
‘control’ of meaning away from the author and the text and give it to the 
reader. This suits the Judaeo-Christian support for the primacy of the self, as 
the power to interpret resides within the individual reader. 
This leads to the question whether it is possible to read a text from a 
Buddhist viewpoint, and how this would be achieved. In his work Reading 
Emptiness, Jeff Humphries claims that a Buddhist theory of literature is not 
possible, because that would be tantamount to making ‘a philosophical view 
out of emptiness’.71 Humphries explains how – historically and until the 
present day – Buddhist schools have tended to over-emphasise concerns about 
71 Jeff Humphries, Reading Emptiness (New York: SUNY, 1999), p. xi. 
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 the reader wishing to gain something from engagement with literature, whilst 
maintaining that texts could hold no meaning.  
Despite Buddhist scepticism towards literature, however, Humphries 
argues that reading and writing can facilitate insight into the ultimate 
Buddhist goal of knowing emptiness. He maintains that the practice of 
literature could provide the most efficient method available in the West for 
realising enlightenment, by revealing the illusions inherent in all human 
activity undertaken in the name of the self, in the ‘provisional’ world of 
appearances: ‘The greatest potential in human being is its plasticity. […] 
Literature and Buddhism have in common that both recognize and embrace 
this plasticity.’72 Humphries shows how experiencing ‘emptiness’ through 
reading can be salutary rather than depressing, as literature opens up a 
window on the general and impersonal truth of reality, rather than capturing 
specific, localised events.  
One technique applied in the teaching of Buddhism could serve as a way 
of reading. ‘Skillful means’ (or upaya kusala) is a term to denote the idea that 
‘the Buddha skillfully adapted his teaching to the level of his audience’.73 One 
oft-cited example is the parable of the burning house, where a man rescues 
his children from a fire by telling them of wonderful toys waiting for them 
outside the house. The story shows that ‘what seems to be lying is not lying’ 
because it is done ‘for the sake of beings that are trapped in a dangerous 
situation without knowing that they are in danger’.74   
Mahayana Buddhists took this concept further, employing ‘skillful 
means’ as a ‘radical hermeneutic device’ exhibiting an awareness of ‘a gap 
72 Humphries, pp. xxi-xxii. 
73 Asaf Federman, ‘Literal Means and Hidden Meanings: A New Analysis of Skillful Means’ in 
Philosophy East and West, Vol 59, No. 2 (Apr 2009), p. 125 . 
74 Ibid., p. 132. 
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 between what texts literally say and their hidden meaning’.75 Since nirvana is 
a state empty of defining characteristics and beyond intellectual reasoning, the 
Buddhist master has to resort to unorthodox methods to edge people towards 
enlightenment. The ‘false and unreal devices’ chosen for this purpose are 
‘fictions’ which can later be discarded, once they have proved their 
effectiveness.76 ‘Skillful means’ thus demonstrate how it is possible to ‘become 
enlightened by way of fiction, that is, how to approach truth by way of 
fiction’.77 In this context Zen master Linji can declare ‘no Buddha, no Dharma, 
no Nirvana, and no Enlightenment’, and claim that his teachings do not have 
‘a particle of Dharma to give anyone’.78 His skillful means do not attempt to 
explain the laws of causality or analyse human nature, but ask us to reflect on 
‘how attachment to Buddhism gets in the way of liberation’.79  
Adopting a similar approach, the paradoxes and contradictions in Kafka’s 
work can be read ‘skillfully’ in that they invite the reader to let go of 
attachments, and the trials and tribulations of Kafka’s protagonists can be 
viewed as the inevitable consequences of an ‘unskillful’ dependency on self. 
The enlightened reader should maintain an ever-open mind, careful to stave 
off closure, keeping the moment/text open and not allowing ‘meaning’ to settle 
or reify. The reader searching for ‘facts’, ‘truths’ or ‘views’ will find plenty of 
instances, but they will all turn to dust once they are taken out of the context 
of the text and applied extra-textually.  
As a result, reading as a Buddhist becomes a balancing act demanding 
fluidity and sacrifice. On the one hand, readers have to ‘make sense’ of the 
text inasmuch as they have to interpret the language used, make connections 
75 Ibid., p. 125. 
76 Lene Bech, ‘Fiction That Leads to Truth: “The Story of the Stone” as Skillful Means’ in 
Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews (CLEAR), Vol 26 (Jan 2004), p. 3. 
77 Ibid., p. 3. 
78 John Schroeder, ‘Nagarjuna and the Doctrine of “Skillful Means”’ in Philosophy East and 
West, Vol 50, No. 4 (Oct 2000), p. 576. 
79 Ibid., p. 575. 
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 between thoughts, follow logic and arguments, and ‘decode’ a message in order 
to arrive at a given significance. This, as has been pointed out by many critics, 
not least from deconstructionist circles, is a notoriously difficult thing to do 
since the ‘keys’ to the codes are not centrally agreed or binding.  
On the other hand, Buddhist readers must also remain mindful of the 
essential emptiness of words and instability of meaning. At best, a 
‘provisional’, ‘partial’ meaning can be derived from a text, and this explains 
why the shifting views and stances that are put forward in Kafka’s work are 
amenable to a ‘skillful’ Buddhist reading, but result in negative interpretations 
when viewed from a ‘self-centric’ position. In a formulation which suggests a 
degree of affinity between some post-structuralism positions and a Buddhist 
one, Hélène Cixous talks of the Kafkaesque impasse of ‘I do not know myself, I 
do not know you and you do not know me’, but this is not a tragic 
circumstance. Although it is hard to tell a story if ‘in the place of truth, there 
is no law that decides’, that is not the end of the story: ‘Here truth begins’.80   
Chung-Ying Cheng offers two ways to deal with Zen paradoxes 
(ontological reduction and ontological substitution) and these can be applied 
to passages in Kafka’s work that often draw declarations of defeat or victory, 
but could be seen as transcendent, hinting at a realm beyond duality. The first 
case arises with the ‘ontological insight into a reality to which no ontological 
commitment can be made’, and the response is to remain silent.81 In Das 
Schloß then, K.’s blank reaction to Bürgel’s offer can be taken as an 
enlightened rejection of his Castle quest, rather than bafflement or 
indifference. In the other case, understanding can be shown through 
80 Hélène Cixous, Readings: the poetics of Blanchot, Joyce, Kafka, Kleist, Lispector, and 
Tsvetayeva (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 75. 
81 Chung-Ying Cheng, ‘On Zen (Ch’an) Language and Zen Paradoxes’ in Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy, Vol 1 (1973), p. 94. 
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 ‘presentation of a totally different and irrelevant semantic context’.82 In Der 
Proceß, Titorelli’s convoluted presentation of release options can be seen as 
Zen responses to Josef K.’s queries relating to innocence. 
1.2.3 Methodology 
The path of awakening is not about positive emotions. On the contrary, 
enlightenment may not be easy or positive at all.83 
These two routes towards a Buddhist interpretation of Kafka, focusing on 
content and delivery, can be summarised using terms coined by J. L. Austin in 
How to Do Things With Words.84 Austin looks at what the word carries in terms 
of meaning (illocution as explanation or message), but realises that meaning is 
deceptive and the word can actually just be something on which an action is 
based (perlocution as performance, effect). Broadly speaking, an illocutionary 
utterance is performed in saying something (such as giving information, in the 
manner of an aphoristic ‘truth’), whereas a perlocutionary speech act is 
performed by saying something (such as giving reassurance).  
Though Austin uses these terms in a linguistic context, they can be 
applied to discussions on literature and philosophical expression. Henry 
Rosemont Jr uses the notions of illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts 
to arrive at an appreciation of Zen koans and mondos, which are aphoristic in 
appearance, but do not carry a ‘pith’ or kern of meaning. Zen masters use 
koans to manoeuvre the listening novice into a mental cul-de-sac where they 
can no longer think logically because the utterance contains conflicting or 
confusing elements. Rosemont concludes that the koan and mondo are 
perlocutionary in nature, because it is the intent of the Zen master to elicit a 
particular response from his student which has little to do with the content of 
82 Ibid., p. 94. 
83 Adyashanti in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/genuine-path-awakening. 
84 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
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 his words: ‘This intent does not have an ordinary Judaeo-Christian equivalent, 
for the master uses such sentences literally to shock his students out of their 
conceptual schema.’85 
In this dissertation I will adapt the terms used by Austin and Rosemont 
Jr to guide my method of approaching Kafka’s work. In the first place I will 
consider the illocutionary impact of his texts by looking at their content to 
discern the potential ‘meaning’; secondly, I will consider the perlocutionary 
impact of Kafka’s writing by looking at how the form of expression affects the 
reader, in the same way that koans carry a ‘punch’ rather than a ‘message’.  
The correlations between Kafka and Buddhism (Zen in particular) are at 
their strongest when looking at the perlocutionary effects of their utterances. 
The similarities represent more than a veneer of resemblance, and indicate a 
profound kinship of spirit and a significant overlap in philosophical outlook. 
The call to mindfulness is embodied in all Zen koans, and the theme of 
awakening is a consistent feature in Kafka’s work, noticeably from Der Proceß 
onwards, transforming his depiction of human misery from a lament of unjust 
suffering into an indictment of misguided attachment. 
Zen dovetails well with Kafka’s fiction because it challenges the features 
which appear highly problematic when reading from Western-based 
viewpoints. Concepts such as ‘mind’, ‘authority’ and ‘purpose’ are life-defining 
for many Western philosophies, but for Zen they all represent frequent 
stumbling blocks on the path to freedom, as outlined by The Three Universal 
Characteristics of not-self, impermanence and suffering. ‘Mind’, or thinking, is 
invariably a product of the self, its organ of expression; ‘authority’ suggests a 
reliance on order or direction; ‘purpose’ indicates an attachment to a goal, 
such as happiness, power or knowledge. In Kafka’s work, these three ideas are 
85 Rosemont Jr., p. 117. 
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 all called into question, which is bound to render his literature ‘dark’ when 
seen from a non-Buddhist standpoint.  
Zen seeks to induce enlightenment by whatever means possible, violent if 
necessary, but without using the tools of reason and reflection, or any other 
common conventions such as language. This creates many difficulties, as 
language is needed to communicate at a basic level. However, the key to Zen is 
its refusal to attach – it uses and abuses language at the same time by 
twisting logic and reason inside out in order to help its followers see the futility 
of attachments, producing ‘a cul-de-sac in the thinking mind’.86 Hence, Zen 
does not attempt to be intelligible, but targets the gap between an intellectual 
and an intuitive contact with reality: ‘The method of Zen is to baffle, excite, 
puzzle and exhaust the intellect until it is realised that intellection is only 
thinking about’ (author’s italics).87 
It is in this unforgiving maelstrom of unclear meanings and dashed 
hopes that Zen and Kafka meet, united in the same cause – opening a path to 
understanding that suffering is caused by attachment. It hurts when the 
fiction of absolute selfhood is exposed, and this pain marks the common 
ground between Kafka and Buddhism. Typical Judaeo-Christian viewpoints 
would mourn the passing of the self, but the Buddhist perspective celebrates 
the disappearance of a false division. 
For the above reasons, drawing on the general tenets of Buddhist 
thinking and the specific designs of Zen techniques, it is possible to transform 
perceptions of the Kafkaesque by portraying suffering as the result of 
attachment to self. This revised approach firstly seeks to ‘re-present’ Kafka’s 
texts through their thematic content whenever characterisation and subject 
matter map against Buddhist philosophical concepts; secondly, it seeks to 
86 Christmas Humphreys, Zen Buddhism (London: Diamond Books, 1996), p. 87. 
87 Humphreys quotes Alan Watts in Zen Buddhism, p. 80. 
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 ‘defuse’ the impact of paradox in the same way Zen koans can help readers 
relax their attachments to illusory principles.  
From a Buddhist perspective, these two approaches can complement 
each other. Such an arrangement works in Kafka’s literature, as suggested 
coincidentally by Steven Davis when offering examples of illocutionary acts: 
‘appointing someone to a position, vetoing a motion, and finding someone guilty 
or innocent’ (my italics).88 As Davis explains, when it is not enough simply to 
be understood and we want to bring about certain effects on the thoughts or 
actions of our hearers (such as an awakening), then ‘our purpose in bringing 
these about is the point or purpose of our communicating and the achieving of 
our purpose is the performance of a perlocutionary act’. These comments 
summarise how to read Kafka in a less negative light. The acts of ‘appointing 
someone as land surveyor’ and ‘finding someone guilty’ may fall short as 
illocutionary acts because the ‘information’ does not seem to tally with the 
‘evidence’; as perlocutionary acts, however, their purpose is to induce the 
realisation that attachment to self will result in suffering. 
Before proceeding to a Buddhist interpretation of Kafka’s texts, the next 
chapter sets out in more detail the Buddhist ideas that find resonance in 
Kafka’s work and show the clearest contrast with Western thinking. As 
indicated above, two approaches will be followed; the illocutionary route will 
assume that there is a ‘sense’ to the writing and compare narrative 
descriptions with key Buddhist doctrines for signs of agreement; the 
perlocutionary approach offers a complementary line of investigation, by 
assuming that the passages resistant to a ‘sensible’ reading are purposefully 
obscure, offering an alternative route to awareness of emptiness (sunyata). 
88 Steven Davis, ‘Perlocutions’ in Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1979), p. 233. 
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 Chapter 2 Tightropes and tripwires 
2.1 The text as a tightrope  
Once our minds have constructed the notion of ‘I’, it becomes our central 
reference point. We attach to it and identify with it totally. We attempt to 
advance what appear to be its interests, to defend it against real or apparent 
threats and menaces. And we look for ego-affirmation at every turn: 
confirmation that we exist and are valued.89 
There are probably as many routes into Kafka’s works as there have been 
commentators on them, as each will have pieced together a different ‘jigsaw’ of 
their significance. Much like the man from the country sitting outside his door 
to the law, readers looking to gain access to Kafka’s writing will have their own 
point of entry, and it will be the right one for them. In other words, many 
solutions can claim to address the issues raised by Kafka, and hence caution 
must be exercised when taking an intellectual approach to the text: the 
bewildering array of potential readings turns each into a tightrope.  
Buddhist philosophy works on the basis that personal attachments block 
awakening to the nature of existence, and this thesis will argue that the 
suffering and frustrations presented in Kafka’s works are the result of 
ignorance in the individual, a condition which is treatable and not terminal. 
The sections below explain key Buddhist ideas in more detail, from The Three 
Universal Characteristics and The Four Noble Truths, to Dependent 
Origination and awakening. Kafka’s writing will be referred to throughout to 
illustrate areas of correlation, with closer textual readings following in 
chapters three to six. 
89 John Snelling in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/not-self-0.  
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 2.1.1 The Three Universal Characteristics 
Through the understanding of impermanence, suffering, and notself, we will 
have freed ourselves of the fundamental errors that imprison us within the cycle 
of birth and death – the error of seeing things as permanent, the error of seeing 
things as pleasant and the error of seeing things as self.90 
The bedrock of Buddhism is formed by The Three Universal Characteristics, 
which set out the conditions relating to the nature of existence: anicca 
(impermanence), dukkha (suffering) and anatta (not-self). This teaching shows 
how the universe works, exposing the illusions and delusions which cloud our 
perception of the world. 
First, impermanence stresses the ever-changing nature of existence, 
which applies to all things without exception. This transience can be 
manifested in many ways: in time (which never halts); in composition (the 
‘whole’ is made up of a number of constituent parts); in relativity (good and 
bad do not exist as absolutes, for they are defined relative to each other); and 
in names (they are convenient labels designated by human beings to help 
define things and distinguish between them).  
Second, dukkha has a broader meaning than the English ‘suffering’, as it 
also encompasses incompleteness, unsatisfactoriness and imperfection. 
Suffering takes many guises: birth, old age, disease, death, not getting what 
one wants, worrying about losing what one has. 
Third, the truth of not-self in Buddhism rejects the belief in a real, fixed, 
independent, permanent entity that is represented by ‘I’. The self is a 
convenient name for a collection of factors which are ever-changing, 
interdependent, impermanent physical and mental experiences, such as 
feelings, ideas, thoughts, habits, attitudes. The compelling presence of the self 
90 Peter D. Santina, Fundamentals of Buddhism (Singapore: Buddha Dharma Education 
Association, 1984), p. 124. 
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 has been likened to a flame, a constant source of energy in an apparently 
constant form: ‘Actually there is no I existing as some substantial thing; there 
is only the ceaseless flow. [...] That there is this seemingly fixed form based on 
various conditions is interdependence.’91  
Buddhism rejects the idea of a fixed self because it causes greed, anger, 
illusion, pride and prejudice. If we equate self with existence, then without it 
we cease properly or meaningfully to exist, and must therefore protect it from 
attack at all costs. However, we set ourselves a perpetual task, for the ever-
vulnerable self demands constant attention. If we realise that the ‘I’ we wake 
up to, dress, and take to work is nothing more than a useful means of carrying 
the volatile mix of thoughts and emotions that run through our body and 
mind, we can eliminate at a stroke the delusions of the self and its attendant 
suffering. 
To the newcomer, these three core characteristics may have an unsettling 
preoccupation with misery and lack. Rather than sketch a picture of future 
heavenly bliss, Buddhism insists first on a realisation of life’s present 
dissatisfactions, and Kafka’s fiction reveals a similar focus. Taken in isolation, 
this stance would appear pessimistic, but it would be unfair to judge 
Buddhism (or Kafka) purely on an opening position. Rather than shield 
human beings from the harsh facts of life, Buddhist teaching takes the view 
that it is better in the long run to dispel ignorance about the disconcerting 
truths of our existence and stress the importance of cultivating a state of 
mindfulness. There are undoubted parallels with Kafka, which suggests that 
his exploration of suffering is a means of exposing attachment and not 
expressing despair. 
91 Kosho Uchiyama, Opening the Hand of Thought: Foundations of Zen Buddhist Practice 
(Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004), p. 99. 
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 In Judaeo-Christian systems of thought, for example, there is room for 
(perhaps even a need of) something absolute and enduring, and this can 
assume many forms, such as God (representing salvation, authority), justice 
(order), good and evil (meaning), freedom and selfhood (independence). These 
absolutes have varied in their manifestation and relative importance across 
the ages; nevertheless, they have assumed defining roles in the modern 
human condition. Impermanence is a threat for it undermines stability, order 
and meaning. For Buddhists, it is an equally uncomfortable proposition, but 
the problem lies in how we approach it, and not how we define it: the stronger 
our attachment, the deeper the suffering. Kafka’s tortured heroes resist 
impermanence and suffer the consequences. 
In the case of ‘justice’, for example as experienced by Josef K., it is not 
important whether the notion is real and attainable, or theoretical and 
illusory; what assumes importance is when the individual takes a rigid stance 
towards the subject, which then impacts his own existence. For example, a 
person could (a) have implicit trust in justice, (b) have no faith in the law but 
struggle for personal justice, or (c) have no concern for justice at all; this 
would appear to ‘produce’ three different people, a law-abiding citizen, a 
dissident, or an outlaw, but they are all ‘similar’ in that they have taken a 
stance (defined themselves) in regards to justice. In a Buddhist sense, the 
enlightened individual will see how justice is a conventional truth not an 
ultimate truth: faith in (or pursuit of) justice is a personal trait which adds 
local colour to the matrix of the self, but creates nothing enduring. Becoming 
aware of the distinction between conventional and ultimate reality helps 
advance a ‘skillful’ interpretation of Kafka’s work: the suffering undergone by 
human beings can be attributed to their own ordinary delusions rather than 
the extraordinary interference of others.  
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 Supported by the law of impermanence, the Buddhist teaching on not-
self states that there is in reality no fixed, absolute self, but it does not mean 
that the ‘I-me-mine’ that we refer to every day is illusory. It is a real, but 
‘provisional’ self, a network of cells, thoughts and motivations, wrapped in a 
recognisable shell, and perishable nonetheless. It exists as a convention or a 
convenient invention, something created rather than absolute. An enlightened 
person would be aware of two levels of truth when looking in the mirror: the 
initial glance at the face staring back reflects the momentary focus of all the 
elements (or ‘aggregates’) that make up our person, but more profound 
contemplation would see through the reflected image and acknowledge the 
underlying lack of essence, the reality of emptiness.92  
Selfhood is important within the confines of conventional reality, but this 
supremacy does not seep across into ultimate reality. The self is a link in a 
chain like any other, even if it is more complex and with more connections: 
awareness of this dependency on other events and influences reveals the 
underlying emptiness, which is accessible now and at any time for those with 
the right insight.93 
Given the prominence of suffering in Kafka’s work, it is important to note 
the distinction in these perspectives. The Buddhist view regards suffering as a 
consequence of birth, and the symptom of a cognitive failure to transcend the 
illusion of essentiality. Suffering is inevitable, but our relationship to it is not. 
Seen against this backdrop, the problems faced by Josef K., for example, take 
on a completely different aspect. To the Judaeo-Christian eye, the arrest-
without-charge and shadowy Court are the mysterious sources of K.’s malaise 
which are difficult to combat, and hence his demise is felt to be unjust and 
meaningless. The Buddhist reader is more likely to observe K.’s suffering and 
92 A useful background to these ideas can be found in Guy Newland’s Introduction to Emptiness 
(Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2008).  
93 This idea is addressed further in chapter two, under the law of Dependent Origination.  
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 wonder to what extent his limited understanding of the world has contributed 
to this sad state of affairs. 
Buddhism’s uncompromising stance on not-self and impermanence is 
reflected in the Buddha’s exhortations to test authority and accept nothing as 
‘given’. A theistic view of selfhood would struggle to accommodate such fluidity 
because the self is in effect divine property and must have some fixed 
elements, configured in accordance with predetermined values. Philosophies 
with no place for God, on the other hand, would not baulk at seizing (what 
used to be seen as) divine property, and asserting the freedom and 
independence of the individual. However, the point could be made that 
whether it is maintained in the name of God or occupied by existential 
squatters, the edifice of selfhood remains as a point of reference and it is 
attachment to this that contrasts with Buddhist thinking.  
The matter of personal identity is treated differently in Western and 
Buddhist thinking and these variations in outlook result in divergent readings 
of Kafka’s work. Whether secular or religious in nature, Western traditions 
tend to stress the significance of the self. Where belief in a creator exists, 
death and passage into heaven does not eclipse the primary status of the self, 
for union with God will bring untold bliss to the individual – paradise is there 
to be enjoyed as a reward. In the absence of God, the existentialist self, for 
example, fills the void with its own importance, whereas the deconstructed self 
still retains an influential role from its position on the sidelines. Typically, the 
Western self is an entity to be discovered, accumulated, sculpted: it is ground 
to be covered, knowledge to be gained, feelings to be experienced, relationships 
to be had, dislikes to be avoided, ambitions to be held, deeds to be done – all 
rolled into an ever-swelling being which amounts to ‘me’. 
The Buddhist view contrasts with this in its assertion that the self does 
not exist in any constant or absolute form. There is certainly a constantly 
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 evolving aggregate of cells, tissues and emotions, but nothing which amounts 
permanently to ‘me’: there is no definitive core or residue. Destruction of the 
self is largely seen in Western eyes as abhorrent, whereas Buddhists note that 
it is impossible to destroy what does not exist. What should be destroyed, 
however, is the illusion of the self, which ironically is very real and 
damaging.94 
It is not by chance that K. in Das Schloß is a ‘Landvermesser’, with the 
‘vermessen’ connection hinting at a combination of boldness, arrogance and 
measuring or defining (incorrectly to boot, through the prefix ver-). K. is a self-
confident aggressor who is determined to carve out his place in the Castle-led 
community, by making connections, closing deals, sealing bonds. It is perhaps 
a trait of the Western mind that the individual bears without question this 
concept of integrated selfhood and its primacy: we all have some significance – 
however minor – and must claim our place as a piece in the universal jigsaw.  
From a Buddhist viewpoint, K.’s occupation as a surveyor can be seen as 
an ironic commentary on a misguided attachment to the self. K. spends his 
time vainly attempting to ‘map out’ the terrain, trying to draw boundaries, 
seeking to make connections, striving to define the environment in which he 
exists. That he fails is not then simply a reflection on what he does or what he 
encounters, such as the elusiveness of Klamm, the indifference of the Castle 
itself, his own aggressive or manipulative nature, or his tactics. It is rather a 
reflection on the surveyor’s deluded mind: failure is inevitable at the outset 
because in a world of flux and constant change there is neither a permanent 
self, nor any secure place to which to attach it. The surveyor would be better 
advised to put away his measuring tools and reflect on the fundamental 
94 Ayya Khema’s Who is My Self? provides a useful account of the Buddhist idea of self. 
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 nature of reality. To his credit, K. does finally achieve some kind of 
understanding of the futility of his search. 
Different views on the notion of identity are bound to produce divergent 
readings of Kafka’s works. For example, a Freudian view of the hunger artist’s 
search for the perfect fasting might conclude that his art is a manifestation of 
subconscious feelings of inferiority. He experiences lack, longs for 
nourishment, and his starving is a way of ridding himself of an unwanted 
existence. Possible solutions to his suffering would involve measures to find 
alternative nourishment: in short, to ‘feed’ his ego or ‘boost’ his sense of self. If 
the right food cannot be found, death will follow, and so inevitably will a 
gloomy interpretation of the story: how difficult it is to find the food that will 
nourish us. If we don’t like our self, we should alter it or destroy it. 
A Buddhist view would be critical of the hunger artist’s tacit acceptance 
of a self in the first place. Any endeavour to prop up an illusory construct is 
doomed to failure. The reader watches as the hunger artist slides blindly and 
unavoidably into oblivion, noting the irony of the starving man’s position – he 
defines his self as a ‘starvation artist’, so surely the clearest definition will be 
obtained by starving himself to the extreme. In trying to capture his ‘essence’ 
as a faster, he must keep fasting and thereby destroy this ‘essence’. A more 
constructive reading of this story would be to point out the folly of assuming 
that there is a self that needs to be ‘fed’ or nourished. 
Another important difference between Buddhist ideas and Western 
philosophies is the way in which the individual views his position in relation to 
his external surroundings. As suggested by Jerrold Seigel and Charles Taylor 
in the opening chapter, modern Western thought tends to assert the rights of 
the self, before attempting to square them off with the outer world and all its 
conflicts. This establishes a division between the individual and his 
surrounding world which is difficult to overcome. The Buddhist view tries to 
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 dissolve the role of the self, seeing it as a fly in the universal ointment, 
contaminating the individual’s attempts to access a pure understanding of 
existential reality.  
God does not appear as a guiding force in Kafka’s work, and other 
potential frameworks of authority – paternal, judicial, social – seem at best 
unreliable or at worst destructive. The reader is faced with an unfamiliar 
representation of the nature of selfhood, because the minimal description of 
character and environment turns the focus from the external appearance and 
location of his main protagonists to their inner preoccupations. It is for this 
reason not surprising that taking a Judaeo-Christian perspective on the self 
portrayed by Kafka results in a harrowing vision of human existence. Gabriel 
Josipovici notes the points at which self-concerns – the quest for acceptance, 
the battle against authority, the struggle for freedom – prepare a life of 
suffering: ‘To be alive in Kafka's sense does not mean to exist. It means 
understanding one’s place in the world.’95 We try to interpret the world by 
using our mental faculty, but this tool is inadequate: ‘The imagination, which 
had appeared to provide contact with some transcendental source, turns out 
to be only an instrument of the vanity of the self, avidly shielding the self from 
the reality of things.’96  
2.1.2 The Four Noble Truths 
Central to the Buddha’s teaching is the doctrine of anatman: ‘not-self’. This does 
not deny that the notion of an ‘I’ works in the everyday world. In fact, we need a 
solid, stable ego to function in society. However, ‘I’ is not real in an ultimate 
sense. It is a ‘name’: a fictional construct that bears no correspondence to what 
is really the case. Because of this disjunction all kinds of problems ensue.97 
95 Gabriel Josipovici, The Lessons of Modernism and Other Essays (London: Macmillan, 1987), 
p. 21. 
96 Ibid., p. 21. 
97 John Snelling in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/not-self-0.  
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 With its foundations established through The Three Universal Characteristics, 
the main pillars of Buddhist thinking are erected in The Four Noble Truths, 
which seek to show the individual how he relates to the world around him and 
how he can disentangle himself from suffering in it. It is at this point that 
Buddhism breaks free of criticisms of pessimism and plots a way forward. We 
need not dwell on the grim picture of the world painted by impermanence, 
dissatisfaction and not-self, but can consider a way of dealing with this reality. 
The Four Noble Truths offer a way out by (1) admitting that there is suffering, 
(2) identifying the cause of suffering, (3) looking towards the cessation of 
suffering, (4) and showing a practical path leading to the cessation of 
suffering.98  
The First Noble Truth states that ‘there is’ suffering, rather than ‘we’ or ‘I’ 
or ‘you’ suffer. The truth of the matter is presented impersonally, and this goes 
to the heart of Buddhism. A person ignorant of the Dharma would say, ‘I am 
suffering’, ‘I am upset’, ‘I am unhappy’. The ‘I’ amplifies the suffering by 
personalising it. Looking at suffering through the ‘I’ is tantamount to throwing 
oil onto a flame. The awakened person learns to starve the combustible ego of 
oxygen and adopt a position of reflection and objective observation.  
Impermanence brings ample opportunities for suffering to arise, but it is 
an occasion of, rather than a cause of, suffering because it only leads to 
suffering when ignorance and craving are present. When we attach to pleasant 
feelings, often in the hope that they may be prolonged or fixed, we are bound 
to suffer. Failing to understand that all phenomena are impermanent is 
ignorance. Craving for and clinging to these phenomena are the causes of 
suffering. Kafka’s work is full of characters who see every setback as a 
98 Ajahn Sumedho, The Four Noble Truths (Hertfordshire: Amaravati Publications, 1992). This 
text provides a clear and concise explanation of the basic ideas of Buddhism. 
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 personal attack, from early figures like the officer in In der Strafkolonie, 
through both K.s and on to the hunger artist. 
The Second Noble Truth states that the origin of suffering is desire, 
which comes in various forms, such as wanting to experience sense pleasures 
or becoming something. Desire is present at any given moment as we hunger 
for nourishment, long for happiness, strive to become wealthy, or seek praise 
by doing good deeds. Even apparently ‘selfless’ actions bear the hallmarks of 
the self, such as wanting to do good to secure a blessing. This point is 
illustrated by a famous exchange when Bodhidharma, the first patriarch of 
Zen, met Emperor Wu of the Liang Dynasty: ‘Wu said: “I have endowed 
temples and authorized ordinations – what is my merit?” Bodhidharma's 
answer was radical: “No merit at all.”’99 Wu’s good works bore the hallmarks of 
attachment to selfhood, so there was no spiritual reward. 
Then there is the desire to get rid of things, such as pain or misfortune. 
Buddhism does not maintain that it is wrong to want success or to change a 
job. It is rather that we should reflect on why the ‘I’ needs to have or be 
something, on the clash between internal wishes and external limits: ‘The real 
cause of our suffering is the unrealistic desire, not the reality that frustrates 
it. The real cause of the economic problem is not the absence of means to 
satisfy our endless wants, but the presence of these insatiable wants.’100 Given 
the spiritual chain of demand-and-supply, the shortfall is addressed by 
reducing demand, not increasing supply: ‘We have to awaken from our world 
of dreams and come down to reality, to face and accept reality as it is.’101 
The Third Noble Truth concerns the cessation of suffering and aims to 
develop further the reflective mind in order to let go of delusions. Out of 
99 Jisho Cary Warner in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/onpractice/snaggletoothed-barbarian.  
100 Rahula Yogavacara Bhikkhu, The Way to Peace and Happiness (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 
1996), p. 16. 
101 Ibid., p. 16. 
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 ignorance, we attach to desires for sense pleasures and, in doing so, we 
effectively pursue something which will perish. We pretend that we are going 
to be happy with the things we attach to, only later to feel disillusioned when 
they are gone. We might succeed in becoming what we want, but that too is 
temporary as we then turn to another ambition to fill the void. Finally, the 
desire to be released from life, craving suicide or annihilation, is a mortal or 
death-bound condition and such desires bring despair. 
To cease suffering we have to break the perpetual cycle of ‘wanting’.102 
For example, the desire for love is a basic human urge which causes both the 
greatest happiness and sadness in human life. This is no paradox, however, 
for there is nothing inherently ‘wrong’ with love that makes it turn from good 
to bad. It is rather the degree of human attachment to it which determines 
whether love is the cause of pleasure or pain. Once the object of desire is lost, 
the self feels its attachment and does not want to be separated from the thing 
which has become a part of its identity. As the self asserts itself, want is born: 
this is ‘becoming’ driven by desire and in our ignorance we are caught in this 
becoming process through all our senses. But through knowing desire for 
what it is rather than what it means for ‘us’, by seeing with the ‘eye’ rather 
than with the ‘I’, we can avoid grasping at it, and thus we can experience the 
cessation of suffering.  
The Fourth Noble Truth shows how we can achieve cessation by following 
The Eightfold Path. It covers the ways in which we think and act, namely Right 
Understanding and Right Aspiration, grouped together as wisdom; then there 
follow three moral elements in Right Speech, Right Action and Right 
Livelihood; finally come Right Effort, Right Mindfulness and Right 
Concentration, which together form heart or spirit.  
102 Seung Sahn dedicates a book to this point: Wanting Enlightenment is a Big Mistake (Boston: 
Shambhala, 2006). 
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 Right Understanding teaches how to use intelligence for reflection and 
contemplation, that is, how to think with discrimination rather than with 
ignorance – this is something few of Kafka’s characters are endowed with. 
Right Aspiration is doing things with the right attitude or intention. Josef K. is 
a good example of failings in this area, as he consistently acts out of selfish 
motives. Right Speech, Right Action and Right Livelihood place an emphasis 
on being responsible for what we say and do, because inappropriate words 
and imprudent deeds cause pain, anguish and anger. If you see someone fall 
over and go to help them, and do so out of compassion, it is a skillful action 
and is empty of selfhood. However, if you act out of expectation of some 
reward for your action, then self is involved, even though you are doing a good 
deed. Right Effort, Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration are concerned 
with how to achieve balance, harmony and serenity in our actions. Serenity is 
in short supply in Kafka, but significant outbreaks of contentedness appear 
towards the end of his work, as exemplified by post-Bürgel K., and the 
narrators from Eine kleine Frau and Josefine. 
Broadly speaking, Western thought is concerned with the destination, 
while Zen keeps interrupting the trip. Kafka’s texts often have no clear 
resolution, and readers may feel the narratives lead them ‘down the garden 
path’, but this perception may derive from the desire to complete the journey. 
Once we stop thinking about a goal, the labyrinth ceases to confound and 
reverts to being a path, albeit a circuitous one. Similarly, we could choose to 
interpret in a negative way the apparently vicious cycle of frustration which 
torments K. in Das Schloß. Whatever steps he takes, he always seems to be 
out of reach of his goal, somewhat like the road he walks along which skirts 
around the Castle, but never gets any nearer. If we assume that access to the 
Castle is a real, viable and worthy goal, then K. appears to be condemned to 
circle around the dead-ends and blind alleys down in the village. If we are 
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 sympathetic to K., we could read his misfortune as the result of a cruel or 
indifferent authority; if we are critical of K.’s behaviour, his failure to ‘arrive’ at 
the destination is down to his personal shortcomings. In any of these 
scenarios, the assumption is that there is nothing wrong in considering access 
to the Castle as a sensible goal. However, if we assume that the endpoint is an 
illusion, a figment of K.’s deluded egotistical desires, then his meanderings 
become an indictment of his stubborn ignorance. Speculation about the 
Castle’s powers and significance amounts to a projection of what K. lacks, 
what his ego needs to ‘complete’ itself.  
The Buddhist view of how lives unfold is cyclical, rather than linear, 
which means the burden of escaping from suffering is carried by the 
individual.103 For a Buddhist there is no ‘final reckoning’, but an unbroken 
journey through revolutions of birth, death and rebirth, driven by the forces of 
karmic energy accumulated through craving and attachments. Failure to 
attain nirvana during any lifetime is never damning, since there is always 
another life (however this is to be understood) in which progress can be made. 
Efforts to lessen the effects of karma bring rebirth with an ‘upward’ 
momentum into ‘higher’ realms, bringing conditions more conducive to 
developing understanding. Ultimate release from the cycle comes with a 
complete mental and spiritual realisation of the truth of the Dharma.  
These conflicting perspectives on how life develops will inevitably return 
different readings of certain happenings in Kafka’s writing. From a Judaeo-
Christian perspective, for example, Josef K.’s death could be seen as tragic. 
Despite the sinister aspect of the Court, K. has failed to come up to scratch in 
life and is sentenced to a grisly end. The fairness of the verdict is debatable, 
and readers might speculate as to whether an innocent or ignorant K. did not 
103 Walpola Rahula covers the notion of the ‘cycle of continuity’ (samsara) in What the Buddha 
Taught (London: Wisdom Books, 1990), p. 27. 
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 understand the arrest/test, or whether the arrest/test was too harsh. But the 
feeling remains that K.’s failure could happen to anybody, and an inevitably 
pessimistic pall hangs over the novel.  
From a Buddhist perspective, Josef K.’s death is just the last chapter in 
the book, but not the end of the series. There is a failure, but it is not final, 
and can be attributed to K.’s ignorance. It will bring consequences (the 
Buddhist concept of karma), but hell does not await K. because there is no 
soul to damn. K.’s frantic stabs at fending off the accusation of guilt might 
serve as a wake-up call to any individuals prone to similar delusions about 
their innocent lives. K.’s life (and death) was bleak, but ours need not be. 
2.1.3 The Law of Dependent Origination 
Shakyamuni Buddha taught that all material things are subject to laws. Birth, 
old age, sickness, and death are laws in themselves, and not problems that 
have to be solved through the power of human beings or through some other 
power. There is no ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in laws. Only through the intervention of 
people’s views does this notion of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ arise.104 
Suffering is central to Buddhist thinking, and it also seeps into every corner of 
Kafka’s writing. To the Christian mind, suffering is a problem, an anomaly, 
perhaps a punishment. If it does not square up with the notion of a just and 
benevolent god, suffering needs to be explained in other ways, such as being 
self-inflicted or the price of future happiness. To the Buddhist disposition, 
suffering is equally unwelcome, but natural and inevitable, made worse by 
personal resistance.105 The First Noble Truth declares the reality of suffering 
and goes on to suggest that it is our ‘ownership’ that causes pain.  
104 Sekkei Roshi in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/law-all-things.  
105 ‘The suffering itself is not so bad, it’s the resentment against suffering that is the real pain.’ 
Allen Ginsberg, Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/fear-first-noble-truth.  
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 The mechanics of ownership are set forth in paticcasamuppada, the Law 
of Dependent Origination.106 This is the glue that holds Buddhist thought 
together because it blends the realities of The Three Universal Characteristics 
(not-self, suffering, impermanence) with the practicalities of The Four Noble 
Truths. In essence, this doctrine holds that ‘because there is this, there is 
that; because this is not, that is not’. It shows how suffering arises and ceases, 
due to an interdependence of a number of natural factors, with no place for a 
god or creator pulling strings. There is no room for an autonomous self in 
paticcasamuppada: there is an unbroken flow of interconnected arising and 
ceasing, which we mistakenly hive off into chunks, preserve and rename ‘I’, 
‘you’, ‘me’, and so forth. It is unsettling to hear that this flow of phenomena 
does not contain a fixed ‘me’ anywhere, but uplifting to know that the stream 
can be channelled into different directions. Dependent Origination is not fate 
or determinism, and although it would be wrong to suggest that we can simply 
become anything we want to, we have the power to encourage ‘good’ and 
prevent ‘evil’, once we understand how things arise and cease.  
This doctrine is of fundamental importance to Buddhism for it is the 
means of opening people’s eyes to the fact that craving and ignorant 
attachment to selfhood block release from suffering: ‘Every time there is sense 
contact without wisdom concerning liberation, there will be becoming (bhava) 
and birth (jati). To put it another way: when there is only ignorance present at 
the point of sense contact, the Law of Dependent Origination is put into 
motion.’107 If you take the example of a farmer, toiling in the fields under a 
blazing sun, he might stop for a moment, wipe the sweat from his brow and 
exclaim, ‘Oh, I’m so hot!’. If there is no clinging in this cry, then the suffering 
106 Paticca means ‘grounded on, concerning, because’ and samuppada means ‘origin, arising, 
genesis, coming to be, production’. Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, Paticcasamuppada: Practical 
Dependent Origination (Nonthaburi: Vuddhidhamma Fund, 1992), p. 24.  
107 Ibid., p. 11. 
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 is a simple, natural reaction. If the exclamation is shot through with a sense of 
self, ‘my’ suffering, why am ‘I’ so hot, why should ‘I’ have such a difficult life, 
why is this happening to ‘me’, then this dissatisfaction amounts to suffering 
according to the law of paticcasamuppada.  
It is worth observing the process that unfolds after making contact with 
an object and experiencing unsatisfactory consequences, and noting how 
closely it fits with the way Kafka’s characters live their deluded lives. First, 
there is ignorance relating to the truth about suffering, impermanence and 
lack of selfhood, and this gives rise to mental formulations which reveal the 
way we express ourselves, through body, speech and thought. Thereupon 
follows consciousness, in six forms: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. 
These forms of consciousness give rise to mentality/materiality in the form of 
feelings, perceptions and physical elements, which in turn give rise to the six 
sense bases corresponding to the six kinds of consciousness. The senses lead 
to contact, which in turn engenders feeling, and then craving. From craving 
arises attachment, which can be to the senses, to views, to rituals, and to the 
‘I’ concept, whereupon arise becoming, birth, decay, death, rebirth, all in a 
perpetual cycle.108 
Rebirth in Western thought tends to refer to the final passage of the self 
(or soul) to a form of afterlife, and the heavenly or hellish nature of the resting 
place depends on the judgment passed by the controlling authority (e.g. God). 
In Buddhism rebirth simply indicates another turn on the Wheel of Samsara, 
the continuity of existence which can only be stopped through wisdom.109 
Nagapriya explains that the terms ‘(re)birth’ and ‘becoming’ should be 
108 Buddhadasa lists the eleven steps in the chain of causation in his study, 
Paticcasamuppada, p. 30. 
109 ‘The process of birth, death and rebirth (samsara) is said to continue indefinitely until we 
become spiritually liberated.’ Nagapriya, Exploring Karma and Rebirth (Birmingham: Windhorse 
Publications, 2004), p. 15. Nagapriya’s account of dependent origination, karma and rebirth is 
particularly lucid. 
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 understood in their context, for they need not refer to a physical birth from a 
womb, but could indicate the birth or arising of the ego, the ‘I’ concept. He 
points out that such a view is not even metaphorical, but a literal account of 
how want and desire are born, the arising of the ego. One turn of the cycle of 
dependent origination from ignorance through sense contact, attachment and 
birth, may take moments, and not necessarily years or a lifetime.110 When the 
Buddha achieved enlightenment, it is said that he was able to recall all his 
thousands of past lives and rebirths, which could be understood to mean that 
he was able to recollect all the instances in which his ego had asserted itself in 
the presence of ignorance, thereby conditioning further I-rebirths. 
This is relevant to a study of Kafka because it demonstrates how 
suffering is linked inextricably with attachment to selfhood: pursuit of or 
maintenance of the illusion of the ego can only result in dissatisfaction. All of 
Kafka’s characters succumb to the delusion of fixed selfhood, and in their 
attachments and cravings suffering is the natural outcome. At the point of his 
arrest, Josef K. has not ‘awoken’ to reality, despite the fact of his physical 
awakening, and he can be said to undergo the following turn of the cycle of 
dependent origination: owing to his ignorance, and clinging to a threatened 
self, he experiences fear and anger at the news of his ‘Verhaftung’; he (his 
identity, his existence) is perceived to be in danger. In Buddhist terms, ear 
contact (hearing the announcement) causes feeling, craving and attachment: ‘I 
am innocent!’, ‘Why is this happening to me?’. This is suffering arising and the 
birth of the ‘I’ concept. 
By way of contrast, the single outstanding figure who manages to escape 
from this entanglement is K. post-Bürgel, after he has relinquished his claims 
for Castle recognition. The calm, unperturbed figure at the end of the novel is 
110 This view is supported by Buddhadasa: ‘In just one moment, a complete cycle of 
Paticcasamuppada can roll on.’ Paticcasamuppada, p. 31. 
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 not an oddity, but an enlightened person, on the path to understanding what 
Josef K. was hostage to: how the all-consuming thirst of the self for existence 
drives a perpetual cycle of suffering.  
To adapt the much-quoted Cartesian formula, the law of dependent 
origination is rather like, ‘I think therefore I become’. With wrong view, every 
birth of the ‘I’ will engender suffering of some description. With right view, the 
self can be seen for what it is: an aggregate of feelings and thoughts, tissues 
and cells, which is continuously evolving. Like wading into a river and trying 
to snatch at the current, any attempt at clutching at selfhood is doomed to 
failure, to suffering. This may explain the sense of gloom in Kafka’s work, but 
the key to a brighter view is to see through attachment, as shown by 
enlightened K. after relinquishing his quest. With paticcasamuppada, nothing 
is random because everything has a cause, even though we may not see it. 
An important component in dependent origination is karma, the Sanskrit 
term for ‘action’, which gives each individual the means to determine to a 
certain degree the direction his life takes. Put very loosely, the law of karma 
states that past actions condition present experience, and present actions 
condition future experience. It should also be noted that ‘actions’ include 
‘thoughts’, and the mental attitude or volition which motivates an action can 
be as significant as the action itself. It is in this respect that karma is of use in 
reading Kafka, for the internal, mental disposition of his characters can be 
explored as a means of understanding their situation, rather than trying to 
analyse the composition of external elements in their lives, such as courts or 
castles. 
Karma is of huge importance to Buddhist thought because it both ties 
down and liberates. It ties down in the sense that it is an impersonal, 
incorruptible law that unfolds in a natural process. It is inflexible in the 
respect that it cannot be bypassed or overruled, and it treats everybody 
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 equally and impartially: hence, like the Court’s Law in Der Proceß, it is 
infallible. It is also liberating, however, in that it helps us to transform who we 
are, because it empowers us by bestowing a force on all of our actions. We can 
work towards shaping our world by understanding that our willed actions 
have effects, and that by taking responsibility for these consequences we are 
in some measure creating our future. 
The essence of karma is intention, and this covers will, choice and 
decision. Intention is manifested through thought, speech and deed, and it will 
have its effects, however small or fleeting the instance may seem: ‘All kamma, 
whether good or evil, bears fruit. There is no kamma, no matter how small, 
which is void of fruit.’111 Karma can be unskillful (akusala) or skillful (kusala). 
Unskillful actions are born of greed, hatred and delusion; skillful actions are 
born of non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion. Karma that is channelled 
through the mind is considered to be the most significant, as deeds and 
speech are derived from mental action. Mental karma can be divided into 
different aspects and one of the most important of these is dithi – beliefs or 
views. The Buddha spoke of wrong view as a harmful condition because it 
influences subsequent actions, expressed verbally, bodily or mentally: ‘Monks! 
I see no other condition which is so harmful as wrong view. Of harmful things, 
monks, wrong view is the greatest.’112  
An essential part of the teaching of karma is rebirth, for it is important to 
allow time for the consequences of our actions to bear fruit. If we consider our 
time is up after one life, we may despair that an unskillful life will lead to 
eternal punishment in hell, or we may grow complacent that a skillful life will 
bring rewards. However, as explained in the doctrine of dependent origination, 
111 P. A. Payutto Bhikkhu, Good, Evil and Beyond: Kamma in the Buddha’s Teaching (Bangkok: 
Buddhadhamma Foundation, 1993), p. 8. It follows that an act which is without intention has 
no karma. 
112 Ibid., p. 16. 
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 there is in the here-and-now a never-ending roll of ‘births’ every time we will 
the ego into existence with our cravings and attachments. Buddhism explains 
how the seeds of our actions will sprout in later existences, in one form or 
another, so we should remain ever-vigilant of our conduct. No matter how 
desperate our situation, there is always the prospect that suffering can be 
eradicated in the longer term by cultivating better understanding and 
banishing the urges of the ego. 
Karma is often misunderstood as a fatalistic law of cause and effect, 
attributable to three main misperceptions.113 In the first instance, the law of 
karma is seen as a rule which governs every aspect of existence, a kind of 
comprehensive universal principle. This is not the case, for Buddhists use the 
concept of dependent origination to refer to the principle which proposes that 
all things arise and fall in dependence on conditions, which means that there 
are no constant, permanent entities in the universe. The law of karma is one 
strand in the wider teaching of dependent origination, and its scope is limited 
to the sphere of actions created by volition: karma has never caused an 
earthquake.  
In the second instance, karma may be viewed as a principle which 
preserves the balance of good and evil in the universe. In other words, if I 
commit some evil, then something bad will later happen to me to ‘even things 
up’. This suggests an almost mechanical operation of ‘payback’, but such a 
view might be unhelpful because it can easily fall prey to the deluded 
expectations or fears of an ego obsessed with self-interests, that is, ‘my’ 
rewards or ‘my’ punishment are ‘my’ just desserts: the fantasy of selfhood gets 
reinforced in this way. This misconception tends to see karma as a force of 
retribution, or a kind of ‘cosmic judge’, weighing up all our conduct in 
113 A detailed discussion on karma and how it is viewed by Western and Indian religious 
traditions is provided by Whitley R. P. Kaufman’s ‘Karma, Rebirth, and the Problem of Evil’ in 
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Jan 2005), pp. 15-32. 
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 accordance with unshakeable moral laws and distributing appropriate 
sentences. There is necessarily an element of reward and punishment to the 
remit of the law of karma, but there are so many other variables in play (cf. 
the concept of dependent origination) that it would be incorrect to treat karma 
as an all-seeing, omnipotent authority. Although it acts at the personal level, 
karma is an impersonal force, in that it takes no notice of ‘who we are’. It is 
not intelligent, but rather a natural law of cause and effect which comes into 
play when actions (deeds and thoughts) are executed, and a consequent effect 
is born. 
A further misunderstanding is to view karma as a kind of fate – whatever 
happens to us is pre-ordained. The problem here is that it can make the 
individual lazy, because the effect attributed to karma is removed from the 
individual’s influence and placed with a supposed external entity. That would 
turn karma into a mystical working of the universe to which we must submit, 
and the danger would be that a deluded ego could divorce karma from the 
actions it was associated with – there would be no point in trying to fight such 
an irresistible force. Actually, karma is just a natural flow of cause and effect 
which is initiated by the actions we undertake by ourselves.114 We alone are 
responsible for our karma, so it could be said that we are judged by our own 
actions. 
In his interpretation of Die Verwandlung, Michael Ryan sees karma at 
work in Gregor’s metamorphosis into a beetle.115 He suggests that Gregor 
Samsa’s surname could have been derived from the term samsara, indicating 
114 ‘The theory of karma is the theory of cause and effect, of action and reaction; it is a natural 
law, which has nothing to do with the idea of justice or reward and punishment. Every volitional 
action produces its effects or results. If a good action produces good effects and a bad action 
bad effects, it is not justice, or reward, or punishment meted out by anybody or any power 
sitting in judgment on your action, but this is in virtue of its own nature, its own law.’ Rahula, 
p. 32. 
115 Michael P. Ryan, ‘Samsa and Samsara: Suffering, Death and Rebirth in The Metamorphosis’ 
in The German Quarterly, Vol 72, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 133-52. 
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 the world of suffering we inhabit and are compelled to keep returning to in a 
perpetual cycle of birth, life, death and rebirth. 
Ryan goes as far as to link the three stories in the Strafen series in a 
rebirth motif, where the unfortunate Georg Bendemann suffers death under 
the direction of his father, to be reborn as Gregor Samsa, who suffers from the 
strains of supporting his family, until transforming into a beetle and dying, 
before being reborn as the traveller visiting the penal colony, who this time 
undergoes no pain or punishment, but looks on as others suffer. This 
progression would represent a kind of development from ignorance to insight.  
Ryan’s application of karma and rebirth to the lifecycles of Kafka’s 
characters appears to overstretch the teaching which is central to 
understanding individual growth in Buddhism. In an attempt to portray 
development across a series of stories, he oversimplifies the complicated and 
intricate concepts relating to cause and effect, and ends up grafting a mosaic 
of Buddhist terms onto narratives which share thematic links, but do not 
belong in an organic whole.  
Karma in narrative action is represented more convincingly in the film 
Groundhog Day which displays an uncanny similarity with the troubles 
experienced by Kafka’s K.s. In the story, a misanthropist weather reporter 
(Phil Connors) finds himself trapped in a cycle where he relives the same day 
over and over again.116 All the other people go about their business as if they 
are experiencing the day for the first time, but the weatherman must wake up 
at the same time every morning in the knowledge that the day just dawning is 
the same day as the one he left behind on going to sleep. He is not condemned 
to repeat the same actions from the day before and has the ‘freedom’ to act 
116 Groundhog Day, directed by Harold Ramis (Columbia Pictures, 1993). The film refers to the 
day when, according to popular tradition, a groundhog’s actions are interpreted to determine 
whether winter is over. The weatherman undergoes a prolonged ‘winter’ of his own due to the 
intensified effects of his increasingly selfish behaviour. 
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 differently, but he will always go to bed knowing that the next day will again 
be ‘Groundhog Day’. There are parallels here with both Der Proceß and Das 
Schloß: Josef K. wakes up to an ‘arrest’, and is told by one of the warders that 
he can go about his business as usual, but should just be a little more 
mindful of his actions; K. spends day after day (and all the days seem the 
same) trying to satisfy his quest to enter the Castle.  
A Buddhist interpretation of the film would describe the weatherman’s 
predicament as a stylised example of living in samsara, the endless round of 
life, death and rebirth that is driven by karmic energy from our volition-fuelled 
lives. It would point out how we accrue unskillful karma from all our actions 
which are born of ignorance and carried out in the name of our deluded egos. 
The weather reporter reaches a high point in selfish conduct on the first day, 
to the extent that he appears to trigger an exaggerated instance of samsara, 
where the life cycle is speeded up or concentrated into a day cycle. Connors is 
initially shocked to find his day repeating, but in keeping with his selfish 
character his first reaction is simply to satiate his ego, by drinking, carousing, 
chasing women and generally behaving to excess, safe in the knowledge that 
he will wake up the next day undamaged, without a hangover, and seemingly 
back at square one with all the people he had abused earlier. 
Eventually, Connors (the ‘con’ in his name hints at self-delusion) tires of 
these excesses, which ushers in the first point of the Buddhist commentary: 
the self can never be satisfied, because it must continually renew itself, as 
must our desires. As soon as one want is fulfilled, another one springs up. At 
this stage, he turns to the other extreme and tries to destroy this ‘self’ which 
has now become a burden. Tragically for him, his repeated suicide attempts all 
fail because he must always start the next day, alive and in the same shape. 
For Buddhists, suicide carries a very heavy karmic weight because it 
represents a very strong craving (for non-existence). 
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 In the end, exhausted by his attempts to satisfy his self and escape the 
cycle of rebirth, Connors changes tack. He turns his attentions away from the 
concerns of his self, and towards the world in which he is trapped: perhaps 
trying more constructive pursuits would allow his days to pass more 
pleasurably. He turns over a new leaf and starts doing good deeds, not to 
bolster his ego and ‘buy’ his way out of his ordeal with an accumulation of 
merit, but out of a genuine concern for his fellow human beings. He spends 
time learning how to play the piano, for example, in order that he may give 
pleasure to listeners, not impress them. Ultimately, he wakes up to a new day 
and the cycle is broken, but only because he has stopped trying so hard to 
satisfy himself or escape his existence. By busying himself with concerns 
beyond his ego, Connors manages to transcend this ‘Verhaftung’ and his 
lifecycle continues in a more conventional pattern: he is not fully enlightened, 
but he has shed many of his delusions and unskillful actions, and thus finally 
exhausted the effect of karma.  
It is not too great a step to suggest that both Josef K. and K. inhabit 
‘Groundhog Days’ of their own. Josef K. learns little in his repeated attempts 
to shake off the arrest, which is tantamount to a person trying to divorce 
himself from his life. His only hope would have been to take the early advice 
and look a little more closely at the unskillful intentions which have dogged 
his existence. K. fared better in the later novel, because after a similar merry-
go-round of craving-driven actions he relinquishes his ego’s quest for 
recognition from the Castle. After the Bürgel episode, where he is apparently 
offered a way into the Castle, K. falls asleep and misses this chance to satisfy 
a want. The result, however, is not despair or dismay, but equanimity and 
relative content. In the final scenes, K. interacts with Castle officials and 
villagers with a calm reserve, but rather than abdication or surrender, this is 
disengagement, a tactical withdrawal. Just like the weatherman’s switch from 
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 wrong view to right view, K. has realised that his struggle is not against the 
Castle, but against the all-consuming self, which burns everything with never-
satisfied hunger. This dawning awareness is evidenced in K.’s victory dream 
after passing up Bürgel’s offer: paradoxically, K. has achieved victory in defeat 
– he has gained by letting go. As Connors found after practising skillful 
actions, those who do not seek shall find.  
If we investigate Kafka’s treatment of human discontent, we can begin to 
assess how Kafka views the human condition: what is it like to exist as a 
person in this world? We can analyse the origins of the misfortunes that befall 
K. and his fictional cousins, and trace them back to three potential sources: 
two belong to the Western tradition, and one to a non-Western approach.  
In the first case, the origins of suffering are largely reckoned to be 
external to the narrative hero, not of his making, attributable to a specific 
other source, albeit a distant, inaccessible one. The individual, such as K. in 
Das Schloß, comes under the power of an overarching authority, which is 
typically inscrutable, invisible, and arbitrary in its judgments. There is little 
that the individual can do in the face of such an omnipotent force, and the tale 
we read can be seen as the struggle to connect with and reconcile with the 
Creator. Here, from a Christian perspective for example, the suffering could be 
‘resolved’ by putting faith in the Creator. In the case recounted in Das Schloß, 
K. misses this potential solution by failing to trust the external authority, and 
by insisting on explanations or guarantees. Faced with a perceived exclusion 
from the Castle’s approval, he bangs his head stubbornly against this brick 
wall of divine revelation. The source of the suffering is the unrealisable or 
unconceivable gap between the individual and the whole. The suffering is 
exacerbated by K.’s doggedness; a lack of faith rules out hope of salvation.  
In the second case, the origins of suffering are similarly external to the 
protagonist, but this time not attributable to any specific centre or creative 
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 power. It is rather that the randomness and impersonal nature of the universe 
holds sway and this causes the troubles to occur. The protagonist, for 
example, Josef K. or Gregor Samsa, appears to have done little wrong, for 
there is no account of any specific transgression. The individual is unaware of 
any ‘sin’, but experiences suffering nevertheless. Here, the existentialist or 
deconstructionist position would point out that faith in the religious sense is 
pointless, as there is nobody or nothing out there to hear our cries. Instead, 
we have to realise that the flux holds sway and we will inevitably be subjected 
to some buffeting. In light of this, the best we can do is try to suspend belief in 
a creator, create our own meaning and sense of purpose, and build projects 
for our own lives, reassured in the knowledge that suffering is bad luck and 
not punishment for our sins. Win or lose, at least we have been ‘true’ to our 
selves. 
The third case is different from the other two in that the origins of 
suffering are essentially put down to the individual himself. There is no 
almighty to blame and the fact of the universe’s randomness cannot be offered 
up as an excuse either. Anything which arises has a cause and does not exist 
independently. This is the doctrine of dependent origination which underpins 
Buddhist thinking. The individual is the principal (not sole) architect of his 
own destiny, which is shaped by the decisions he makes, the actions he 
commits and the thoughts he thinks, as well as by the things he chooses not 
to do, think or say. For the most part, this latter view has not been linked to 
an interpretation of Kafka’s works. It reflects the Buddhist position, which 
starts off by stating that nothing in the universe is a constant, but everything 
is subject to passing through an endless cycle of life, death and rebirth. These 
facts are not to be lamented or celebrated, merely accepted as a fundamental 
truth.  
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 In the first two scenarios dealing with suffering, the individual tends to 
be seen as existing at odds with his surroundings, set apart, out of step. 
Reconciliation or salvation may or may not be possible, but there is at the very 
outset a tear in the fabric of existence, seen via the perspective of the 
individual. This is because the individual sees via the ‘I’, which is always 
striving to set itself off against the other, the not-self.117 
In Buddhism, the individual is urged to realise the fact that there is no 
self or soul of any lasting or reliable significance, but an unbroken, ceaseless 
stream of events and phenomena in which we are propelled. With every effort 
to preserve, define or contain the self, to set it apart against the not-self, we 
are perpetuating suffering. This is how the individual is responsible for his 
suffering and is the only person who can find salvation. The path leading away 
from suffering starts from an enlightened mind, from the awareness that the 
ego needs to be dissolved, that not-self is the reality, and chasing after self is a 
delusory pursuit doomed to failure. 
2.1.4 Awakening and enlightenment 
The Buddha is not a savior but a guide who teaches the technique of saving 
oneself after having tested it himself. The destiny of man is not controlled by the 
whims of a creator, but by the kind of life he leads, his thoughts, speech and 
actions in accordance with the law of cause and effect.118 
The themes of awakening and enlightenment cannot be overstated in 
Buddhism, as they refer to a nascent understanding of the Dharma, i.e. the 
truth about the way things are. This can arise through one’s own efforts and 
enquiries, be prompted by an external agent, such as a teacher, or be triggered 
by an incident; it can arrive at the end of long contemplation, or it can come in 
a blinding flash. It is both the entry-point into Buddhism and its goal, 
117 Attachment to self, therefore, brings vulnerability: ‘Our greatest fear…is the fear of losing 
our sense of self’. Dzigar Kongtrül, It's Up to You (Boston: Shambhala, 2005), p. 62. 
118 Yogavacara, p. 15. 
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 however, and its lack cannot be substituted by blind faith or expectation of 
grace. Without awakening, we remain in a state of ignorance and no amount of 
effort or application will alleviate our suffering.119 Lack of enlightenment is a 
key feature in Kafka’s work, suggesting how serious the implications are when 
ignorance is perpetuated. In Der Proceß, Josef K. ‘wakes up’ to his arrest, but 
does not awaken from his misguided lifestyle; in Das Schloß, K. falls asleep 
during his interview with Bürgel, but awakens as a new man.  
This initial glimpse of the Dharma is an opening through which the 
individual can begin to improve his life. Awakening is not merely the endpoint 
or goal, but a doorway through to a clearer perspective. The aim of Buddhism 
after the awakening is to nurture this new insight across a whole lifetime of 
vigilance, to extend the awakened moment until it becomes an ever-present 
consciousness or enlightened state.120 In other words, the struggle against 
ignorance is an ongoing process: one must strive to be always mindful. 
Buddhism is named after the Buddha, but it is his teaching (the Dharma) 
not his person that is important. His death did not save lives, and he was not 
sent by God: he was just able to access the truth. This is of fundamental 
importance, because it sets Buddhism apart from Judaeo-Christian thought at 
the outset – there is no cult of personality, of self.121 As the ‘Awakened One’, 
the Buddha is a guide, not a saviour. Accordingly, Buddhism stresses the 
need to develop one’s own powers of understanding and not rely on ‘fremde 
Hilfe’ like Josef K. Some people can wake up at the slightest disturbance, some 
119 Bhikkhu Vimalo (Walter Kulbarz) describes the essence of the Buddha’s doctrine as 
awakening and enlightenment in Awakening to the Truth (Thailand: Annual Publication 
Buddhist Association, 1974). 
120 A good introduction to the aim of Buddhism is provided in Buddhadasa Bhikku’s Handbook 
for Mankind, (Surat Thani: Dhammadana Foundation, 1996). 
121 Sangharakshita goes so far as to eschew the name ‘Buddhism’ in favour of ‘Dhamma-
Vinaya’, translated as ‘principles and practice’, in The Taste of Freedom (Birmingham: 
Windhorse Publications, 1997), p. 9. 
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 need repeated jolts, and others need violent shaking – the same can be said for 
awakening to the Dharma. 
Nirvana, like karma, is a Buddhist concept that is often misunderstood. 
It is not a place to go to or a prize to claim, but represents total attunement to 
emptiness: this ‘dimension’ is here now but obscured by our attachments. The 
aim of Buddhist teaching is to show people how to ‘exit’ lives of suffering 
locked into a cycle of rebirths, or samsara. The first step towards nirvana 
must be made through awareness, through shaking off the fetters of craving, 
attachment and delusion. By clinging to an idea of the self, perpetual 
wandering along the blind alleys of samsara is guaranteed. All the subsequent 
steps are taken in a bid to maintain a state of mindfulness in which 
enlightenment reigns. It is unhelpful to use terms such as ‘access’ and ‘entry’ 
when speaking of nirvana, for this suggests that it is a place. It is rather what 
happens to the individual when the veils of selfhood are lifted and reality can 
be experienced in its purest form, beyond all duality and separation.  
Few of Kafka’s characters get close to experiencing this dimension of 
pure being, because they are all hung up on their self-identity. While striving 
to preserve, define, defend or impose their self, they will automatically find the 
doors to this other realm locked. It is only when they let go of their hungers, 
attachments, obsessions and desires that a kind of peaceful equanimity will 
reign and the dawning insight will illuminate the way. Josef K. was too 
attached to his self – this is the warning given to him on his arrest. He failed to 
take note and pursued his path of trying to establish a clean slate for his self-
image: his downfall was inevitable. In contrast, K. renounced his Castle quest 
and consequently experienced a form of peace and refined insight. There can 
be no talk of nirvana for K., but in beginning the process of letting go of his 
attachment to self, he has progressed further along the path on which Josef K. 
stumbled.  
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 The cornerstones of Western traditions, such as self, justice and freedom, 
are considered desirable and realisable. Buddhism on the other hand stresses 
emptiness because the nature of existence is transitory, ungraspable and 
ultimately inessential. The line taken on these issues impacts on the question 
of what life ‘means’, or what its purpose might be. If one approaches Der 
Proceß from a Christian point of view, Josef K.’s demise would seem terrifying. 
He is arrested without apparent charge and suffers a painful death at the 
hands of Court executioners. Eternal damnation appears to await him. The 
doubts surrounding the nature of Josef K.’s ‘sin’ assume great significance, 
because the rest of eternity hangs on it. What precisely did he do wrong? Is 
this Original Sin? If so, why should Josef K. pay for an inherited crime? Given 
an omniscient creator, such a case is mystifying and tragic, reconcilable only 
through absolute faith in God’s mysterious ways. From a Buddhist viewpoint, 
the ‘crime’ could be ignorant attachment to self, and hence Josef K. suffers an 
appropriate karmic punishment. The ‘sentence’ is not for eternity, but for the 
next life (or lives), with new, fresh karma being accumulated to keep the 
process going, until enlightenment finds a way to stop the cycle from turning. 
The Buddhist reading would then appear less pessimistic. 
The Judaeo-Christian mindset is founded on the ‘Word’ – the law or 
organising principle established by a supreme authority. It assumes a purpose 
for the universe, complete with a plan, in which we all figure. This reach for 
meaning may outstrip the human spiritual and intellectual grasp, but it is 
reasoned that theoretically an answer is ‘there’, and so efforts to find the 
answer are sanctioned as positive or life-affirming. In the world of science, it is 
held that human beings should strive towards an understanding of this 
supreme ‘Truth’, and that the tools of reason and logic will eventually succeed 
in unlocking the door to a comprehension of what life is all about. In the world 
of religion, it is considered acceptable to use faith to bridge the gap between 
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 what we can know and what we cannot know – trust in the ultimate 
benevolence of the Creator. In either case, knowable or not, the assumption is 
that an absolute meaning exists. In contrast, Buddhism tends to keep silent 
on metaphysical matters and prefers to turn its attention inwards in an 
attempt to understand what goes on in our own bodies and minds; indeed, it 
is insight into the truths and fears underlying our individual existence which 
holds the key to understanding the universe as a whole.  
Buddhism thus sidesteps the question of life’s purpose, a response which 
would most likely be met with dismay from Judaeo-Christian quarters. To a 
Zen student, the question ‘Why are we here?’ is misguided and ranks 
alongside koans such as ‘What is the sound of one hand clapping?’, a non-
sequitur guaranteed to meet with bafflement. The question might be answered 
with reference to the here-and-now because, according to Buddhist 
philosophy, we only have access to the flux of the present moment. Nirvana 
has no place, but it does have a time and that is the present. The Western 
‘carpe diem’ is a self-oriented philosophy which urges us to live now and 
accumulate as many ‘present victories’ as possible. But this can become an 
attachment to opportunity, a pitfall K. eventually learns to avoid when he 
stops ‘displacing’ his self into the future where satisfaction awaits. His 
rejection of displacement should not be seen as defeatist, but a positive 
endorsement of non-attachment.  
Buddhism focuses on ‘the moment’, but its ‘meaning’ is devoid of 
personal qualities and attachments, and this is the fundamental difference. 
Meditation is a key practice in the search for enlightenment, not because it 
delves deep into the mind to unlock rational understanding and insight, but 
because it switches off the mind’s activity, stalls its thinking, freezes thought 
to allow the flux of the moment to flow without being constrained by personal 
ties.  
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 This goes some way to explaining K.’s ‘victory’ in Das Schloß. In Western 
terms it is a hollow victory because he has won nothing except perhaps his 
dignity in not bowing to the Castle. In Buddhist eyes, K. is free to live his life 
differently – his failure to conquer the Castle is a failure to ‘take the bait’ of 
attachment, as he swims past Bürgel’s dangling hook. 
2.2 The text as a tripwire 
The attainment of enlightenment from ego’s point of view is extreme death, the 
death of self, the death of me and mine, the death of the watcher. It is the 
ultimate and final disappointment. Treading the spiritual path is painful. It is 
constant unmasking, peeling off of layer after layer of masks. It involves insult 
after insult.122 
In the above quotation, Trungpa’s stark warning about the hardships to be 
endured on the path to enlightenment is intended as preparatory guidance for 
the individual about to embark on a spiritual journey. The words contain an 
uncomfortable but candid message, delivered in an illocutionary style, and the 
insults referred to describe the assault on the self that accompanies the path 
to insight.  
Zen masters tend to be direct with their insults, as shown by Shunryu 
Suzuki Roshi’s reply when pressed by a follower for guidance on the subject of 
enlightenment: ‘What do you want to know for? You may not like it.’123 This 
classic Zen response illustrates the perlocutionary technique employed in 
many koans and bears more than a passing resemblance to Kafka’s short 
piece, Gibs Auf, discussed below. In barely a dozen words, Suzuki deflects a 
simple request for information about an important Buddhist concept with a 
precision attack on two pillars of Western philosophy: ‘know’ and ‘like’. First, 
the issue surrounding ‘wanting to know’ is telling because the presence of 
122 Chögyam Trungpa, The Myth of Freedom, p. 6. 
123 Quotation at www.quangduc.com/English/basic/14dharma.html#What is enlightenment. 
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 ‘want’ flags up the point that enlightenment cannot be achieved through 
selfhood, the seat of desire. Second, the value of ‘knowing’ is questioned: as an 
intellectual exercise, it has limitations in being able to effect understanding of 
emptiness. In similar vein to Suzuki, Seung Sahn deployed the refrain ‘don’t 
know’ on a regular basis, to communicate to his students that he did not have 
all the answers, that it was not necessary to have all the answers, and that it 
was often beneficial not to have any answers. Third, Suzuki’s masterstroke is 
to associate the pursuit of enlightenment with the pursuit of pleasure. As 
Trungpa suggests above, understanding emptiness will be a hard slog and 
result in the death of self. Those people who seek nirvana because it is viewed 
as a heavenly paradise are completely misguided, so Suzuki confronts this 
‘desire’ directly.  
2.2.1 Koan effect 
‘You talked about the first principle again, but I still don't know what it is,’ I said 
to Suzuki. ‘I don't know,’ he said, ‘is the first principle.’124 
The koan’s chief weapon is its unsettling effect, and it can be deployed in 
different types of texts from single-line aphorisms to full-length novels. 
Accordingly, it is not just Kafka’s aphorisms themselves which bear the 
hallmarks of Zen techniques, but other elements in Kafka’s work achieve a 
similar effect, from short pieces such as Gibs Auf, to longer narratives such as 
Ein Hungerkünstler.  
Through the koan’s nonsensical and paradoxical features, its 
perlocutionary effects could ‘migrate’ to other genres. If it were in fact possible 
to have such a thing as a 200-page koan, it might read like Der Proceß.125 The 
work would become an extended paradox designed to ‘arrest’ readers, to jolt 
124 Quotation at www.tumblr.com/tagged/shunryu%20suzuki?before=39. 
125 In Reading Emptiness Humphries floats the idea of ‘a vast koan’ when he considers the 
impact of Proust’s A la Recherche du Temps Perdu. 
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 them out of their misperceptions of the world, their role in it and relationship 
to it. Furthermore, where Kafka’s work resists conventional philological 
definition and interpretation, it does not have to be a sign of how painful the 
human condition is, but can be taken as corroborative evidence of koan-like 
qualities, aimed at dissolving attachment to self. 
Just as the ‘cumulative’ packets of information built up through 
illocutionary readings can eventually lead to understanding, so can the 
cumulative effects of exposure to paradoxical koans lead to enlightenment. No 
Zen master would insist that hearing a single koan would bring a flash of 
understanding of the Dharma (though it is not impossible): reading koans for 
enlightenment is not like trying different keys in a lock and hoping for access. 
In fact, it could be said that none of the keys/koans will ever ‘fit’ the lock and 
the point of the practice is to realise this. It is the repeated ‘hits’ and failed 
access which break down dependence on orthodox thinking and open up the 
path to not-self and emptiness. 
In terms of reading literature, if the illocutionary approach arranges 
jigsaw pieces to form a picture, the perlocutionary approach makes sure there 
are pieces missing, duplicated or misshapen. For an intellectual 
understanding, all the pieces fit together in some way and each piece relates to 
others around it; to block this route, Zen alters the pieces so that they appear 
superficially to fit, but on closer inspection fail to build up to a coherent 
whole. Thus the Zen koan acts as a perlocutionary aphorism, deliberately 
refusing to deliver an intelligible message.  
According to Iser, the reader engages with a text through its gaps, and in 
this respect Kafka’s work offers the reader plenty of points of entry, though the 
gaps tend to frustrate, rather than stimulate. In Iser’s analysis of the reading 
process, the conventional aphorism would be classified as a didactic text, 
because there is little work for the reader to do, no gap in which to formulate 
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 his interpretation – all the jigsaw pieces are supplied by the author, and no 
contribution is needed from the reader. In contrast, much of Kafka’s aphoristic 
writing carries a non-standard quality that bears comparison with Zen’s 
perlocutionary koans. This explains why reading Kafka can sometimes be an 
uncomfortable experience, with paradoxical statements and unexpected twists 
in the narrative, often producing cyclical (some might say repetitive) rather 
than linear paths. From a Zen perspective, such writing would be deemed 
successful, as it would have delivered its perlocutionary moment in the 
reader’s confusion. If it transpires that a reader ‘enjoys’ the uneasy ride 
through the tales of suffering or the all-pervading sense of gloom in a text, the 
medium has failed to deliver a ‘glimpse of emptiness’, or rather has ‘only’ 
succeeded in imparting an intellectual ‘truth’ on an illocutionary level (e.g. we 
are doomed to suffer). 
Reading Kafka’s work as a Buddhist would demand the same approach 
as ‘doing anything’ as a Buddhist: with awareness or mindfulness. The gaps, 
paradoxes and contradictions which litter Kafka’s work function as obstacles 
to arriving at meaning, and hence reveal ‘emptiness’. Here, the practice of 
meditation can be informative for it offers a method of mental distillation 
which strips away the myriad concerns of the mind and focuses on the reality 
of ‘the present moment’. When the mind ‘thinks’, its engagement encompasses 
a swirl of people, places, moods and countless other elements that race 
around in an overwhelming matrix of impulses which feed back values to the 
self, the ‘me’. In meditation, the object is to become aware of the swirl without 
getting entangled in it, to filter out references to the past and links to the 
future, leaving a purified moment.  
To ‘read’ as a Buddhist the principles of not-self and mindfulness are 
important. This explains the efficacy of koans for Zen purposes because these 
paradoxical statements encompass the irreverence, suffering and challenge 
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 that enquirers must face. Typically brief and aphoristic, koans do not hold a 
series of ‘views’ to be learned, but are delivered for the performance. If the 
reader is the batsman, the koan is a type of ball that is difficult to ‘read’ or 
deal with, like a ‘googly’ causes confusion by veering off in an unexpected 
direction.  
Felix Greß notes this constructive use of paradox in Kafka. Rather than 
deploy paradox as ‘das sprachliche Zugeständnis der Hilflosigkeit gegenüber 
den Forderungen der Transzendenz’, Kafka finds it possible ‘vom 
Inkommensurablen zu reden’.126 For Greß, Kafka uses this technique of 
oblique references to help grasp the normally inaccessible: ‘er dient den Lesern 
als Signal und Hinweis, das Dargestellte nicht wörtlich zu nehmen.’127 This is 
akin to the perlocutionary effect of a Zen koan, as it tries to ‘refract’ 
understanding past conventional thinking into a different dimension.  
The individual who is unable to ‘read’ the koan has no room to 
manoeuvre into a position of safety or comfort, for the only options available 
are all similarly disquieting, illogical and threatening. This already sounds 
Kafkaesque, but the suffering induced in the listener/reader is not intended to 
represent the meaning of life, but its reality.128 There are two elements to the 
koan, its text and its effect, with the text typically non-sense and the effect 
usually confusion, and it could be said that the art of the koan lies in the 
latter. The Western reader, for example, might wonder what the text signifies, 
searching within his self if necessary for clues to help unlock any potential 
meaning. Sooner or later, the Zen reader learns to discount the text as 
inherently meaningless and notes that the resultant unease is not a 
representation of anything but the essence of the impermanent nature of being 
126 Felix Greß, Die gefährdete Freiheit (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1994), p. 24. 
127 Ibid., p. 24. 
128 The prison chaplain says as much about ‘the Law’ to Josef K. in Der Proceß: ‘Man muß 
nicht alles für wahr halten, man muß es nur für notwendig halten’ (p. 303). 
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 and meaning.129 This non-sense should not then be turned into ‘some thing’, 
but simply understood as the reality behind all things: emptiness. As long as 
this truth is kept in mind, the self will not suffer because all attachments, 
cravings, desires and fears will dissolve in the face of this universal 
characteristic. 
2.2.2 Kafka’s koans 
It is foolish to try to interpret Kafka. The text is there to read, not to be 
interpreted. […] What it refers to does not exist. A work affirms only its 
inessential essence, a nothing or a silence.130 
The short piece known as Gibs Auf (1922) is open to a variety of illocutionary 
interpretations which would attempt to decipher its meaning by evaluating its 
semantic content.131 A Buddhist reader, for example, would highlight ‘Weg’, 
‘Schutzmann’ and ‘gibs auf’ as key words and use them to determine the sense 
of the text. In this case, the narrator is seeking the way, but feeling lost and 
flustered in an unfamiliar location. The policeman should be there to offer 
protection as his name suggests, but he surprisingly declines to help, and 
furthermore advises the narrator to give up. There is no indication that the 
policeman does not know the way, but his response instead pinpoints the 
narrator’s dependency: ‘Von mir willst du den Weg erfahren?’ (my italics). The 
Buddha insisted on the importance of self-reliance and discovering the path 
for ourselves: you cannot borrow somebody else’s eyes to help you see, as 
Josef K. was warned about chasing ‘fremde Hilfe’. Here, the policeman 
assumes Buddha status in his refusal to ‘spoon-feed’ the lost soul. This 
129 Chung-Ying Cheng offers the following view: ‘The semantic incongruity […] in a Zen paradox 
leads the mind of the hearer to a state where he realizes that he could not and should not 
attach any reference to the given semantic structure.’ Thus, the hearer should look into ‘an 
uncategorizable ontological structure of no specific reference which has been referred to as the 
ultimate reality of self-nature or mind’ (pp. 91-92). 
130 Van Meter Ames, ‘Art for Art’s Sake Again?’ in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
Vol 3, No. 3 (Spring, 1975), p. 305. 
131 Published as ‘Ein Kommentar’ in Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente (Vol. 2), ed. Jost 
Schillemeit (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1992), p. 530. 
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 approach sees the way to enlightenment as a tightrope; so narrow is the way, 
that it only supports a single traveller.  
From a perlocutionary angle, a Buddhist reading would come to a similar 
conclusion about the arduous path to insight, but via a different route. Rather 
than inviting the reader to edge along the tightrope of meaning, the text trips 
him up with its message simply ‘to give up’. The text (koan) is constructed in 
such a way that the final words of the policeman are expressed independently 
of any other utterance, and thus it is ambiguous whether the narrator should 
give up his search for the station or abandon the quest (for the way) 
altogether. The unsatisfactoriness of the reply stems from associating ‘gibs auf’ 
with directions, spiritual guidance or any other specific object. The command 
‘gibs auf’ takes on a negative charge and invites a pessimistic reading. 
However, it should be noted that the policeman is smiling as he responds, so 
his apparent lack of helpfulness could actually be a calculated attempt to 
divert the narrator from a misguided course: in true Zen style, this guide urges 
the lost traveller to shun the straight and narrow and offers the more 
expansive advice: give up the quest (attachment). In similar fashion, Artur and 
Jeremias are sent to ‘distract’ K., who takes his Castle crusade too seriously. 
Roy Pascal’s understanding of Gibs Auf displays distinctly Zen features 
as he explains how we are left ‘baffled’ when ‘the normal assumption of order, 
upon which we build our daily existence, is suddenly shattered’.132 He goes on 
to describe ‘a general experience of incipient lostness and isolation’, but his 
bewilderment informs a negative illocutionary message, in ‘the repeated 
existence of being abandoned’.133 With a koan, however, bewilderment is the 
intended ‘reaction’ and does not form the basis of any ‘meaning’. This 
132 Roy Pascal, Kafka’s Narrators: A Study of his Stories and Sketches (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), pp. 160-61. 
133 Ibid., p. 161. 
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 perlocutionary effect is produced by the link between the phrase ‘gibs auf’ 
(surrender, admit defeat) and its issue from the mouth of a trusted figure of 
authority. The incongruity can be defused by breaking the link, either treating 
‘gibs auf’ as a ‘standalone’ utterance (let go, of attachments generally), or 
becoming independent of the authority figure. The same can be seen in other 
areas of Kafka’s work, where an apparent paradox with its negative 
connotations often disguises a more palatable reading, such as K.’s 
‘conversion’ at the end of Das Schloß. K.’s victory dream seems at odds with 
his dashed hopes of entry into the Castle, but the final scenes exude an 
equanimity and peace that suggest his letting go was in fact a triumph. 
Gibs Auf serves as a good example of perlocutionary effect with its 
apparent exhortation to surrender. In the face of the unknown and the 
unknowable, the text invites a negative interpretation, but a Buddhist reader 
would detect a subtle caution against craving direction (meaning), and this 
awareness wards off the dangers of attachment.134 As a kind of Zen roadblock, 
the koan is not there to stop us from reaching our goals, but to make us 
question the point of our goals. The tripwire in Kafka’s Gibs Auf works in a 
similar way: ‘Quite possibly there is no such thing as spiritual practice except 
stepping out of self-deception, stopping our struggle to get hold of spiritual 
states. Just give that up’ (my italics).135 
2.3 Scope 
The spiritual journey, then, is a journey of detachment, a process of learning 
how to let go. All of our problems, miseries, and unhappiness are caused by 
fixation - latching onto things and not being able to release them.136 
134 Christian Goodden makes this point in another context: ‘The quest and all it stands for 
must be renounced’, from ‘The Great Wall of China: The Elaboration of an Intellectual Dilemma’, 
in Franz Kuna, ed., On Kafka: Semi-Centenary Perspectives (London: Paul Elek, 1976), p. 142. 
135 Trungpa, The Myth of Freedom, p. 150. 
136 Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/letting-go. 
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 If we separate Kafka’s writing into three phases, the scope of this dissertation 
will concentrate on the middle phase from Der Proceß, through his Zürau 
aphorisms, to a selection of his later works. This thesis contends that the 
aphorisms occupy a pivotal position in Kafka’s literary output, not because 
they define his personal philosophy, but rather because they signpost a 
development in his sensibilities, moving from expressions displaying mixed 
elements of Western and Buddhist-type thought in his earlier works, to a style 
and delivery close to certain Buddhist practices in his later writing. The 
aphorisms show a shift in themes from initial reservations about how the 
individual can live in a dualistic world to a heightened appreciation of the 
demands and dangers of attaching to self. This transition in Kafka’s work and 
its growing affinity with Buddhist ideas can be charted as it moves broadly 
across early, middle and late periods, measured by its coincidence with the 
stages of The Four Noble Truths.  
Kafka’s early writing includes Das Urteil, Die Verwandlung and In der 
Strafkolonie, and the themes covered run from judgment, punishment and 
guilt, to paternal authority and family constraints. As Ritchie Robertson 
suggests, there is a wide range of concerns, from specific social issues such as 
‘the nature of life in the contemporary urban and industrialized world’, to 
‘psychological and moral problems’, which touched on his own experience.137 
The mood is dark and uncompromising, with a clear representation of The 
First Noble Truth of suffering. While Das Urteil is considered Kafka’s literary 
breakthrough, the early texts show few signs of progressing beyond the stage 
of identification with suffering and developing the ‘skillful’ outlook linked to 
non-attachment. 
137 Ritchie Robertson, Kafka: Judaism, Politics and Literature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), p. 85. 
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 Der Proceß marks the next phase in Kafka’s work, where the mood 
remains sombre, but the earlier issues surrounding judgment and guilt have 
taken on a broader sweep, beyond the personal. Josef K. wrestles with 
authority, but his troubles cannot be traced back to a paternal or social 
source; he resists punishment, but his claim of innocence is not justified. In 
terms of guilt, the arrest without charge suggests that life itself is on trial, 
rather than a specific act within it. There are flashes of insight and narrative 
irony which suggest that Josef K. is on the wrong track and needs to stop 
blaming external influences for his suffering. This shift in emphasis to an 
analysis of cause marks progression towards The Second Noble Truth, which 
focuses on craving as the root of suffering. 
Accordingly, the textual analysis will start with Der Proceβ, which can be 
seen as a spiritual breakthrough, as it has moved beyond the representation of 
suffering to an analysis of its cause, a feature which becomes more prominent 
in his subsequent work. After Der Proceß, Kafka wrote a series of aphorisms 
which touch on issues across the spectrum from suffering to the path away 
from it. It is significant that Jeff Humphries in his study of how to read as a 
Buddhist proposed Kafka’s aphoristic paradoxes as the style most suited to 
communicating the experience of emptiness: ‘The closest that Western 
thought, or deconstruction, ever comes to reaching beyond its limitations has 
been in this kind of style: some of the work of Franz Kafka, for instance.’138 
In the final phase, which includes composition of Das Schloß, there is a 
more distinct movement away from the personal, individual quest for self-
definition, and progress towards release or enlightenment through detachment 
from delusion. In other words, there are chinks of light, as exemplified by K.’s 
rejection of the quest after the episode with Bürgel, and this suggests 
138 Humphries, p. 28. 
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 development towards The Third Noble Truth of cessation. The theme of 
judgment recedes further into the background and the foreground is occupied 
with issues concerning the nature of existence itself, the relationship between 
the individual and his self, rather than his location in the wider community. 
Robertson describes Kafka’s late fiction as ‘for the most part quiet and 
restrained’ and also notes an increased propensity towards ‘reflection’.139 I will 
later draw attention to K.’s growing powers of reflection in Das Schloβ, as his 
struggle with the Castle authorities oscillates between periods of action and 
contemplation, and in Ein Hungerkünstler, where two narrators ponder the 
challenges they face with sober, stoic commentaries. 
The next four chapters will read selections of Kafka’s work using the two 
Buddhist methods outlined above: an illocutionary approach to gauge the 
impact of spiritual guidance – this path constitutes the tightrope; and a 
perlocutionary approach to test whether the textual incongruities and 
paradoxes can be linked to the Zen practice of deliberate confusion, to wean 
the reader off attachment to meaningfulness – this constitutes the tripwire. 
Given the limitations of space and the different concerns of Kafka’s 
earlier fiction, the texts chosen for study are Der Proceß and Das Schloß to 
represent the novels, the collection Ein Hungerkünstler for examples of shorter 
pieces, and the Zürau aphorisms for a non-narrative style. I aim to show in 
greater detail how suffering in Kafka’s work presents a focused running 
commentary on how we are slaves to our selves, captives of our cravings. 
Kafka wrote page after page of commentary on how human beings continue to 
search blindly for a truth which is already at hand, should they just take a 
moment to open their eyes and behold it. Kafka was not a philosopher, but he 
did not need to be in order to create texts which speak in a Buddhist 
139 Robertson, Kafka: Judaism, p. 273. 
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 ‘language’: he investigated individual fixations on selfhood, caused by the 
deluded dependence on the ever-hungry ego. However, the major effect of 
Kafka’s art is the way it translates suffering into the reading experience, and 
for this reason his fiction, especially from Der Proceß onwards, reveals a 
Buddhist sensibility which supports McCort’s description of him as a Zen 
master.  
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 Chapter 3 Der Proceß 
3.1 Introduction 
Zen master: Do not search for truth. Just stop having opinions.140 
In the previous chapter, two approaches to reading Kafka were suggested to 
show how different interpretations can be formed of his work. The 
illocutionary method (information/illustration) indicates an analytical, rational 
approach, which tries to explain the ideas being presented; the perlocutionary 
method (performance/demonstration), on the other hand, represents an 
intuitive approach which tries to induce a spiritual understanding beyond 
thinking. From a Buddhist perspective, Der Proceß marks an important 
milestone in Kafka’s writing because it showcases a prevalence of 
perlocutionary effects which help develop insight into such universal laws as 
not-self and impermanence, by immersing the individual (the character within 
the text as well as the reader without) in an unfamiliar and uncomfortable 
environment where those laws prevail.  
From its opening lines, Der Proceß raises issues which go to the heart of 
all philosophical systems – is there such a thing as justice per se and how is it 
administered? By launching the novel with an arrest without a charge, a quest 
is set in motion to establish innocence or guilt. Josef K. (and the reader) 
proceeds to gather intelligence via a variety of sources: Court officials and 
employees, clients, acquaintances, as well as pronouncements, parables and 
anecdotes. None of this information seems to explain what Josef K. has been 
arrested for, why he in particular has been targeted, and how he can extricate 
himself from this predicament.  
140 Timothy Freke in Christopher Titmuss, ed., Sons and Daughters of the Buddha: Daily 
Meditations from the Buddhist Tradition (London: Rider, 2002), p. 20. 
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 An illocutionary analysis of Der Proceß would examine the content of the 
information presented directly in the text, the messages communicated by the 
various characters and the narrator. This information is open to 
(mis)interpretation because words and phrases have different shades of 
meaning and can be read in different ways, but the ‘source’ of the information 
at least is distinct. There cannot therefore be a single ‘correct’ evaluation of 
illocutionary messages, but many versions, depending on how the information 
is collected and managed.141  
Little in the world of the Court points to answers that would satisfy 
concerns regarding the security of the self, and from this aspect it is 
understandable to see Josef K.’s death as an unfair and excessive 
punishment. For Heinz Politzer, the novel presents a gloomy outlook because 
it is ‘an indictment of a world order where authorities lie’, and the 
impenetrability of the Court and the mystery of K.’s guilt are major flaws 
which leave Josef K. at the mercy of a ‘dubious justice’.142 The only route to 
salvation left open is that of trust. God can never be ‘known’ by an intellect as 
limited as a human’s, so a leap of faith may help negotiate instances of 
extreme and meaningless suffering.143 
Christian Eschweiler, however, takes the opposite view and believes his 
reworked edition of the novel uncovers significant sources of hope. Two major 
revisions are to place the cathedral chapter with its illuminating parable ‘Vor 
dem Gesetz’ as a fulcrum in a central position, and to include the ‘embraced 
death’ of ‘Ein Traum’ as a counterweight to the ‘imposed execution’ of ‘Ende’. 
141 For Sokel, ‘the trial is a summons to interpretation which cannot consist in passively seeing 
what is there, but rather in an urge to search for meaning which the seeker must provide for 
himself’. Walter H. Sokel, ‘Dual Perspective in The Trial’ in William J. Dodd, ed., Kafka: The 
Metamorphosis, The Trial and The Castle (New York: Longman, 1995), p. 111. 
142 Heinz Politzer, Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 
163. 
143 John Kelly sees guilt and salvation in the novel, in ‘The Trial and the Theology of Crisis’, in 
Angel Flores, ed., The Kafka Problem (New York: Gordian Press, 1975), pp. 151-71. 
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 Although mankind is torn between two opposing worlds, ‘der sterblichen der 
Natur und der unsterblichen des Geistes’,144 redemption can be found through 
‘die geistige Auszeichnung des Menschen’.145 By finding a way to embrace 
death, man can have the last word: ‘Deshalb ist der Mensch im Weltbild 
Kafkas dazu bestimmt, leben zu müssen and sterben zu wollen, um überleben 
zu können’.146  
From a Buddhist perspective, there is also hope in the text, but it can be 
found in all editions because Josef K.’s self-centred ignorance stands out as a 
warning of ‘unskillful’ behaviour. As K.’s trial unfolds, a number of key 
Buddhist concepts emerge, such as The Three Universal Characteristics, The 
Four Noble Truths and Dependent Origination. The Law of the Court is not so 
much a collection of discrete rules and regulations relating to specific 
misdemeanours, but a philosophy which governs everyday lives and in this 
respect it bears comparison with the natural laws of the Dharma. 
Josef K. misunderstands his ‘Verhaftung’ and wonders how he can be 
arrested and go about his normal life, because he misconstrues the law in 
accordance with which he is being judged. K. ignores all the cues about paying 
more attention to himself and assumes he is dealing with a criminal charge. 
Unable to understand what this very peculiar ‘Proceß’ says about him, K. 
determines that there must be something wrong with the authority from which 
the arrest order issues. K. is sent messages from sources that offer a different 
view, but he is too narrow-minded and self-preoccupied to take heed. First, 
the warders pick up on the contradiction between K.’s reflex protests of 
innocence and his admission that he does not know anything about this 
‘Gesetz’. Second, even Frau Grubach can see that the arrest may do K. some 
144 Eschweiler, Kosmos, p. 13. 
145 Ibid., p. 15. 
146 Ibid., p. 13. 
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 good: ‘Es handelt sich ja um Ihr Glück’ (DP 33), an assessment lost on K., who 
dismisses the event as insignificant.147 
If the law of the trial is taken to be a kind of natural law, it makes sense 
that K. can carry on with his life ‘ungestört’. In fact, his life is not undisturbed 
at all, but has been turned upside-down by the arrest. The absence of physical 
incarceration gives the impression that nothing has happened, but in truth 
nothing is the same now. His guilt issues from not seeing the Dharma, and his 
suffering grows with every moment of ignorance.  
The perlocutionary force of the novel is strong for many passages have a 
koan-like quality, in that they pose questions which are unanswerable or 
provide answers which are questionable. These instances range from the 
particular (e.g. Huld’s bewildering explanations of legal action) to the general 
(the nature of the Law). A Buddhist reader can assume that the confusion is 
set as a deliberate challenge to conventional ways of thinking. The subsequent 
feelings of disorientation and frustration should lead to an abandonment of 
attachment to self and realisation of the Dharma. This awakening is not an 
invitation to destroy cherished notions such as self, justice and good, but 
brings insight into the essential emptiness of all phenomena. The work as a 
whole resembles a Zen koan as it pushes readers to the point where logic and 
other traditional mainstays no longer offer reliable solutions and relax their 
hold.  
From a Buddhist perspective, both methods of approach support a 
skillful interpretation of the novel: they show that the prospect of an 
impersonal, universal Law governing existence is nothing to fear if our ties 
with selfhood are cut. The text makes ‘thinking’ difficult, blocking attempts at 
147 Franz Kafka, Der Proceß, ed. Malcolm Pasley (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1990). Hereafter, 
references will be taken from this edition and marked as DP, followed by the page number. 
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 constructing a reliable framework of principles, because attachment to fixed 
ideas results in enslavement to illusions.  
As the story unfolds, K. walks a series of ‘tightropes and tripwires’ where 
certain messages are communicated to him, although in each case it appears 
that he fails to respond or show understanding. When reason and logic cannot 
communicate the Dharma, the perlocutionary countermeasure is to abandon 
rational argument. As a kind of spiritual medicine, the Zen koan is a bitter pill 
that provides a dose of illogicality, to help abandon attachment to cherished 
principles. A Buddhist reading of this text would see the action unfold in the 
following stages: 
• Arrest: what it means and how Josef K. should deal with it 
• Law: the philosophy underpinning the Court and its nature  
• Consequences: cause and effect in the law and its demonstration to K. 
• Guidance: advice about how Josef K. could approach his trial 
• Closure: the reasons for Josef K.’s suffering and the trial’s conclusion. 
3.2 Tightropes (illocutionary approach) 
As the Buddhist view has consistently demonstrated, it is the perspective of the 
sufferer that determines whether a given experience perpetuates suffering or is 
a vehicle for awakening.148 
The illocutionary tightropes serve to show how Josef K. lacks awareness of his 
condition. He is presented with numerous opportunities to reflect upon his life 
and take steps to improve it, but instead he becomes defensive and arrogant, 
refusing to accept that he could be at fault. A Buddhist reading scrutinises the 
given environment for evidence of impermanence, suffering and not-self, and 
determines how far attachment and ignorance have taken root. As K. proceeds 
along the tightrope seeking an explanation of his arrest and vindication of his 
148 Mark Epstein in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/changing-ones-view. 
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 innocence, he reacts to passing signs as indications of truth or falsehood, 
friend or foe, gain or loss, and struggles when no clear answer is forthcoming. 
This dualistic appraisal of his situation contrasts with a Buddhist assessment, 
which reads the signs as fragments of the truth, and empty of reliable 
meaning. Josef K.’s pride and obstinacy are important factors in determining 
how he handles unwelcome situations (by finding blame elsewhere) or behaves 
towards other people (whether they might be useful in his case). He dismisses, 
misreads or simply misses the advice and experiences that come his way, and 
fails to negotiate a path out of ignorance to a more insightful perspective.  
3.2.1 Arrest 
Our difficulties are not obstacles to the path; they are the path itself. They are 
opportunities to awaken. Can we learn what it means to welcome an unwanted 
situation, with its sense of groundlessness, as a wake-up call?149 
The theme of awakening and its associated dawning of insight is central to 
Buddhism and holds a special significance for Kafka, for whom ‘the ritual of 
life […] begins with the sudden awakening, with a complete realization that 
everything is different from what it was in the previous instant’.150 This view is 
reflected in the very beginning of Der Proceß, when K. is captured from his life 
of ignorance: waking in the morning is a pivotal moment identified with 
‘coming to consciousness’.151 For a Buddhist, failing to awaken means that we 
remain in a state of ignorance, condemned to lead a life plagued by suffering, 
caused by our attachment to impermanent things.  
K. has ample opportunities to learn, observe and reflect, though he lets 
the chances pass by. The first tightrope, and perhaps the most significant and 
illuminating, is the arrest. There are essentially three scenes, each of which 
149 Ezra Bayda in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/follow-difficult-path. 
150 George H. Szanto, Narrative Consciousness: Structure and Perception in the Fiction of Kafka, 
Beckett, and Robbe-Grillet (Austin: University of Texas, 1972), p. 20. 
151 Ibid., p. 20. 
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 sheds light on the admittedly unusual situation: the unannounced home visit, 
the interview with the supervisor (‘Aufseher’), and the brief conversation with 
Frau Grubach. 
The first people K. interacts with on his ‘awakening’ are two ‘Wächter’ 
and their supervisor. They have been sent precisely to wake K. up from his 
sleepwalking through life, from his ignorance of the nature of reality, and to 
keep an eye on how he deals with his trial. When later recounting the scene to 
Fräulein Bürstner, K. confirms the role of the supervisor: ‘Der Aufseher ruft 
als ob er mich wecken müßte’ (DP 45). 
No information is supplied – to the reader or to K. – as to the precise 
details of the arrest: why it has happened, who the arresting authorities are 
and what it concerns. We are not told for it is not important. What is 
important is the announcement and Josef K.’s reaction to this unexpected 
event. Despite an initial ‘Warum denn?’ the main question for K. appears to be 
who is bringing the charge, and not the nature of the charge itself. K. 
considers the matter of his guilt a side-issue: ‘die Hauptfrage ist: von wem bin 
ich angeklagt?’ (DP 21). This is at odds with the Buddha’s advice to avoid 
unnecessary speculation.152 The warders and the supervisor, however, deflect 
K.’s preoccupation with authority and seek to lead him back to the main 
purpose of the arrest, which is to wake him up.  
The precise nature of the ‘Verhaftung’ needs some examination as there 
is plenty of talk of arrest in the novel, but little of any specific charge relating 
to it. The first mention of ‘verhaftet’ comes in the opening sentence and 
appears as the consequence of an alleged ‘Verleumdung’. This is the only time 
152 The Buddha preferred to keep silent rather than speculate over metaphysical questions, 
urging his disciples towards practical efforts: ‘Suppose a man is struck by a poisoned arrow and 
the doctor wishes to take out the arrow immediately. Suppose the man does not want the arrow 
removed until he knows who shot it, his age, his parents, and why he shot it. What would 
happen? If he were to wait until all these questions have been answered, the man might die 
first.’ Thich Nhat Hanh at www.thebuddhistblog.blogspot.co.uk/2006/08/teaching-of-poisoned-
arrow.html. 
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 anything specific is offered to shed light on the arrest, and it appears as 
conjecture, perhaps reporting the view of Josef K., who remains convinced of 
his blamelessness. In protesting his innocence, however, Josef K. 
inadvertently walks into an ‘ego’ trap that aggravates his suffering. K. can 
maintain – quite genuinely – that he has committed no specific wrongdoing, 
has nothing to hide and is wearing no mask.153 The nightmarish scenario for 
the Judaeo-Christian reader is that there are no grounds to doubt K.’s 
sincerity, but there is also no ‘evidence’ against him: the fault must therefore 
lie with the Court, but this cannot be proved.  
Buddhism offers a way out of this impasse by noting the inherent self-
delusion in any claim to being ‘true to one’s self’ as there is no fixed self to 
which we can refer. The Court’s arrest brings suffering because it is in effect 
an ‘unmasking’ of the self, but not in the manner of peeling off a layer of 
deception to reveal the truth below: it is the painful removal of the last 
bulwark that separates ‘us’ from everything ‘else’. The arrest simply informs K. 
of this attachment to self, but rather than develop his powers of insight to 
reach a happy conclusion, he becomes defensive and perceives an attack of 
defamation: his reputation, his good name, his entire ‘being’ has come under 
threat and must be protected. 
After the first mention of the word ‘verhaftet’, Warder Willem gives a 
simple but clear explanation of the situation. The warders cannot explain ‘why’ 
K. has been arrested (that is not their job, they cannot know the ins and outs 
of K.’s life): they are just there to inform K. of the proceedings now underway. 
In kindly terms that the average arresting officer would not use with a 
suspected criminal, Willem takes pains to reassure K. with some friendly 
153 Lionel Trilling discusses the ‘unmasking trend’, an intellectual tendency to reveal the 
‘underlying truth’ of the unconscious mind and search for ‘deception and self-deception’. Lionel 
Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 141. 
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 advice: ‘Sie werden alles zur richtigen Zeit erfahren. Ich gehe über meinen 
Auftrag hinaus, wenn ich Ihnen so freundschaftlich zurede’ (DP 9). 
Reinforcing the message to wake up, Warder Franz adds, ‘Sie werden 
noch einsehn, wie wahr das alles ist’ (DP 10). K. will hopefully gain insight into 
the truth. K., however, pays no attention to these words (‘achtete auf diese 
Reden kaum’) and instead sets about annoying the warders with issues that 
are ‘nutzlos’, such as demanding a ‘Verhaftbefehl’ and producing his birth 
certificate (as if proof of being born exonerates one from guilt). The warders 
simply repeat their initial line – that they are there to ‘keep watch’, keep K. 
awake, focused on his state of ‘Verhaftung’ or attachment.154 
The theme of being awake is also served in the opening chapter by 
several references to a lack of ‘Geistesgegenswart’ and to ‘Zerstreutheit’, 
further evidence that K. leads his life without any clarity of thought. K. is 
thrown by the appearance of some bank staff in his apartment, to the extent 
that he then does not notice the supervisor leave: ‘Viel Geistesgegenwart 
bewies das nicht und K. nahm sich vor, sich in dieser Hinsicht genauer zu 
beobachten’ (DP 29). In addition, K. suggests to Frau Grubach that he could 
never have suffered such an arrest had he been in the bank, where he is alert: 
‘vor allem bin ich dort immerfort im Zusammenhang der Arbeit, daher 
geistesgegenwärtig, es würde mir geradezu ein Vergnügen machen dort einer 
solchen Sache gegenübergestellt zu werden’ (DP 34). In other words, he 
attributes his being ‘caught’ to not being ‘vorbereitet’. In a Buddhist sense, 
when we are in the throes of attachment (‘im Zusammenhang’), we are at our 
most ignorant and unaware. It is not surprising that it is when the mind is at 
rest, not absorbed in working, desiring, seeking, that feelings of guilt might 
manifest themselves, that the first chinks of light can begin to dawn. 
154 Wilhelm Emrich, however, describes the warders as ‘simpleminded and arrogant’, in Franz 
Kafka (Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag, 1958), p. 326. 
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 As well as being there to awaken K., the warders advise K. to stay calm 
and collect himself for the great demands ahead, i.e. those of coming to terms 
with his ‘arrest’ or life of attachment: ‘Wir raten Ihnen, zerstreuen Sie sich 
nicht durch nutzlose Gedanken, sondern sammeln Sie sich, es werden große 
Anforderungen an Sie gestellt werden’ (DP 15). The term ‘zerstreut’ later 
figures at other key points in K.’s trial, showing that K. fails to keep a clear 
and focused mind. The supervisor’s first address to K. wakes him from his 
reveries: ‘Josef K.?’ fragte der Aufseher, vielleicht nur um K.’s zerstreute Blicke 
auf sich zu lenken’ (DP 20). 
Josef K. is advised by the warders, and later the supervisor, to pay more 
attention to himself, and less to others or what is ‘nebensächlich’ (DP 22). K.’s 
instinct, however, is to look for an external solution to the problem at hand 
because he cannot conceive of personal wrongdoing. His subsequent repeated 
failures to gain access to the Court and secure any meaningful support show 
this line of reasoning to be misguided. The first casualty in K.’s arrest is his 
‘Vernunft’. After the initial brief exchange with the warders, he goes back into 
his room, which appears to the warders to be a smart move: ‘Er scheint 
vernünftig zu sein’ (DP 12). K. does not return there to engage in healthy 
introspection regarding his situation, but tries to find ‘Legitimationspapiere’. 
In other words, K. looks for official documents from an external authority to 
establish his identity. It is as if he needs confirmation of who he is, a definition 
of his ‘self’, from a source outside himself. K. is made to look ridiculous by the 
‘Aufregung’ he works himself into and the first papers he comes across, a 
trivial ‘Radfahrlegitimation’. 
It is unlikely also to be coincidental that one warder is called ‘Willem’, a 
name evoking the will, volition, intention, precisely the forces which drive 
kamma and perpetuate the cycle of life-death-rebirth enslaving those living in 
ignorance. Moreover, since the first person Josef K. speaks to is called Franz, 
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 it is tempting to suggest that this warder carries some authorial presence, a 
wake-up call in effect from Franz Kafka to Josef K. This supports a Buddhist 
reading of the text, for in sending himself to nudge Josef K. out of his ignorant 
ways, Kafka sets up Der Proceß as an examination of how people live oblivious 
lives, full of frantic activity and driven by powerful emotions, but devoid of 
meaningful direction, understanding and insight. We are in need of constant, 
regular ‘awakenings’ to keep alive the reality of our ‘Verhaftung’, our 
attachment to desires.  
By acknowledging guilt, the grounds for an arrest would melt away: there 
is no ‘Verhaftung’ once we see the truth of how attachment arises. For K., 
however, his arrest raises the questions ‘Why me?’ and ‘In whose name?’. In 
other words, K. assumes that man is born innocent but acquires guilt through 
specific wrongdoing. A Buddhist would say that from an early age man 
acquires guilt through attachment to the self, until awakening or insight to the 
truth offers the prospect of release.155 
3.2.2 The Court and its Law 
The defining teaching of the Buddhist tradition, that of non-self, is merely 
pointing out the limitations of this reflexive view we hold of ourselves. It’s not 
that the self does not exist, but that it is as cobbled-together and transient as 
everything else.156 
As for the Court itself, the following description manages to encompass the 
impermanence of phenomena, the law of cause and effect, the ubiquity of 
attachment and the truth of the Dharma. K. is urged to understand that: 
[…] dieser große Gerichtsorganismus gewissermaßen ewig in Schwebe 
bleibt und daß man zwar, wenn man auf seinem Platz selbständig 
etwas ändert, den Boden unter den Füßen sich wegnimmt und selbst 
abstürzen kann, während der große Organismus sich selbst für die 
155 ‘K.’s guilt in The Trial turns essentially on his attachment to his personal experience.’ 
Stanley Corngold, The Necessity of Form (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 245. 
156 Andrew Olendzki in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/limited-mask-self. 
94 
                                           
 kleine Störung leicht an einer andern Stelle – alles ist doch in 
Verbindung – Ersatz schafft und unverändert bleibt (DP 160). 
According to Advokat Huld, the Court does not allow any legal defences 
in its cases, and displays ‘Verachtung’ for lawyers. If K. really were faced with 
a criminal trial, this might raise the spectre of totalitarianism and 
infringements on individual rights, but the trial does not concern a specific act 
in K.’s life. It makes sense then that lawyers are not necessary when the 
charge is ignorance of our attachments. Guilt is the starting position and the 
trial has been brought to allow K. the opportunity to reflect and change to a 
plea of guilty. This cannot be achieved by the sharp practices of a legal team, 
but by the admission of one’s cravings and by their elimination through a 
more mindful attitude. The Court’s law does not uphold the idea of ‘innocent 
until proven guilty’, but rather ‘guilty until proven enlightened’. 
References to the Court and its law support the view that K. is not 
persecuted by a predatory, punitive authority, but confronted with a governing 
principle that is drawn to cases of suffering. The Dharma is not personal, but 
neutral, absolute, the same for all beings and all things. K. is not persecuted, 
is allowed to roam freely, and is only asked to pay more attention to his words 
and deeds. The problem is therefore that K. does not know how to ‘read’ the 
arrest or any of the ‘signs’ given, or alternatively that he tries to read the signs 
from a personal perspective. 
Thomas M. Kavanagh’s view as a semiologist describes the universe of 
Der Proceß as ‘absurd’ and compares Josef K. to a semiologist seeking a code 
to make sense of the confusing messages presented to him. He fails to restore 
order to a ‘disintegrating world’, and Kavanagh concludes that Kafkaesque 
man remains forever separated ‘in an irretrievable alienation from all 
95 
 meaning’.157 Not all views of the novel lead to despair, however. Stuart Lasine 
attributes Josef K.’s guilt to his ‘failure to live as a personally responsible, yet 
social, human being’, and reads the Court as a ‘sensitive moral agency 
designed to give K. the opportunity to undergo a moral metamorphosis; it is 
neither an oppressive, bureaucratic organization nor even a representative of 
strict, absolute justice without mercy’.158 
The next illocutionary tightrope K. walks comes during his visit to the 
‘Kanzleien’. K. is initially unimpressed by the poverty of the Court’s offices, 
which lead him into a false feeling of superiority. He judges by appearance and 
concludes that there is nothing else to know about the law, dismissing the 
modest premises of his legal enemy, just as he looks down on the warders and 
the assembly at his hearing. K. is nevertheless upset by the oppressive 
atmosphere in the stuffy rooms and by the attendant’s annoying habit of 
walking a couple of steps behind him, ‘als ob er verhaftet vorgeführt werde’ 
(DP 96). This appears to touch a nerve for he then declares that he has seen 
enough: ‘ich will nicht alles sehn’ (DP 96). This statement does not augur well 
for somebody gathering information and in fact K.’s mood deteriorates further. 
He has managed to penetrate into the bowels of a Court building, but ‘er wollte 
nicht weiter eindringen’ (DP 98). This is a clear indication of K.’s blinkered 
attitude to existence – he is unwilling to contemplate anything that falls 
outside his usual sphere of experience. In the attic rooms he finds many other 
people like himself (accused), but he feels no affinity with them or sympathy 
towards them. He considers his case special because he is innocent and the 
charge must be wrong or fabricated. 
157 Thomas M. Kavanagh, ‘Kafka’s The Trial: The Semiotics of the Absurd’, in James Rolleston, 
ed., Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Trial (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1976), p. 
93. 
158 Stuart Lasine, ‘The Trials of Job and Kafka’s Josef K.’ in The German Quarterly, Vol 63, No. 
2 (Spring 1990), p. 195. 
96 
                                           
 He is gradually overcome by the close atmosphere in the airless corridors 
(recalling the scene of his first hearing and prefiguring Titorelli’s cramped 
atelier) and starts to feel faint. He is helped by some officials, one of whom is 
significantly called ‘der Auskunftgeber’ (information officer), who can inform 
enquirers about the ‘Gerichtswesen’. The holder of this position is authorised 
to answer questions about the Court and its law, lighting an illocutionary 
beacon which should satisfy K.’s curiosity: ‘Er weiß auf alle Fragen eine 
Antwort’ (DP 102).  
Information that was not forthcoming from the warders or the supervisor 
is put within tantalising reach, but K. is too out of sorts to pay any attention 
and just wants to leave. Offered a potential key to the door of enlightenment, 
Josef K. can barely acknowledge the presence of the information officer and 
sits quietly there, ‘mit seinen eigenen Angelegenheiten beschäftigt’ (DP 103). 
The opportunity to gain intelligence, to dispel a few clouds of ignorance has 
been lost and does not properly return until it is too late, through the 
chaplain. It is ironic that after this point K. invests a lot of energy in trying to 
elicit titbits of information from people outside the law, that amount to mere 
opinion or gossip. When the prospect of genuine ‘inside’ information presents 
itself, he misses it. 
This episode contrasts starkly with a comparable scene in Das Schloß 
where K. falls asleep during his meeting with Bürgel, missing the offer of a 
route into the Castle. However, whereas K. gains in stature and confidence 
after spurning the chance to firm up his attachment to the authorities, Josef 
K. continues on his downward spiral to an ignominious demise, for he has 
refused to listen to worthwhile guidance. As we will see later, K.’s ‘epiphany’ in 
Bürgel’s room marks the closest any character of Kafka’s will get to 
enlightenment by rejecting the temptation of influence. Josef K., on the 
contrary, is very weak in this respect and continually searching for favours: he 
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 feels ill-at-ease under the rules of the Court and is desperate to escape to 
familiar territory, where the whims and desires of his own self hold sway and 
he can breathe freely again. In the later novel, K. replaces self-interest with 
insight, but Josef K. ignores insight in favour of self-preservation. 
From a Western viewpoint, Josef K. knows nothing of the Court and its 
law, and this seals his fate, as explained by Christian Schärf: ‘Gerade weil er 
das Gesetz nicht kennt und damit nicht anerkennt, ist er schuldig.’159 But at 
the same time it seems that the law is distant and inaccessible: ‘Das Gesetz ist 
völlig unerreichbar, unvorstellbar, seine Richter sind nicht von dieser Welt.’160 
Hence, a negative reading is likely because Josef K. is outside the law (an 
outlaw), and it is difficult to plot a route to the law which would allow K. to 
exonerate himself or atone for his wrongdoing, because the law is invisible. A 
Buddhist reading also condemns Josef K., but the law is simply a reflection of 
his status, a way of communicating his guilt to him. Josef K. is too wrapped 
up in his self to acknowledge his separation or isolation from his 
surroundings. The law is everywhere and it is not necessary to draw a map to 
find it. It is within Josef K. and without, and when he stops looking for it he 
will see it. 
3.2.3 Consequences 
The root of human suffering is not sin, but our confusion about ego. We suffer 
because we believe in the existence of an individual self. This belief splits the 
world into ‘I’ and ‘other’.161 
Before his trial has progressed very far, Josef K. has thus failed to heed any of 
the lessons related to his arrest or the authority behind it. The next stage is an 
enactment of one aspect of his life that has attracted the attention of the 
159 Christian Schärf, Franz Kafka: Poetischer Text und heilige Schrift (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2000) p. 118. 
160 Ibid., p. 117. 
161 Stephen Butterfield in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/feature/accusing-tiger. 
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 authorities: his selfishness. In the chapter ‘Der Prügler’, K. stumbles across a 
disturbing punishment scene in a lumber room at work. He is implicated in 
the flogging being handed out to the two warders assigned to his case, because 
it was his complaint about them at his initial hearing that triggered the 
punishment. This pricks his conscience because at the end of the episode he 
wonders if he should have offered to take the place of the victims. For a man 
mystified by his arrest, here is evidence of behaviour (after the event) to raise 
feelings of guilt.  
From many interpretive perspectives, the beating scene is uncomfortable 
because Josef K. is implicated in the punishment of the warders, but he did 
not order it. Between the complaint and the thrashing, there must be an 
agency which considers the case and decides the sentence: this has to be the 
Court, not Josef K. Regarding the charge, either Josef K. is guilty of 
wrongdoing, or he has been ‘verleumdet’. This reading has gaps which invite 
speculation because the specific charge is unknown, and thus a quest after 
‘meaning’ is initiated. 
From a Buddhist point of view, the illocutionary message of the beating 
also suggests a chain, that of cause and effect, but there is no insistence on 
meaning or justice as the ‘process’ is natural and not subject to interpretation 
or personalised readings. Action begets action, thought begets thought and 
nothing in existence can abide outside the chain of cause and effect.  
When K. discovers the warders being beaten, it need not be taken as an 
example of a vindictive organisation harassing those underlings that step out 
of line, and doing so under K.’s nose to make him feel ‘guilty’. It is just that 
K.’s unwholesome words (his wrong speech) result in suffering for people 
around him. K.’s feeble excuse that he had not asked for the warders to be 
punished has no influence on natural law: whatever is uttered bears a karmic 
load: ‘Bringt er es dann allerdings öffentlich zur Sprache, dann muß die Strafe 
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 erfolgen’ (DP 109). As a result, suffering is ‘ebenso gerecht als unvermeidlich’ 
(DP 110).  
K.’s guilt may be indisputable, but there is no pre-judgment about his 
case: he has simply been arrested, not condemned. We have seen how the 
warders are upbeat about K.’s prospects – if he pays a little attention to 
himself – and the ‘Gerichtsdiener’ states that there are ‘keine aussichtslosen 
Processe’ (DP 91), in contrast to K.’s uncle’s gloomy prognosis. Josef K. has 
received a lesson on how karma works, but he fails to understand. He chooses 
instead to brush aside the stirrings of guilt and continue with his quest to 
have the arrest overturned.  
The trial is about self-confrontation and K. determines his self by the 
choices he makes. This is similar to the Buddhist theory of Dependent 
Origination, for it suggests that all human beings are responsible for their own 
situations. This is where East and West diverge because the law in the West is 
bound up with notions of right and wrong, punishment and reward; from the 
Buddhist point of view, the law is a framework reflecting natural conditions in 
a neutral, impersonal world. For Buddhists, the Dharma is a truth stripped of 
decorations and enhancements, and enlightenment means that the individual 
realises how notions of right and wrong, punishment and reward are 
meaningless, virtual partitions within the universe that would not naturally 
arise. Sokel states that ‘K.’s guilt remains impenetrable because the only 
access to it is interpretation, which is risk, instead of revelation, which gives it 
certainty’.162 This conclusion is quite the opposite to a Buddhist view, which 
would argue that neither interpretation nor revelation is the way, because 
each relies on external sources as points of reference. K.’s guilt would become 
162 Walter Sokel provides a detailed discussion of K.’s guilt in ‘The Programme of K.’s Court: 
Oedipal and Existential Meanings of The Trial’ in Franz Kuna, ed., On Kafka: Semi-Centenary 
Perspectives (London: Paul Elek, 1976), pp. 1-21. 
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 clear to him on attaining enlightenment through mindfulness of his 
attachment to selfhood, at which point his guilt would cease to be. 
3.2.4 Guidance 
A monk sat meditating all day long. His Master asked him what he sought. ‘My 
desire is to become a Buddha,’ said the monk. The Master picked up a piece of 
brick and began to polish it on a stone. Asked to explain his action, the Master 
said that he wished to make a mirror. ‘But no amount of polishing a brick will 
make it into a mirror,’ said the monk. ‘If so, no amount of sitting cross-legged 
will make thee into a Buddha,’ said the Master.163 
By the halfway point in the novel Josef K. has misunderstood the nature of his 
suffering, passed up the chance to learn about the Court and failed to accept 
the connection between his actions and their consequences. The next stage in 
the novel is the most densely filled with illocutionary messages and represents 
instances of guidance. A series of scenes unfolds with figures who offer Josef 
K. advice on how best to combat the trial. His uncle, Kaufmann Block and the 
‘Fabrikant’ have walk-on parts and move the action along by suggesting new 
attachments as the solution to the faltering progress of his case. His uncle 
introduces Huld, the ‘Fabrikant’ leads Josef K. to Titorelli and Block opens up 
the option of multiple representations, effectively hedging his bets in a manner 
resonant with the ‘zwanzig Hände’ that Josef K. later regrets. The main figures 
are Huld and Titorelli, who dominate large tracts of narrative with their 
expansive accounts of the Court, its practices, and how best Josef K. should 
proceed. 
Through his uncle, Josef K. finds himself ‘attached’ to the services of 
Huld, an ageing, bed-bound lawyer who pulls his strings of influence through 
acquaintances built up over a lifetime working on trials. In most respects Huld 
comes across as a very confusing, ambivalent figure whose ‘help’ seems to 
163 Humphreys, Zen Buddhism, p. 82. 
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 consist in scaring his clients into submission (e.g. Block), or blinding them 
with convoluted explanations into trusting his judgment and experience. In 
spite of this, Huld’s words can largely be taken at face value and offer useful 
insights into the workings of the Court.  
In chapter seven, Huld makes an admission that is astonishing in its 
implications, for it undermines the legal profession he is part of: ‘Die 
Verteidigung ist nämlich durch das Gesetz nicht eigentlich gestattet, sondern 
nur geduldet, und selbst darüber, ob aus der betreffenden Gesetzstelle 
wenigstens Duldung herausgelesen werden soll, besteht Streit’ (DP 152). 
Lawyers are despised by the Court, but rather than deplore this state of affairs 
Huld agrees with the principle that the accused must personally come to 
terms with his ‘Proceß’ and take some responsibility for his defence. This is 
not to say that legal assistance is useless, for Huld believes it is crucial. It is at 
points such as this – where Huld’s line diverges from the Court’s – that the 
illocutionary message is left open to interpretation and argument. It is 
indisputable that the Court barely tolerates the actions and influences of the 
legal profession, for Huld explains how there is a separation between the 
accused and the defence lawyers, who are excluded from the hearings: ‘[S]ie 
müssen daher nach den Verhören, undzwar möglichst noch an der Tür des 
Untersuchungszimmers den Angeklagten über das Verhör ausforschen und 
diesen oft schon sehr verwischten Berichten das für die Verteidigung taugliche 
entnehmen’ (DP 154). 
Tellingly, Huld rates ‘persönliche Beziehungen’ as the key benefit of 
hiring a lawyer. Much of Huld’s advice is based on opinion and hearsay, and 
the occasional ‘facts’ about the Court are obscured by the long-winded, self-
contradictory passages full of qualifications and disclaimers. The Buddhist 
reader can spot Huld’s odd ‘pearl of wisdom’ because those remarks concern 
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 the general nature of the ‘Proceß’ or ‘Verhaftetsein’, and are not offered as 
arguments to persist with the lawyer’s services. 
The illocutionary tightrope that Josef K. is invited to walk is to realise 
that he is responsible for himself: ‘Man will die Verteidigung möglichst 
ausschalten, alles soll auf den Angeklagten selbst gestellt sein. Kein schlechter 
Standpunkt im Grunde’ (DP 153). Buddhism is very clear on this point, for 
salvation or enlightenment can only be attained by the individual, and is not 
transferable through grace and favours. This idea is later picked up by the 
chaplain, who chides Josef K. for seeking too much ‘fremde Hilfe’. It also 
echoes the comments of the warders, who urge Josef K. to focus on himself 
(his self) and not elsewhere.  
Another significant point is that people recently charged waste time and 
effort in the early stages of their trial on ‘Verbesserungsvorschläge’. The best 
course of action is calmly to take stock of the situation: ‘Das einzig Richtige sei 
es, sich mit den vorhandenen Verhältnissen abzufinden’ (DP 160). This advice 
from Huld is no doubt offered to Josef K. to stop him from meddling and have 
him leave the proceedings to the legal team. However, the basic message is 
clearly one of reflection (meditation) and understanding, not noise and action. 
Before his execution, Josef K. has a momentary insight when he realises he 
was wrong to grasp at life ‘mit zwanzig Händen’ and this seems to support 
Huld’s assessment. The lawyer is using his description of the overwhelming 
power of the Court to scare Josef K. into submission, but this does not alter 
the fact that all the effort in the world will come to nothing if the accused fails 
to come to terms with his situation. This is another tightrope K. fails to 
negotiate. 
K. eventually grows impatient with the perceived lack of progress made 
by Huld and decides to dispense with his services and defend himself. This 
could be a wise move, as the suffering experienced by the individual is caused 
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 by his own thoughts and deeds born of ignorance. No amount of lobbying will 
get the individual off the hook of attachment. The only acceptable form of 
outside help comes in the form of measured, enlightened advice, but Huld can 
only offer ‘persönliche Beziehungen’. 
Huld’s defence entails completion of an ‘Eingabe’, a declaration of 
innocence, and K. resolves to take on the submission himself after he fires 
Huld. He is soon frustrated by the endless task, for which ‘das ganze Leben in 
den kleinsten Handlungen und Ereignissen in die Erinnerung zurückgebracht, 
dargestellt und von allen Seiten überprüft werden mußte’ (DP 170). He needs 
to prove he has done nothing wrong, although he is unaware of the charge 
against him. The difficulty of encompassing the self, of trying to define exactly 
what and who we are, bears comparison with the teachings of the Dharma, 
where the principle of impermanence ties in with the idea of not-selfhood.  
In choosing the name Huld (grace) for K.’s lawyer, Kafka underlines the 
counterproductive efforts of seeking outside help. The Buddha urged listeners 
to work out their own path to salvation with diligence and an open mind. The 
Buddha would act as guide, but not tread the path for you. The importance to 
Buddhism of self-help and independence finds an almost comic parody in 
Huld’s boast that some lawyers hoist their clients up onto their shoulders and 
carry them off to the verdict. Looking to divine intervention for the answers 
and the efforts that will secure release is one further sign of ignorance.  
K.’s meeting with Titorelli falls under the same category as Huld because 
he is still looking for ways to influence the Court. Titorelli can be bracketed 
with Huld in the sense that he is a figure who feeds off the Court, but who – 
for all his experience – is nevertheless relatively unenlightened. Like Huld, 
Titorelli recognises all the obstacles that stand in the way of the accused, but 
he is unable to offer Josef K. any guidance of a spiritual nature. Titorelli’s 
great contribution to the novel is his explanation of acquittal options, or 
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 ‘release from suffering’ if expressed in Buddhist terms. Titorelli’s delivery style 
is similar to the convoluted arguments and layered disclaimers used by Huld; 
the gist of his message, however, has an illocutionary force which could strike 
Josef K. with some impact, but results in further miscommunication.  
Titorelli’s long discussion of the various ways in which acquittal can be 
achieved fits in well with a Buddhist view of the world. The first way is a ‘real 
acquittal’, which is effectively the consequence of innocence, and as such is 
purely down to the individual: ‘Es gibt meiner Meinung nach überhaupt keine 
einzelne Person, die auf die wirkliche Freisprechung Einfluß hätte. Hier 
entscheidet wahrscheinlich nur die Unschuld des Angeklagten’ (DP 205). If K. 
really is innocent he needs no help: ‘Da Sie unschuldig sind, wäre es wirklich 
möglich, daß Sie sich allein auf Ihre Unschuld verlassen. Dann brauchen Sie 
aber weder mich noch irgendeine andere Hilfe’ (DP 205-206). 
The fact that the Court is attracted to guilt means that nobody in its 
sights is innocent. If, in Buddhist terms, the guilt relates to attachment, it can 
be removed by seeing the Dharma: hence true acquittal is a real, if rare, 
possibility. When this happens, all the trial documentation is ‘vernichtet’ (DP 
214), in the same way that cravings can be annihilated or let go of. In other 
words the Court cannot be mistaken about guilt, but the guilt can melt away 
to give enlightened freedom.  
The other two types of acquittal are more common, however, as they deal 
with evasion and trickery, strategies in staving off a verdict or putting up a 
smokescreen. The ‘scheinbare Freisprechung’ involves having Titorelli vouch 
for the innocence of his client in a carefully worded text and doing the rounds 
with it among the judges he knows. The result could be acquittal, but in a 
passage characteristic of the qualifications and equivocations that tempt and 
tease K., this apparent acquittal is unsurprisingly not all it seems: ‘[Sie sind] 
nur scheinbar frei oder besser ausgedrückt zeitweilig frei. Die untersten 
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 Richter nämlich, zu denen meine Bekannten gehören, haben nicht das Recht 
endgiltig freizusprechen’ (DP 213). In other words, the path to cessation of 
suffering must be travelled by the individual. Salvation through the support of 
another, or faith in another, is not possible. We cannot attain enlightenment 
through a third party, so the Court does not sanction legal aid as it belongs to 
the type of ‘fremde Hilfe’ that can only obscure clear understanding of the 
Dharma.  
The other feasible alternative for K. according to Titorelli is 
‘Verschleppung’, where the devil is in the detail. Through ‘ununterbrochener 
persönlicher Fühlung mit dem Gerichte’ (DP 216), the trial gets bogged down 
in its initial stages. In other words, ignorance is perpetuated indefinitely and 
the ‘personal’ reason for this is clear. There is no pretence to contemplate what 
the trial might mean, and the individual just defers having to deal with the 
consequences of his arrest. This is the legal equivalent of sticking our head in 
the sand. Titorelli points out, however, that ‘Der Proceß kann nicht stillstehn’ 
(DP 217) – everything is subject to constant change, growth, decay. Simply 
slowing down one’s lifestyle does not ‘thin out’ the suffering and make it 
disappear: it just lasts longer and delays the inevitable unwholesome fruit that 
our uninformed actions will bring. 
3.2.5 Closure 
As long as we insist that meditation must be meaningful, we fail to understand 
it. We meditate with the idea that we’re going to get something from it - that it 
will lower our blood pressure, calm us down, or enhance our concentration. And, 
we believe, if we meditate long enough, and in just the right way, it might even 
bring us to enlightenment. All of this is delusion.164 
So far, as the novel reaches its conclusion, Josef K. has faced many challenges 
which have left him demoralised and disillusioned, but he has also failed to 
164 Steve Hagen in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/-cushion/looking-meaning. 
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 pass various tests where insights into his predicament have been revealed: at 
his arrest, inside the legal offices, at a flogging, and in the counsel of a lawyer 
and Court painter. The fifth stage and final opportunity for Josef K. to redeem 
himself and gain some awareness of his suffering comes through the 
‘Gefängniskaplan’, who offers very direct words of advice, as well as teaching 
shrouded in the parable, Vor dem Gesetz.  
When they first meet, the chaplain declares plainly that K.’s trial 
‘schlecht steht’ (DP 288), but that a final verdict has yet to be reached. The 
unequivocal advice to him starts with ‘Du mißverstehst die Tatsachen’ (DP 
289) and covers two lines of approach which are intertwined. The first is that 
Josef K. seeks ‘zuviel fremde Hilfe’ (DP 289), which is significantly ‘nicht die 
wahre Hilfe’ (DP 290). From a Buddhist point of view, the contrast of ‘fremd’ 
and ‘wahr’ suggests that true help must be ‘self-help’. ‘Fremd’ can mean 
strange, alien, foreign and different, but the idiom ‘ohne fremde Hilfe’ indicates 
a situation where the individual has found his own way. This recalls the early 
advice of the warders that Josef K. should pay more attention to ‘home truths’.  
Triggered by Josef K. admitting that he can ‘offen reden’ with a figure he 
deems worthy of trust, the second element of the chaplain’s counsel concerns 
self-delusion. In words reminiscent of the Buddha’s exhortations not to take 
for granted even what he himself said, the chaplain stops K. in his tracks: 
‘Täusche Dich nicht’ (DP 292). The parable follows, in which the man from the 
country comes unstuck in precisely the same way K. does, through a 
dependence on the view of a perceived authority.  
K.’s characteristic self-absorption surfaces in his rash identification with 
the ‘duped’ man from the country and is picked up by the chaplain: ‘Sei nicht 
übereilt […] übernimm nicht die fremde Meinung ungeprüft’ (DP 295). The 
parable has been recounted exactly as stated in the scriptures: ‘Von 
Täuschung steht darin nichts’ (DP 295). A long discussion ensues in which 
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 Josef K. tries to gain a foothold in the ‘truth’ of the story, but he is never 
shown any solid ground by the chaplain. The advice is similar to the caution 
regarding ‘fremde Hilfe’: ‘ich zeige Dir nur die Meinungen, die darüber 
bestehen. Du mußt nicht zuviel auf Meinungen achten’ (DP 298). Opinions are 
expressions of selfhood, individual filters on phenomena which ultimately have 
no personal attachments or targets.  
A reading of Vor dem Gesetz can be undertaken from any number of 
perspectives, and the parable lends itself to a Buddhist view as well as any 
other. An illocutionary Buddhist reading would pin the man’s failure to enter 
the law on his ignorance. The door is there for him; he just needs to walk 
through, once the conditions are right (enlightenment has been achieved). If 
we wait for an invitation, we will be disappointed. We have to take care of our 
own salvation and work out what to do. Waiting for grace is not the answer, 
nor is any amount of supplication to any external entities.  
Ingeborg Henel’s reading of the parable sees it as the chaplain’s attempt 
to enlighten K. to the fact that his arrest is not so much ‘an action of the 
court, but the state in which Josef K. already finds himself at the outset of the 
novel’.165 For Henel, the entrance reserved for the man from the country 
‘proves that it does not lead to a universal, generally valid law, comprehensible 
by reason and accessible to any rational person of good will’.166 This 
interpretation may hold true if the law in question is ‘earthly’ or ‘temporal’, 
and used to help keep our selfish ‘selves’ in check. The Highway Code must be 
made available to all if we wish to keep our roads safe. However, if the law 
pertains to the nature of existence and how we can avoid suffering and achieve 
165 Ingeborg Henel, ‘The Legend of the Doorkeeper and Its Significance for Kafka’s Trial’ in 
James Rolleston, ed., Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Trial (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall Inc, 1976), p. 46. 
166 Ibid., p. 48. 
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 ‘salvation’, ‘peace’ or ‘contentment’, these goals can only be attained outside 
attachment to selfhood, so each individual must work out his own path. 
K., suffering from the same ignorance as the man from the country, feels 
that the doorkeeper tricks the man by holding out the possibility of entry. The 
chaplain, however, recounts different perspectives on the story, merely to 
show K. how confused and deluded we can become, if we fail to exercise our 
own judgment. Opinions will vary, but – crucially – the ‘scripture’ remains the 
same: ‘Die Schrift ist unveränderlich und die Meinungen sind oft nur ein 
Ausdruck der Verzweiflung darüber’ (DP 298). In short, we must strive after a 
measured understanding of the facts, of the truth, and not rely on hearsay or 
opinion. K. does not listen to the facts of the story, but jumps to conclusions, 
filtering information through his own perspective and experience: ‘Du hast 
nicht genug Achtung vor der Schrift und veränderst die Geschichte’ (DP 295). 
This is another tightrope because Josef K. listens intently to the sea of 
conflicting interpretations before finally settling on a reading that he finds 
agreeable. No sooner has Josef K. come to rest on this view than the chaplain 
offers yet another ‘Gegenmeinung’. This technique will be examined as part of 
the section on perlocutionary effects, but at this juncture the chaplain’s 
objective (illocutionary) is to warn Josef K. about his reliance on external 
support. He has not been able to communicate this point to Josef K. whose 
final comment at the disappointing interpretation of the parable is left 
unanswered. The chaplain looks on K.’s suffering with ‘ein großes Zartgefühl’ 
but simply ‘nahm K.s Bemerkung schweigend auf, trotzdem sie mit seiner 
eigenen Meinung gewiß nicht übereinstimmte’ (DP 303). 
The chaplain’s ‘Zartgefühl’ reflects his sadness at K.’s inability to 
comprehend the teaching. The long discussion, with all the winding alleys of 
interpretation and nuances of meaning, culminates in the ultimate distillation 
of the message of the Law: ‘man muß nicht alles für wahr halten, man muß es 
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 nur für notwendig halten’ (DP 303). This expresses the Buddhist teaching of 
The Three Universal Characteristics – impermanence, not-self and suffering. 
The reality of existence does not take into account the petty concerns of 
personal selves and each individual must realise that this core fact of 
impermanence is not compatible with ideals such as ‘right’, justice’ and ‘good’. 
These ‘meaningful’ principles have substance only in the hearts and minds of 
individuals, but have no foundation elsewhere. This is the illocutionary force 
of ‘notwendig’, as opposed to ‘wahr’. K.’s parting remark (‘trübselige Meinung’) 
confirms his continued ignorance as he refuses to let go of the notion of his 
innocence: ‘Die Lüge wird zur Weltordnung gemacht’ (DP 303). 
The tightropes that Josef K. passes along and falls from are like the entry 
to the law which the man from the country similarly fails to negotiate. Both 
the man and Josef K. suffer from delusions about the nature of the law – they 
believe that it is synonymous with justice and has definition, as a constant 
entity. Both the parable and the story of K.’s ‘Proceß’ show this to be a 
misconception. Eschweiler, in contrast, claims that the ‘Licht der Wahrheit’ 
which the man from the country sees shortly before he dies is Kafka’s way of 
allowing his heroes a glimpse of ‘den unverlöschlichen Glanz der Ewigkeit’.167 
The Buddhist reader, however, would point to the man’s failing eyesight for he 
does not know ‘ob ihn nur die Augen täuschen’ (DP 295). This final yearning 
would then be a reflection of the self clinging to a lost cause, and the empty 
bid for affirmation of the law prefigures Josef K.’s dying grasp after 
intervention. 
If we wish to salvage a salutary message from Der Proceß it rests in the 
words of admission K. utters before his death. K. seems to have learnt 
something from his failures as he experiences a moment of insight. His 
167 Eschweiler, Der verborgene Hintergrund, p. 12. 
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 ‘Verstand’ condemns his lifetime habit of ‘grabbing at’ (attaching to) the world 
around him: ‘Ich wollte immer mit zwanzig Händen in die Welt hineinfahren 
und überdies zu einem nicht zu billigenden Zweck. Das war unrichtig, soll ich 
nun zeigen, daß nicht einmal der einjährige Proceß mich belehren konnte?’ 
(DP 308). 
Before he is executed, however, his ignorance reasserts itself. Just as the 
man from the country hopes for admittance from the doorkeeper, K. sees a 
figure in a window and clutches at the prospect of a saviour come to help. In a 
description echoing his twenty grasping hands, he continues to reach out to 
the world, rather than reach within: ‘Er hob die Hände und spreizte alle 
Finger’ (DP 312).  
From a Christian viewpoint, the ending is important because it frames 
the meaning of the story, and K.’s execution invites a particular interpretation 
of his whole life. Taken positively, K.’s death would have to incorporate 
atonement for sins and submission to a just fate, and the distant figure K. 
glimpses would assume prophetic proportions. John Kelly’s upbeat Christian 
view of Der Proceß sees a tale of guilt and forgiveness, where Josef K. is 
pursued by the Court but in the end ‘joyfully’ accepts its sentence: this would 
show that man cannot save himself, but the ‘Absolute’ will come and offer ‘its 
own peculiar salvation’.168 A Buddhist reading would accept the condemnation 
of Josef K., but take it as a salutary lesson from which to learn (and move on 
from in a future life), not as an opportunity for supreme intervention. 
Eschweiler reinstates the chapter ‘Ein Traum’ to stress Josef K.’s 
‘entzückt’ reaction to death, as he realises ‘den Sinn seines Todes als einzige 
Möglichkeit zur Erlösung’.169 This hopeful outcome is then translated to the 
final scene when he seems to ‘merge’ with his executioners in a ‘gewollte 
168 Kelly, p. 170. 
169 Eschweiler, Der verborgene Hintergrund, p. 89. 
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 Identität von Geist und Körper’, representing an enlightened ‘Bejahung des 
Todes’.170 In Buddhist terms, however, this late affirmation of death indicates 
a desperate bid to secure a ‘meaningful end’ for the self. 
3.3 Tripwires (perlocutionary approach) 
When a Brahman came to the Buddha, bearing a gift in either hand, the 
Buddha’s greeting was the one word – ‘Drop it!’ The Brahman dropped the gift 
in his right hand and advanced. ‘Drop it!’ said the Blessed One, and the 
Brahman dropped the gift in his other hand. But as he advanced with empty 
hands, again the command rang out – ‘Drop it!’ The Brahman was 
enlightened.171 
Few of Kafka’s works seem to offer straightforward readings, but Der Proceß is 
a prime example of sustained deliberate perplexity and paradox, and as such 
it functions as an antidote to attachment to selfhood. Clayton Koelb 
undertakes a detailed study of the rhetorical gaps (aporia) in Der Proceß, 
focusing in particular on K.’s arrest, for which he points out there is no 
illocutionary act of arresting. Uncertainties arise from the unclear status of 
illocutions and perlocutions, creating a rhetorical moment which follows ‘a 
path of genuine pain through a depressingly real universe’.172 He concludes 
that ‘Kafka’s world rests on a foundation of rhetorical illocutions – assertions, 
requests, commands, and so on, that do not assert, request or command 
anything in particular but nevertheless direct the lives of his characters’.173 
For Koelb, Kafka’s writing creates these aporia to illustrate how problematic 
language shapes the world we live in, and the assumption is that this world is 
ambiguous and painful. A Buddhist analysis, however, would agree with the 
ambiguity, but stop short of linking it to pain, for that only comes if we attach 
to a need for clarity of meaning. 
170 Eschweiler, Der verborgene Hintergrund, p. 91. 
171 Humphreys, Zen Buddhism, p. 12. 
172 Clayton Koelb, ‘Kafka’s Rhetorical Moment’ in PMLA, Vol 98, No. 1 (Jan 1983), p. 42. 
173 Ibid., p. 45. 
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 While readers find ambiguity and ambivalence in the Court, Josef K. 
wrestles with a confusing whirl of conflicting opinions which ‘häufen sich um 
das Verfahren bis zur Undurchdringlichkeit’ (DP 268). Walter Sokel thus talks 
of the ‘opaqueness’ of Der Proceß, as there is neither an external, revealed 
truth nor an inner truth, which results in Josef K. being torn apart.174 But this 
obscurity is precisely the effect intended by Zen masters, such as Dogen, who 
want to break the reader’s grasp for sense: ‘Dogen’s writing, in places, is 
almost perversely opaque, to the point where one wonders whether he actually 
intends communication at all.’175 So rather than identifying with Josef K.’s 
despair, a Buddhist would see a depiction – and ironic condemnation – of 
ignorance and intransigence despite the real prospect of salvation available 
through self-help.  
Buddhism recognises in much of Kafka’s work the futility of grasping at 
what is not really there. Josef K.’s struggle to find his accusers and establish 
his innocence is a classic case of ignorance: at key moments in the story he 
has the chance to learn something about his situation and change the 
direction of the trial, if he understands the underlying reasons for the arrest. 
The fact that he fails to ‘awaken’ is not the fault of the external authorities, 
but the effect of his personal clinging.  
3.3.1 Arrest 
We resist facing life as it is because that would mean abandoning our views of 
how we think it should be. The most basic form of resistance is wanting life to 
be other than it is.176 
The opening chapter is a triumph of perlocutionary engineering for it teems 
with koan-like statements while the narrative moves along its linear 
174 Walter H. Sokel, ‘The Opaqueness of The Trial’, in James Rolleston, ed., Twentieth Century 
Interpretations of The Trial (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1976), pp. 56-59. 
175 Dogen, Beyond Thinking: A Guide to Zen Meditation, ed. Kazuaki Tanahashi (Boston: 
Shambhala, 2004), p. xxxi. 
176 Ezra Bayda in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/breaking-through-resistance. 
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 illocutionary axis. We have seen how helpful advice falls on deaf ears as Josef 
K. struggles to come to terms with the bombshell of his arrest. He is also 
confronted with a series of ‘Zen challenges’ as outlined below which he again 
fails to respond to skillfully, because he approaches each task in too rational a 
manner, not befitting the extraordinary circumstances he finds himself in. For 
Sokel, the early morning arrest is like an ambush, when the ego is at its 
weakest through distraction, its guard down.177 To underline the point, Sokel 
draws attention to a deleted passage, where K. refers to the moment of 
awakening as ‘der riskanteste Augenblick am Tag’.178 The moment of waking 
up is when we are most vulnerable: for Buddhism it is when we are at our 
most lucid, with attachments, habits and the usual conditioning switched off, 
with the ego not fully engaged, and the time is apposite to strike and allow a 
more enlightened, ego-light perspective to flourish. 
Tempers are frayed in the early exchanges between Josef K. and the 
warders, and the end of one altercation does have a minor perlocutionary 
effect on K. When he is called to see the supervisor, it is with a loud shout that 
causes him to bang his teeth on the glass he is drinking from. This jarring 
moment is followed by an order to dress properly which K. takes particularly 
badly: ‘Laßt mich, zum Teufel!’ (DP 18). The warders were simply trying to 
make sure K. gave a good impression and their reaction to his rage is telling: 
‘“Es hilft nichts,” sagten die Wächter, die immer, wenn K. schrie, ganz ruhig, 
ja fast traurig wurden und ihn dadurch verwirrten oder gewissermaßen zur 
Besinnung brachten’ (DP 18). This unexpected, sad silence momentarily 
shakes K. and the combination of ‘verwirren’ and ‘zur Besinnung bringen’ is a 
fitting outcome for a Zen koan. 
177 Walter H. Sokel, ‘The Three Endings of Josef K. and the Role of Art in The Trial’ in Angel 
Flores, ed., The Kafka Debate: New Perspectives for Our Time (New York: Gordian Press, 1977), 
p. 351. 
178 Franz Kafka, Der Proceß (Apparatband), ed. Malcolm Pasley (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1990),  
p. 168. 
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 Josef K. has barely recovered his poise before he stumbles into another 
perlocutionary ‘pothole’. He dismisses the supervisor as an ‘upstart’ lacking in 
authority, and announces that he will call Staatsanwalt Hasterer, expecting 
that the mention of this influential figure’s name will ‘hurry’ matters along. 
The supervisor permits the call, but questions the motive and this so 
wrongfoots K. that he then refuses to call after all, making himself look 
childish and petulant. With the warders and the supervisor, Josef K. is driven 
by aggression and challenges, and when no barriers are put in his way other 
than using good sense, he is left nonplussed. The same could almost be said 
of the entire ‘Proceß’, for K. is free to go about his normal business, but he 
struggles as if he had actually been put in chains. Josef K. seems to feed off 
adversity, but the Law is not there to attack K. (and prompt his defence): it is 
there to trigger awareness, through a pause in his usual flow of consciousness 
to allow a different perspective to emerge. As the novel progresses, the Court 
interrupts K.’s life with more perlocutionary episodes, but K. is generally 
unable to understand this non-aggressive tactic and consequently fails to re-
orient himself to a more insightful view on life. 
3.3.2 The Court and its law 
We all know what addiction is; we are primarily addicted to ME.179 
Tripwires abound relating to experiences with the Court on its own territory. 
The first opportunity for Josef K. officially to air his grievances comes through 
a hearing which, superficially at least, has all the trappings of a formal 
procedure. In koan fashion, however, the meeting does not provide a forum 
from which he can argue his case, but an obstacle blocking the path ahead. 
Josef K. has some initial success for he heeds the early advice about the Court 
being attracted by guilt: he heads off for his first official meeting on the 
179 Pema Chödrön, The Wisdom of No Escape (London: Element, 2003), p. 40. 
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 appointed day without knowing the exact time, but assuming it would be 
whenever he showed up.  
Josef K. learns by telephone of the day and location of the hearing, but 
not the exact time or place. He assumes that the proceedings will start at 9am 
and heads off accordingly, but soon realises that the directions are inadequate 
as he struggles to find the entrance. This prefigures the chaplain’s parable, 
where the man from the country tries to gain access to the law through the 
right doorway. Josef K. remembers Willem’s words about the Court being 
attracted to guilt, and simply enters a room, assuming that his choice will be 
the right one. This is effectively an admission of guilt, for he does ultimately 
find the way to the assembly: the Court and his guilt find each other. On 
arrival at the hearing, however, K. soon falls back into his old habits and 
reverts to his aggressive, self-centred character, ready to attack the Court and 
oblivious to his own shortcomings.  
As a Zen master might try to wrongfoot his students, an official at the 
first hearing opens proceedings by addressing Josef K. as ‘Zimmermaler’ (DP 
61). This error could be interpreted as evidence of the shoddy preparations of 
the Court, and potentially of a case of mistaken identity, hence a wrongful 
arrest. However, it could also be viewed as the classic opening gambit of Court 
officials trying to ‘help’ K. see the error of his attachment to identity. Josef K. 
rises to the bait and launches into a tirade against the Court, not only 
protesting his own innocence, but suggesting that such ill-informed thuggery 
has ruined many others before him.  
On arrival at the hearing, K. had in fact decided to be circumspect and 
measured (‘mehr zu beobachten, als zu reden’), but he is easily tempted into 
delivering a long dramatic tirade to the assembly, punctuated with theatrical 
gestures and table-thumping: ‘[ihn] freute das angespannte Aufhorchen der 
ganzen Versammlung, in dieser Stille entstand ein Sausen, das aufreizender 
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 war als der verzückteste Beifall’ (DP 69). Carried away by his ‘Rednererfolg’, K. 
lambasts the Court for a deliberate attack on ‘mein öffentliches Ansehen’ (DP 
66). K. has not heeded the warders’ earlier advice to stop moaning and take a 
closer look at himself: ‘machen Sie keinen solchen Lärm mit dem Gefühl Ihrer 
Unschuld’ (DP 22). Again, K. passes up a chance to stay quiet and reflect. 
It is significant from a Buddhist point of view that the issue that causes 
Josef K. to lose control is specifically the question of his self, his identity. He is 
proud of his elevated position at the bank which forms an integral part of his 
idea of self-worth. The perlocutionary effect here is to shake the foundations of 
his being, and the repeated assaults on K.’s fixed view of himself serve to 
communicate the folly of attaching to an illusory absolute. Needless to say, 
Josef K. fails this test and despite the regular illocutionary signposts to keep 
him on the right path K. sleepwalks through all the trials and tribulations 
until his eventual demise (as if he had never awoken on the morning of the 
arrest). 
3.3.3 Consequences 
The teachings of the Buddha are: Let go and open to your world. Realize that 
trying to protect your territory […] is fraught with misery and suffering.180 
Gates figure prominently in Buddhist texts, symbolising portals to other 
dimensions of understanding, but it is never a matter of simply stepping 
through.181 The practice of meditation reveals to the individual a ‘self-free’ 
room in which the reality of the present moment can be experienced: ‘Zazen 
[Zen sitting meditation] is the dharma gate of enjoyment and ease; it is 
undivided practice-enlightenment.’182 By leaving one’s ego at the door, one 
180 Chödrön, p. 70. 
181 Good examples of this can be found in Two Zen Classics: The Gateless Gate and The Blue 
Cliff Records, translated by Katsuki Sekida (Boston: Shambhala, 2005). 
182 Dogen, p. xxviii. 
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 crosses the threshold to a more enlightened realm, and koans can help in this 
process.  
Similarly, Kafka’s doors often mark breaches in the laws of space and 
time, leaving his characters nonplussed and unable to hold onto conventional 
logic. In the opening chapter Josef K. loses his self-control when entering 
Fräulein Bürstner’s room, fascinated by the young lady’s private chamber and 
quite forgetting the reason he is there (the arrest). Titorelli’s cramped studio 
has hidden doors leading to the law chambers, and the doors to the venue for 
his initial hearing are sealed after his arrival, as if his presence creates special 
conditions. Another key ‘gate’ is the entrance to ‘Das Gesetz’ described by the 
chaplain. The man from the country is stumped by the paradox of the open 
entrance and verbal warning of formidable interior doorkeepers. Unwilling to 
walk away, but unable to progress without official sanction, he typifies the 
ignorant individual striking matches in the dark.  
The lumber room flogging also has perlocutionary elements that defy 
interpretation as K. opens the door to a scene of cause and effect, thereby 
continuing the theme of stepping through ‘portals’ into new dimensions. He is 
taken by surprise, but manages to find some composure and extricate himself 
from the predicament, without committing to assisting the poor warders. The 
next day he opens the door to the lumber room expecting to see it as it was 
originally, but he is dumbstruck to see the three men inside in exactly the 
same pose, as if time had frozen until K.’s entrance allowed the punishment to 
continue. This flouting of the rules of physics can be considered a 
perlocutionary device, for it completely throws Josef K. (‘wußte er sich nicht zu 
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 fassen’) and he loses composure: ‘Sofort warf K. die Tür zu und schlug noch 
mit den Fäusten gegen sie, als sei sie dann fester verschlossen’ (DP 117).183 
Josef K. has responded poorly to this invasion of irrationality, as he 
simply wants the scene wiped from his memory. However, if this scene had 
been a lesson set by a Zen master, it would be considered successful as K. 
sets off home at the end of the day ‘müde und gedankenlos’, precisely the 
intended effect – the emptying of the mind, the cessation of thinking. 
Following the episode in the lumber room, he is unable to concentrate in 
the office. His earlier trumpeted ‘presence of mind’ at work is destroyed by the 
image of the warders suffering. In effect, even though they are not literally 
keeping watch over him, the warders are fulfilling their duty of keeping K. 
aware of his ‘Verhaftung’, and dragging him out of the orbit of his old, 
unreformed ways. K. cannot simply ‘lose himself’ in his work any longer.  
3.3.4 Guidance 
The process of finding the truth may not be a process by which we feel 
increasingly better and better. It may be a process by which we look at things 
honestly, sincerely, truthfully, and that may or may not be an easy thing to 
do.184 
Advokat Huld and Maler Titorelli both overwhelm K. with a deluge of 
information about the Law, and also succeed in tieing him up in knots of 
confusion. The conversations with lawyer and artist explore strategies for 
dealing with the trial and taking on the Court, but their declarations and 
explanations serve to perplex rather than inform. From a Zen perspective, 
these messages represent tripwires warning the individual against taking up a 
quest as a ‘personal way’ to happiness. The path to non-suffering is not 
183 A similar effect is achieved when K. skips out of the introductory meeting with Huld to forge 
an alliance with Leni. In the narrative flow, it seems as if he is just moments with her but his 
uncle later upbraids him for disappearing ‘stundenlang’ (DP 146). 
184 Adyashanti in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/end-your-world.  
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 travelled by measuring the distance or direction of the steps made (for there is 
no fixed destination), but by being mindful of how the steps are made, i.e. 
without attachment to self: the steps to enlightenment leave no karmic 
footprint. 
Huld spins a number of bewildering koans, but one particular passage is 
a good example of the difficulty of interpretation that accompanies his words 
of ‘wisdom’. After telling K. that the Court frowns upon the involvement of a 
defence and thus tries to isolate the arrested person so they can concentrate 
on themselves, Huld unleashes a series of justifications for the defence which 
start off promisingly before falling short of conviction. One such presentation, 
delivered in a dense unbroken passage of ‘erlebte Rede’, takes Josef K. on a 
rollercoaster ride with the following twists and turns, raising and dashing 
hopes in equal measure. First, the defence plays no official role in any trial, 
but in fact the defence is ‘notwendig’. Having said that, ‘Das Verfahren ist 
nämlich im allgemeinen nicht nur vor der Öffentlichkeit geheim, sondern auch 
vor dem Angeklagten’ (DP 154). The accused has no ‘Einblick’ into the 
proceedings, but the defence comes to the rescue. However, since the defence 
is not allowed into the hearings, it must rely on inaccurate briefings from the 
accused. This is where the defence’s contacts start to play a part. 
The discussion of the general merits and drawbacks of hiring a defence 
lawyer move seamlessly into more specific considerations, such as Huld’s own 
credentials, his relationship with Court officials and the way to approach a 
trial – whatever the topic, the same pattern of raised and dashed hopes is 
repeated: ‘In solchen und ähnlichen Reden war der Advokat unerschöpflich. 
Sie wiederholten sich bei jeden Besuch. Immer gab es Fortschritte, niemals 
aber konnte die Art dieser Fortschritte mitgeteilt werden’ (DP 164). The 
perlocutionary effect on Josef K. is redolent of Zen as he is rendered ‘ganz 
ermattet’ by all this talk. He cannot fathom whether Huld is trying to create 
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 ‘Trost oder Verzweiflung’ (DP 165), but Josef K. is suspicious of the lawyer’s 
‘unaufhörlich hervorgehobenen persönlichen Beziehungen zu den Beamten’ 
(DP 165) and decides that he would be better off representing himself. In this 
case it would appear that K. has made the right decision for the wrong 
reasons: he feels uncomfortable relying on Huld’s ‘personal contacts’, but 
instead of seeing that these connections (attachments) are part of the problem 
not the solution, he merely chooses to substitute Huld’s contacts for his own. 
The brief hiatus in seeking ‘fremde Hilfe’ is short-lived, however, for K. 
finds it tough preparing his ‘Eingabe’ and loses focus at the bank. One of K.’s 
clients notices the change in his demeanour (‘bedrückt’, DP 179) and puts him 
in touch with a painter called Titorelli, who is said to be well-connected and 
knowledgeable about the Court. Aside from the negative Buddhist overtones 
that come with the notion of attachment, the ‘Verbindung’ that Josef K. seeks 
with Titorelli demonstrates his inability to follow the ‘pointers’ of earlier Court 
koans. After hearing Huld’s paradoxical and baffling speeches, Josef K. could 
have eschewed a legal defence and launched a move in a more enlightened 
direction. But in fact, Josef K. has merely decided to dispense with the person 
of Huld as a defence lawyer, yet persist with the idea of defending himself, i.e. 
seeking justice for wrongful arrest. The episode with Titorelli is another 
attempt to mount a defence, which in Zen terms is a misguided quest to 
rationalise the irrational: koans urge us to explore and embrace the illogical 
and unconventional, rather than trying to fit everything into an orderly 
pattern. In other words, K. keeps trying to hammer his square peg into a 
round hole, when it may just be the case that the peg and hole are not meant 
to correspond. 
The scenes with the painter have a twofold perlocutionary effect, in terms 
of the issues discussed and the environment of the meeting. The latter causes 
K. several shocks for the atelier is so small the two men are virtually sitting on 
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 top of each other. Furthermore, K. realises at the end of the meeting that a 
door behind the bed leads directly to more Court offices. This adds to the 
somewhat surreal atmosphere surrounding the Court, as it appears 
increasingly shrouded in enigmatic, ‘unnatural’ occurrences, producing koans 
at every point of contact with its human subjects, capturing the combined 
essence of impermanence, not-self and suffering. 
The scene with Titorelli occasions a deep discussion of life under the 
Court, and Josef K. sits close by Titorelli in the cramped quarters, hanging on 
every word (as he will later do in his conversation with Block). He is captivated 
by his craving for information on the Law and confounded by his inability to 
comprehend the mysterious ways of the authorities. Much of Titorelli’s 
description of the Court has a Zen feel to it, shot through with disclaimers and 
disqualifications, and the most prominent example is the explanation of how 
to deal with the state of being under arrest. The long and detailed account 
holds illocutionary value, in that it is informative of how the Court works, but 
for Josef K. it would appear that its perlocutionary effect exerts the greatest 
influence on him because his most noteworthy reactions are triggered by 
features of Titorelli’s account which do not relate specifically to the matters in 
question, but which are delivered in a particular form.  
The preamble to the discussion of ‘Befreiung’ options contains a mixture 
of illocutions (information) and perlocutions (paradoxes and 
counterarguments) woven together in such a way that they offer guidance on 
how to avoid suffering. Titorelli opens the meeting by asking K. bluntly if he is 
‘unschuldig’ (DP 200), and K. duly proclaims his complete innocence with 
‘Freude’. When Titorelli accepts this declaration and concludes the situation is 
‘einfach’, K.’s mood darkens because he believes the painter is as ignorant as 
‘ein unwissendes Kind’ of the machinations of the Court. 
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 The downward spiral continues when Titorelli uses the word ‘unschuldig’ 
for a third time, pointing out this is the ‘Hauptsache’ in the whole affair. By 
the time Titorelli has told K. the Court is never mistaken about guilt and K. 
would have more success pleading his innocence before paintings of the 
judiciary than the judges in the flesh, K.’s ‘Freude’ has evaporated and all he 
can do is mutter to himself. In an aside that sums up the painter’s methods, 
Titorelli tells K. ‘halb im Scherz, halb zur Eklärung’ (DP 202) that the noisy 
girls outside his studio also belong to the Court: ‘es gehört ja alles zum 
Gericht’ (DP 202) – the half-serious, half-joking remark is also half-
illocutionary and half-perlocutionary. The final blow comes when Titorelli 
notes that Josef K. has ‘keinen Überblick über das Gericht’ (DP 202), but that 
need not matter because he is already ‘unschuldig’.  
Hitherto, K. has not seen the advantage of being ‘unschuldig’ because he 
has focused on the ways of the Court and, unable to understand them, he 
cannot work out how to ‘place’ his innocence in relation to the Law. Titorelli 
seems to back this up by confirming that the Court will not hear 
‘Beweisgründe’ for innocence. This would rule out any chance of an appeal, 
but Titorelli introduces the crucial distinction of what proof is brought before 
the Court, and what is presented to the network of support services ‘hinter 
dem öffentlichen Gericht’. This is of huge interest to K. and the conversation 
takes a hopeful turn: ‘Waren die Richter durch persönliche Beziehungen 
wirklich so leicht zu lenken, wie es der Advokat dargestellt hatte, dann waren 
die Beziehungen des Malers zu den eitlen Richtern besonders wichtig und 
jedenfalls keineswegs zu unterschätzen’ (DP 203).  
In true Zen style, the contradiction is not long coming for Titorelli notices 
with some concern (‘Ängstlichkeit’) the twinkle in K.’s eye at the possibility of 
influencing the ‘Proceß’ through his ‘Kreis von Helfern’: ‘Der Maler beobachtete 
die Wirkung, die seine Erklärung auf K. gemacht hatte’ (DP 203). This 
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 ‘Wirkung’ is perlocutionary for K. has applied to Titorelli’s words a logic that is 
inappropriate. K. will be disabused of this false hope at a later juncture when 
he tells Titorelli that there are contradictions in the painter’s description of 
how the Court operates. 
Before K. is handed his next disappointment by Titorelli’s rebuttal, there 
are still plenty of other peaks and troughs in the exchange between them. K.’s 
hopes are raised by Titorelli’s access to the ‘backstreets’ of the Law, where 
deals can be made and alliances forged. K. learns that Titorelli has inherited 
his position, effectively making it ‘unerschütterlich’, so he can occasionally 
risk helping ‘einem armen Manne, der einen Proceß hat’. K. probes further, 
sensing an opportunity for aid, oblivious to the implication that he is the ‘poor 
man’ in the example. Titorelli continues his account with ‘in Ihrem Fall’, 
thereby disabusing K. of this illusion. A crushing blow is then dealt by the fifth 
mention of the key term ‘unschuldig’, which almost assumes a perlocutionary 
effect of its own because it speaks volumes beyond the reference to 
‘innocence’: ‘Die wiederholte Erwähnung seiner Unschuld wurde K. schon 
lästig’ (DP 205). Ironically, what irks K. is not any doubt regarding his 
innocence, but actually the repeated assumption that he is indeed innocent; in 
other words, the position he has maintained all along.185 
Josef K. shakes off this setback by reasoning that Titorelli’s contacts offer 
more promise than Huld’s, so he is prepared to keep listening. The description 
of the ‘Befreiung’ options that follows is both an illocutionary masterclass in 
the perils of clinging to selfhood and a textbook delivery of a series of koans 
that send K. reeling by the end of the session.  
185 Corngold picks up on K.’s intransigence: ‘The attitude which Kafka solicits and which Josef 
K. fails to provide is one of openness to the possibility of guilt.’ Stanley Corngold, ‘The Question 
of the Law, the Question of Writing’, in James Rolleston, ed., Twentieth Century Interpretations 
of The Trial (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1976), p. 101. 
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 The first option of ‘wirkliche Freisprechung’ is ideal, but Titorelli has 
regrettably ‘nicht den geringsten Einfluß auf diese Art der Lösung’ (DP 205) 
and, to make matters worse, neither does anybody else. The only factor taken 
into consideration by the Court is (once again) ‘die Unschuld des Angeklagten’. 
Two further instances of the term ‘Unschuld’ explain that K. does not actually 
need any help if he is truly innocent. Although at face value Titorelli’s 
statement is intended to inform (illocutionary), its function in the text acquires 
perlocutionary effect: ‘Diese geordnete Darstellung verblüffte K.’ (DP 206). He 
recovers by pointing out perceived inconsistencies (‘Sie widersprechen sich’), 
but his ‘logical’ approach to the koan is brushed aside. The painter’s response 
to the challenge is a knowing smile worthy of a Zen master (‘lehnte sich 
lächelnd zurück’), for Titorelli is clear in his own mind that everything adds 
up. K. senses that the discussion has left the sphere of rationality and moved 
into uncharted territory: ‘Dieses Lächeln erweckte in K. das Gefühl, als ob er 
jetzt daran gehe, nicht in den Worten des Malers sondern in dem 
Gerichtsverfahren selbst Widersprüche zu entdecken’ (DP 206). A Zen master 
would be encouraged to see his pupil starting to scratch surface reality and 
discover the underlying impermanence. 
K. presses on undaunted and points out the paradoxes he has found, but 
Titorelli’s reply is typical of another classic Zen strategy as he completely 
wrongfoots K. by changing the terms of reference of the discussion: ‘Es ist hier 
von zwei verschiedenen Dingen die Rede, von dem was im Gesetz steht, und 
von dem was ich persönlich erfahren habe’ (DP 206). The opposition of ‘Gesetz’ 
and ‘persönlich’ is crucial from a Buddhist point of view, for it implicates 
person/self as the source of resistance, suffering and ultimately ‘Schuld’. K.’s 
hopes are crushed by Titorelli having no experience in his lifetime of ‘wirkliche 
Freisprechung’, so he wonders about earlier times, only to meet with the same 
response. Here, K.’s despair is clear to see as he clings to the faintest of hopes, 
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 through accounts of yore, much like tales from religious scriptures. His 
expectations of release (salvation) have shifted from conviction to faith, and 
Titorelli’s subsequent use of the term ‘Legende’ foreshadows the teaching that 
K. will receive from the chaplain. K.’s quibbling with the painter resembles the 
man from the country’s attempts to talk his way past the doorkeeper into the 
Law. Another aspect of the conversation which prefigures the meeting with the 
chaplain is K.’s willingness to look past contradictions and accept whatever 
opinions are presented, in order to broaden his chances of getting help, the 
very thing he is cautioned against doing.  
Titorelli has already effectively confirmed the only way out of the arrest: 
innocence. K. thus abandons the ‘koan’ on actual acquittal and turns to the 
next option, at which point Titorelli draws K.’s attention to the room’s 
stuffiness and invites him to remove his coat. K. becomes aware of a feeling of 
nausea, which recalls the reaction he had when he last visited Court attic 
rooms – he was close to losing consciousness and had to be ushered out 
before he could learn anything from the information officer. The following part 
of the discussion concerns how to delay the inevitable (unfavourable) 
sentence. In contrast to his faint in the attic rooms, K. struggles through the 
heat and physical discomfort – ‘unbequem und ungesund’ (DP 209) – to learn 
more about evasions which will be spiritually uncomfortable and unhealthy for 
him. It is at this juncture that we are told that Titorelli’s attic has a window 
that does not open – a ‘fake’ aperture for decoration and some little 
illumination, but affording neither relief nor release, much like the acquittal 
options to be discussed. 
The second ‘Befreiung’ koan starts with typical ambiguity as Titorelli 
declares the remaining two options are both ‘erreichbar, natürlich nicht ohne 
Mühe’ (DP 211). The only ‘effortless’ solution is actual acquittal. The core 
element of the ‘scheinbare Freisprechung’ is the guarantee of innocence that 
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 Titorelli would promise to ‘hawk’ around his judge acquaintances. On the 
downside, K. feels that he would create a burden for the painter, but the initial 
prospects seem bright as Titorelli outlines the main features of the deal: ‘nicht 
mehr viel Hindernisse’, ‘Zeit der höchsten Zuversicht’, ‘es bedarf jetzt keiner 
besonderen Mühe mehr’ (all DP 212), and most attractively, ‘Sie aber treten 
aus dem Gericht und sind frei’ (DP 213). 
As befits a koan, all is not so simple and there must be hurdles to 
overcome. K. has learnt something from his experience with the Court and 
approaches the term ‘frei’ with an element of scepticism (‘zögernd’). Titorelli 
duly applies the perlocutionary disclaimer: ‘aber nur scheinbar frei oder, 
besser ausgedrückt, zeitweilig frei’ (DP 213). The circles Titorelli moves in have 
‘lower’ judges who cannot make the release ‘endgiltig’: ‘dieses Recht hat nur 
das oberste, für Sie, für mich und für uns alle ganz unerreichbare Gericht’ (DP 
213). The term ‘zeitweilig’ achieves a similar effect to the Buddhist 
‘impermanence’. 
The next comments provided by Titorelli set out the difference between 
actual and apparent acquittals, in terms which could not sound more 
Buddhist if they were written by a Zen master. The crucial point concerns the 
legal documents or evidence which build the case against the accused. When 
the actual acquittal is passed (i.e. the arrested party is declared innocent), all 
the files disappear and ‘alles ist vernichtet’ (DP 214); with the apparent 
acquittal, the existing papers are not altered, but extra documents are added 
to mark the statement of innocence, hence the case file is ‘bereichert’ (DP 214). 
The distinction here is no less significant than the way in which the self is 
viewed from Buddhist and Western perspectives. Attachment to self is seen as 
the main barrier to enlightenment by Buddhists, so it follows that suffering is 
decreased as the reliance on self is reduced, much as a hot-air balloon rises 
when ballast is thrown overboard. A Christian approach, for example, does not 
127 
 seek to dispense with attachment to selfhood, but encourages it, not in the 
‘greedy’ sense of ‘selfish’, but in the sense that the individual’s outlook is still 
centred in selfhood. Jesus is there to save each one of us as we are, and the 
bond between self and Christ is the way of faith and the path to redemption. 
The ‘enrichment’ of selfhood with such a relationship to Jesus is positive, and 
contrasts with the stark advice issued by ninth-century Zen master Linji: ‘If 
you meet the Buddha, kill him.’186 The use of the word ‘bereichert’ to describe 
the extra ‘ballast’ added to the Court’s case files fits in well with paradoxical 
Zen statements that appear rational but hide pitfalls. A case that is ‘rich’ with 
proofs of innocence undermines itself with its weight of evidence: innocence is 
not quantifiable. 
To underscore this message, during which K. has significantly and 
uncharacteristically not interjected even once, Titorelli relates how the case 
may seem to disappear from sight, but can resurface at any moment, 
sometimes even before the acquitted person has returned home: ‘Es geht kein 
Akt verloren, es gibt bei Gericht kein Vergessen. Eines Tages – niemand 
erwartet es – nimmt irgendein Richter den Akt aufmerksamer in die Hand, 
erkennt daß in diesem Fall die Anklage noch lebendig ist und ordnet die 
sofortige Verhaftung an’ (DP 214). 
The final blows of the apparent acquittal leave K. ‘zusammengesunken’ 
(DP 215). The potentially endless loop of ‘Freisprechung’ and ‘Verhaftung’ 
(similar to the samsara of life-death-rebirth) dumbfounds K. and his presence 
in the text is curtailed to ‘schwieg’ and ‘nickte’ (DP 216). Baffled silence is 
often the response to a particularly inscrutable koan, so K.’s quiet resignation 
indicates a successful perlocutionary hit. 
186 Judith Blackstone and Zoran Josipovic in Titmuss, p. 274. 
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 The third ‘acquittal’ koan reveals the conditions for ‘Verschleppung’, 
which centre on keeping the trial tied up ‘im niedrigsten Proceßstadium’ (DP 
216). The advantage is that there will be no sudden re-arrests (the individual 
is still officially under arrest), but the drawback is that there must always be 
some movement in the case, however trivial. This echoes the first Universal 
Characteristic of impermanence and adds another layer of paradox to the koan 
for the only way to stop the trial from progressing is to keep it moving. The 
trick of keeping the case mired in bureaucracy comes with serious 
consequences for both the accused and his helper – they are in 
‘ununterbrochener persönlicher Fühlung mit dem Gerichte’ (DP 216). The 
combination of ‘unbroken’ and ‘personal’ rings alarm bells for the Buddhist 
reader.  
Titorelli runs through more details on ‘Verschleppung’, but K. has 
already stood up to leave. In the way that a Zen master might ask his student 
whether he has understood the lesson, Titorelli hopes his insights (koans) 
have been useful: ‘“Oja,” sagte K., dem von der Anstrengung mit der er sich 
zum Zuhören gezwungen hatte der Kopf schmerzte’ (DP 218). K. is not the first 
person to have suffered a headache when presented with baffling koans, but 
Titorelli tries to simplify matters by concluding that both ‘scheinbare 
Freisprechung’ and ‘Verschleppung’ would prevent ‘Verurteilung’. K. counters 
that they also prevent an actual acquittal, which gains Titorelli’s approval: ‘Sie 
haben den Kern der Sache erfaßt’ (DP 218). Unfortunately, this only indicates 
that K. has grasped the (superficial) illocutionary message rather than been 
enlightened by its perlocutionary implications. 
The scene closes with Titorelli suggesting they keep ‘in Verbindung’, and 
the Buddhist reader would note the dangers inherent in cultivating 
attachments. The chapter ends after a series of unexpected turns, all of which 
confuse K., from buying a range of identical paintings and departing by 
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 climbing out over Titorelli’s bed through to the neighbouring attic rooms. After 
the verbal koans, these physical koans underline the non-sense of following 
Titorelli’s instructions. 
3.3.5 Closure 
Buddhism is about getting unbrainwashed. It's about waking up from this 
hypnotic state of subservience to ego.187 
As K.’s ‘Proceß’ has advanced he has faced a number of situations which have 
all caused him to reflect on his case, either by shock tactics (home arrest, 
lumber room beating) or through irrational argumentation (‘Zimmermaler’, 
Huld’s unsanctioned but essential defence, Titorelli’s binding personal 
guarantees that don’t bind to anything). K. has failed to make any headway 
after all these promptings and has reached such a critical stage that the Court 
arranges a final warning, in the figure of the prison chaplain. We have seen 
above how the chaplain offers K. some unequivocal advice (illocutionary), but 
the text also allocates to the chaplain the novel’s clearest teaching via 
perlocutionary means, the parable Vor dem Gesetz.  
Perlocutions are about effect and reaction, rather than meaning, so it is 
worth examining how K. is ‘prepared’ for the parable. K. has ostensibly gone to 
the cathedral to meet a client, so an impromptu Court hearing is the last thing 
on his mind (although clearly his trial is also the first thing on his mind).  
The meeting in the cathedral begins properly when the chaplain calls K.’s 
name. By this stage, the burden of upholding his good name, of hanging on to 
the notion of a closed, coherent self, has started to weigh heavily. The chaplain 
seeks to confirm his identity as Josef K., and K. replies in the affirmative, 
noting to himself: ‘er dachte daran wie offen er früher immer seinen Namen 
genannt hatte, seit einiger Zeit war er ihm eine Last’ (DP 288). His profession 
187 Kongtrül, p. 81. 
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 of ‘Unschuld’ has become a millstone rather than an anchor. If a specific 
charge had been brought against K. he could fend off an attack by pointing to 
his good character or an alibi. The koan strategy of the text is to leave the 
charge ‘open’, and yet apply the arrest – this triggers a self-defence 
mechanism, but K. struggles to get a ‘grip’ without a specified accusation to 
counter. This is the perlocutionary message that speaks through all the 
paradoxes in the novel – the instinct of the self is to defend itself, but because 
the point of attack is so vague, the defence cannot focus. The counter-intuitive 
response would be to accept the attack in order to negate it – ignorance is 
dispelled by acknowledging the ‘guilt’ of attachment to self. The Zen koan 
creates a situation where the individual’s self and cherished values become a 
burden or liability. The Court has made some headway in this respect for K. 
now feels suffering at the mere mention of his name.  
The perlocution continues with the chaplain explaining that he has 
summoned K., but K. talks of the appointment with the Italian client, having 
forgotten the other unannounced incursions of the Court into his life. The 
chaplain tells him to ignore ‘das Nebensächliche’, much as a Zen master tries 
to ‘clear’ a student’s mind. The chaplain asks K. if he is holding a prayer book, 
but it is a city map, so he instructs K. to throw it away as irrelevant. This 
double instance of incongruous question-response (mondo style) leads to the 
revelation that his case is going badly, and the perlocutions switch from 
incongruity to ignorance.  
The next element of the conversation consists of a densely packed series 
of exchanges which culminate in the revelation of the ‘scripture’, Vor dem 
Gesetz. At every step K. faces an issue in relation to which his view is at odds 
with the position of the chaplain. It is furthermore interesting to note how 
these issues correspond to The Four Noble Truths, a teaching aimed at 
enlightening those in ignorance.  
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 First, their discussion centres on ‘Schuld’: K. insists on his innocence, 
but justifies it by referring to a generic human lack of guilt: ‘Wie kann denn 
ein Mensch überhaupt schuldig sein. Wir sind hier doch alle Menschen, einer 
wie der andere’ (DP 289). Since the arrest, K. has trained his thoughts on the 
notion of guilt, and not his person, which is held to be unassailable. He 
understands the general concept of guilt, but cannot relate it particularly to 
himself. The chaplain responds by re-attaching the two parts of guilt and self: 
‘Das ist richtig […] aber so pflegen die Schuldigen zu reden’ (DP 289). Guilt is 
therefore that of selfhood – it is not a moral, social or criminal wrongdoing, but 
a spiritual or existential one.188 This echoes The First Noble Truth: there is 
suffering. K. still does not learn and fails another perlocutionary test.  
The next topic under discussion is ‘Vorurteil’, for K.’s paranoia sees the 
world against him. His conspiracy theories come from his self-defence 
mechanism and an ego-centric world view. This ties in with The Second Noble 
Truth: the source of suffering is desire or attachment. The chaplain sets him 
straight again, in words which pre-empt the parable: ‘Du mißverstehst die 
Tatsachen’ (DP 289). The verdict in K.’s type of trial is not decided after 
deliberation and then declared as a sentence, but unfolds as a gradual process 
(‘Verfahren’).  
The third aspect of the discussion relates to help, and elicits a clear 
warning (illocutionary) from the chaplain: ‘Du suchst zuviel fremde Hilfe’ (DP 
289). The question is whether K. recognises what ‘wahre Hilfe’ is, which in fact 
corresponds to the opening words of guidance uttered by the warders, about 
following a more introspective route to achieving understanding. K. rambles 
defensively about the help available from women and Court officials, but the 
chaplain stays silent. The text reports, significantly at this point, that the 
188 ‘K.’s sense of guilt is existential. No crime need be named, since he feels that it is a crime 
for him to be alive at all.’ Anthony Storr, ‘Kafka’s Sense of Identity’ in J. P. Stern and J. J. 
White, eds, Paths and Labyrinths (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, 1985), p. 12. 
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 stormy weather outside has created ‘tiefe Nacht’ (DP 290). This represents K.’s 
lowest ebb, as he is unable to understand how suffering is ceased by 
extinguishing craving and attachment (The Third Noble Truth).  
The fourth aspect of the discussion preparing K. for the parable is 
triggered by K., filling the uncomfortable gap created by the chaplain’s silence 
with questions that miss the point of the previous teaching. K. suspects he 
has upset the chaplain and continues to ramble: ‘Bist Du mir böse?’ and ‘Ich 
wollte Dich nicht beleidigen’ (DP 290). All these interjections are ‘self’- 
governed, fashioned by emotion, appealing to the person. Clearly, K. has 
learned nothing about extinguishing desires for happiness and justice, for self-
ratification and self-gratification. The chaplain breaks his silence with an 
angry shout: ‘Siehst Du denn nicht zwei Schritte weit?’ (DP 290). His good 
intention shines through and the cause for his concern is that K. does not see 
‘the way’, and this leads us to The Fourth Noble Truth, how to follow the right 
path to arrive at enlightenment. This signals the introduction of the parable. 
Although K. has not understood the advice, it is important to note his 
reaction to the discussion. He realises that the chaplain has not delivered a 
‘Predigt’, but he has made ‘Mitteilungen’ which did not show K. in a good light. 
As a Zen student recognises the good intentions of his master, so has K. 
noticed the ‘gute Absicht’ of the chaplain, despite the criticisms and 
confusions: ‘es war nicht unmöglich, daß er von ihm einen entscheidenden 
und annehmbaren Rat bekäme, der ihm z. B. zeigen würde, nicht etwa wie der 
Proceß zu beeinflussen war, sondern wie man aus dem Proceß ausbrechen, 
wie man ihn umgehen, wie man außerhalb des Processes leben könnte’ (DP 
291). Somehow K. has sensed that there is a way to deal with the trial, and it 
is not by influencing it – that is, trying to change its course – but by stepping 
outside it. This is Zen for looking beyond the narrow, rational and 
conventional aspects of our personal lives to see the underlying reality. It is 
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 significant that the chaplain’s warning speaks of ‘Schritte’ because the series 
of tripwires that the Court has set before K. have all caused him to stumble. In 
this sense, K. cannot see two steps in front of himself, but focuses ten or 
twenty ahead, to the extent that he misses the problem under his nose – he 
suffers from an excess of foresight, not a lack, and the tripwire is designed to 
bring his attention closer to home. 
The chaplain then leaves the pulpit, as if to signify that he is no longer 
representing the Court directly and can now speak informally, but K. again 
mistakes this for a personal gesture. This prompts the chaplain to reiterate his 
warning to K. about getting his facts wrong and creates the opportunity to 
recount the parable: ‘In dem Gericht täuschst Du Dich’ (DP 292). The 
perlocutionary aspect to this statement is that it refers to K., not to the Court 
– in other words, K.’s ignorance is not of the ways of the Court, but rather that 
under the Law (Dharma), selfhood is illusory. 
The parable stands as a koan in its own right and illustrates K.’s 
misconceptions. The scripture delivers a message (illocutionary) about how 
different textual interpretations have emerged, but the exchange that follows 
has perlocutionary effects in the way that the chaplain continually wrongfoots 
K. by introducing new information. The effect is designed to stop K. relying on 
‘fremde Hilfe’ and adopting ‘die fremde Meinung ungeprüft’, a core Buddhist 
teaching. The parable’s simplicity and brevity has allowed many 
interpretations to be offered, and these variations constitute a warning about 
attaching to personal opinions. 
Throughout the subsequent conversation, the chaplain sets tripwires to 
wean K. off his attachment to ‘Meinungen’. For example, K.’s instant reaction 
to the story is to blame the doorkeeper, thereby identifying with the man. The 
chaplain immediately steps in to warn him of jumping to conclusions, 
explaining that there is no mention of deception in the parable. K. sticks to his 
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 initial view, until the chaplain puts forward a defence of the doorkeeper, 
suggesting he was just doing his duty. K. rejects this logical account of the 
doorkeeper’s role (he simply guards the door) in favour of his subjective view: 
‘Seine Pflicht war es vielleicht alle Fremden abzuwehren, diesen Mann aber, 
für den der Eingang bestimmt war, hätte er einlassen müssen’ (DP 295). The 
chaplain warns K. not to alter the facts of the scripture and embarks on a 
lengthy defence of the doorkeeper, going so far as to suggest that it is the 
doorkeeper who is deceived. En route, he introduces a comment from an 
‘Erklärer’ which alone is worthy of koan status: ‘Richtiges Auffassen einer 
Sache und Mißverstehn der gleichen Sache schließen einander nicht 
vollständig aus’ (DP 297). This is also a key Zen teaching, for it shows the 
limits of the intellect. The chaplain probes more deeply into the various 
readings of the parable, until K. can only respond: ‘Du kennst die Geschichte 
genauer als ich und längerer Zeit’ (DP 298). The silence thereafter suggests 
that the chaplain’s perlocutions have given K. pause for thought.  
Though reluctant to abandon his original thoughts, K. concedes after 
further discussion that it is possible for the doorkeeper to have been deceived. 
But just when it seems that K. is about to agree, the chaplain takes the 
parable into another direction (‘Gegenmeinung’). The final twist in the reading 
places the doorkeeper in the service of the Law and hence confers on him an 
indubitable ‘Würdigkeit’. K. cannot agree to this view because he feels that it 
makes the doorkeeper infallible: ‘wenn man sich ihr anschließt, muß man 
alles was der Türhüter sagt für wahr halten’ (DP 302). The chaplain’s response 
could come from a Zen textbook: ‘man muß nicht alles für wahr halten, man 
muß es nur für notwendig halten’ (DP 303). The opposition of ‘wahr’ and 
‘notwendig’ sits at the heart of Buddhism because it rejects truth in favour of 
reality, or cause and effect as the basis of existence. This disappoints K. who 
takes the rejection of truth as a victory for ‘die Lüge’, thereby failing to grasp 
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 the perlocutionary message aimed at undermining his reliance on meaningful 
order. 
The parable and its related koans have forced K. to think differently, but 
he is unable to step away from what he is used to: ‘Er war zu müde, um alle 
Folgerungen der Geschichte übersehn zu können, es waren auch ungewohnte 
Gedankengänge, in die sie ihn führte’ (DP 303). The chaplain is moved by K.’s 
unease (‘Zartgefühl’), but must now let him go. K. feels abandoned and insists 
on using the condition of personal relationships as a barometer of how his life 
is faring: ‘jetzt aber entläßt Du mich, als läge Dir nichts an mir’ (DP 304).  
The closing exchange of the chapter works on two levels for it presents an 
enigmatic picture of the Court and it draws parallels between K.’s case and the 
parable. Both Josef K. and the man from the country receive a personalised 
sermon/address, but neither makes headway in his quest. Just as the 
doorkeeper closes the door on the dying man, the chaplain closes the hearing 
by saying he wants nothing more: ‘Das Gericht will nichts von Dir. Es nimmt 
Dich auf, wenn Du kommst, und es entläßt Dich, wenn Du gehst’ (DP 304). K. 
is simultaneously subject to the law (unable to escape it) and outside the law 
(he cannot influence it). The only solution is to ‘become’ or ‘enter’ the law, but 
this can only be done without any baggage, by relinquishing attachment to 
selfhood. The Court, responsible for K.’s arrest, apparently does not make any 
demands on K. Usually, when an authority sanctions an arrest, it means that 
it intends to punish or reprimand the accused – here the Court arrests K. but 
leaves him at large. This is a koan to end the chapter and also to define the 
nature of the Court, with its authority stemming from insight, not 
punishment. The Court’s role is to help make individuals aware of their 
ignorance and attachment to self – the pain and suffering of their conduct 
follows according to natural laws and mechanisms, such as karma.  
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 The second aspect of the chapter ending is its correspondence with the 
parable. K. is the man from the country who tries all he can to gain access to 
the Law (insight), including ‘unofficial’ figures or ‘parasites’ operating outside 
the law, such as Huld, Titorelli and Leni, but fails because enlightenment 
cannot be bestowed. As the doorkeeper shuts the entrance, so the same 
happens to K. and the final chapter confirms this conclusion. Foreshadowing 
the closing of the parable door, K. is ushered into the meeting room at his first 
hearing and told: ‘Nach Ihnen muß ich schließen, es darf niemand mehr 
hinein’ (DP 58). The law or Dharma may concern universal and absolute 
truths, applicable to all, in that we all suffer, but it is also ‘empty’ in that it is 
not a ‘prop’ intended to support us.189 Each individual case of suffering, 
craving and ignorance is different, because it is composed of the karma 
accumulated from the things each individual has said, done and thought. 
3.4 Sleepwalking into suffering 
As long as we are enmeshed in our beliefs and preconceptions, we can make no 
progress.190 
Josef K. is the classic sleepwalker: he cuts a very active and purposeful figure 
who clearly believes in his quest for ‘Freisprechung’, but to onlookers (within 
and without the text) he is living in a world of his own. He is conscious of his 
actions, but unaware of their consequences, as well as being ignorant of the 
‘Law’. His unskillful, attachment-laden decisions attract the attentions of the 
Court and his stubborn grasping after ‘fremde Hilfe’ underlines his guilt.  
Though we learn little about the details of K.’s life, there is enough 
evidence about the kind of person he is to warrant his ‘arrest’. K. displays a 
series of personality traits which are typical of somebody completely unaware 
189 For Cixous, the law is a ‘verbal construct’ with ‘no material inside’, p. 18. 
190 Khema, p. 121. 
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 of the Dharma, the truth about how things are, the facts of impermanence, 
unsatisfactoriness and not-selfhood. Impatience, violence, rage, revenge, 
jealousy, arrogance – all these feelings arise in Josef K. during the course of 
his trial. All are caused by ignorance, by not realising that everything is 
subject to change, that there is no immutable self to hang on to, that all 
things carry within themselves the seeds of dissatisfaction. 
The first two adjectives that describe Josef K. on the morning of his 
arrest, while waiting for his breakfast, are ‘gleichzeitig befremdet und hungrig’ 
(DP 7). These two words appear like beacons to Buddhists, clear signals of 
suffering. Firstly, K. is ‘befremdet’ because his morning routine has been 
disturbed. The usual ordered, comfortable, familiar pattern of events has been 
broken and he is not happy. A crack has appeared in the edifice of K.’s 
carefully constructed life. It is no longer ‘his’ life, ‘his’ routine, ‘his’ habit, but 
something alien, a strange occurrence, a different event, one that does not fit. 
Lacking breakfast at the usual hour, K. is also hungry. Hunger appears 
commonly as a synonym for desire in Buddhism and is a major factor in 
attachment to things. So, within a few lines of having slander suggested for 
K.’s arrest, an alternative possibility arises much closer to home: K.’s craving 
or desire. 
Closing the opening chapter with perfect symmetry, Josef K.’s hunger 
finds some satisfaction in the lips of Fräulein Bürstner. K.’s desperate sexual 
lunge bears all the hallmarks of a Buddhist description of craving: ‘[K.] faßte 
sie, küßte sie auf den Mund und dann über das ganze Gesicht, wie ein 
durstiges Tier mit der Zunge über das endlich gefundene Quellwasser hinjagt’ 
(DP 48). K. barely notes her lack of response to his slavering advances and 
later goes to sleep, with a feeling of satisfaction. Significantly, however, the 
satisfaction is short-lived, as other concerns surface to trouble his mind. The 
parallels with Buddhist teaching are clear, for it is explained that even 
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 pleasure comes wrapped up with worry of how to protect it or hang on to it. 
K.’s thirst is not slaked by the assault on Fräulein Bürstner, merely extended 
and transformed into another form of ‘Sorgen’, this time in the figure of 
Hauptmann Lanz.  
K.’s ignorant ways constitute the guilt that has attracted the Court. The 
‘Verhaftung’ announced at the beginning of the novel is reinforced by later 
references to ‘Beziehungen’ and ‘Verbindungen’. It is ironic that the more K. 
struggles with his protests of innocence, the more ‘connections’ and 
‘attachments’ he runs up. Rather than clearing his account of bad debts and 
cravings, he pushes his life further into the red. We have seen how a number 
of officials serving the court (supervisor, chaplain, information officer) attempt 
to disabuse him of his illusions, to no avail. He has been advised to reflect on 
himself, which might shatter his delusions of a solid, meaningful life, and 
expose its underlying tissue of transitory desires, ambitions and hopes. 
Instead, K.’s mind is full of external threats, influential networks and personal 
connections. K.’s defence of himself (of his self) consists of trying to strengthen 
his grip on his standing in society by calling in favours. From a Buddhist 
standpoint, K. simply succeeds in hardening the bonds of attachment, and 
puts the prospect of enlightenment further out of reach.  
In contrast to the radiance and peace exuded by an enlightened being, 
one of the most common terms for describing Josef K. is ‘Aufregung’. Twice in 
the opening chapter and twice when stumbling on the warders in the lumber 
room, K. is given over to ‘Aufregung’. Similarly in the grip of overwhelming 
emotion, K. threatens to knock down a feeble old man who happens to be 
standing close to him at the end of the first hearing, an ironic closure to his 
speech, in which he paints himself as the small, innocent victim, bullied by a 
big organisation. On his way to the hearing, faced with some mean-looking 
kids, K. settles on a strategy for any possible future encounters: ‘Wenn ich 
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 nächstens wieder hergehen sollte […] muß ich entweder Zuckerwerk 
mitnehmen, um sie zu gewinnen oder den Stock um sie zu prügeln’ (DP 55). 
The word ‘prügeln’ later resurfaces in the lumber room, and ‘gewinnen’ 
describes the effect of K.’s rhetoric during his hearing, hinting at a rather cold, 
calculating way of treating his fellow men, with clear karmic repercussions. 
Huld’s servant, Leni, may not disclose much useful information regarding 
the nature of the Court, but she does reveal something about K. himself. She 
calls him ‘unnachgiebig’, a personality trait born of ignorance regarding 
impermanence. K. just will not ‘let go’, which is what one must do to be rid of 
attachment. The last word in the debate on K.’s personality goes to Josef K. 
himself. He admits to ‘grasping’ just before he is put to death. If the guilt he 
refused to accept is attachment-related, it is significant that the only bit of 
soul-searching K. does, the only admission of fault, is expressed in terms of 
attachment. K. admits trying to attach to the world with twenty hands and 
must now pay for his ignorance. Although he cannot execute himself, he 
willingly stops following the Fräulein Bürstner figure, as if to signal this is one 
attachment he has learnt to give up: ‘Das Fräulein war inzwischen in eine 
Seitengasse eingebogen, aber K. konnte sie schon entbehren’ (DP 309). 
In Buddhist teaching, developing insight for ourselves is a skill which 
requires careful balance. We should not blindly follow what others do, nor 
should we reject out of hand what could be good advice. It is up to us to 
assess the veracity and wisdom contained in a teaching or some information, 
and not to worry about the status of the informer or messenger. K. fails on 
both counts. At various points he listens to or is led by his uncle, Advokat 
Huld, Leni, Kaufmann Block and Maler Titorelli, but he ignores reasonable 
advice from the arresting officers. Instead of investigating the worth of some 
information, K. assesses the quality of its packaging. He falls foul of the 
Buddha’s advice to treat all hearsay with caution, even that which appears to 
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 emanate from the highest, most reliable source. The only credible source is 
that which has been filtered through and checked by our own mental 
processes and experience. In contrast, K. dismisses the views of the warders 
as ‘Dummheiten’, befitting their lowly station in the social pecking order: ‘Ein 
paar Worte, die ich mit einem mir ebenbürtigen Menschen sprechen werde, 
werden alles unvergleichlich klarer machen, als die längsten Reden mit diesen’ 
(DP 15). Well-meaning, sensible advice from the supervisor is rejected for 
similar reasons: ‘Schulmäßige Lehren bekam er hier von einem vielleicht 
jüngern Menschen?’ (DP 23). He presumably considers the chaplain 
‘freundlich’, because he has official recognised status. 
Everything K. ‘learns’ comes second-hand via fellow trial-bearers or 
parasites of the Court. Advokat Huld and Maler Titorelli make certain telling 
observations about the law, but the tangle of contradictions and qualifications 
in their explanations never provides K. with a clear picture of the truth. K. 
eventually grows suspicious of Huld’s methods, where personal ‘Beziehungen’ 
to court officials come into play, but not because he realises it would be wrong 
to seek more attachments, rather because the lawyer’s contacts may be too 
low-ranking and unable to lend the right influence to his case. K. goes along 
with Huld’s ploy of seeking ‘Verbindungen’, but he later considers Titorelli a 
better recruit to his ‘Kreis von Helfern’, on account of the higher order of 
officials he has access to. 
Kaufmann Block is a fairly pathetic figure who has eked his own trial out 
over five years and enlisted the ‘aid’ of a battery of lawyers. K. initially 
considers Block ‘niedrige Leute’ (DP 228), but is impressed by his efforts on a 
variety of fronts. Block has made no progress, however, and in his tale of failed 
petitions, wasted efforts and misguided notions lies a cautionary tale for K. 
Block lets slip one pearl of wisdom when he admits: ‘Jeder Fall wird für sich 
untersucht, es ist ja das sorgfältigste Gericht. Gemeinsam kann man also 
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 nichts durchsetzen, nur ein einzelner erreicht manchmal etwas im Geheimen’ 
(DP 238). Everybody has to work out the path to their own salvation: you 
cannot ‘borrow’ insight from somebody else’s life.  
3.5 Conclusion 
That which we call ‘I’ is just impermanent, ownerless karma rolling along. Don’t 
take it personally.191 
Of all Kafka’s works, Der Proceß sets the sternest test in the attempt to find 
positive interpretations. The novel ends in a gruesome execution, the victim’s 
‘fault’ is not specified and the presiding authority appears vindictive rather 
than supportive. Despite the pall hanging over Josef K.’s trial, however, there 
are signs pointing the way to a skillful reading: his suffering is not the result 
of persecution by an external force, but a natural prosecution by 
‘impermanent, ownerless karma’, fuelled by his self-attachment. 
Der Proceß represents a breakthrough for Kafka as it intertwines a 
straightforward narrative and plot (a man is arrested, tries to defend himself, 
gets executed) with a kind of counter-narrative, almost a ‘sub-text’, which 
consists of less straightforward elements that jar and purposefully do not 
correspond with the main flow of events. Hence, the more help K. seeks, the 
more serious his predicament appears; the more he learns about the Court, 
the less it appears to make sense; the further he probes into the Law, the 
further the ‘Truth’ appears to recede.  
Der Proceß differs from the three main narratives that preceded it 
because the textual ambiguities in the ‘Strafentrilogie’ were largely located in 
gaps in the storyline, for example why Georg Bendemann and his father were 
at odds and why Gregor was turned into an insect. In Der Proceß, however, the 
ambiguities centre on the kind of world in which the action unfolds, for 
191 Lama Surya Das in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/dont-take-it-personally. 
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 example where a god, supreme authority or natural laws hold sway. From a 
Western perspective, the missing charge in Der Proceß counts as a gap 
because the notion of justice does not make sense without it; from a Buddhist 
point of view, the lack of charge is irrelevant, or even to be presumed because 
the ‘open-arrest’ model used by the Court suggests existential guilt not 
criminal wrongdoing. 
It is standard Western practice to seek to extract ‘meaning’ from a work, 
hence it is not surprising that K.’s death invites negative thoughts of defeat 
and punishment, whereas Buddhist thinking sees it as entirely natural.192 For 
Erich Heller, Der Proceß ‘confronts the reader and interpreter not so much 
with difficulties as with inescapable defeat’, and he concludes that there can 
be no other novel ‘so thoroughly pervaded by the sense of nightmare and 
paranoia as The Trial’.193 For Heller, the heart of the problem was that Kafka 
insisted on ‘the ultimately incompatible, the goodness of the Law and the evil 
of its application’.194 An unfortunate outcome is inevitable as soon as dualistic 
concepts such as good and evil take root. The principal cause of negativity is 
the separation of the law into good nature and bad application. 
Walter Sokel takes up a position which is possibly as far from Buddhism 
as can be in stating that death is akin to redemption for Kafka.195 Sokel 
compares entering the Law with self-preservation, hence K.’s struggles with 
the Court, and his inability to comprehend the charge and circumstances of 
his arrest must result in self-destruction. From a Buddhist perspective, entry 
into the Law would not mean acquiescence to punishment or submission to a 
superior order, but recognition that the self is not the highest or purest form 
192 ‘Death is irrational’, from Solomon J. Spiro’s ‘Verdict – Guilty! A Study of The Trial’ in 
Twentieth Century Literature, Vol 17, No. 3. (Jul 1971), p. 178. 
193 Erich Heller, ‘Man Guilty’ in James Rolleston, ed., Twentieth Century Interpretations of The 
Trial (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1976), p. 98. 
194 Ibid., p. 98. 
195 Sokel, ‘The Three Endings of Josef K.’, p. 338. 
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 of personal expression: it represents a highly volatile contingency and this 
impermanence needs to be respected.  
Like Sokel, Eschweiler finds redemption in the novel, especially once his 
revised edition turns the cathedral scene into a ‘Drehpunkt’ and restores Josef 
K.’s dream. Eschweiler considers ‘Der Dom’ the ‘Achsenkapitel’ because K.’s 
behaviour after the parable is marked ‘weniger durch Verständnislosigkeit und 
Auflehnung als vielmehr durch Einsichten und demgemäβes Handeln’.196 
Josef K. consequently embarks on a series of actions which Eschweiler 
describes as ‘Aspekte der Hoffnung’ (dismissing Huld, learning about art, 
deciding to visit his mother). From a Buddhist viewpoint, however, the sermon 
is best placed at the end of the novel for it flags up K.’s reluctance to examine 
his guilt and his reliance on external support: the chaplain’s exasperation 
suggests that the end is nigh unless K. can find insight quickly. 
For Eschweiler, Kafka’s art depicts ‘einen überzeugenden sinnerfüllten 
Kosmos’, and his revised form of Der Proceβ demonstrates this, with Josef K.’s 
dreamed death a key moment.197 The painful blows of arrest, trial and 
execution are re-cast into transformative stepping stones towards redemption: 
death may be inevitable but Josef K. can claim victory by going willingly to his 
final resting place. Jens Kruse agrees with the inclusion of ‘Ein Traum’ 
because it supplies the ‘necessary elements of hope that are part of the fabric 
of the novel’.198 Josef K.’s dream represents ‘the fulfilment of his unfulfillable 
wishes’ by making available what was otherwise out of reach: ‘resolution, 
understanding, insight, affirmation of identity’.199 
196 Eschweiler, Der verborgene Hintergrund, p. 30. 
197 Eschweiler, Kosmos, p. 51. 
198 Jens Kruse, ‘Kafka’s “Ein Traum” and the “Ende” Chapter of Der Proceß’ in German Studies 
Review, Vol 26, No. 2 (May 2003), p. 262. 
199 Ibid., p. 270. 
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 In a Buddhist sense, however, this wish-fulfilment is not a ‘skillful’ 
reading because the death-espousing ‘Verwandlung’ masks an act of 
desperation, devoid of insight and compromised by attachment to self. Josef 
K.’s leap into his grave recalls his earlier ‘thirsty lunge’ at Fräulein Bürstner 
(‘wie ein Hungriger die Nahrung’) and foreshadows the hunger artist’s 
inexorable slide into starvation, clinging to a veneer of selfhood to hide the 
hollow principles beneath. Josef K.’s descent towards an ignominious 
execution contrasts strongly with K.’s unburdened emergence from the 
meeting with Bürgel, which stands as a more convincing moment of 
‘transformation’.  
Although Der Proceβ deals with death, it does not need to be dark. While 
a Buddhist would find Josef K. guilty (of attachment to self), this does not 
mean his fate is sealed (as his uncle suggests). The guilt which attracts the 
Court is a living, organic phenomenon which does not ‘scar’ the individual for 
life, but ‘colours’ his present status. Change is possible, but it must come 
through understanding, an enlightened outlook, and Josef K. fails all the 
Court’s (perlocutionary) attempts to jolt him into this realisation. Robertson 
states that Josef K.’s guilt results from ‘being the person he is’, which is open 
to negative interpretation if it is read as an evaluation of his character because 
it is not clear what specifically is wrong. However, if the guilt is seen as an 
indication of his insight, as if the Court’s assessment is tantamount to taking 
his ‘spiritual’ temperature, then Josef K. is driven by attachment to selfhood, 
and his feverish attempts to ‘buffer’ his self only serve to aggravate his 
condition. The surfeit of negative karma means he is outlived by his ignorance: 
es war, als sollte die Scham ihn überleben’ (DP 312). 
Der Proceß has captivated many readers with the questions it raises and 
apparently declines to answer. Gaps and inconsistencies depress the spirit in 
a (Judaeo-Christian) world where truth and justice are expected to prevail, but 
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 they ring true in a (Buddhist) world where impermanence and emptiness 
reign. For example, the lack of charge cited for K.’s arrest hints at an abuse of 
justice or an illogical set of laws – both nightmarish consequences. 
Alternatively, the lack of charge can be disregarded as insignificant, because 
the non-custodial arrest points to wrong view, rather than a specific act: the 
nightmare here is not that there is a problem with the world, justice or 
authority, but with the individual who has fallen out of line with it. A Buddhist 
reader might see that the strings of selfhood are responsible for the discord 
and it is thus ourselves who can reharmonise. 
The marriage of illocutionary and perlocutionary devices in the text has a 
significant influence on the structure of the work. The infusion of koan-styled 
elements into the narrative interrupts the linear flow of the story, such that it 
is possible to establish only a rudimentary plot and timeline. K.’s thirtieth and 
thirty-first birthdays add a frame to the action, but the year’s events are not 
easy to pinpoint. From a rational perspective, this can be viewed as ‘missing’ 
information and need not overly influence the interpretation of the text, but 
the passage of time is often used as a measure of progress. Franz Kuna called 
Der Proceß ‘one of the most labyrinthine books in the history of literature, a 
book not only pregnant with dire complexities but full of dead ends, 
contradictions and paths continuously doubling back on themselves’.200 This 
is not intended as praise but marks a potential barrier to understanding. If we 
do not have all the facts and figures to hand, how can we evaluate whether 
K.’s arrest is warranted or not?  
In the years following Der Proceß, Kafka’s failing health presented him 
with the opportunity to avoid familial and romantic commitments that may 
have perturbed him and from this open ground sprang the Zürau aphorisms, 
200 Franz Kuna, Kafka: Literature as Corrective Punishment (London: Paul Elek, 1974), p. 111. 
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 a collection of expressions which build on the link between suffering and 
craving (Sünde, Leid, Hoffnung), by exploring ways to address the problem (der 
wahre Weg). There would be a significant gap before Kafka’s next novelistic 
enterprise, Das Schloß, which displays further attunement to Buddhist 
thinking in its account of K., the ignorant sleepwalker who wakes up from his 
traumatic reveries.  
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 Chapter 4 The Zürau Aphorisms 
4.1 Introduction 
‘All this Zen stuff is nonsense,’ said the sceptic. ‘You are perfectly correct,’ 
responded the master, ‘but this is a teaching I normally reserve for my most 
advanced students.’201 
The third chapter shows how Der Proceß represents a breakthrough in that 
Kafka moved beyond the depiction of unexplained suffering which marked his 
earlier works, and started to focus on how the individual is to a significant 
degree himself responsible for his suffering. This chapter explores the next 
period in Kafka’s writing, characterised by a shift in philosophical expression, 
as well as form, and exemplified by the aphorisms written during his stay in 
Zürau, also known under the title coined by Max Brod, Betrachtungen über 
Sünde, Leid, Hoffnung und den wahren Weg.  
Kafka withdrew to Zürau to recuperate after his health deteriorated and 
it can be speculated that the changes in Kafka’s circumstances caused a 
certain amount of reflection about the path his life might take. Gabriel 
Josipovici contends that they form ‘Kafka’s most sustained meditation on life 
and death, good and evil, and the role of art in human life’.202 For Robertson, 
they are ‘central to Kafka’s work’203 and in these thoughts he ‘ponders the last 
things of religion in order to establish the principles on which the new 
community of the future must be founded’.204  
The Betrachtungen are not typically aphoristic in that they do not 
uniformly provide short, pithy statements expressing a general truth, but vary 
in content and form. Some tackle traditional subjects like Original Sin, and 
201 Timothy Freke in Titmuss, p. 21. 
202 Gabriel Josipovici, The Singer on the Shore (Carcanet Press: Manchester, 2006), p. 179. 
203 Robertson, Kafka: Judaism, p. 187. 
204 Ibid., p. 189. 
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 others experiment with unusual imagery, such as the personification of 
question and answer; some are brief and to the point and deliver an 
unequivocal message (illocutionary style), while others filter their reflections 
through retractions and qualifications to leave an uncertain message 
(perlocutionary style). These enigmatic messages are not the result of muddled 
thinking, but deliberate constructions, much like the koans and mondos used 
by Zen masters to jolt students out of ingrained habits and assumptions.205 
Zen is particularly drawn to paradox because the interruption of reason 
provides the ‘lightning flash’ which illuminates the mind to the reality of 
emptiness, and this technique would give a more positive interpretation to 
similar constructions in Kafka’s work.  
Robertson detects in the aphorisms the expression of a ‘spiritual crisis’, 
and this ‘self-estrangement’ could be a step towards non-attachment to self.206 
According to Richard Gray, Kafka found in aphoristic discourse a method of 
‘coming to terms with the self in textual form’ as it offers the opportunity ‘to 
produce a “constructive destruction” of the self, i.e. a dismantling and 
reconstruction of the self accomplished through a specific textual medium’.207 
This still sits within the compass of many Western traditions, as the self re-
emerges in a new project. In contrast, a Zen approach would dismantle the self 
but keep it in unreconstructed form, in a fluid aggregate of elements, to avoid 
the arising of attachments and dependencies. 
This investigation into the Zürau aphorisms follows the methodology 
outlined earlier: first, texts will be examined at a conceptual level, to determine 
205 Not all Buddhist aphorisms are paradoxical. The Dhammapada, a collection of thoughts 
illustrating the Dharma, offer unequivocal teachings, such as: ‘42. An enemy can hurt an 
enemy, and a man who hates can harm another man; but a man’s own mind, if wrongly 
directed, can do him a far greater harm’. The Dhammapada, translated by Juan Mascaro 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 41.  
206 Ritchie Robertson, ‘Kafka as Anti-Christian: Das Urteil, Die Verwandlung, and the 
Aphorisms’ in James Rolleston, ed., A Companion to the Works of Franz Kafka (New York: 
Camden House, 2003), p. 109. 
207 Richard Gray, pp. 19-20. 
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 how closely the content and themes reflect Buddhist thinking (illocutionary 
approach); second, texts will be considered in terms of the response they are 
designed to elicit in the reader (perlocutionary approach). 
4.2 Illocutionary messages 
Life seems to be a perpetual struggle, some enormous effort against staggering 
odds. And what is our solution to all this dissatisfaction? We get stuck in the ‘if 
only’ syndrome.208 
Kafka’s aphorisms cannot all be seen as devices to cause bafflement, and in 
many instances it is fruitful to treat them as illocutionary and explore the 
content as an indication of certain preoccupations Kafka had. This is not to 
say that the Betrachtungen can be read as conventional aphorisms with ‘truth-
defining’ qualities, because the texts are vehicles for literary expressions, 
rather than philosophical beliefs. As such, the aphorism helps Kafka to 
explore the maelstrom of hopes, fears and desires that crystallise into the idea 
we have of ourselves. Richard Gray suggests a similar process when he 
describes an aphorism by Kafka as ‘a literary text depicting the tension, so 
typical of Kafka’s works, between a theoretically recognised possibility and the 
simultaneous denial of its concrete realisability’ (author’s italics).209 This 
relieves the texts of any didactic quest to capture ‘truth’, and the ideas 
explored can be taken as ways to explore the question of selfhood.  
Viewed within a Buddhist framework, the mystery of the self relates to its 
underlying emptiness, not an ethereal essence. While a Christian reader, for 
example, searches for an essential, unique soul buried under the perishable 
features of our earthly lives, a Buddhist reader searches conversely for the 
nameless transitoriness that lies hidden below the decaying labels used to 
208 Henepola Gunaratana, Mindfulness in Plain English (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1991), p. 
9. 
209 Richard Gray, p. 8. 
150 
                                           
 define personality. To reflect this correspondence with a Buddhist 
understanding of selfhood, a selection of aphorisms follows, grouped around 
themes related to The Four Noble Truths. It is not the case that all the 
aphorisms ‘fit’ Buddhist readings, but a significant proportion display clear 
pointers to these key notions: 
• considerations of suffering (The First Noble Truth) 
• consequences of attachment (The Second Noble Truth) 
• withdrawal from attachment (The Third Noble Truth) 
• the path (The Fourth Noble Truth). 
The First Noble Truth 
This selection shares connections with the basic tenets of Buddhist thought, 
such as suffering, emptiness as the underlying truth, and ignorance as a 
major obstacle to enlightenment. One route to a skillful reading of Kafka lies 
in finding links with the Buddhist account of the self (as non-existent in the 
absolute sense); from this perspective much of Kafka’s work can be seen as a 
critique of the stubborn practice of striving after selfhood, a key difference 
between Buddhist and Western thought. 
The First Noble Truth declares the inevitability of suffering and attributes 
it to a fault in human perception of the world (human beings are guilty of 
misunderstanding the nature of things), rather than a fault in the way the 
world operates (human beings are affected as innocent bystanders). Kafka’s 
thinking in the aphorisms reveals some correlation with this view that most 
human suffering is self-inflicted, occasioned by clinging to selfhood: the pain 
resides in the personal connection. 
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 Aphorism 24 
Das Glück begreifen, daß der Boden, auf dem Du stehst, nicht größer sein kann, 
als die zwei Füße ihn bedecken. (NSF2 118)210 
In this aphorism the statement is brief and bold, and may demand some 
reflection on the part of the reader, but the intention is not to dazzle or 
confuse. There is a hint of paradox, in that the introduction of ‘good fortune’ at 
the beginning suggests something positive will follow, but the news that we 
can only occupy by nature a small plot of land (the area that we stand on) may 
come as an initial disappointment before the sense of the message is 
understood. 
The spatial limitation initially seems rather sad and meagre, but the lack 
of territory can also be seen as liberating. With less ground to be attached to, 
and fewer objects for the self to latch onto, there should be fewer obstacles 
and hindrances on the path to enlightenment or salvation. We can own great 
tracts of land but the ground on which our feet are planted is always the same 
size. The sense of this message was not grasped by Josef K., as he was always 
trying to extend the ground on which he stood, but K. fared better in Das 
Schloß, as he eventually let go of his designs on the Castle and refocused on 
his role in the village. 
Aphorism 27 
Das Negative zu tun, ist uns noch auferlegt, das Positive ist uns schon gegeben. 
(NSF2 119) 
This brief two-part aphorism is general enough to allow a variety of 
interpretations. A Christian view would find tension in the opposition of 
positive and negative, with the positive in us attributable to God, for those in 
210 Kafka’s numbered aphorisms are taken from Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente (Vol. 
2), ed. Jost Schillemeit (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1992), pp. 113-140. References will be shown as 
NSF2 and the page number. 
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 touch with their faith. As Josef K. suggests when he does not like being 
referred to as one of the guilty, the negative is a consequence of Original Sin 
that human beings cannot avoid.  
Viewed from a Buddhist position, the positive within us would refer to 
our ‘Buddha nature’, or the innate potential within all human beings to realise 
an enlightened state. Carrying out the negative is what we must do to unearth 
the Dharma within from beneath the layers of self-motivated actions that 
obscure the way to enlightenment. The instruction in this aphorism runs 
counter to the actions of the ‘buffered self’ with the aim of dismantling rather 
than reinforcing the divisions which separate the individual from the world. 
Josef K. tries to prove his innocence (lack of wrongdoing), but in fact his 
innocence (innate Buddha nature) is ‘given’ and he needs to strip away the 
layers of self-ishness (guilt) to reveal it. 
Aphorism 50 
Der Mensch kann nicht leben ohne ein dauerndes Vertrauen zu etwas 
Unzerstörbarem in sich, wobei sowohl das Unzerstörbare als auch das 
Vertrauen ihm dauernd verborgen bleiben können. Eine der 
Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten dieses Verborgen-Bleibens ist der Glaube an einen 
persönlichen Gott. (NSF2 124) 
This aphorism has found its way into many texts about Kafka’s work because 
of its references to ‘etwas Unzerstörbares’, ‘Glaube’ and ‘Gott’. These terms are 
Judaeo-Christian touchstones which define the way we see ourselves. It is 
difficult to resist a negative interpretation once the desired indestructible core 
remains hidden and is substituted with a belief in God. This suggests that 
man ‘kann nicht leben’ without belief and this is not solid ground on which to 
base existence. Taken as a whole, the reflection suggests that a man needs his 
faith, but that he may never be able to uncover it. This reading would 
therefore appear to correspond to the sense of abandonment experienced by 
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 all the major figures in Kafka’s work, from Gregor Samsa to Josef K., and 
would strike a chord with anybody who is looking for evidence of existential 
angst in Kafka’s writing: God is in hiding from us. 
However, the Buddhist evaluation of this reflection avoids the emotive 
absolutes and targets the word ‘persönlich’, for it is from here that suffering 
and angst spring. This produces a different result, in that the feeling of ‘loss’ 
or ‘concealment’ is attributable to the individual, instead of to an unwanted, 
undeserved situation imposed from without. That which is indestructible, from 
a Buddhist viewpoint, is not a self or soul or anything personalised, but can be 
understood to be the Dharma or Buddha nature. If it is concealed, it is not 
through an uncaring or punitive creator, it is because we have obscured it 
(inadvertently or not) by inscribing our name on it. The personal god referred 
to is the one we pray to in order that our wishes, our desires and our fears are 
heard, the one we look to for our protection. The consequences of this are far-
ranging, for if the ‘fault’ is within us, then it can presumably be fixed from 
within. If the fault lies externally in some unknown place, it is difficult to fix. 
Aphorism 62 
Die Tatsache, daß es nichts anderes gibt als eine geistige Welt, nimmt uns die 
Hoffnung und gibt uns die Gewißheit. (NSF2 127) 
This aphorism contains a stark message in a novel twist, as it trades off 
‘Hoffnung’ and ‘Gewißheit’. Ordinarily, the certainty of something would be 
more attractive than the mere prospect of it, but the context is the fact that 
the world we live in is nothing but a ‘geistige Welt’. We must pay for this 
certainty with the loss of the physical aspect of the world, and hence we stand 
to lose much of the substance which defines our identity. The aphorism bears 
comparison with the disappointed conclusion Josef K. draws from his 
discussion with the chaplain. K. has been shaken by the difficulty in 
extracting any kind of reliable meaning from the parable Vor dem Gesetz 
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 because he is told to accept the doorkeeper’s words as ‘notwendig’ rather than 
‘wahr’. K. declares that ‘die Lüge’ represents the order of the world, as he is 
unable to give up the hope of meaningfulness in exchange for the reality of 
emptiness, a harsh lesson that Buddhists will be familiar with. 
Aphorism 66 
Er ist ein freier und gesicherter Bürger der Erde, denn er ist an eine Kette gelegt, 
die lang genug ist, um ihm alle irdischen Räume frei zu geben und doch nur so 
lang, daß nichts ihn über die Grenzen der Erde reißen kann. Gleichzeitig aber ist 
er auch ein freier und gesicherter Bürger des Himmels, denn er ist auch an eine 
ähnlich berechnete Himmelskette gelegt. Will er nun auf die Erde drosselt ihn 
das Halsband des Himmels, will er in den Himmel jenes der Erde. Und trotzdem 
hat er alle Möglichkeiten und fühlt es, ja er weigert sich sogar das Ganze auf 
einen Fehler bei der ersten Fesselung zurückzuführen. (NSF2 127-128) 
Metaphorical chains can be found throughout Kafka’s work, from Josef K.’s 
(assumed) innocence to K.’s (unofficial) land surveyor status. Josef K. is 
enslaved by his pursuit of justice, while the Court informs him he is actually 
free to continue his life. K. demands recognition, though the Castle is happy to 
allow him to stay in the village anyway. Suffering in each case is down to the 
need to be ‘gesichert’ to solid ground. Freedom of movement is something that 
can easily be achieved and its lack keenly perceived. But freedom from 
security is not sought after. 
This aphorism gives an accurate account of the nature of ignorance and 
attachment, and an explanation of why at times we appear to be comfortable 
with life-as-suffering. The opening line is a classic paradoxical gambit in that 
we are introduced first to a citizen who is ‘frei’ and ‘gesichert’, but also 
enchained. This chain offers security, by keeping him away from areas of 
danger, and freedom, by giving him a long enough leash to not feel the strain 
of the metal. There are actually two chains, earthly and heavenly, so he forms 
part of a tug-of-war between the two poles. 
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 This citizen chooses to ponder all the possibilities open to him, but 
refuses to acknowledge the mistake on which the entire enchainment has been 
built. This mistake can be understood as attachment to some kind of certainty 
that will underpin our existence. Herbert Tauber sees the text as an 
expression of belonging to two spheres of existence ‘opposed to each other in 
continual struggle’, and suffering results from this frustration because ‘the ego 
can identify itself with neither’.211 The Buddhist approach would transcend the 
tension of not-fitting by recognising the underlying emptiness of both spheres. 
Readers with a Western outlook would see the chains and the exclusions, 
and struggle to find an arrangement which satisfies ‘alle Möglichkeiten’. 
Richard Gray notes the paradox of chains and freedom, and concludes that 
the possibilities of freedom cannot be realised: ‘The situation Kafka describes 
here […] denies humankind’s capacity to transform reflection on the possible 
into concrete enactment in life: the split between abstract knowledge and the 
practical realm of lived experience is absolute.’212 For a Buddhist, the chains 
present a problem, but in a different way. It is not so much the ‘human’ end of 
the chain that causes the suffering (the end linked to the citizen), but the 
other end linked to solid ground. It is the attachment to being ‘gesichert’ that 
causes trouble, but the Western mindset is such that it needs an ‘open chain’ 
– secured at one end, but with an infinitely long tether to allow total liberty of 
movement. 
Aphorism 82 
Warum klagen wir wegen des Sündenfalls? Nicht seinetwegen sind wir aus dem 
Paradiese vertrieben worden, sondern wegen des Baumes des Lebens, damit 
wir nicht von ihm essen. (NSF2 131) 
211 Herbert Tauber, Franz Kafka: An Interpretation of his Works (London: Secker & Warburg, 
1948), p. 217. 
212 Richard Gray, p. 146. 
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 Aphorism 82 concerns the question of Original Sin and offers a clear, 
unequivocal reworking of the traditional idea, albeit from an unorthodox angle. 
The reflection fine-tunes the story of the Fall and suggests that the reason for 
the expulsion from paradise was to keep people from eating of the tree of life. 
This version suggests that we should not attribute the suffering in our lives to 
the effects of Original Sin (disobeying an external law), but rather to our lust 
for life. In other words, suffering issues from our own actions, not from a 
distant authority that relieves us of some of the blame.  
Aphorism 83 
Wir sind nicht nur deshalb sündig, weil wir vom Baum der Erkenntnis gegessen 
haben, sondern auch deshalb, weil wir vom Baum des Lebens noch nicht 
gegessen haben. Sündig ist der Stand, in dem wir uns befinden, unabhängig 
von Schuld. (NSF2 131) 
The discussion on sin continues in aphorism 83 with the assertion that sin is 
nothing to do with right or wrong, guilt or innocence. It is not a transgression 
against a particular set of rules or codes, but it is a rather a perception or 
attitude.  
A Christian reading would baulk at the idea of being sinful regardless of 
guilt, a situation which evokes the fate of Josef K. and offends against the 
human sense of justice. Richard Gray takes a similarly negative line for he 
understands sin as conceived by Kafka to mean ‘the oppositional space 
between two inimical absolutes, pure knowledge and pure life’.213 We are torn 
between these two poles, condemned to suffering. The Buddhist reader, 
however, would not associate sin with a particular event, but see it as the 
reality of conditioned existence to which all things are subject, and appreciate 
that the ‘antidote’ to sin is a dose of insight into emptiness. The aphorism 
points out the consequences of pursuing knowledge without living life, which 
213 Richard Gray, p. 145. 
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 would approximate to the Buddhist view that knowing alone cannot lead to 
understanding. 
Aphorism 102 
Alle Leiden um uns müssen auch wir leiden. Wir alle haben nicht einen Leib 
aber ein Wachstum und das führt uns durch alle Schmerzen, ob in dieser oder 
jener Form. So wie das Kind durch alle Lebensstadien bis zum Greis und zum 
Tod sich entwickelt (und jedes Stadium im Grunde dem früheren, im Verlangen 
oder in Furcht, unerreichbar scheint) ebenso entwickeln wir uns (nicht weniger 
tief mit der Menschheit verbunden als mit uns selbst) durch alle Leiden dieser 
Welt. Für Gerechtigkeit ist in diesem Zusammenhang kein Platz, aber auch nicht 
für Furcht vor den Leiden oder für die Auslegung des Leidens als eines 
Verdienstes. (NSF2 137) 
This aphorism reads like a Buddhist manifesto, incorporating all the key 
concepts of suffering, impermanence and not-self. First, it speaks of change 
and the passage of time, things which recall the notion of impermanence and 
evoke the idea of samsara, describing the inevitability of suffering in a general 
cyclical sense as we grow from childhood through adulthood to inevitable 
death. Second, it underlines the notion of not-self, as it prefers to talk of 
‘Wachstum’ rather than ‘Leib’, hence stressing the fact that our bodies are in 
constant development. Finally, it hints at the characteristic of not-self in its 
denial of justice in the world. The concept of justice is dependent on the world 
being meaningful, requiring fixed, constant values for what is good and bad, 
resting on an established framework of rules. Given the notions of 
impermanence and not-self, the idea of worldly justice must be illusory, 
because it presupposes the idea of the person. This is what trips up Josef K. in 
Der Proceß, but later in Das Schloß K. realises that personalised ‘Gerechtigkeit’ 
is a fantasy, hence his ‘victorious’ withdrawal. 
In addition to these thoughts, this aphorism also opens with a comment 
that evokes Buddhist teaching on karma. It is central to Buddhist philosophy 
that the suffering we undergo be seen as caused from within by the self’s 
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 attachments and desires, and not blamed on external factors. The last line of 
the aphorism shuts off the route via which suffering can be justified as a 
meaningful experience, by elevating the endurance of pain and hardship into 
something worthy of merit or admiration.  
Aphorism 109 
‘Daß es uns an Glauben fehle, kann man nicht sagen. Allein die einfache 
Tatsache unseres Lebens ist in ihrem Glaubenswert gar nicht auszuschöpfen.’ 
‘Hier wäre ein Glaubenswert? Man kann doch nicht nicht-leben.’ 
‘Eben in diesem “kann doch nicht” steckt die wahnsinnige Kraft des Glaubens; 
in dieser Verneinung bekommt sie Gestalt.’ 
Es ist nicht notwendig, daß Du aus dem Haus gehst. Bleib bei Deinem Tisch und 
horche. Horche nicht einmal, warte nur. Warte nicht einmal, sei völlig still und 
allein. Anbieten wird sich Dir die Welt zur Entlarvung, sie kann nicht anders, 
verzückt wird sie sich vor Dir winden. (NSF2 139-140) 
This aphorism comes in two parts, the first of which displays a mondo-style 
exchange on the subject of belief. The initial speaker makes a positive 
declaration about human faith, which is underlined by the very fact of our 
being alive. The response suggests there is nothing special in just ‘living’, 
which is the bare minimum we can do. But the initial speaker explains that 
the force of belief can be witnessed in this basic urge to resist ‘nicht-leben’. It 
is possible to interpret the aphorism in an existentialist way, as the human 
will shines through as the dynamic life force. A Buddhist view would be wary 
of the ‘crazy’ power of belief because it assumes ‘Gestalt’ and hence the risk of 
attachment is palpable. This is a good representation of the tightrope we walk, 
balancing the need for self-preservation with the desire to have meaning.  
The second part uses the familiar qualification by degrees formula which 
can often be seen in Kafka’s narrative fiction. The reader is urged to stay at 
home, listen and wait, though to and for what are not specified. Then the 
advice is revised to exclude listening, then exclude waiting, until all that 
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 remains is to keep still. This reads like tips for practising meditation, where 
the aim is to remove step by step any traces of selfhood from consciousness by 
laying bare its volitions. Described as ‘verzückt’, whether in agony or ecstasy, 
this ‘unmasked’ world reveals the truth of suffering. The exhortation not to do 
anything in order to get something is typically Zen-like. It follows in the best 
traditions of paradoxes such as, ‘the harder you look, the less you see’. This 
expression finds its way into Der Proceß, as the warders counsel introspection 
or contemplation, but Josef K. prefers action, ‘mit zwanzig Händen’.  
The Second Noble Truth 
The following aphorisms address the cause of suffering, which can variously 
be rendered as desire, thirst, attachment or craving (tanha). It is the cause of 
grief because our wants defy the characteristic impermanence of the world as 
we try to stake claims, establish solid ground, possess or absorb something 
within the self. Understanding this is of crucial importance to Buddhism, and 
the texts below suggest this consideration did not escape Kafka’s attention. 
Aphorism 2 
Alle menschlichen Fehler sind Ungeduld, ein vorzeitiges Abbrechen des 
Methodischen, ein scheinbares Einpfählen der scheinbaren Sache. (NSF2 113) 
This aphorism talks about impatience, rather than attachment, but the cause 
of the impatience is the desire to possess now (‘Einpfählen’). This simple, 
general statement sets up impatience as an underlying feature of human 
nature, an innate fault which leads inevitably to error and suffering. The 
problem with impatience is the inability to move with the flow of time, to 
accept impermanence and the process of change. It is common for Buddhists 
to recommend living in the moment (rather than for the moment, which 
implies a focus on meaningfulness) and not to dream away one’s life 
speculating on the future or agonising over the past. Impatience arises when 
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 we want the future to become the present, and interrupt what we are doing to 
accelerate the arrival of the desired object.  
We are not content with the object of our desire being ‘imagined’ or 
‘remembered’, but we crave something concrete or visible, a physical 
relationship with something: we therefore ‘pin down’ the nearest ostensible 
object and attach ourselves to it. In doing so, we ruin the present by not living 
‘in’ it, where we acknowledge that it is a moment in time and ride along with it; 
instead we live ‘for’ it, where we drop anchor and expect that the present is 
always here, not going anywhere and not subject to change.  
Aphorism 3 
Es gibt zwei menschliche Hauptsünden, aus welchen sich alle andern ableiten: 
Ungeduld und Lässigkeit. Wegen der Ungeduld sind sie aus dem Paradiese 
vertrieben worden, wegen der Lässigkeit kehren sie nicht zurück. Vielleicht aber 
gibt es nur eine Hauptsünde: die Ungeduld. Wegen der Ungeduld sind sie 
vertrieben worden, wegen der Ungeduld kehren sie nicht zurück. (NSF2 113) 
Aphorism 3 continues the theme of impatience, but this time with much 
greater conviction, as it is elevated to the status of ‘Hauptsünde’. Kafka’s 
predilection for assertion and retraction is again in evidence as the initial 
reflection confidently names ‘Ungeduld’ and ‘Lässigkeit’ as the two principal 
vices, only to retract the latter and leave impatience as the reason for man’s 
eviction from paradise and continued exclusion.  
From a Buddhist point of view this makes sense, as impatience carries 
greater karmic baggage, derived from slavish obedience to what the self craves 
and a lack of understanding of the impermanent nature of all things. The 
antidote to impatience, and one which works with many human failings, is 
mindfulness. Developing this quality by living fully in the moment stills the 
flow of wants and desires, which drag the self out of the present into the 
future.  
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 Aphorism 13 
Ein erstes Zeichen beginnender Erkenntnis ist der Wunsch zu sterben. Dieses 
Leben scheint unerträglich, ein anderes unerreichbar. Man schämt sich nicht 
mehr, sterben zu wollen; man bittet aus der alten Zelle, die man haßt, in eine 
neue gebracht zu werden, die man erst hassen lernen wird. Ein Rest von 
Glauben wirkt dabei mit, während des Transportes werde zufällig der Herr 
durch den Gang kommen, den Gefangenen ansehn und sagen: ‘Diesen sollt Ihr 
nicht wieder einsperren. Er kommt zu mir.’ (NSF2 116) 
This aphorism starts negatively as the positive allure of dawning 
understanding is offset by ‘der Wunsch zu sterben’. This death wish is a 
natural consequence of repeated disappointments, moving through life from 
one hated ‘Zelle’ to another, understandable given the prison setting. The 
scene darkens further when faith is introduced, as the vestige of hope is fed by 
a chance meeting with the governor, who has the power to issue an unlikely 
reprieve. There are Christian overtones in the reference to ‘Herr’, as salvation 
rests on the ‘Lord’ to release the prisoner from his cycle of incarcerations.  
The aphorism’s negativity comes from the puzzle of ‘Erkenntnis’ being 
impossible in this life and unattainable in any other. The ‘Transport’ to a 
better place with the Lord is ‘zufällig’. A Buddhist view would be more positive, 
but would entail reading ‘against the grain’: the dawn of enlightenment comes 
with death of the self (or its illusory absolute form). The problem to overcome 
is why the individual is a ‘Gefangener’: Josef K. would stumble at this hurdle, 
but a Buddhist might recognise the individual’s imprisonment in selfhood: 
relying on external help (from the Lord, or ‘fremde Hilfe’) is unskillful. 
Aphorism 76 
Dieses Gefühl: ‘hier ankere ich nicht’ und gleich die wogende tragende Flut um 
sich fühlen. 
Ein Umschwung. Lauernd, ängstlich, hoffend umschleicht die Antwort die Frage, 
sucht verzweifelt in ihrem unzugänglichen Gesicht, folgt ihr auf den sinnlosesten 
d. h. von der Antwort möglichst wegstrebenden Wegen. (NSF2 129-130) 
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 This aphorism expresses a clear statement on non-attachment, and hence 
aligns with the other reflections relating to suffering associated with 
possession. By not wanting to ‘drop anchor’ the individual is rejecting the need 
for a secure mooring. The sea-swell represents the world of impermanence, 
and its movement can induce a sense of nausea, as well as a sense of freedom. 
Human instinct, driven by self-preservation, seeks a secure mooring when 
floating on the sea of impermanence. Anchoring would result in reduced 
manoeuvrability and more chance of coming to harm; the more enlightened 
option would be to learn how to float freely on the swell, to rise and fall on the 
waves and thereby remain close to the surface. This is not an easy task, but 
the main challenge lies in taming the fear and panic within the self, rather 
than navigating the waves. 
The second part of the aphorism investigates a related theme, and one 
close to Zen Buddhism, which sees answer and question come to life in an 
uncomfortable relationship where they seem unable to communicate properly: 
this suggests how we fail to see an answer right under our nose and instead 
look in vain in more remote places. An idiom in English tells us that the 
answer is staring us in the face, and Kafka brings this to life with a twist as 
the Answer looks the Question directly in the face, but is not acknowledged. In 
other words, the answer to our question is sometimes very simple, but we 
choose to look for complicated solutions that are ‘sinnlos’ and ‘wegstrebend’. 
We are told that Question averts its gaze, and this lends a sinister undertone 
to the thought, suggesting that the Answer has been deliberately ignored, 
hence its ‘Verzweiflung’. 
The interplay between question and answer calls to mind the Zen mondo 
as a method of tackling the conundrum ‘What is the true self?’: ‘It is a way of 
extracting an answer from within the mind of the questioner himself, because 
163 
 the answer lies potentially in the question.’214 Buddhism does not seek to give 
answers, but asks us to look for the answers from within the depths of our 
own beings, not by reasoning but by going beyond reasoning, into an intuitive 
meditation. 
Aphorism 86 
Seit dem Sündenfall sind wir in der Fähigkeit zur Erkenntnis des Guten und 
Bösen im Wesentlichen gleich; trotzdem suchen wir gerade hier unsere 
besonderen Vorzüge. Aber erst jenseits dieser Erkenntnis beginnen die wahren 
Verschiedenheiten. Der gegenteilige Schein wird durch Folgendes hervorgerufen: 
Niemand kann sich mit der Erkenntnis allein begnügen, sondern muß sich 
bestreben, ihr gemäß zu handeln. Dazu aber ist ihm die Kraft nicht mitgegeben, 
er muß daher sich zerstören, selbst auf die Gefahr hin, sogar dadurch die 
notwendige Kraft nicht zu erhalten, aber es bleibt ihm nichts anderes übrig als 
dieser letzte Versuch. (Das ist auch der Sinn der Todesdrohung beim Verbot des 
Essens vom Baume der Erkenntnis; vielleicht ist das auch der ursprüngliche 
Sinn des natürlichen Todes.) Vor diesem Versuch nun fürchtet er sich; lieber will 
er die Erkenntnis des Guten und Bösen rückgängig machen; (die Bezeichnung: 
‘Sündenfall’ geht auf diese Angst zurück) aber das Geschehene kann nicht 
rückgängig gemacht, sondern nur getrübt werden. Zu diesem Zweck entstehen 
die Motivationen. Die ganze Welt ist ihrer voll, ja die ganze sichtbare Welt ist 
vielleicht nichts anderes, als eine Motivation des einen Augenblick lang 
ruhenwollenden Menschen. Ein Versuch, die Tatsache der Erkenntnis zu 
fälschen, die Erkenntnis erst zum Ziel zu machen. (NSF2 132-133) 
The longest aphorism is an alternative reading of the biblical ‘Fall’, which 
contains some unusual and complicated ideas, but they are not shocking, 
irrational or nonsensical. It explores the links between knowledge, 
understanding and motivation and belongs in the group of reflections on the 
theme of attachment, because it concludes that the individual’s powerful urge 
towards self-preservation is the force behind Original Sin. 
214 Julia Ching quotes D. T. Suzuki on mondos in ‘Paradigms of the Self in Buddhism and 
Christianity’ in Buddhist-Christian Studies, Vol 4 (1984), p. 48. 
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 Eating of the Tree of Knowledge represents the birth of the ego, the split 
of the lesser ‘personal’ self from the all-encompassing universal Self. By trying 
to build up knowledge, facts, information, the self causes an ever deeper split 
– a sharp duality – with the rest of Nature. The effort of pooling this 
accumulated knowledge and converting it into an overall understanding of the 
world is too demanding, because it must necessarily result in a destruction of 
the self, as it merges again with the Self. Just as the Question avoids the 
Answer, it is human instinct to avoid that which poses a threat to the self. So 
rather than accept the answer and agree to self-denial, the human response is 
to cover up the tracks which show how Original Sin can be traced back to the 
self and its thirst for knowledge.  
A smokescreen is created by ‘Motivationen’, which are attempts to make 
of knowledge an end in itself. This is the self creating a protective barrier 
around itself. The equivalent of motivation in Buddhist thought would be 
volition, or expressions of the will. This is how the self communicates its 
desires and perpetuates its existence. The result of the motivation may be 
successful or not, achieved or not, fulfilled or not, but for the purposes of the 
self the mere birth of a motivation is sufficient to create an extra layer of 
protection. This is because – in Buddhist terms – all of our volitions come 
charged with karmic weight, whenever they are issued from the self.  
So, in this sense, Original Sin is to be understood as a sin because the 
first bite of the apple was the first act of the newborn self. The use of the word 
‘sin’ may be misleading because from a Western viewpoint it carries with it the 
connotation of wrongdoing, of straying from a set path and therefore subject to 
punishment: there has to be a clear directive (such as ‘not to eat of the tree of 
knowledge’), which is then disobeyed, to result in a ‘crime’. Josef K. cannot 
accept sin or guilt, because no crime is defined. In Buddhism, the 
interpretation of sin is different, and is not limited to ‘wrongdoing’, but it can 
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 also stretch to the act of separation: this is the ‘criminal’ act of the self, as it 
splits away from the rest of creation: suffering is thus a ‘natural’ punishment. 
The Third Noble Truth 
This selection of aphorisms deals with the cessation of suffering by eradicating 
the cause: thirst. Suffering is not insurmountable, unless the path of 
ignorance is chosen, along which attachment and desire are cultivated. The 
first two Noble Truths set out the problem and the cause; the third begins the 
process of addressing the solution.  
Aphorism 6 
Der entscheidende Augenblick der menschlichen Entwicklung ist 
immerwährend. Darum sind die revolutionären geistigen Bewegungen, welche 
alles frühere für nichtig erklären, im Recht, denn es ist noch nichts geschehn. 
(NSF2 114) 
This aphorism walks a Buddhist tightrope as it declares that the key quality of 
human development is its permanent renewability, rather than its past 
achievements or future potential. It talks of revolution, but the message can be 
understood as one of evolution, change or impermanence. If we recognise the 
human self as an ongoing process, then there is less danger of becoming 
attached to its various forms. Buddhists do not deny the existence of a self, 
but rather the existence of a fixed, absolute one. The argument presented in 
this reflection runs along parallel lines, for if we accept that we are always 
developing, then any aspect of self that we cling to turns to dust in our hands. 
In this sense, Josef K. is a reactionary figure because he cannot let go of ‘alles 
Frühere’ and dismisses his arrest as ‘nichts’. Buddhism stresses the 
usefulness of meditation, as it heightens awareness of the moment (in which 
we can act) as opposed to the past or future, where actions are spent or 
unreal. 
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 Aphorism 20 
Leoparden brechen in den Tempel ein und saufen die Opferkrüge leer; das 
wiederholt sich immer wieder; schließlich kann man es vorausberechnen und es 
wird ein Teil der Ceremonie. (NSF2 117) 
This aphorism appears to be at odds with aphorism 6, because it talks of an 
event which happens repeatedly, to the point at which it can be relied upon to 
happen – it becomes a certainty. Despite the apparent contradiction, however, 
the difference between the two is a matter of perception. The key aspect of the 
reflection is the word ‘Zeremonie’, for we are dealing here with habits, and the 
human tendency to look for patterns and meanings and knit them into an 
interlocking, overarching significance. It may well be that the leopards keep 
breaking into the temple, but that does not mean that we can make a rule out 
of it.215 As we live our lives, we try to achieve certainty by defining our 
environment and building up the self, instead of dismantling its attachments.  
Aphorism 30 
Das Gute ist in gewissem Sinne trostlos. (NSF2 119) 
This brief reflection gets to the very heart of Buddhist discussions on karma 
and selfhood, though it could appear cold to Western sensibilities, which 
would see good rewarded. Good is comfortless when there is no attachment or 
craving present; the person can act freely and unfettered, not manipulated by 
the self. As individuals we seek comfort in our image of self, but without an 
ego to sustain there would be no need for ‘Trost’. The self is not to be 
demonised as an evil entity, to be eradicated in order that enlightenment can 
215 The human tendency to cling to meaningful patterns is illustrated by this story: ‘One day 
Mara, the Evil One, was travelling through the villages of India with his attendants. He saw a 
man doing walking meditation whose face was lit up in wonder. The man had just discovered 
something on the ground in front of him. Mara’s attendant asked what that was and Mara 
replied, “A piece of truth.” “Doesn’t this bother you when someone finds a piece of truth, O Evil 
One?” his attendant asked. “No,” Mara replied. “Right after this, they usually make a belief out 
of it.”’ Quotation at www.myrkothum.com/the-10-very-best-zen-stories/. 
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 dawn. Self is a necessity, and it is rather attachment to self that creates the 
demons that plague our world. 
Aphorism 31 
Nach Selbstbeherrschung strebe ich nicht. Selbstbeherrschung heißt: an einer 
zufälligen Stelle der unendlichen Ausstrahlungen meiner geistigen Existenz 
wirken wollen. Muß ich aber solche Kreise um mich ziehn, dann tue ich es 
besser untätig im bloßen Anstaunen des ungeheuerlichen Komplexes und 
nehme nur die Stärkung, die e contrario dieser Anblick gibt, mit nachhause. 
(NSF2 119-120) 
This aphorism covers Buddhist ground in its references to the self, desire and 
contemplation. It employs a classic Zen style, and the pithy, punchy opening 
statement contains a surprise: the subject claims he does not strive for self-
mastery, which ordinarily would rank as an admirable quality to pursue.  
The reason for shunning self-mastery is not so much that there is 
something wrong with trying to control the self, but it is rather the way that 
we get driven by our actions. The best way to ‘describe circles’ around the self 
is to do it ‘without action’ – which appears to be another paradoxical 
statement, for ‘doing’ normally entails ‘Tätigkeit’. However, the key to the 
puzzle is supplied soon after by contrasting ‘acting’ with ‘gazing’ or 
‘contemplating’. The activity of striving and doing reinforces the notion of the 
self and hence accumulates karma; on the contrary, self-mastery achieved 
through contemplation enables the viewer to observe the ‘ungeheuerliches 
Komplex’ (of the self) without clinging, and thereby gaining selfless ‘Stärkung’. 
This is the strength of withdrawal, the cessation of suffering. 
The strength derived from shunning ‘Selbstbeherrschung’ would be seen 
as a sign of weakness from a Western point of view, and Tauber suggests that 
the thought ‘deprives life of its whole objectivity, of its whole weight’.216 If 
216 Tauber, p. 229. 
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 Kafka’s writing is seen as an expression of the difficulty of adding weight or 
‘substance’ to human existence, then it is inevitable that a negative 
interpretation will follow. Buddhism skirts round this issue by declaring that 
there is actually no ‘weight’ to anything, because all is emptiness. There is 
again a meditative element to this reflection in that control happens best when 
the ‘unendliche Ausstrahlungen’ of the self in all its projections and creations 
are ignored, akin to letting a tempest blow itself out, leaving behind the calm. 
The Fourth Noble Truth 
This selection of aphorisms offers thoughts on ‘the Way’. Buddhism confronts 
directly such unpalatable truths as the inevitability of suffering, because it 
has an answer. The Noble Eightfold Path sets out the way to deal with the pain 
of existence, and within Kafka’s aphorisms there is also a collection of 
suggestions indicating a way forward. 
Aphorism 38 
Einer staunte darüber, wie leicht er den Weg der Ewigkeit gieng; er raste ihn 
nämlich abwärts. (NSF2 121) 
In this aphorism the theme of the path is considered, and the mood is upbeat 
as progress towards ‘Ewigkeit’ is ‘leicht’. We learn, however, that the traveller 
was rushing ‘abwärts’ and, from a Western perspective, the downhill trajectory 
suggests that eternity may not be blissful. 
To remain on a sombre note, this reflection could be read as an instance 
of how easily we are carried away by our desire to reach for heaven. Eternity 
should not be confused with salvation. In fact, from a Buddhist point of view 
and given the cyclical nature of existence, we are already stuck in eternity, 
and only enlightenment will find release from it. A number of figures in Kafka’s 
fiction enjoy a deceptively smooth ride (downhill), before they start to 
experience discomfort. Georg Bendemann seems to have the world at his feet, 
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 Josef K. has a high position in a bank, and K.’s early encounters with Castle 
officials make him feel confident of success. Their ease is illusory.  
Aphorism 64 
Die Vertreibung aus dem Paradies ist in ihrem Hauptteil ewig: Es ist also zwar 
die Vertreibung aus dem Paradies endgiltig, das Leben in der Welt 
unausweichlich, die Ewigkeit des Vorgangs aber macht es trotzdem möglich, 
daß wir nicht nur dauernd im Paradiese bleiben könnten, sondern tatsächlich 
dort dauernd sind, gleichgültig ob wir es hier wissen oder nicht. (NSF2 127) 
The ‘Vertreibung aus dem Paradies’ triggers birth into samsara, the 
conditioned world of life, death and rebirth. This is the realm of the self, of 
individuation, of separation from all other creation. This expulsion is 
‘endgültig’ because we cannot travel back in time and stop it from happening. 
There is no way back to the innocence or purity of pre-expulsion paradise, but 
through enlightenment regarding the truth about existence, we would 
recognise that paradise (or nirvana) is actually here with us now, and 
accessible for those clear-sighted enough to enter it. Nirvana is not a place to 
go to, or a time to wait for, but a sustained degree of understanding. It is 
located on a particularly fine wavelength which can only be tuned into through 
clear understanding and mindfulness beyond the interference of the self. 
4.3 Perlocutionary messages 
I remember a short conversation between the Buddha and a philosopher of his 
time. ‘I have heard that Buddhism is a doctrine of enlightenment. What is your 
method? What do you practice every day?’ ‘We walk, we eat, we wash 
ourselves, we sit down.’ ‘What is so special about that? Everyone walks, eats, 
washes, sits down.’ ‘Sir, when we walk, we are aware that we are walking; 
when we eat, we are aware that we are eating. When others walk, eat, wash, 
or sit down, they are generally not aware of what they are doing.’217 
217 Thich Nhat Hanh in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/awarenss-what-were-doing. 
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 The koan’s apparently nonsensical or paradoxical content is designed to 
prompt the reader into the realisation that a rational, ordered, logical enquiry 
into the text is not always suitable for dealing with the underlying reality of 
emptiness. Skillful reading of a mind-boggling koan sees corroborative 
evidence of impermanence, not-self and suffering; unskillful reading bemoans 
its ‘essential’ irrationality or its hidden, ‘locked’ meaning, and feels a sense of 
frustration that the hitherto trustworthy tools of logic and reason have been 
rendered powerless and ineffectual. Richard Gray notes how the undermining 
of logical structures in aphorisms is common in Kafka’s thought processes, 
through ‘incessant retractions, recursions, negations, exclusions and 
qualifications’.218  
A selection of koan-like aphorisms follows, showing how there may be 
subtle differences in the type and force of perlocutionary effect which can be 
sought after in the reader. One approach deals with the redefinition of 
conventional reality and seeks to undermine the assumptions, rules and 
traditions which cause ignorance. Another approach goes somewhat further in 
that it aims to dislocate the reader from conventional reality altogether 
through an irrational statement and leave the way open to an understanding 
of emptiness.  
Redefinition 
The following aphorisms introduce familiar ideas and images from the 
dimension of conventional reality and subvert them in a way which could 
result in a less deluded understanding. The everyday world of objects, hopes, 
duties and mundane tasks is no less real for the fact that it is empty of 
intrinsic essence. Clear perception of ultimate reality does not cause 
conventional reality to vanish, and life continues to unfold. Its progress will, 
218 Richard Gray, p. 256. 
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 however, be less painful once misguided views, attachments and desires are 
extinguished. In the same way, the Court can have Josef K. arrested to jolt 
him into a realisation of reality, but nothing is affected in the superficial 
comings and goings of his daily life. 
Aphorism 1 
Der wahre Weg geht über ein Seil, das nicht in der Höhe gespannt ist, sondern 
knapp über dem Boden. Es scheint mehr bestimmt stolpern zu machen, als 
begangen zu werden. (NSF2 113) 
If any of Kafka’s aphorisms could be described as bearing a ‘classic’ Zen koan 
style it would be aphorism 1. It is concise and compact, and displays a 
technique used in much of Kafka’s other fiction. There is an opening 
statement, which is then qualified by successive statements which all 
contribute to a weakening of the opening position until we end up almost at 
the opposite pole. 
We are told first of a true path, but within a few words it has been 
transformed into a tripwire. The difference between the two is considerable, 
given that one is meant to lead to a destination which benefits the traveller, 
such as salvation or happiness, whereas the other is there to frustrate, impede 
or injure. 
Because of the way the aphorism is written, however, the steps from true 
path to tripwire progress smoothly without jarring too much, and this 
contributes to the sense of paradox when ‘der wahre Weg’ and ‘Seil’ are 
juxtaposed. First, the path is along a rope suspended above the ground, but 
only by a few inches. Walking along a rope calls up the idea of a tightrope, 
which suggests risk and difficulty, and this would fit well with the idea of a 
true path, because such spiritual paths are often not easy to follow and many 
travellers will fall by the wayside. However, the metaphor does not take this 
obvious extension after the initial comparison of path and rope, because the 
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 rope is finally described as being perpendicular to the traveller, not in the 
same line of travel. It is here that the comparison jolts the reader, because the 
suggestion is that this ‘true path’ is something that runs against the grain, 
something that cuts across our expectations and interferes with our 
preferences and habitual actions. When embarking on a path, whether it leads 
east, west, north or south, the way should extend directly in front of us. In 
this instance, the supposedly ‘true’ path cuts across our ‘natural’ path. In 
other words, the true path is something which appears puzzling, unnatural or 
paradoxical. 
Parallels with Zen practice can be drawn here because it is customary for 
Zen teachers to confound their pupils by presenting images which make no 
sense or appear back-to-front. The problem to be solved has no apparent 
logical or rational solution, but this is the point of the exercise, for the teacher 
is inviting the pupil to enter a world of contemplation which occupies a 
different dimension to that hitherto experienced. The disruption is a common 
technique designed to help the student unhook himself from a traditional way 
of thinking, and explore different avenues.  
Aphorism 5 
Von einem gewissen Punkt an gibt es keine Rückkehr mehr. Dieser Punkt ist zu 
erreichen. (NSF2 114) 
This aphorism offers a short, sharp perlocutionary shock owing to an 
unexpected twist. It consists of a couple of brief statements which at first 
reading sound rather daunting, with the hint of a threat: a short introductory 
sentence written in familiar, idiomatic style is stood on its head. The idea of a 
point of no return can be rather unsettling, but if it is no return to suffering, 
then this point is desirable. It is not revealed exactly where this particular 
point in time or space is located, so the focus switches from the undefined 
point to the idea of no return, which from many Western viewpoints could 
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 seem negative as it hints at banishment. The Buddhist reader would 
acknowledge a reference to the truth of impermanence: everything is in 
movement, and we cannot select a reverse gear for our lives. However, life is 
cyclical and we are subject to a constant round of rebirths through ignorance.  
Aphorism 40 
Nur unser Zeitbegriff läßt uns das Jüngste Gericht so nennen, eigentlich ist es 
ein Standrecht. (NSF2 122) 
This text deals with the problem of perspective, and how any viewpoint 
expressed through the self must be based on delusion. The reflection on the 
Last Judgment is a variation on the theme of wrong view. If we subscribe to a 
linear appreciation of time, we are born, we live, we die, and after that we pass 
into an eternal afterlife following a final reckoning to determine our resting 
place. The Buddhist view of time is cyclical, so we are born, we live, we die, 
and then there is rebirth with another lifecycle, and so on. The effect of karma 
can be viewed as a kind of judgment, but it is neither final nor personal. The 
idea of the ‘Standrecht’ paints a grim picture, replacing the Pearly Gates with 
a firing squad, but it has a good perlocutionary shock factor. It disfigures the 
image of divine scales of justice carefully weighing up our deeds and conveys 
instead a more brutal truth: if we present ourselves before any court, we will 
always be sentenced to death. The only escape is through enlightened 
detachment from selfhood. This aphorism summarises in one sentence what 
Der Proceß does in hundreds of pages. Josef K. perceived his Court as ‘das 
Jüngste Gericht’ and tried to argue his case for a favourable ‘Freisprechung’, 
but the Court is actually a ‘Standrecht’ – the execution was inevitable given 
his inability to see beyond his own frame of reference. 
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 Aphorism 54 
Es gibt nichts anderes als eine geistige Welt; was wir sinnliche Welt nennen ist 
das Böse in der geistigen und was wir böse nennen ist nur eine Notwendigkeit 
eines Augenblicks unserer ewigen Entwicklung. 
Mit stärkstem Licht kann man die Welt auflösen. Vor schwachen Augen wird sie 
fest, vor noch schwächeren bekommt sie Fäuste, vor noch schwächeren wird sie 
schamhaft und zerschmettert den, der sie anzuschauen wagt. (NSF2 124-125) 
Aphorism 54 commences by hinting at an idea which is of pivotal importance 
to Buddhist thought, the notion that there is nothing of absolute, enduring 
quality in the world. All that we see has been mentally constructed, subject to 
constant development and generated by earlier forces, circumstances, actions 
or thoughts, either willed or random. Kafka’s use of ‘nur’ to describe this world 
suggests that what we ordinarily chase after and preoccupy ourselves with is 
not worth the effort. 
Though complex, there is nothing baffling about this reflection, but the 
second part of the aphorism bears the perlocutionary effect. It opens with 
conventional Buddhist imagery relating to sight and clarity of view: under a 
strong, penetrating light (e.g. here the light of the Dharma), the constructed 
world disappears. This suggests that clearsightedness has the benefit of being 
able to see through the world and note that nothing is absolute or worth 
clinging to. The aphorism then goes on to explore the converse by suggesting 
that weaker eyes – those not able to penetrate the veil of superficiality – will 
perceive the world as being ‘fest’, as having a stable, fixed, meaningful nature. 
The final turn of the aphorism moves from tightrope to tripwire as it comments 
on the correspondence between weaker vision (or greater ignorance) and 
stronger risk – the less we are prepared or able to look closely at the world and 
see through to its essential lack of substance, the more we are likely to suffer. 
The aphorism ends on a disturbing note as the world grows fists and swings a 
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 punch. The violent twist hints at the fate that lies in store for the ignorant, 
such as Josef K. who dies a painful death at the hands of his executioners. 
Aphorism 99 
Wieviel bedrückender als die unerbittlichste Überzeugung von unserem 
gegenwärtigen sündhaften Stand ist selbst die schwächste Überzeugung von 
der einstigen ewigen Rechtfertigung unserer Zeitlichkeit. Nur die Kraft im 
Ertragen dieser zweiten Überzeugung, welche in ihrer Reinheit die erste voll 
umfaßt, ist das Maß des Glaubens. 
Manche nehmen an, daß neben dem großen Urbetrug noch in jedem Fall eigens 
für sie ein kleiner besonderer Betrug veranstaltet wird, daß also wenn ein 
Liebesspiel auf der Bühne aufgeführt wird, die Schauspielerin außer dem 
verlogenen Lächeln für ihren Geliebten auch noch ein besonders hinterhältiges 
Lächeln für den ganz bestimmten Zuschauer auf der letzten Gallerie hat. Das 
heißt zu weit gehn. (NSF2 135-136) 
The first part of this complicated aphorism regards justification of human 
ephemerality as more oppressive than the conviction of our present sinful 
state; in other words, more suffering is caused by the attempt to bestow 
meaning on our transitory lives, than is felt by the burden of wrong actions. 
The Buddhist view is that human pain is linked to claiming personal 
definitions, drawing lines in the quicksand. If we admit to sins, we can try to 
behave better; if we cannot admit to intrinsic emptiness, we will always be 
chasing shadows. The perlocutionary element is supplied by the concluding 
thought that ‘das Maß des Glaubens’ (a positive Judaeo-Christian concept) is 
related to how tenaciously we can cling to our delusions of meaningfulness.  
The second part of the aphorism illustrates the classic ‘Why me?’ 
complaint of the unenlightened sufferer. From a Buddhist point of view, 
suffering is not something imposed on us by the external world, but something 
that exists as we impose our self onto the world. To a Judaeo-Christian 
mindset, there is often no answer to ‘Why me?’, and it is shattering to discover 
that there is no discernible underlying organising principle to our universe, or 
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 at least a structure in which the inconvenience of unjust suffering is later 
compensated for, as if we are ‘owed’ an explanation for agreeing to the concept 
of universal order. If our immediate reaction when trouble strikes is to think 
‘Why me?’, there will be no way past suffering. According to Buddhist 
thinking, we fail to come into contact with the real world when we view events 
through the filter of selfhood. This failure is represented by the spectator who 
imagines that certain gestures performed by an actress on stage are directed 
specifically at him – these secret winks and nods are harmless and trivial, but 
they reveal the spectator’s thirst for meaningful involvements and 
attachments. 
Dislocation 
In a popular Hollywood movie, an intrepid secret agent receives a message 
containing an impossible mission which he can choose to accept or reject: 
whatever his choice, the message will self-destruct in five seconds. There is 
something of the mission impossible about understanding the emptiness of 
ultimate reality, and Zen masters use koans to light the fuse which causes 
reasoning powers to self-destruct. The perlocutionary effect stuns the senses, 
leaving the self unable to function. The enlightened receiver of the message 
should choose neither to accept nor reject the mission, but just acknowledge 
its impossibility. 
In this type of koan, the paradox of mutually exclusive propositions 
presents ‘mission impossible’ scenarios. It is hard to see how one can exist 
outside one’s own circle, or how ‘freuen’ can pair up with ‘flüchten’, so any 
rational attempt to float a meaningful interpretation in these vessels will end 
up on the rocks. But that is where the Zen master wants to see his pupils – 
shipwrecked in dangerous waters. The pupil’s conventional thought processes 
and assumptions have been disturbed or challenged. The dislocation from 
rational thinking and logical structures is unsettling and frightening, but it is 
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 a ‘true’ representation of emptiness in which there is no reason or order. The 
sooner the reader can forget attachments and adjust to the fluid conditions, 
the quicker he will regain equilibrium and achieve enlightenment. 
Aphorism 15 
Wie ein Weg im Herbst: kaum ist er rein gekehrt, bedeckt er sich wieder mit den 
trockenen Blättern. (NSF2 117) 
This aphorism is a short, poetic sentence, which on the surface seems largely 
uncontroversial and straightforward: autumn leaves obscuring a forest path. 
One thing is missing, however, and that is the subject. Something is compared 
to the autumn path, but this is not revealed. The theme of the path is shared 
with other aphorisms in the sense of following a philosophical or spiritual 
track to salvation or enlightenment. The path is continually covered in leaves, 
cleared, swept clear and obscured again. So there is a cyclical element to 
treading the path which suggests that there is no easy route towards purity. 
To be able to follow the path to nirvana, it has to be kept free of hindrances 
and obstacles, such as desires and cravings. A clear path suggests a clear 
mind, the mind in meditation emptied of personality and selfhood.  
Tauber takes a very different view, as the leaf-strewn path represents a 
personal challenge: ‘Man must prove himself in the world with his truth.’219 It 
is almost as if the man is defined by the path and his true nature needs to be 
kept clear of unwanted objects. For Buddhists, life is never neat and tidy, as 
the truth of impermanence constantly blows leaves onto our path. 
Aphorism 25 
Wie kann man sich über die Welt freuen, außer wenn man zu ihr flüchtet? (NSF2 
118) 
219 Tauber, p. 246. 
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 This aphorism is very close in form to a Zen koan, in that it is unusual to 
rejoice in flight, or flee towards a place rather than away from it. The purpose 
of this kind of expression can often be to confound and jolt the student into 
enlightenment. There is no solution as such, but the purpose is to get the 
reader to reconsider conventional practice and thought, and find new 
relationships between internal and external worlds in order to get used to 
living without a solution. One possible approach to this aphorism would be to 
keep in mind the unstable nature of selfhood. Joy would be accessible by 
avoiding the pitfalls of a conditioned self and connecting directly to a world via 
unfiltered sense perceptions, that is, without passing through the ‘I’. In this 
sense, it could be seen that we have to ‘flee from’ the corrupted views of our 
attached self and ‘flee to’ a world without this kind of suffering. Cessation of 
suffering comes through cutting off desires and severing attachments. 
Aphorism 26 
Verstecke sind unzählige, Rettung nur eine, aber Möglichkeiten der Rettung 
wieder soviele wie Verstecke. 
Es gibt ein Ziel, aber keinen Weg; was wir Weg nennen, ist Zögern. (NSF2 118) 
The first part of aphorism 26 (crossed out by Kafka) belongs to the type of 
short, paradoxical statements which at first glance raise more questions than 
they supply answers. Initially there is a comparison between ‘Verstecke’ and 
‘Rettung’, as if they were opposites. It is not explicit what the hiding places are 
offering protection from, nor who or what is being hidden, but the contrast 
with salvation suggests that it could be a matter of the self clinging to its own 
existence. 
In Buddhist terms, salvation is not to be understood spatially or 
temporally, for it is potentially already with us here and now. It is rather to be 
understood as a kind of release from conditioned existence, from dependence 
on birth and arising, but not through destruction or annihilation. This 
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 aphorism hints at how salvation cannot be reached as long as the self has 
secreted itself in difficult-to-access places. Salvation is ‘one’, beyond the 
duality occasioned by the separation of the self. But the ‘possibilities’ of 
salvation are as numerous as there are hiding places, because the path to 
salvation is revealed everywhere a self is uncovered. 
There is only one salvation, though its point of access is not fixed. This 
means that there could be many ways of realising nirvana, as many as there 
are hideaways where the self has erected a barricade and is refusing to come 
out. 
The second part of the aphorism seems to contrast with the first in that 
there is no way towards ‘das Ziel’, which could be understood as no possibility 
of salvation. The opening statement is qualified, however, when the reference 
to ‘Weg’ is replaced by ‘Zögern’. Confusion about how the destination is to be 
reached would linger, unless it was understood that the idea of a destination 
is the wrong way to view salvation or nirvana. The arrival point is defined as a 
specific place, located in time and space, but nirvana resists definition and 
location. Similarly, the path followed by Buddhists is not so much a means to 
an end, or a way to a goal, but the means and end all rolled into one. The 
Noble Eightfold Path sets out how enlightenment can be nurtured and 
sustained, so as to maintain mindfulness and fight ignorance. So, the aim is 
almost to keep walking on the path and develop an engagement with the 
Dharma, not focus on one point where the road stops to mark a happy ending. 
This is another example of an apparent paradox concealing a simple truth. 
Tauber refers to the idea of ‘inner truth’, to deal with the roadblock. If 
there is a goal but no path leading to it, we just need to believe, to have 
‘trusting surrender’.220 This solution is an external one and is doomed to 
220 Tauber, p. 247. 
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 failure; the Zen view would stress the impossibility of reaching the goal by 
conventional, linear means and hope to trigger a different approach, perhaps 
by questioning the need for goals which are inaccessible.  
Aphorism 34 
Sein Ermatten ist das des Gladiators nach dem Kampf, seine Arbeit war das 
Weißtünchen eines Winkels in einer Beamtenstube. (NSF2 120) 
The juxtaposition of the extraordinary with the ordinary, or of the spectacular 
with the mundane is another favourite Zen tactic, that of jarring the seeker 
out of ignorance into enlightenment. This two-part aphorism operates on 
different levels. First, there is the mismatch between the noble gladiatorial 
arena and the humble ‘Beamtenstube’, and then there is the added 
incongruity of fighting and whitewashing. In addition, it seems that holding a 
paintbrush can cause the same exhaustion as gladiatorial combat; and to 
stretch the incongruity to breaking point, the whitewashing only covers a 
corner of a room. According to Tauber, ‘the success of earthly efforts seems 
ridiculous’.221 
From a Buddhist perspective, however, the apparently overblown 
comparison of spectacular battle and plain decorating does stand up to 
scrutiny. If the focus shifts from the deed to the effort, from the action to the 
concentration, then a grain of truth can be located in the reflection. In this 
respect, whitewashing a wall can involve as much mindfulness as slaying a 
bear. If one ‘loses one’s self’ in the activity, it can be a liberating experience. 
Our actions and thoughts come and go, arise and fade with great regularity, 
but the power of meditation is such that it can sustain a clear focus on the 
truth about the world.  
221 Tauber, p. 228. 
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 Aphorism 35 
Es gibt kein Haben, nur ein Sein, nur ein nach letztem Atem, nach Ersticken 
verlangendes Sein. (NSF2 120) 
This aphorism ‘chokes’ the reader with its dense expression and gloomy talk of 
‘Ersticken’, but retains a Buddhist feel through its reference to The Three 
Universal Characteristics. Yearning for death is a result of the no-man’s land 
between ‘kein Haben’ on the one hand and ‘Sein’ with its death wish on the 
other. There is always risk of attachment in the idea of selfhood, and this is 
where mindfulness is effective as a broom to sweep out hidden desires.  
A Buddhist reader would be able to agree with the notion of ‘kein Haben’ 
because its message of no possession dovetails with that of impermanence and 
non-attachment. If there is no ‘Haben’, that leaves ‘Sein’, but that too is 
subject to impermanence and non-attachment, so it is not possible always to 
stay what we ‘are’. The image is unsettling, but it is simply a way of expressing 
the constant renewal of the self. 
Aphorism 37 
Seine Antwort auf die Behauptung, er besitze vielleicht, sei aber nicht, war nur 
Zittern und Herzklopfen. (NSF2 121) 
Broaching the theme of attachment, this single-sentence aphorism offers a 
paradox in the Zen tradition, as it turns on the conflict between possession 
and non-existence. The opening part of the clause reports an assumption or 
charge, that of possessing, but not existing. This is an unusual assertion, for 
to be in possession of something a person must presumably already exist. In a 
further twist, this rather vague and confusing charge still manages to unsettle 
the addressee to the extent that he suffers physical distress.  
Read from a Buddhist perspective, however, the idea of possessing 
without existing is less problematic. Taking possession needs a possessor, and 
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 that is expressed as ‘I’. Once the ego is born, what is lost is an unmediated 
experience of existence. Life as ‘a person’ consists of an accumulation of 
possessions – feelings, desires, and fears, as well as objects – and the person 
does not exist in a pure, integral sense. The individual is too busy fortifying 
the ramparts of the self to notice his division and disappearance from the rest 
of the universe. Josef K. is in possession of power and status, but the subtlest 
of changes is enough to shake his world to the foundations, for he cannot 
produce any concrete evidence of who he is or what he represents. 
Aphorism 69 
Theoretisch gibt es eine vollkommene Glücksmöglichkeit: An das Unzerstörbare 
in sich glauben und nicht zu ihm streben. (NSF2 128) 
This aphorism exhibits the kind of paradoxical statement that has long been 
the staple of Zen koans. ‘Glücksmöglichkeit’ is rarely discussed in the 
aphorisms, but here the path to happiness lies in belief in the indestructible, 
but not looking for it. At first sight, this appears contradictory, because it does 
not sound right to believe in something, but not attempt to communicate with 
or relate to it.  
Beyond the paradox, however, the aphorism works on two levels. First, if 
‘glauben’ is taken at face value, then it should follow that it is unnecessary – 
even undesirable – to try to substantiate it. If a person has a belief in God, he 
is happy to acknowledge the existence of God without having direct proof. 
Searching for evidence for God would suggest very shaky grounds for belief; if 
this God were discovered, belief would then not be required anyway. Second, 
and this corresponds to the Buddhist point of view, the focus is not on the 
belief, but on the thing which is indestructible. If this is understood to be 
Buddha nature (the essence of the Dharma teaching that all things are one 
until we break them down into selves) then it is impossible to look for it. 
Buddha nature is that which purely is, without mediation, without 
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 characteristics, without qualities and self, so the only way to comprehend it is 
by ‘not looking’ or by stripping away all the effects of individuation which the 
self tries to sustain to keep itself distinct from the indestructible. Happiness 
here is not a commodity but a release from the strains of upholding the self’s 
separation. Robertson links Das Unzerstörbare to Schopenhauer’s ‘will’, as a 
‘vital force supplying one’s life with sustenance and impetus’.222 
‘Glücksmöglichkeit’, as such, is not realised by possessing das Unzerstörbare, 
but by attuning to it, i.e. ‘not union but equilibrium’.223 The hunger artist has 
a very strong belief in something indestructible – his perfect fasting – but he 
strives after it, whereas post-Bürgel K. provides the best example of how to 
lose striving but gain control. 
Aphorism 80 
Wahrheit ist unteilbar, kann sich also selbst nicht erkennen; wer sie erkennen 
will, muß Lüge sein. (NSF2 130) 
Aphorism 80 runs parallel with the reflections on the indestructible: the truth 
asserts its indivisibility and, because of this oneness, misses as falsehood 
whatever claims to recognise it. This thought suggests that entities such as 
the indestructible or the truth cannot be owned or claimed, in the sense that 
any single individual could say that he or she possesses a soul, or that truth is 
on his or her side. The truth is nothing but the truth, and it does not belong 
anywhere or to anyone.  
To recognise ourselves we look in the mirror, but what we see is not 
ourselves, but a reflection of ourselves. The difficulty of this thought comes in 
the joining of truth and falsehood: only ‘Lüge’ can understand ‘Wahrheit’. This 
impasse is Zen-like and would require somersaults in logic to find a 
222 Robertson, Kafka: Judaism, p. 200.  
223 Ibid., p. 201.  
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 resolution. The sticking point is the insistence on ‘erkennen’, just as K. 
insisted on Castle recognition.  
Aphorism 90 
Zwei Möglichkeiten: sich unendlich klein machen oder es sein. Das erste ist 
Vollendung also Untätigkeit, das zweite Beginn, also Tat. (NSF2 133) 
This aphorism gets its perlocutionary effect from a paradox in its instructions, 
using a ‘reverse polarity’ technique. The alternative options, of making oneself 
infinitesimally small or being so, are described respectively as inaction and 
action, when it would seem that the ‘making’ should correspond with action 
and the ‘being’ should correspond with inaction. The Zen response, however, 
would turn the paradox on its head by linking the subject to a discussion of 
the self. In this way, perfection is achieved by constant mindfulness and 
reduction of the self to its smallest possible size, until it shrinks to zero: it 
takes concentrated effort to do nothing. The opposite possibility is to be 
infinitely small, but in a world marked by impermanence this can only mark 
the beginning of a process, and hence implies action.  
Aphorism 94 
Zwei Aufgaben des Lebensanfangs: Deinen Kreis immer mehr einschränken und 
immer wieder nachprüfen, ob Du Dich nicht irgendwo außerhalb Deines Kreises 
versteckt hältst. (NSF2 134) 
In the same vein as aphorism 90, the task here is to rein in the self, to cut 
back its sphere of influence. The paradoxical twist comes in a reminder to 
make sure that ‘you’ do not hide outside this sphere. It would seem impossible 
for oneself to stand simultaneously inside and outside the territory of the self. 
However, the self-preservation instincts of the self work in many ways and the 
individual must always be on his guard (mindful) to ensure that no little 
‘pockets’ of selfhood are left uncovered. 
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 Tauber’s view of this exercise in limiting the self suggests a means of 
filtering out unwanted elements in the self to retain an ‘inner purity’, rather 
than continuing the filtering indefinitely until the self disappears altogether.224 
Suffering will be the result of partial self-limiting as this inner self will always 
remain elusive and indefinable. The chaplain in Der Proceß urges Josef K. to 
give up looking for ‘fremde Hilfe’, as a way of restricting the circles of 
influences built up by the self. K.’s execution is proof that traces of self were 
‘versteckt’ elsewhere. 
Aphorism 103 
Du kannst Dich zurückhalten von den Leiden der Welt, das ist Dir freigestellt 
und entspricht Deiner Natur, aber vielleicht ist gerade dieses Zurückhalten das 
einzige Leid, das Du vermeiden könntest. (NSF2 137) 
Aphorism 103 explores the misguidedness of taking the self as a refuge. 
Buddhist teaching maintains that the outside world is characterised by 
impermanence, and we should not grow attached to any of its objects, 
otherwise suffering will ensue. By the same token, our internal world – what 
we call our self – is equally subject to the condition of impermanence which 
governs all existence. Hence, there is no hiding place inside ourselves to which 
we can run for shelter. The shelter is the Dharma, the truth about the nature 
of the world. So while it is possible to withdraw from the world to spare 
ourselves some pain, there is other suffering awaiting us within which is more 
difficult to escape. 
The perlocutionary aspect comes in the classic Kafka ruse of offering a 
bold statement, only to retract it later with reservations. We are told how it 
might be possible to avoid suffering on a global scale, but this withdrawal is 
described as ‘einzig’, as if it is severely limited in its scope or effectiveness. The 
224 Tauber, p. 244. 
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 seeming paradox can be solved if we introduce the internal personal self as a 
counterpart to the external impersonal world. We often talk of the ‘world 
within’, so it then becomes more sensible to understand how avoiding conflicts 
in the huge world outside is meaningless, if we fail to deal with the infinite 
problems posed inside by our attachment to self. If the reality of suffering is 
acknowledged, the one suffering that can be avoided is that of clinging to 
selfhood, of retreating into the self for protection.  
Aphorism 104 
Der Mensch hat freien Willen und zwar dreierlei:  
Erstens war er frei, als er dieses Leben wollte; jetzt kann er es allerdings nicht 
mehr rückgängig machen, denn er ist nicht mehr jener, der es damals wollte, es 
wäre denn insoweit, als er seinen damaligen Willen ausführt, indem er lebt. 
Zweitens ist er frei, indem er die Gangart und den Weg dieses Lebens wählen 
kann. 
Drittens ist er frei, indem er als derjenige, der er einmal wieder sein wird, den 
Willen hat, sich unter jeder Bedingung durch das Leben gehen und auf diese 
Weise zu sich kommen zu lassen undzwar auf einem zwar wählbaren, aber 
jedenfalls derartig labyrinthischen Weg, daß er kein Fleckchen dieses Lebens 
unberührt läßt. 
Das ist das Dreierlei des freien Willens, es ist aber auch, da es gleichzeitig ist, 
ein Einerlei und ist im Grunde so sehr Einerlei, daß es keinen Platz hat für einen 
Willen, weder für einen freien noch unfreien. (NSF2 137-138) 
This aphorism is one of the most tortuous, puzzling and paradoxical of Kafka’s 
reflections. The reader is ‘ambushed’ as he reads through a well-constructed 
description of free will, only to be told at the end of the text that there is no 
will in existence, free or otherwise. 
The aphorism is split into five parts and appears to set out a detailed 
analysis of the threefold nature of free will, through introduction, body and 
conclusion. The main points of the argument put forward the case for free will 
as an agent in a person’s past, present and future. The summary condenses 
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 the three strands of free will into one simultaneous entity, before finally 
declaring that there is no room in life for any kind of will at all, regardless of 
its nature. 
It is difficult to make sense of such contradictory logic, where arguments 
are constructed clearly, before being dismissed with peremptory notice. If the 
intended effect is to startle or confound, the aphorism resembles the kind of 
literary vehicle used in Zen Buddhist practices. It is not sufficient, however, 
just to be obscure and obtuse; there must be a method to the apparent 
madness.  
The key to this koan lies in the ideas of delusion and perspective; it must 
be understood that our volition gives birth to the karmic energy which fuels 
our lifecycle. The powers and rights that we (claim to) possess belong to us in 
a theoretical sense, but are not ‘real’ in the sense that they are absolute. The 
self we look after from moment to moment, from past to future, passes 
through time as a series of provisional drafts of a self. It is on loan to us for 
the duration of our lives and is never completed. Whatever we willed in the 
past, we reap the consequences in the present; we are also able to choose 
what to do in the present, and those choices will play a part in our future. The 
three come together in the present, in that it is actually just in the present 
that anything happens – the past is always gone, and the future is always 
distant. Finally, in an ideal, fully enlightened state, we would not need to 
concern ourselves with free will at all, because it is a desire of the self. 
Disabused of our ignorance, we could act from a position of insight and realise 
that, to obtain release from the world of samsara, we need freedom from the 
will to be truly free. If we were not deluded by the need to placate the self, we 
would recognise the interconnection of past, present and future, and we would 
see how our desire for free will is just one more way in which the self tries to 
define itself and defend itself from attack. 
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 4.4 Conclusion 
According to the teaching of the Buddha, the idea of self is an imaginary, false 
belief which has no corresponding reality, and it produces harmful thoughts of 
‘me’ and ‘mine’, selfish desire, craving, attachment, hatred, ill-will, conceit, 
pride, egoism, and other defilements, impurities and problems. It is the source of 
all the troubles in the world from personal conflicts to wars between nations. In 
short, to this false view can be traced all the evil in the world.225 
The aphorisms occupy an important position in Kafka’s literary output, 
because they signpost developments and sensibilities in his literature (rather 
than his personal philosophy), from expressions which display mixed elements 
of Western and Buddhist thought, to a style and delivery which are better 
explained in analogy to Buddhist methods.  
These reflections also appear at a transitional point in Kafka’s writing, for 
they show a shift in themes from initial reservations about how the individual 
can live in a dualistic world to a more enlightened view of the dangers of 
attachment. They bear comparison with Kafka’s narrative writing, both in 
terms of subject matter and style, through the prominence of the ‘fragmentary’ 
and ‘anti-systematic’.226 These features are in tune with concepts such as 
emptiness and impermanence, and thus at odds with the quest for wholeness 
or closure that is characteristic of a Western frame of reference. 
Furthermore, while Kafka’s work can be divided into phases, it still 
retains a coherent feel across early, middle and late periods, both thematically 
and stylistically. The aphorisms play a significant role in determining the 
nature of any patterns or commonalities because they reflect in one place a 
number of features from across Kafka’s oeuvre. This is not to overstate the 
importance of the aphorisms, but simply to make use of a confluence of typical 
topics and techniques. 
225 Rahula, p. 51. 
226 Richard Gray sees close ties between Kafka’s aphorisms and his wider fiction, p. 17. 
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 If some of Kafka’s aphorisms confound and unsettle, this reaction can be 
taken as their purpose, rather than as the consequence of the disturbing 
content. That we suffer for no apparent reason is not really ‘the point’ of 
Kafka’s writing; the fact that we needlessly and irrationally build this suffering 
into the framework for our existence constitutes the story which Kafka’s texts 
deliver, often through the medium rather than the message. It is in this 
respect that parallels can be drawn between novels of hundreds of pages and 
aphorisms of a single sentence.  
The next chapter looks at Das Schloß, which carries the most significant 
perlocutionary event, from a Buddhist perspective, in the transformation of K. 
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 Chapter 5 Das Schloß 
5.1 Introduction 
Letting go of fixation is effectively a process of learning to be free, because every 
time we let go of something, we become free of it. Whatever we fixate upon limits 
us because fixation makes us dependent upon something other than ourselves. 
Each time we let go of something, we experience another level of freedom.227 
Das Schloß is Kafka’s next great work after Der Proceß and it is hewn from the 
same raw materials: an unknown individual is faced with a life-defining 
challenge, apparently thwarted by a powerful, inscrutable authority and 
surrounded by helpers who offer questionable support. In Das Schloß the 
canvas is painted with a familiar collection of gloomy rooms, inclement 
weather, obstructive officials and an ambivalent central character who seems 
to receive and issue unfair treatment in equal measure. 
Despite the familiar atmosphere, Das Schloß succeeds in opening a 
completely new vista in Kafka’s work through its differences. From a Buddhist 
viewpoint, the main development is that K. represents the first Kafka hero to 
demonstrate a degree of spiritual enlightenment. At the end of the novel, K. is 
not only alive, but free from the futile struggle that had ensnared him. His 
stated aims are not fulfilled, but the evidence suggests that K. has revised his 
initial, deluded claims and refocused to a more skillful way of leading his life. 
Ronald Gray notes the same oppressiveness in Das Schloß that characterises 
his earlier works, but he too finds a novel ‘with more moving humanity’, 
attributing this to the directness of K. who is active, critical and positive where 
Josef K. is passive, acquiescent and negative.228 There is a clear decision to let 
go of a fixation and, as suggested by Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche above, this 
marks a step towards freedom.  
227 Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/learning-let-go-0. 
228 Ronald D. Gray, Franz Kafka (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 52-53. 
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 The darkness of the novel serves as a backdrop to accentuate K.’s 
eventual progress. This dissertation argues that a pessimistic reading of the 
novel is inevitable if K. is regarded as a victim of mankind’s doomed fate rather 
than his own misguided choices. At regular intervals during K.’s struggle, we 
are told of disillusionment and disappointment, but these stem from a 
wrongheaded insistence on setting unreachable targets, such as the security 
of selfhood. The air of futility is lifted at the end of the novel, when K. learns to 
relinquish his ill-advised obsessions after a chance meeting with secretary 
Bürgel.  
Kafka’s two great novels are separated by half a dozen years, with the 
intervening time spent reflecting on the consequences of failing health and a 
failed engagement. This may have prepared the ground for a confluence of 
aphoristic and fictional writing, and hence Das Schloß commands both a 
philosophical undercurrent and a compelling narrative.229 
Das Schloß appears to resonate more strongly with the Buddhist model of 
enlightenment than Kafka’s previous works. In Der Proceß, a fluid combination 
of illocutionary and perlocutionary devices suggest Josef K.’s attachment to 
innocence contributes to his suffering, but whatever form the message takes, 
he does not respond skillfully to the spiritual guidance offered. In Das Schloß, 
the narrative accommodates a more structured progression in that K.’s stay in 
the village can be tracked through a series of challenges, warnings and 
setbacks that culminate in his shift from ignorance to relative enlightenment. 
The novel oscillates between periods of action (where K. stakes his claim in a 
variety of ways) and reflection (where K. gathers or is presented with 
information about his quest which needs to be processed to re-assess his 
situation).  
229 Ronald Gray detects an impetus for Das Schloß from Kafka’s stay in Zürau, p. 140. 
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 There is evidence that some insight filters through into K.’s 
consciousness, hence it is worth focusing on the moments of reflection 
separately. While direct warnings and koan-style jolts have no discernible 
effect on Josef K., with K. the situation is different. He engages much more 
with the community and appears to digest the information which is fed 
through to him. He is already clear on the nature of his suffering (lack of 
official status), but unlike Josef K. he recognises the damaging effect of his 
desire and takes the enlightened step towards cessation of his attachments. 
This key difference in outlook between Das Schloß and Der Proceß stems 
from two factors: a) K. belongs to a community and is exposed to the same 
pressures and challenges, whereas Josef K. is isolated in his suffering; and b) 
K.’s presence in the village, his lack of satisfaction and his frustrations are all 
self-imposed. While Josef K. was confronted with the news of his arrest by the 
Court and mounts a rearguard action in ‘self-defence’, K. arrives in the village 
‘on the attack’, laying claim to a position which he feels is rightfully his.  
The option to renounce the Castle quest is always open and is never 
accompanied by the threat of punishment. Josef K. cannot give up his quest 
for innocence, since he assumes his life is at stake. K., however, does not even 
face ‘Hinauswurf’ from the community, so his situation is less critical or 
desperate. Although K. describes his quest as a ‘fight for his existence’, it is in 
reality more about the quality of his life than his survival.  
The differences are subtle, but there is common ground too: from a 
Buddhist point of view both men choose to take up opposition to authorities 
which do not invite confrontation or resistance, but encourage recognition of 
the truth of attachment. For Josef K., the arrest and its related guilt assume 
the weight of a punishment, when they could be seen as natural by-products 
of his ignorance. The event of the arrest is the Court’s way of awakening Josef 
K. from his spiritual slumber and warning him of the dangers of attachment. 
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 In Das Schloß, K. talks specifically about his ‘Existenz’ and ‘Recht’, but there is 
no threat of punishment, just the pain of failure to reach a goal. K.’s suffering 
is essentially the product of a ‘non-event’ (official land surveyor status) and his 
reaction to it.  
The clearest definition of K.’s quest is delivered to Amalia: ‘meine 
Angelegenheiten mit den Behörden in Ordnung zu bringen, ist mein höchster, 
eigentlich mein einziger Wunsch’ (DS 268).230 Hence, the underlying argument 
of this dissertation – that tanha (thirst, craving, wish) provides the powerful 
undercurrent that pulls the individual down into suffering – is openly stated 
as the driving force of the central character. He eventually learns to detach 
himself from claims on absolute certainty and settles for ‘normal’ village life. 
In his initial desperation to establish recognition from the Castle, K. 
believes the best way forward is through connections (attachments). Rather 
than feeling pity for the forsaken land surveyor, rebuffed at every turn by 
faceless bureaucrats and impenetrable, indecipherable protocols, the Buddhist 
reader would lay the blame for K.’s failures squarely at his own ignorant 
practices. He tries to ‘weave’ himself into the fabric of the village and become a 
part of the whole. But whatever he tries to possess turns to dust as nothing 
has any lasting presence. K. scuttles around the village from contact to 
contact, spinning a web of connections in a bid to achieve a relationship with 
the Castle. But the end product is just entanglement in a jumble of threads 
stretching haphazardly between Frieda, Barnabas, Olga and semi-official 
figures such as the village mayor (‘der Gemeindevorsteher’), the innkeepers 
and secretaries. 
For Ronald Gray, K.’s fixations could assume noble proportions in the 
‘ceaseless attempt at penetrating to the innermost depths and conquering 
230 Franz Kafka, Das Schloß, ed. Malcolm Pasley (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1982). References relate 
to this edition and are marked DS, followed by the page number. 
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 them’, and there is no disgrace in losing to the Castle, but a ‘liberation of some 
sort’.231 This interpretation puts a positive spin on K.’s failure, but shows how 
much value is invested in discovering (or creating) meaning. The issue is not 
the quest per se, but the attachment to the quest; not self per se, but 
attachment to self. The Four Noble Truths explain how seeking to attach 
ourselves to our surroundings guarantees suffering, as we can never hope to 
hang on to anything we cling to. A Buddhist reading of Das Schloß points to 
several cases of K. falling foul of this misconception. The delusions of 
attachment are present in many of K.’s dealings with other characters in the 
novel, and mostly they lead to disappointment.  
Buddhism treats ‘meaning’ with caution, thus K.’s quest after a 
meaningful, official position is seen as delusion, a vain chase after his own 
tail, borne of ignorance. K. is not heroic, because for the greater part of the 
novel he stubbornly pursues an illusion, contrary to the facts at hand. There 
is nothing to be admired in blindly attaching oneself to a misguided sense of 
self. In this respect, K.’s unilateral declaration of independence serves as an 
illustration of the pain in store for those clinging to a mirage, because all his 
efforts to assert himself yield nothing but suffering. 
For the majority of the novel, there seems to be no way out for K., and his 
meanderings through the village never bring him nearer to his goal. No matter 
how much information he gathers, no matter how many allies he makes, no 
matter how cunningly or obstinately he executes his plans, he fails because he 
is simply seeking knowledge for the wrong reason or with the wrong 
motivation. He needs insight, not information. The mountains of documents 
kept by village officials should suffice to reveal how futile it would be to try and 
build up a picture of the Castle and its operations. The jigsaw has an infinite 
231 Ronald Gray links the quest to European thinking’s search for knowledge, p. 167. 
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 number of pieces which are always renewing themselves, but K. keeps trying 
to collect them and build up a coherent picture. Here is a case of an individual 
trying to complete a puzzle from the centre (self) outwards, without the benefit 
of finite borders to give guidance. 
The next two sections follow the methodology outlined in the opening 
chapter. The first part investigates the information that is presented to K. 
(both by illocutionary and perlocutionary means) and the actions and 
reflections he undertakes, with reference to Buddhist teaching. The second 
part considers the character of K., and how his conduct and attitude 
contribute to his suffering.  
5.2 Tightropes and tripwires 
The false sense of self is the root of afflictions: ignorance working through the 
false sense of self is thus at the root of our being limited to the rounds of birth 
and death, and thus at the root of all our hankering and suffering.232 
In Der Proceß, we saw that Josef K. made no progress along the tightrope of 
understanding (illocutions) and fell over every tripwire (perlocutions) without 
being jolted from his delusions. In Das Schloß, K. emerges from a week in the 
village with a changed perspective on his environment and circumstances. He 
engages in a very active struggle with the Castle and its representatives, but 
he also takes time to listen, and it is ultimately his ability to reflect and adjust 
that leads to a more positive outcome than befell Josef K. 
K.’s experiences in the village oscillate between action and reflection and 
can be presented as follows: 
1. Action: arrival and aims (Frieda, Klamm) 
2. Reflection: Castle law (mayor, Gardena) 
3. Action: staking claims (sledge, school) 
232 K. Venkata Ramanan in Titmuss, p. 48. 
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 4. Reflection: village law (tales of community members) 
5. Action: dealing with consequences (Gehilfen, Frieda) 
6. Reflection: special law (Bürgel’s loophole) 
7. Action: letting go (self, others) 
In the early stages (1-3) of his quest, K. effectively continues from where 
Josef K. finished, aggressively staking claims ‘mit zwanzig Händen’. He 
endures a number of frustrations, defeats and humiliations which all combine 
to exacerbate his suffering and underline the dangers of attachment. By the 
middle stages (4-5), K. starts to react differently to the information that is 
presented to him about the Castle. He deals less harshly with the assistants 
and treats Frieda with greater openness and respect. The final stages (6-7) 
culminate in the special communication with Bürgel, which is followed by the 
appearance of a ‘detached’ K. engaged with Castle officials and villagers. In 
stark contrast with the ending of Der Proceß, K. experiences no suffering at all, 
and appears at ease and philosophical in his last two conversations, with Pepi 
and the ‘Wirtin’.233 It can be concluded that the meeting with Bürgel causes a 
Zen-like transformation in K., who embraces emptiness (sunyata) as a positive 
and peaceful way of engaging with life. 
K.’s progression corresponds loosely to the development depicted in The 
Four Noble Truths, charting movement from darkness into (relative) light. In 
the first stages of action/reflection noted above, K.’s suffering (The First Noble 
Truth) is established as being caused by his attachment to personal quests 
(The Second Noble Truth); through Bürgel, K. learns about cessation of craving 
(The Third Noble Truth) and in the last stage he practises aspects of the path 
(The Fourth Noble Truth), by displaying right understanding, right view, right 
speech and right livelihood.  
233 To avoid confusion, the landlady at the Bridge Inn will be referred to as Gardena, while her 
counterpart at the Herrenhof will be referred to as the ‘Wirtin’. 
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 5.2.1 Arrival and aims (action) 
A monk asked a Master, ‘Show me the way without appealing to words’. Said 
the Master, ‘Ask me without using words’.234 
The opening three chapters of the novel set the tone for K.’s stay in the village 
by introducing the quest, revealed during K.’s arrival at the Bridge Inn as a 
desire for official recognition from the Castle as ‘Landvermesser’. This aim 
provides the undercurrent to the whole work and K. pursues it through two 
channels: official (for example, via Klamm) and personal (via Frieda).  
K.’s single-minded determination to penetrate the Castle is clear from his 
first day in the village, but ambivalence soon creeps in: ‘Die Augen auf das 
Schloß gerichtet, ging K. weiter, nichts sonst kümmerte ihn. Aber im 
Näherkommen enttäuschte ihn das Schloß’ (DS 17). Shortly thereafter, on 
meeting the schoolteacher, it seems life in the village would not be that 
fulfilling either: ‘Ich bleibe hier längere Zeit und fühle mich schon jetzt ein 
wenig verlassen, zu den Bauern gehöre ich nicht und ins Schloß wohl auch 
nicht’ (DS 20). The tone is set for one disappointment after another, and a 
Buddhist view of K.’s misguided quest would expect nothing more. 
After a short, uncomfortable stay with Lasemann, K. waits for a passing 
sledge on the road to the Castle but is informed by the onlooking Gerstäcker 
that there is no traffic on that path. The phrase ‘hier ist kein Verkehr’ in 
connection with the Castle gives K. an early indication of how difficult it will be 
to establish firm links with authority. K.’s quest to gain entry to the Castle 
suffers a further blow later that evening, when he heads off with Barnabas in 
the deep snow after latching on to him at the inn. The Castle is his ‘Ziel’, but 
he struggles to keep his thoughts focused under the conditions: ‘Statt auf das 
Ziel gerichtet zu bleiben, verwirrten sie sich’ (DS 49). He hangs on to Barnabas 
but loses focus on his purpose and his mind wanders back to a moment of 
234 Humphreys, Zen Buddhism, p. 102. 
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 youthful triumph when he became one of the few local boys to scale a high 
cemetery wall: ‘das Gefühl dieses Sieges schien ihm damals für ein langes 
Leben einen Halt zu geben’ (DS 50). The question of how much such an 
achievement could spur him on in difficult times is soon answered when they 
negotiate their way through the snow, only for K. to realise they have not 
arrived at the Castle gates, but are standing outside Barnabas’s front door. 
Just as climbing the wall did not open up any new vistas (there were gaps 
offering access to the adjacent graveyard anyway), K. prevails over the weather 
conditions to no effect. Most of K.’s ‘triumphs’ are empty and pointless in this 
way. The apparently ‘leichtes Ziel’ (DS 50) turns out to be a more problematic 
target: the theme of the spluttering quest is thus established.  
Crestfallen, K. declines the opportunity to stay with Barnabas and ends 
up at the Herrenhof, where he meets Frieda. It is not long before he actively re-
attaches himself to his ‘goal’, by trying to win Frieda from Klamm. No sooner 
has he claimed her love, than absent-mindedness sets in. Frieda lies back 
ready for a night of passion, but K. already has other things on his mind: ‘wie 
ohnmächtig vor Liebe lag sie auf dem Rücken und breitete die Arme aus, die 
Zeit war wohl unendlich vor ihrer glücklichen Liebe […] Dann schrak sie auf, 
da K. still in Gedanken blieb’ (DS 68). K. eventually comes to, but his thoughts 
are elsewhere while his body rolls around in the beer puddles with her: ‘Dort 
vergiengen Stunden, Stunden gemeinsamen Atems, gemeinsamen 
Herzschlags, Stunden, in denen K. immerfort das Gefühl hatte, er verirre sich 
oder er sei soweit in der Fremde, wie vor ihm noch kein Mensch’ (DS 68-69). 
The warning signs are there for K., as his preoccupation with future goals 
causes a fracture with present realities, leading inevitably to suffering. It is 
significant that his single-mindedness relating to his quest results in absent-
mindedness in his relationships. 
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 One of the key teachings of Buddhism with regard to enlightenment 
concerns the importance of mindfulness, in particular the need to be aware at 
all times of the intrinsic emptiness of all phenomena. This can only 
successfully be achieved by remaining in the moment and recognising it for 
what it is – a temporary step in time caused by a variety of factors, leading to a 
following step and so on. When we live in the present with our minds occupied 
elsewhere, this discord often results in discontent. K.’s frequent troubles with 
Frieda stem from this lack of mindfulness: she devotes herself to K. despite 
her past connection with the powerful Klamm, but K. goes through the 
romantic motions with her, his eye seemingly always drawn towards another 
target. During their first night together, K.’s whirlwind conquest of Frieda 
quickly turns sour when she responds to Klamm’s summons by declaring that 
she is with the land surveyor. Frieda has cut her ties with the past and opened 
a new chapter in her life with K., but K. sees his notional ties to Klamm lying 
in tatters: ‘Was war geschehn? Wo waren seine Hoffnungen? Was konnte er 
nun von Frieda erwarten, da alles verraten war?’ (DS 69-70). 
The opening scenes of the novel set the tone for K.’s ‘wrong view’ as his 
initial setbacks all stem from actions fuelled by the interests of the self, 
conditions which generate negative karmic energy. K. is absent during the 
moment he takes action because he is fixated instead on ulterior motives, and 
this kind of preoccupation can only lead to suffering. It is ironic that a 
potential solution to K.’s early claims can be found in the opening skirmish at 
the Bridge Inn when Schwarzer explains how life works in the village: ‘Dieses 
Dorf ist Besitz des Schlosses, wer hier wohnt oder übernachtet, wohnt oder 
übernachtet gewissermaßen im Schloß’ (DS 8). From a Buddhist point of view, 
the quest could end here, as K. is effectively already ‘im Schloß’: it is futile to 
press on ‘unskillfully’, since there can be no absolute assurances about the 
nature of our existence. K. has conducted his early business without 
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 mindfulness, but in the next chapters he is presented with substantial 
accounts of Castle matters, and is allowed to reflect on his situation.  
5.2.2 Castle law (reflection) 
It is not difficult to see the lack of reflection present in most people in society. 
Even to understand the workings of things on an elementary level, such as in 
seeing the cause and effect involved in personal actions, is beyond most 
people's awareness.235 
Thus K. has arrived in the village and thrown down the gauntlet to the Castle 
by announcing himself as the land surveyor. Permission to stay is granted by 
telephone, but this concession falls short of the official engagement K. desires. 
The second phase of his stay is marked by a series of information-gathering 
scenes, where further details are revealed about the ways of the Castle.  
The first real direct communication from the authorities comes through 
Klamm’s letter of welcome via Barnabas, and it includes the appointment of 
the ‘Gehilfen’. Usually, anything received in writing from an authority can be 
considered definitive, but the letters K. receives are far from it. The Castle 
must be home to Zen masters because the messages are classic koans 
designed to confuse and unhinge, opening up a window into the truth of 
emptiness, by demonstrating the limits of reason. While an illocution uses 
language to deliver its message via a common acceptance of conventions to 
make a connection, a perlocution (ab)uses language to obscure the message 
and point up the untrustworthiness of conventions. For a Buddhist, acts of 
interpretation uncover emptiness because words, just like any other 
phenomena, have no inherent meaning. The letter-koans can thus be seen as 
‘helpful’, in the manner of a Zen master tripping up his student to induce 
enlightenment. 
235 Payutto, p. 69. 
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 K. pores over his first letter from Klamm and finds that its message is not 
‘einheitlich’: K. feels he is seen both as ‘ein Freier’ and as ‘ein kleiner, vom Sitz 
jenes Vorstandes kaum bemerkbarer Arbeiter’ (DS 41). His unease at being 
considered a lowly employee in the Castle hierarchy is confirmed later that 
evening in the Herrenhof, when he learns that Klamm is staying at the inn: 
‘besonders der Umstand, daß gerade sein Vorgesetzter hier war, verblüffte ihn; 
ohne daß er es sich selbst ganz erklären konnte, fühlte er sich Klamm 
gegenüber nicht so frei’ (DS 57-58). K. is ostensibly after an official sanction of 
his position of surveyor, but the mere proximity to his superior results in a 
debilitating sense of awkwardness.236  
K.’s demands for recognition are a ‘fig leaf’ to hide his real desire, which 
is for unconditional freedom: official ‘Landvermesser’ status would place K. in 
the Castle hierarchy and hence ‘die gefürchteten Folgen des 
Untergeordnetseins, des Arbeiterseins’ (DS 58) surface as concerns. His 
ambitions go beyond the work he could undertake as land surveyor and focus 
on the Castle: ‘Nur als Dorfarbeiter, möglichst weit den Herren vom Schloß 
entrückt, war er imstande etwas im Schloß zu erreichen’ (DS 42). This view is 
a clear sign that K. is more interested in the security of his existence than the 
nature of his duties. As a village worker, he could ‘work’, but K. is never seen 
doing any surveying and is focused on the ‘Amt’. This is the crux of his 
suffering, for greater mindfulness relating to his life (work, actions) would 
create less suffering than the quest for appointment (title, name). 
In true koan style, the letters from Klamm cause K. some anguish as 
their ambiguous messages sow doubt rather than certainty: ‘die Briefe richtig 
zu beurteilen, ist ja unmöglich, sie wechseln selbst fortwährend ihren Wert’ 
(DS 363). Koans can be read skillfully, by passing over the content, to 
236 ‘[D]abei aber bedrückte es ihn schwer zu sehn, daß sich in solcher Bedenklichkeit offenbar 
schon die gefürchteten Folgen des Untergeordnetseins, des Arbeiterseins zeigten und daß er 
nicht einmal hier wo sie so deutlich auftraten, imstande war sie niederzukämpfen’ (DS 58). 
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 determine the underlying message and respond in kind. As such, a Buddhist 
reader might view Klamm’s first letter as being perfectly acceptable and not at 
all misleading: it promises nothing more than K. can himself deliver. K. does 
not appreciate the ‘Unentschloßenheit’ that would accompany any discussion 
of how we spend our lives. He concludes instead that only two courses of 
action are open to him, thus preparing the way for his eventual abortive 
struggle. K. calculates that he can either accept the job as a village worker 
(and thereby enter into a ‘scheinbarer Verbindung’ with the Castle), or pursue 
the ‘real’ connection he craves through his messenger Barnabas. The 
advantage of the former is that he will soon establish himself among the 
villagers and as a ‘local’ avoid the official red tape. The disadvantage is the 
status of ‘Arbeitersein’ and all its attendant responsibilities: ‘Dienst, 
Vorgesetzter, Arbeit, Lohnbedingungen, Rechenschaft’ (DS 42). K., through his 
ignorance and delusions of self, gets the worst of both worlds, as it becomes 
clear he will not accept an ‘apparent’ link with the Castle, nor simple ‘worker 
status’, nor does he expect ‘Gnade’ from the ‘Herren’ above. 
It is K.’s instinct to look for ‘etwas Persönlicheres’ in the communication, 
as he is driven by self-interest. Despite the disappointments in the letter, K. 
clings to it as a tangible link to the Castle and hangs it on a nail in his room, a 
fitting sign of his attachment to it.237 
After K.’s wooing of Frieda, he encounters three more sources of Castle 
intelligence, through Gardena (about Klamm), the mayor (about the land 
surveyor’s theoretical position) and the teacher (about the land surveyor’s 
actual position). There are koan-like elements to all three exchanges, which 
have the effect of unsettling K. and giving him cause for reflection – the 
standard objective of a skillful koan. 
237 Marjanne E. Goozé suggests that K. ‘canonizes’ the message by hanging it up, giving it a 
position of authority, in ‘Texts, Textuality, and Silence in Franz Kafka’s The Castle’, in Harold 
Bloom, ed., Franz Kafka’s The Castle (New York: Chelsea House, 1988), p. 126. 
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 In the first instance, K. has little time to enjoy his success with Frieda 
before he is faced with the protective instincts of her guardian, Gardena. K.’s 
moment of rapture with Frieda is soon followed by pangs of doubt as he fears 
losing a connection with Klamm. With Gardena, we see another perspective on 
K.’s objectives as she elevates Klamm to a high, unattainable status and 
relegates K. to the lowest of the low, ‘Adler’ and ‘Blindschleiche’ respectively 
(DS 90). K. holds his own in the discussion with Gardena, however, proving a 
match for her in a way that Josef K. was not, when faced with the arguments 
presented by Huld and Titorelli. Nevertheless, his ability to counter Gardena’s 
objections owes much to a rational assessment of a situation which is clearly 
irrational. Gardena considers K. an outsider ‘der überzählig und überall im 
Weg ist’ (DS 80) and follows her blunt judgment with an account of Klamm’s 
relationship with Frieda that could come from a Zen master’s textbook on how 
to baffle. She explains that Klamm is a distant, inscrutable figure who will 
never be able to hold any meaningful dialogue with lesser mortals such as K. 
Her example is a koan masterpiece as she claims that it does not even follow 
that if Klamm calls Frieda’s name he actually wants her to come to him.238 
Gardena’s remark prefigures the disappointment K. will shortly hear from the 
mayor about Klamm’s letter – it is meaningful, but not in the way K. would 
have it. 
This early koan about Klamm’s inscrutability goes over K.’s head for he 
simply accepts his own ‘insignificance’ and, rather than be daunted by the 
disparity in their status, welcomes the challenge of meeting Klamm: fail or 
succeed, he would claim a special kind of victory ‘frei vor einem Mächtigen 
gesprochen zu haben’ (DS 82). At the end of the conversation with Gardena, to 
whose every objection K. has a rational answer, K. willingly adopts the role of 
238 ‘Und daß er Frieda manchmal rief, muß gar nicht die Bedeutung haben, die man dem gern 
zusprechen möchte, er rief einfach den Namen Frieda – wer kennt seine Absichten? – daß Frieda 
natürlich eilends kam war ihre Sache’ (DS 81). 
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 ‘der Unwissendste’ because it enables him to dare and not be held back: ‘dem 
Unwissenden scheint alles möglich’ (DS 91). Such a comment appears to 
reflect much Western thinking, which would encourage the accumulation of 
knowledge because any increase in it is arguably always positive. The 
Buddhist view differs in that the motivation must be determined first: K.’s 
tactical exploitation of his lack of awareness cannot be considered skillful, 
because he turns his ignorance into an object, like a badge of honour to 
proclaim his courage, or like a battering ram to break down the Castle’s doors. 
K. also spots a logical flaw in Gardena’s argument against meeting 
Klamm – if it is supremely unlikely that the official will agree to see the land 
surveyor, why should she be concerned to block K.? Where K. goes wrong in 
Buddhist terms is his use of conventional logic, for none of his responses get 
through to Gardena; this coincides with the function of the koan, namely to 
encourage the individual to dispense with reason. 
K. sets off for his meeting with the mayor encouraged by his capture of 
Frieda and his deft verbal sparring with Gardena. He is in a bullish mood and 
we gain some indication of how seriously he takes the battle with the Castle 
and the fight for his ‘self’: ‘K. [kämpfte] für etwas lebendigst Nahes, für sich 
selbst’ (DS 92-93). But Gardena’s subtle koan about Klamm that failed to trip 
him up is followed by more intense instances in the discussion about his 
status as ‘Landvermesser’. 
Although the officials have been quite obliging towards him so far, K. 
remains cautious: ‘K. war, wenn er manchmal nur an diese Dinge dachte, 
nicht weit davon entfernt, seine Lage zufriedenstellend zu finden, trotzdem er 
sich immer nach solchen Anfällen des Behagens schnell sagte, daß gerade 
darin die Gefahr lag’ (DS 92). The existence unfolding before him appears to be 
one where ‘Amt’ and ‘Leben’ are intertwined, but K. wants nothing of an 
‘außeramtliche, völlig unübersichtliche, trübe, fremdartige Leben’ (DS 93). 
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 Official sanction is crucial for K. and to that end he needs to keep looking over 
his shoulder, ‘ein Herumblicken nach allen Seiten vor jedem Schritt’ (DS 94). 
Before the meeting, K. reads Klamm’s letter again and basks in its 
seemingly comforting message: ‘Wieder hatte er das Gefühl der 
außerordentlichen Leichtigkeit des Verkehrs mit den Behörden’ (DS 94-95). He 
reflects on how easy it has been to deal with the authorities: ‘Sie trugen 
förmlich jede Last, alles konnte man ihnen auferlegen und selbst blieb man 
unberührt und frei’ (DS 95). It is not necessary to see deception in the letter or 
naivety in K., if he feels a sense of ease. With permission to stay in the village, 
a job, lodgings and a fiancée, his circumstances are not desperate and the 
Castle seems prepared to take the strain and allow him a life of convenience. 
The problem comes when K. starts to think too much (as suggested at the 
beginning of chapter one by Zen master Seung Sahn). He quibbles with the 
mayor over the terms of Klamm’s letter and his fixations gradually lead him 
astray. 
As the novel unfolds, K. is regularly tripped up by appearances and 
assumptions, and the mayor deals the first serious blow to K.’s progress by 
undermining the source of his confidence. Klamm’s letter is deemed to be a 
‘Privatbrief’, of undoubted significance, but not in the sense that K. would 
wish: ‘Ein Privatbrief Klamms hat natürlich viel mehr Bedeutung als eine 
amtliche Zuschrift, nur gerade die Bedeutung die Sie ihm beilegen hat er 
nicht’ (DS 115). Rather than confirm his rightful appointment, the letter 
merely serves to place onto K. the burden of proof: ‘Sie sind nur aufgenommen 
“wie Sie wissen”, d. h. die Beweislast dafür daß Sie aufgenommen sind, ist 
Ihnen auferlegt’ (DS 114). 
The key perlocution in the letter-koan and main cause of suffering for K. 
is the phrase ‘wie Sie wissen’. This phrase effectively means that K.’s status 
rests on the extent of what he knows, but K.’s insecurities regarding his 
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 standing and his lack of familiarity with the Castle leave him open to severe 
doubts. Those three words come to haunt K. as he struggles to establish 
‘knowledge’ of the Castle and its practices. If he took the ‘as you know’ in a 
relative and not an absolute sense, he would not suffer so much. If he had 
insight into the nature of existence and knew that no guarantees were 
available, he would take the ‘wie Sie wissen’ in its makeshift sense: as far as 
can be established, the position of land surveyor is yours. But K. wants ‘cast-
iron’ assurances, known and recognised by the world, not just by himself. It is 
not enough to take on the job as it is and work day-to-day. K. wants 
indisputable recognition that goes beyond what he himself might think: in 
other words, it is not enough that K. alone believes he is the land surveyor. 
Once K. leaves the (already) shifting confines of his self, and ventures out into 
the external world looking for assurances, he is condemned.  
The words ‘wie Sie wissen’ disturb K.’s conscience because he does not in 
fact ‘know’ that he is the land surveyor – he has just assumed it, or aspires to 
it. There is no certainty of knowledge and the Castle cannot come to his aid in 
this respect either. The phrase represents a classic koan challenge, striking at 
the heart of what we feel we can rely on: if we do not know something, does 
that mean it is not true? Or must something be known, for it to be true? K. 
sinks to his lowest ebb here, in contrast with his highest point when he meets 
Bürgel and turns his back on dependency on knowledge. 
K.’s main link to the Castle turns to dust and all other references to the 
land surveyor appear to be just isolated, insignificant strands in a suffocating, 
bewildering bureaucracy. A chastened, demoralised K. dismisses the prospect 
of future interviews with the authorities as they work to consider his claims: 
‘ich will keine Gnadengeschenke vom Schloß, sondern mein Recht’ (DS 119). 
The extent of K.’s delusions regarding what sort of recognition he can 
expect to gain from the Castle becomes clear during this scene. K. is not 
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 impressed with the description of the myriad departments and offices of the 
Castle and insists on hearing ‘ein Wort über mich’ (DS 105), that is, how he in 
particular relates to the whole, as if there is necessarily a guaranteed place for 
him in the hierarchy: ‘Nur glaube ich daß hier zweierlei unterschieden werden 
müsse, nämlich erstens das was innerhalb der Ämter vorgeht und was dann 
wieder amtlich so oder so aufgefaßt werden kann, und zweitens meine 
wirkliche Person, ich, der ich außerhalb der Ämter stehe’ (DS 105). 
The mayor cannot be sure whether K. will get what he wants from the 
Castle – ‘manches spricht dafür, manches dagegen’ (DS 110) – and this 
ambiguous assessment infuriates K. to the point where he suggests taking 
matters into his own hands. Understandably, like anybody fiercely protecting 
a vulnerable ego, K. is sensitive to any attack on his self: ‘Ich werde mich für 
meine Person dagegen zu wehren wissen’ (DS 112). K. is clearly labouring 
under the illusion that the Castle officials are treating him badly and offending 
against what he deems to be wholly legitimate claims: ‘[ich verstehe,] daß hier 
ein entsetzlicher Mißbrauch mit mir, vielleicht sogar mit den Gesetzen 
getrieben wird’ (DS 112). K. seems to be appealing to a higher authority 
(‘Gesetze’), according to which K. is entitled to claim his existential rights. The 
longer the meeting goes on, the more frustrated K. gets and he descends to the 
‘Why me?’ lament which accompanies all personalised human suffering that 
seems undeserved. 
Despite several attempts at getting to grips with the Castle and its 
personnel and practices, K. invariably ends up with a false impression. The 
‘true’ picture (or the realisation that there is none) remains frustratingly out of 
reach, and he labours instead under illusions. This meeting with the mayor 
gives K. his first real taste of what he is facing, as he takes on the Castle 
behemoth and its bewildering tangle of ‘Behörde’ and ‘Kontrollbehörde’. K. is 
initially undeterred by the description of bureaucratic chaos that appears to 
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 cast doubt on his ‘calling’ as land surveyor: ‘Es unterhält mich nur dadurch 
[…] daß ich einen Einblick in das lächerliche Gewirre bekomme, welches unter 
Umständen über die Existenz eines Menschen entscheidet’ (DS 102). K. thinks 
he understands, but his ‘wrong view’ is at the heart of his troubles for he 
assumes that it is ‘das Gewirre’ which decides the fate of man. In a Buddhist 
sense, his error is to see an external force in control over our lives, be it ‘das 
Gewirre’ or ‘das Schloß’, not to mention the false underlying assumption that 
there is something permanently meaningful about our existence. 
Ignorance is considered in Buddhism to be the major obstacle to dealing 
with the problem of suffering: if we cannot see the ‘truth’ of the Dharma, we 
will be slave forever to our cravings. K.’s attempts to gain knowledge are 
repeatedly thwarted as he encounters shifting images, misleading 
communications and confusing descriptions. K. is made to feel uncertain 
about everything as it seems that every statement uttered is soon qualified, 
modified or retracted. For example, K. is disabused of the notion that the 
Castle is capable of making what appears to the untrained eye to be a mistake: 
‘Fehler kommen ja nicht vor und selbst wenn einmal ein Fehler vorkommt, wie 
in Ihrem Fall, wer darf denn endgiltig sagen, daß es ein Fehler ist’ (DS 104). 
The Judaeo-Christian believer might equate this view to faith in an all-
powerful God, whereas a Buddhist might suggest that mistakes are human or 
‘personal’: nature is just nature and cannot be anything but what it is.  
The discussion with the mayor sets the benchmark for K.’s futile struggle 
against the Castle for it marks K.’s passage from early (over)confidence – the 
meeting initially gave him ‘wenig Sorgen’ – to defensive paranoia. When he 
confuses the inscrutability of officialdom for hostility, the mayor corrects him: 
‘Niemand hält Sie hier zurück, aber das ist doch noch kein Hinauswurf’ (DS 
118). 
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 This pivotal meeting shreds every ‘fact’ about the Castle K. has clung to 
hitherto. K. hears about the mountains of paperwork generated by his case 
and regrets the trouble he has caused: ‘mein Ehrgeiz geht nicht dahin, große 
mich betreffende Aktensäulen entstehen und zusammenkrachen zu lassen, 
sondern als kleiner Landvermesser bei einem kleinen Zeichentisch ruhig zu 
arbeiten’ (DS 107). The mayor’s response is crushing: ‘wenn es auf den 
Umfang der Arbeit ankäme, wäre Ihr Fall einer der geringsten’ (DS 107). This 
is echoed at the end of the novel when K. witnesses the disposal of a single 
document and imagines it could be his – a small note, rather than a bulging 
case file. 
K. refers to the telephone call on his first evening in the village, which 
appeared to confirm his appointment, but this ‘information’ too is 
undermined: ‘Sie sind eben noch niemals wirklich mit unsern Behörden in 
Berührung gekommen. Alle diese Berührungen sind nur scheinbar, Sie aber 
halten sie infolge Ihrer Unkenntnis der Verhältnisse für wirklich’ (DS 115). The 
mayor castigates K. for his facile belief that one could just pick up the phone 
and speak directly to the relevant official in the Castle and have one’s query 
settled instantly: ‘Ich begreife auch nicht, wie selbst ein Fremder glauben 
kann, daß wenn er z. B. Sordini anruft, es auch wirklich Sordini ist, der ihm 
antwortet’ (DS 116-117). K. tries to maintain his poise by claiming that he did 
not put much faith in such telephone conversations, but even here the rug is 
pulled from under his feet as the mayor upbraids him for this view, too: 
‘wirkliche Bedeutung kommt diesen telephonischen Antworten durchaus zu, 
wie denn nicht?’ (DS 117).239 To confuse K. further, the mayor goes on to 
‘clarify’ what information emanating from the Castle can ‘mean’: ‘Alle diese 
239 This no-win case has Zen parallels: ‘Zen master Shousan used to hold up a stick and say, 
“If you call it a stick, you are clinging. If you do not call it a stick, you are ignoring. So what do 
you call it?”’ From Zen and the Art of Insight (Boston: Shambhala, 1999), translated by Thomas 
Cleary, p. 9. 
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 Äußerungen haben keine amtliche Bedeutung; wenn Sie ihnen amtliche 
Bedeutung zuschreiben, gehen Sie in die Irre, dagegen ist ihre private 
Bedeutung im freundschaftlichen oder feindseligen Sinne sehr groß, meist 
größer als eine amtliche Bedeutung jemals sein könnte’ (DS 117).  
It seems that whatever opinion K. holds on the Castle, it is turned inside 
out until he has nothing tangible left to cling to: ‘Sie haben darin recht, daß 
man die Äußerungen des Schlosses nicht wortwörtlich hinnehmen darf’ (DS 
118). Such an explanation could also pass as a description of a koan, and the 
leader of the village community grows into a Zen master figure with every 
passing comment that serves to undermine K.’s assumptions. This scene 
offers a narrative version of Kafka’s first aphorism, as the tightrope K. tries to 
walk from the village into the Castle is booby-trapped with a succession of 
tripwires designed to throw him off balance. A similarly bed-ridden Huld 
achieved a comparable effect in Der Proceß when he mesmerised Josef K. with 
his tales of the Court. 
The mayor has sought to tell K. how insubstantial his case is, ranking 
among the ‘winzigste Kleinigkeiten’ (DS 96), but this comment only serves to 
reinforce K.’s resolve. He ends the meeting in defiant mood, effectively rejecting 
further progress along bureaucratic channels, in favour of direct action. 
Fittingly, Klamm’s letter, which began the meeting as K.’s letter of 
appointment, ends it in rather devalued form as an ambiguous ‘Privatbrief’, 
folded into a ‘Schiffchen’ by the mayor’s wife. 
This humiliating close marks the end of the reflective period. K. leaves 
the mayor shaken by the lack of progress made and rejects the olive branch of 
further meetings. He returns to the inn to find Gardena severely incapacitated, 
as the earlier discussion with K. about Klamm has dredged up old memories of 
her younger days, when she enjoyed the official’s ‘favour’. Her exaggerated 
devotion to Klamm offers an extreme example of the pointlessness of 
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 attachment, and holds up a mirror to K. in which he might recognise his own 
fixation. Gardena clings to three ‘Andenken’ (a picture, a cloth and a bonnet) 
as if they contained the Holy Ghost, in a parody of nostalgia and vanity.240 It 
transpires that these mementoes were not even given to Gardena, but they 
were all she could grasp hold of (‘mit zwanzig Händen’, perhaps) before losing 
her place as Klamm’s serving girl. This episode has a perlocutionary effect in 
the way the three Klamm souvenirs follow so soon after K.’s attachment to 
Klamm’s letter, which he had previously hung on a nail in his room as a 
reminder of his goal. Its new incarnation as a folded paper boat, combined 
with Gardena’s laughable ‘relics’, spell out the dangers of clinging to symbols.  
The third part in the series of reflective episodes comes when K. leaves 
Gardena to go to his room and finds the schoolteacher there. Although K. has 
only recently finished his discussions with the mayor, the teacher already 
knows all the details and has come to inform K. that the post of ‘Schuldiener’ 
is being offered. This news-travels-fast effect is repeated throughout the novel 
and takes on a perlocutionary effect of its own. It seems that wherever K. 
ventures in the village (and he is only there for a week) the locals always 
recognise him (and this is without the benefit of social networking aids). The 
effect on K. is that he has no time to reflect on the job offer, but rejects it out 
of hand, much to the delight of the teacher, who regards K. as a selfish, 
arrogant interloper. In his view, the authorities should not be expected to pay 
any particular attention to K.’s case: ‘Wir sind nicht Ihre Schutzengel und 
haben keine Verpflichtung Ihnen auf allen Ihren Wegen nachzulaufen’ (DS 
144). This can be interpreted to mean that the Castle (world) can offer no 
guarantees in life. It falls to Frieda to talk K. into accepting the position for, 
while he was with the mayor, events had moved on and Gardena ordered K. to 
240 It is difficult to subscribe to Patrick Bridgwater’s suggestion that Gardena represents the 
‘voice of reason’, in Kafka’s Novels: an Interpretation (New York: Rodopi, 2003), p. 240. 
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 leave the premises. It seems K. is as slow at hearing local news as the villagers 
are quick – K. has still not adjusted to ‘Castle Mean Time’ and is out of step 
with village life. 
In a short time, K. has gathered a lot of information about the Castle, but 
failed to appreciate that the Castle is potentially a benign influence and not an 
adversary. He views the world in dualistic terms (them and us) despite an 
initial sense of comfort dealing with the authorities, before falling deeper into 
his obsession with his ‘rights’. In this respect, there are similarities between 
the Castle and the Court in Der Proceß: both organisations are perceived as 
supreme authorities with the power to govern people’s lives. From a Buddhist 
point of view, however, this governance rests on natural laws rather than any 
other kind of man-made ordering principles, be they ethical, spiritual, 
economic or otherwise. Just as we never see the Court’s judges or higher-level 
officials, so we never see the top echelons of power in the Castle, only the 
lower tier of bureaucrats who carry out orders according to natural laws. This 
is an important point because it defines the conflict in the novels between the 
main character and the overarching authority. The Court merely 
communicates to Josef K. the fact of his suffering through ignorance and 
attachment to selfhood – there is no punishment for this and he is free to 
continue in his ignorance should he wish. The Castle accepts K.’s self-
appointment as land surveyor, but cannot sanction it officially. This lack of 
recognition is misinterpreted by K. as defiance, when it is communication of 
the truth of emptiness. 
Consistent with a Judaeo-Christian outlook, K. seeks correlation between 
the natural order and his personal aspirations. But, as the schoolteacher 
makes clear, the Castle cannot be responsible for everything: it can only 
represent the impersonal (i.e. neutral) transience of phenomena, which may 
come across as ‘irrational’ to us as we seek to impose meaning on our 
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 situations. In other words, messages emanating from the Castle will 
necessarily be ‘koan-like’ with perlocutionary effects, because the links 
between self, order and meaning are missing and will cause pain until the 
individual sees through the need for rationality.  
As K. hits an interpretive brick wall, it is possible readers might suffer 
the same disorientating fate. The perlocutions that rile K. have elicited 
negative reactions from critics who see the textual ambiguities as inadequacies 
in the writing. Ronald Gray, for example, feels that Kafka is either ‘withholding 
information’ or ‘putting down words which he is not concerned to back up’.241 
K. is exasperated by the Castle’s inability or reluctance to speak 
unequivocally, and the reader is frustrated by the text’s paradoxes and aporia. 
Eventually, K. learns to let go of his insistence on meaningful order and on 
synchronicity between the outside world and his inner being; similarly, the 
reader can relax his expectations of textual integrity. 
The perlocutions directed at K. by the mayor bear comparison with the 
way in which Huld and Titorelli confound Josef K., and this need not be seen 
as evidence of a sinister conspiracy or poor writing. Gray excuses 
‘inconsequential ramblings’ in the mouths of characters like Huld and Titorelli 
because it amounts to satire, but feels the increased prevalence in the later 
stages of Das Schloß suggest Kafka’s writing was almost out of control, to the 
extent that this was perhaps why Kafka had asked for his work to be 
burned.242 From a Buddhist point of view, the opposite holds true, because the 
increased volume of perlocutionary messages brings to a crescendo the 
discordant combination of rational expression in an irrational world. 
241 Ronald Gray, p. 150. (The lack of back-up could also be intentional, a useful tool for Zen 
masters looking to dumbfound their students.) 
242 Ibid., p. 157. 
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 After this period of intensive listening (and some argument), K. leaps into 
direct action again and reasserts his challenge in a more aggressive manner. 
5.2.3 Staking claims (action) 
Do work of all kinds with a mind that is void.243 
The third phase of K.’s stay in the village is marked by a much more desperate 
clutching at ‘moorings’, and there is little evidence of insight gained from 
information received. His next attempt on the authorities comes at the 
Herrenhof when he learns that Klamm is preparing to leave. In earlier 
discussions, K. had already spoken of his need to be free and this represents 
an instance where K. clings to a desire for freedom, but is left empty-handed 
as soon as he tries to assert a hold over it. K. discovers a sledge in the inn 
courtyard being prepared for Klamm’s return to the Castle and decides to wait 
there for an impromptu meeting with the official. His very presence results in 
Klamm’s departure being cancelled, however, and the sledge is put away. 
Although there is ostensibly nothing to be gained by remaining out in the 
snow alone, K. stubbornly stands his ground in the courtyard, attached to his 
hollow victory: ‘es war ein Sieg, der keine Freude machte’ (DS 168). His failure 
is described in terms of the emptiness of possession: ‘Trotzallem was 
geschehen war hatte er das Gefühl, daß das was er bisher erreicht hatte eine 
Art Besitz war, den er zwar nur noch scheinbar festhielt aber doch nicht auf 
einen beliebigen Befehl hin ausliefern mußte’ (DS 167). K. defiantly clings to 
his ‘success’ in blocking Klamm’s departure, chalking up a Pyrrhic victory and 
practical defeat: ‘Dann will ich ihn lieber beim Warten verfehlen’ (DS 167). The 
reason that this freedom appears so paradoxically oppressive is that it is really 
the slavery of attachment to selfhood and its thirst for meaningfulness. Yet in 
claiming this hard-fought victory, K. senses the emptiness of a meaningless 
243 Buddhadasa in Titmuss, p. 38. 
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 possession: ‘da schien es K. als habe man nun alle Verbindung mit ihm 
abgebrochen und als sei er nun freilich freier als jemals und […] als gäbe es 
gleichzeitig nichts Sinnloseres, nichts Verzweifelteres als diese Freiheit, dieses 
Warten, diese Unverletzlichkeit’ (DS 169). If anything, K. has created a kind of 
‘auto-koan’ by baffling himself with his self-deluding behaviour. 
Readers of both Judaeo-Christian and Buddhist persuasions could agree 
with the pointlessness of K.’s gesture, but for significantly different reasons. 
For the former, K. suffers because he has not reached Klamm and he is 
isolated – failure and exclusion. Politzer judges the sledge scene as ‘one of the 
most paradoxical passages Kafka has ever written’.244 K.’s liberty and 
invulnerability lose meaning in a self-imposed exile because he stands alone 
and has no contact with other human standards. From the Zen angle, the 
scene highlights both K.’s stubbornness and the transience of satisfaction, 
both resulting in suffering; hence, The Three Universal Characteristics of 
impermanence, not-self and suffering are all represented in K.’s futile 
courtyard gesture. 
After standing his ground for a while in his futile gesture of protest, K. 
returns to the inn and finds himself in an interview with Klamm’s secretary, 
Momus, who is tasked with recording all the minutiae of village events in a 
register. K. has so far met with little joy from his dealings with the officials, so 
he refuses to participate and is about to walk out when Momus demands co-
operation ‘in Klamm’s name’. Gardena has left her busy kitchen (and sickbed) 
to be present and urges K. to submit to the protocol as the one potential path 
to Klamm, but K. holds out little hope of success: ‘Die Drohungen der Wirtin 
fürchtete K. nicht, der Hoffnungen, mit denen sie ihn zu fangen suchte, war er 
müde’ (DS 183). 
244 Politzer, p. 279. 
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 The term ‘müde’ is often a sign that one of Kafka’s characters is starting 
to experience a world-weariness that could lead to a breakthrough into 
enlightenment. This kind of tiredness is a fertile ground out of which rejection 
of unskillful attachments can be made. K. is not impressed with the prospects 
offered by Momus’s protocol reaching Klamm, so he is minded to let it go. K.’s 
detachment is the correct choice for the wrong reason though, from a 
Buddhist point of view. He is right not to place any hope in such a forlorn 
method of contacting Klamm (on a par with staking out an empty sledge), but 
instead of deliberately eschewing all attempts to link up with the Castle he 
just searches for a better one. K.’s refusal to participate is still action, a 
statement of intent rather than a reflection of understanding. It should be 
recalled that, in Buddhism, all actions fuelled by ego carry karmic weight, so 
K.’s avoidance of the protocol contributes to bad karma. 
This state of mental turbulence indicates how K. has been shaken to the 
point where he does not know what he wants. The Momus protocol, written in 
painstaking detail for Klamm who refuses to read it, is another Castle koan 
sent to give K. some insight into the non-sense of his quest.245 All the other 
villagers submit to it (witness the hush in the room when Momus introduces 
himself as Klamm’s scribe), but this does not mean that they are right or 
wrong, or set any specific store by it. Gardena might be attached to the 
register, in the fervent belief that the minutes are indeed a ‘Verbindung’ with 
Klamm, but she also concedes Klamm’s right not to bother reading it: ‘Ist es 
denn nötig oder auch nur wünschenswert, daß Klamm dieses Protokoll liest 
und von den Nichtigkeiten Ihres Lebens wortwörtlich Kenntnis bekommt’ (DS 
182). 
245 ‘“Bleibt mir vom Leib mit Eueren Protokollen!” pflegt er zu sagen’ (DS 182). 
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 K. leaves the Momus hearing puzzled even as to whether he was right or 
wrong to resist Gardena’s exhortations to comply: ‘schließlich wußte man 
nicht ob man standgehalten oder nachgegeben hatte’ (DS 186). His struggle 
has become pointless and for much of the novel the reader has to look on as 
K. stumbles from one useless initiative to another. The point here is that the 
‘meaning’ invested in the protocol is derived from personal wishes (self) and 
hence K.’s tortured reaction to skipping the interview. His desire to reach 
Klamm is so strong and his options so few that he wonders whether he was 
justified in letting the opportunity go. In this respect, the koan has worked in 
creating doubt in K.’s mind, but a complete breakthrough has to wait until 
another official ‘Verbindung’ is offered (and refused) through Bürgel. 
K.’s suffering increases in this middle part of the novel as his quest 
falters on a number of fronts, via Barnabas, Frieda, the ‘Gehilfen’ and his 
position as ‘Schuldiener’. After rejecting the ‘official’ channel (Momus), he runs 
into Barnabas and takes receipt of Klamm’s second letter. This message from 
the Castle raises K.’s hopes and then creates an immediate disappointment as 
the content bears no relation to what has been happening – it ironically 
describes Klamm’s satisfaction at K.’s surveying activities. Reading like an 
impersonal ‘circular’ letter, it is crammed with platitudes and empty 
encouragement. K. interprets the text as misinformation and evidence of an 
authority which is pathetically out-of-touch, unconcerned, incompetent, or all 
three. This is taking the content at face value, when its underlying target 
could be to draw K.’s attention to the fact that he has not done any surveying 
and, perhaps more significantly, is essentially not mindful of or interested in 
his work. K. seeks to send a quick response through Barnabas, but he learns 
that his messenger has not even delivered the message K. entrusted to him 
when they first met. This pair of miscommunications can also be considered 
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 as perlocutions, since the effect of the (non-)delivery makes the biggest 
impression on K.246 
Barnabas compounds the sense of futility by doing the exact opposite to 
the Castle: the former has a meaningful message (remembered verbatim at K.’s 
dictation) but does not deliver it; the latter has a meaningless message, but it 
is safely delivered. 
After two quick defeats from official quarters (Momus, Klamm’s second 
letter), K. makes for the school where his bride is waiting, but his domestic 
situation offers no respite from suffering, either. The ‘honeymoon’ period is 
over by the first morning as the schoolchildren crowd into the classroom to 
discover the scenes of disorder created overnight by K. and his ‘household’. 
When taken to task by the schoolteacher, K. tries to deflect blame on to his 
assistants, but they are saved by Frieda – K.’s footholds in the village grow 
ever weaker.  
K. is never long without some shadows to chase, however, and since 
Frieda appears disloyal and Klamm as distant as a soaring eagle, he seizes on 
another lifeline. Detours and diversions seem to wrongfoot K. every step of the 
way and rather than treading mindfully along the path (or tightrope) with his 
eyes open, K. hurries along with his eyes fixed on an object located in his 
fantasies. He runs away with his dreams and they run away with him, as 
suggested by the new hope offered through Hans Brunswick’s mother: ‘wer 
weiß wohin er dadurch gelangen würde und in der Nähe der Frau würde er 
jedenfalls häufig sein – so spielte er mit den Träumen und sie mit ihm’ (DS 
235). These tenuous hopes show that K. is ready to sacrifice everything for 
this new delusion.247 From a Buddhist perspective, it is significant that these 
246 K.’s dissatisfaction with Klamm’s letter recalls how the address ‘Zimmermaler’ unsettled 
Josef K. (DP 61). 
247 ‘Das Gespräch mit Hans hatte ihm neue, zugegebenermaßen unwahrscheinliche, völlig 
grundlose, aber nicht mehr zu vergessende Hoffnungen gemacht’ (DS 240). 
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 hopes are ‘grundlos’, and yet K. feels obliged to chase after them. This tends to 
support the picture of attachment-fuelled suffering, with K. in thrall to his 
Castle fixation, as he puts up with ‘die Reihe der fortwährenden kleinen 
Leiden des Lebens’ (DS 241) to reach his goal. Tellingly, we also learn how K.’s 
quest is not related to discovering peace: ‘er war nicht hergekommen um ein 
Leben in Ehren und Frieden zu führen’ (DS 241). 
The trail through Hans’s mother is not followed up by K., but this ‘lead’ 
proves significant in a negative way because it shows Frieda the extent of K.’s 
attachment to his Castle goals, and the consequent diminished interest in 
their love. K. is not aware that he has lost Frieda as he hurries off later to get 
news of Barnabas. At this point in the quest K. has opened up a number of 
fronts on which to attack the Castle, but none is bearing fruit. 
5.2.4 Village law (reflection) 
After the Buddha was enlightened he was walking down the road in a very 
happy state […] And he met some people and they said, ‘You seem very special. 
What are you, are you some kind of an angel or a deva?’ He seemed inhuman in 
some way. ‘No.’ ‘Well, are you some kind of a god then?’ ‘No.’ ‘Well, then are 
you some kind of a wizard or magician?’ ‘No,’ he replied. ‘Well, are you a man?’ 
‘No,’ he said. ‘Then what are you?’ And he answered, ‘I am awake.’248 
K.’s direct actions in the middle part of the novel do not result in any success, 
and these failures precede another period in which he mostly gathers 
information by listening to the villagers. He spends the first morning in the 
school (after the early humiliation) trying to mend fences with the 
schoolteacher by working hard – that is, focusing on the jobs in hand (clearing 
snow, making repairs) rather than on his quest. It is perhaps not by accident 
that K. cuts a relatively serene figure while occupied with his caretaker duties, 
248 Jack Kornfield, The Eightfold Path for the Householder (DharmaNet edition, 1995), p. 1. 
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 for it foreshadows the post-Bürgel incarnation of K., who is equally serene 
once the all-consuming quest has been set aside. 
Before the great transformation can take place, however, K. still has a lot 
to learn and the next phase in his stay is marked by tales-within-a-tale. The 
stories of Barnabas, Olga, Amalia and their father are all presented in varying 
degrees of detail, without reference to K.’s predicament, but purely on their 
own personal terms. The parents and children are shunned by the rest of the 
community, but used to enjoy high standing, and their unexpected, 
controversial fall from favour allows parallels to be drawn with K.’s lowly 
status and problematic relationship with the Castle. Through observation and 
instruction, by illocution and perlocution, village life unfolds before K.’s eyes 
and affords him insight into how his own situation might develop under the 
Castle, depending on the choices made. 
Amalia has experienced ‘real’ suffering in that her rejection of Sortini’s 
advances has caused ostracism from the community. However, she stands 
firm on a point of principle based on conventional moral laws (insulted by a 
lewd proposition), and she never complains about her fate. K., in contrast, 
defends an absolute principle (his right to exist as official land surveyor) that 
has no basis in any kind of law, moral, existential or otherwise, and he makes 
a big fuss about it too. K. yearns for attachment to the Castle, whereas Amalia 
longs for freedom from society, ‘ein fortwährendes, jedem andern Gefühl 
überlegenes Verlangen nach Einsamkeit’ (DS 264).  
Amalia is an enigmatic figure at the centre of the conflict with the Castle, 
but on the periphery of the action. Her situation invites different reactions, but 
whether she is seen as independent or an outcast, it is her isolation that 
garners attention. Franz Kuna believes that Amalia is ‘Kafka’s only truly 
absurdist character’ as she resists the ‘influence of outside powers’ in a ‘heroic 
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 protest against an alien order’.249 Her defiance might even show great resolve 
and principle, and Politzer feels Kafka granted Amalia what he denied his 
main heroes, namely ‘the ability to survive, and even transcend, despair’. 250  
Amalia and her family suffer the consequences as she refuses dialogue 
and shuts herself off from society, but this stubbornness is not the stuff of 
heroines. She could be seen as a selfish character who allows her anger to 
dominate her thinking. The resultant stubborn pride is an apposite example of 
karma at work – selfish actions give rise to suffering. Although there is 
courage in her rejection of Sortini, her withdrawal still counts as attachment 
or fixation because her life is defined by the exclusion. For Goozé, Amalia’s 
problem is that ‘she refuses to interpret at all’, though it could be argued that 
even ‘no interpretation’ is a kind of interpretation.251 Karoline Krauss believes 
that Amalia detaches herself from the Castle, but fails to create a new 
‘discourse’ and remains socially ‘mute’.252 Thus, her detachment in Buddhist 
terms is nothing more than self-isolation, a heightened sense of self-worth 
rather than an enlightened position. K. ultimately chooses a different kind of 
withdrawal in Bürgel’s room because his non-engagement is a release from the 
authorities in a way that Amalia’s never can be. Her self continues to be 
defined by its antagonism towards the Castle; K.’s self hangs free. 
Amalia’s story opens a long account relating to the misfortune afflicting 
the family. It is a rich source of conflicting information about the Castle and, 
judging by his few interjections, K. listens spellbound while Olga talks at 
length about the Castle, without ever revealing a single definitive, authoritative 
fact, for everything she says comes with an eventual disclaimer. K. becomes 
engrossed in the story of how her family is ostracised by the community and 
249 Kuna, p. 177. 
250 Politzer, p. 270. 
251 Goozé, p. 134. 
252 Karoline Krauss, Kafka’s K. versus the Castle (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), p. 94. 
222 
                                           
 apparently (though not ‘officially’) punished for Amalia’s dismissive treatment 
of Sortini. He hears how Olga’s father resorts to increasingly pathetic means to 
attract the attention of the authorities and how he begins to wilt under the 
impossible strain of securing from the Castle an official pardon for an 
‘unofficial’ incident.  
The first person under the microscope, however, is Barnabas and his 
‘scheinbarer Dienst’ as messenger. At one point, Olga seemingly transports K. 
inside the Castle walls on Barnabas’s coat tails, only then to undermine her 
own claims: ‘gewiß, er geht in die Kanzleien, aber sind die Kanzleien das 
eigentliche Schloß?’ (DS 275). The question may be rhetorical, but it sets the 
tone for a long night of reflection for K. 
The role of Barnabas as a Castle employee is unclear, even to himself, so 
the word he brings from the authorities cannot be considered illocutionary, in 
terms of direct, uncomplicated information. His presence can be taken at 
perlocutionary value, however, as it is his existence on the margins of Castle 
life that draws attention to what is missing. Politzer reads Barnabas as a 
‘messenger of hope’, but Klamm’s ambiguous letters, the undelivered 
messages and his unconfirmed status undermine this view.253 Barnabas 
becomes a ‘walking koan’, a living embodiment of the delusions we cling to in 
order to give our lives a semblance of direction and substance. 
Olga describes the uncertainty surrounding the clothes Barnabas wears, 
which are supposed to indicate his work status. He does not have any 
‘Amtskleid’, like certain other senior Castle attendants, but such knowledge is 
not completely encouraging: ‘das ist ein gewisser Trost, könnte man von 
vorherein meinen, aber er ist trügerisch, denn ist Barnabas ein höherer 
Diener?’ (DS 274). Olga’s account raises more questions than it answers and 
253 Politzer, p. 265. 
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 her ability to tie K. in knots continues as he listens approvingly to how she 
has attempted to encourage Barnabas in his role as messenger in the face of 
mounting doubts. Predictably, she then rejects his praise as being misplaced:  
[E]s täuscht Dich, und so täusche ich vielleicht auch ihn. Was hat er 
denn erreicht? In eine Kanzlei darf er eintreten, aber es scheint nicht 
einmal eine Kanzlei, eher ein Vorzimmer der Kanzleien, vielleicht nicht 
einmal das, vielleicht ein Zimmer, wo alle zurückgehalten werden 
sollen, die nicht in die wirklichen Kanzleien dürfen. Mit Klamm spricht 
er, aber ist es Klamm? (DS 285-286) 
These comments offer a particularly rich vein of koans as Olga pours 
doubt on every phenomenon that the senses settle on – in the end we can be 
sure of nothing. The perlocutionary aspects to the mixed messages and signals 
that plague Barnabas’s job are distilled into Olga’s use of the words ‘es 
täuscht Dich’, which recall the chaplain’s last-ditch efforts to open Josef K.’s 
eyes with the parable Vor dem Gesetz.  
In a koan which could stand as a masterpiece on the subject of 
transience, Olga delivers a stunning account of how Klamm seems to 
metamorphose virtually at will. Its perlocutionary effect is shown in K.’s 
reaction (he is ‘betroffen’) – another tripwire to jolt him out of his delusions. 
The description of Klamm would not be out of place if uttered by a Zen master 
trying to shatter the idea of a fixed image of selfhood, subject to the passing of 
time and gradual, if imperceptible, changes:254 
Er soll ganz anders aussehen, wenn er ins Dorf kommt und anders 
wenn er es verläßt, anders ehe er Bier getrunken hat, anders nachher, 
anders im Wachen, anders im Schlafen, anders allein, anders im 
Gespräch und, was hienach verständlich ist, fast grundverschieden 
oben im Schloß. (DS 278) 
254 Politzer draws attention to comments Kafka made in the Blue Octavo Notebooks: ‘Das 
entscheidend Charakteristische dieser Welt ist ihre Vergänglichkeit’ (p. 256). 
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 Klamm may barely have a walk-on part in the novel, in that he is only 
spied sitting in a bar and walking to a sledge, but otherwise he occupies the 
thoughts of the whole village. His name triggers hushed silences and his 
followers cling to souvenirs stolen from his presence. The fact that K.’s case is 
assigned to Klamm could be seen as another perlocutionary act by the Castle, 
because of the impossibility of making contact with him. K. fails to reach him 
at the Herrenhof, but his inability to pin down a man whose appearance seems 
to change by the second is not surprising.  
The name Klamm has different associations in German which can be 
used to support a range of interpretations. In the sense of ‘numb’, it suggests 
a lack of feeling, perhaps indicating that K. needs to take things less 
personally and seriously (which is a mission we later learn was entrusted to 
his assistants). It also evokes the sense of ‘delusion’, which could tell a 
Western reader that K. will find that life is meaningless, or reveals to a 
Buddhist reader that K. is misguided in his quest for meaning.255 This allows 
for ambiguities in the text: does Klamm signify that K. can only find the 
meaning of existence ‘within himself’, or that life has ‘no meaning whatsoever’. 
The Buddhist position sits somewhere between these two poles in that life has 
meaning everywhere inside and outside, but none of it is fixed and reliable, 
and that is where our problem may lie – in our attitude towards it. 
That K. has failed to learn anything from the meeting with the mayor is 
proved as his conversation with Olga develops. She casts doubt on the 
significance of any letters that the Castle might entrust to the young, 
inexperienced, uninitiated Barnabas, but K. dismisses any downgrading of his 
letters from Klamm. He clings to the one favourable interpretation bestowed on 
them, namely their worth as a ‘Privatbrief’: ‘zwar nur eine private und wenig 
255 Bridgwater connects Klamm with the Czech ‘klam’ meaning ‘delusion’. Bridgwater, Kafka’s 
Novels, pp. 228-29. 
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 durchsichtige, aber doch eine große Bedeutung’ (DS 290). Impressed and 
relieved, Olga believes such faith in the letters would encourage Barnabas in 
his job but, barely moments after defending the worthless messages, K. 
launches into a highly ironic piece of advice for her under the circumstances, 
remarking that Olga needs to open her brother’s eyes, not pat him on the 
back: ‘Du kannst jemanden, der die Augen verbunden hat noch so sehr 
aufmuntern, durch das Tuch zu starren, er wird doch niemals etwas sehn; 
erst wenn man ihm das Tuch abnimmt, kann er sehn’ (DS 291). Alternatively, 
seen in retrospect, this conversation with Olga could mark the point at which 
K. starts to open his own eyes.256 
At one point Amalia returns and relates the cautionary tale of a young 
man obsessed with the Castle: ‘ich hörte einmal von einem jungen Mann, der 
beschäftigte sich mit den Gedanken an das Schloß bei Tag und Nacht, alles 
andere vernachlässigte er, man fürchtete für seinen Alltagsverstand, weil sein 
ganzer Verstand oben im Schloß war’ (DS 323-324). Olga wonders who Amalia 
is referring to, but K. suddenly interrupts her speculation. His interjection of 
‘Laß die Deutungen!’ (DS 324) could have been uttered by the chaplain to 
Josef K. Amalia may have touched a nerve, and this indicates perhaps that K. 
is beginning to understand how a reliance on meaningfulness is an ill-advised 
way to lead one’s life. Different interpretations abound and we are free to take 
them or leave them as we please, but fixing ties to them is a path to suffering. 
Despite the warning about a potential loss of ‘Alltagsverstand’, K. cannot 
help drawing similarities between the family’s plight and his, as he grasps for 
a clearer definition of his existence in the village:  
In der Erzählung Olgas eröffnete sich ihm eine so große fast 
unglaubwürdige Welt, daß er es sich nicht versagen konnte mit seinem 
256 This recalls the point of no return that features in Kafka’s Aphorism 5: ‘Von einem gewissen 
Punkt an gibt es keine Rückkehr mehr. Dieser Punkt ist zu erreichen’ (NSF2 114). 
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 kleinen Erlebnis an sie zu rühren, um sich ebenso von ihrem Dasein, 
als auch von dem eigenen deutlicher zu überzeugen. (DS 341) 
The story of Amalia’s rejection of Sortini’s advances offers a parallel to 
K.’s predicament. Olga explains how there was no official complaint about 
Amalia’s angry treatment of Sortini’s messenger, and therefore there was no 
reason for an official pardon. Popular opinion in the village condemned Amalia 
and the family suffered as a consequence, but there was no word on the 
matter from the authorities. This is like the ‘wie Sie wissen’ of Klamm’s private 
letter to K., as it could be argued that the family makes matters worse by 
dwelling on the incident. Indeed, Olga suggests at one point that all they 
would have to do is ride out the storm, show a little remorse and eventually 
their former status would be regained. But Olga’s father is obsessed with 
obtaining an official pardon, so the family embarks on a series of ever more 
desperate methods of attracting the Castle’s attention. Just as K. has found 
out to his own cost, they then find themselves living in a world of ‘Schein’. One 
plan is to seek reconciliation with the offended messenger,257 but given that 
the problem is ‘scheinbar’, the solution will be of a similar nature: ‘Das alles 
konnte ja keine entscheidende Bedeutung haben, war nur Schein’ (DS 346). 
The palpable dissatisfaction with these achievements recall Josef K.’s 
disappointment with Titorelli’s explanation of ‘scheinbare Freisprechung’. 
The tale of Olga’s father and his attempts to get the attentions of the 
Castle bring little respite for K. Olga’s father was unable to establish any 
official condemnation of his family, and hence he had no chance of extracting 
a pardon. He ends up appealing to individual officials, but Olga explains how 
such a mechanism does not exist: ‘Wenn der Vater an einen zuständigen 
Beamten geraten wäre, so kann doch dieser ohne Vorakten nichts erledigen 
257 ‘[W]enn die allgemeine Meinung, sei es auch nur scheinbar, nur von der Botenbeleidigung 
weiß, ließe sich, sei es auch wieder nur scheinbar, alles wiedergutmachen, wenn man den 
Boten versöhnen könnte’ (DS 346). 
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 und insbesondere nicht auf der Landstraße, er kann eben nicht verzeihen, 
sondern nur amtlich erledigen’ (DS 340). The father tries to stop officials in 
passing cars, but can never work out when they will go by or which road they 
will take: ‘jeden Augenblick besteht die Möglichkeit einer Änderung’ (DS 342), 
which sounds like the universal characteristic of impermanence.258 
In a different plan to her father’s, Olga ingratiates herself with the Castle 
attendants, in a bid to get inside the Castle. She achieves ‘eine gewisse 
Verbindung’, but of course in true koan style, ‘eine grosse Verbindung ist es 
nicht’ (DS 350). On the other hand, she learns how it might be possible to 
bypass the otherwise inordinately long process of getting officially hired to 
work in the Castle. But then again, any position gained in such a way has its 
drawbacks: ‘man ist dann zwar nicht öffentlicher Angestellter, sondern nur ein 
heimlich und halb Zugelassener, man hat weder Rechte noch Pflichten’ (DS 
351). Another scheme is to try and get Barnabas, the youngest and most 
innocent (untainted) family member into the Castle, in a bid to clear their 
name. However, ‘jener scheinbare Dienst’ has since yielded just the letters he 
got for K.  
The vain hopes driving K. forward sound uncannily like the deluded 
expectations described by Olga, relating to the impossible task of gaining 
official employment from the Castle. However forlorn, such hopes keep the job 
seeker alive, although in the end this life turns out to be futile: ‘er hofft aber 
doch, wie könnte er sonst leben, aber nach vielen Jahren, vielleicht als Greis 
erfährt er die Ablehnung, erfährt daß alles verloren ist und sein Leben 
vergeblich war’ (DS 352). This long, drawn-out suffering echoes the 
‘Verschleppung’ described by Titorelli, as well as an ending that Kafka had 
258 Bridgwater draws useful parallels between Olga’s father and the man from the country from 
the parable Vor dem Gesetz: both men descend into increasingly ridiculous ways to open a 
dialogue with the respective law-givers. Bridgwater, Kafka’s Novels, p. 323. 
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 once envisaged for K., but it is significant that K. achieves a more effective 
‘wirkliche Freisprechung’ by dint of his decision to let go. 
Olga’s tale of her family’s plight contains many references to existence 
under the Castle and how nobody can expect special treatment. The Castle, as 
supreme power, is of course responsible for everything, but not in the sense 
that it will intervene in the daily troubles of any of its individual subjects on 
demand, so no chance of succour lies there for Olga’s father when his 
business slumps after the Sortini scandal. The following explanation from Olga 
sounds remarkably Buddhist in that it appears to sever any direct link 
between the individual and an overarching authority: 
[S]ollte sich denn das Schloß um alles kümmern? Es kümmerte sich ja 
in Wirklichkeit um alles, aber es konnte doch nicht grob eingreifen in 
die Entwicklung, einfach und zu keinem andern Zweck, als dem 
Interesse eines einzelnen Mannes zu dienen. (DS 335)  
This recalls the teacher’s warning that the Castle cannot be held 
accountable for looking after K. The Castle does not get involved in direct 
action, and is an authority only in the nominal sense, with no judicial or 
punitive powers. The punishment is inflicted by the family on itself, in much 
the same way that Josef K. torments himself by his reaction to the arrest, and 
this illustrates the way in which an unenlightened individual ‘takes ownership’ 
of suffering.259 The Barnabas family’s suffering is real – just as all Kafka’s 
figures ‘really’ suffer – but its perception as punishment is ‘imagined’ because 
they have assumed a causal link between the Castle and Amalia’s dispute with 
Sortini. In other words, for suffering to cease, its ‘ownership’ must cease, and 
this point is the subject of The Third Noble Truth. The Castle, like any other 
authority or power conceived in a Judaeo-Christian framework, has to be 
benign or malign, and the individual will then interpret communications 
259 Krauss talks of the ‘imaginary punishment’ the Barnabas family acts out (p. 27). 
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 accordingly. If the Buddhist line is adopted, the Castle is neither supportive of 
nor hostile towards its village subjects, but is simply indicative of the 
impartial, impersonal ‘truth’ of anicca – all beings fall under the natural law of 
impermanence. 
The Castle and Court do not underwrite laws; they reflect the 
impermanence, not-self and suffering that hold sway across the universe. Just 
as the Buddha was essentially a teacher or guide who knew the truth, the 
authorities are enlightened and know what will lead to suffering and what will 
lead to release from suffering. Because the Castle knows how the world works 
does not mean it controls how it works, but to the untrained eye it can appear 
to hold this power. 
In reality, the Castle cannot appoint K. or pardon the Barnabas family, 
just as the Court cannot exonerate Josef K. The lifestyle options set before 
Josef K. of ‘wirkliche Freisprechung’, ‘scheinbare Freisprechung’ and 
‘Verschleppung’ are just everyday approaches to existence (reflecting insight, 
misguided ignorance and willful ignorance). The same options are picked up in 
Das Schloß, where the paths of ignorance involve a variety of supplications to 
the Castle (or defiance of the Castle, in Amalia’s case), and the insightful 
stance corresponds to the epiphany in Bürgel’s room.  
Throughout this stage in the novel K. has done little more than observe, 
listen and occasionally interject to draw comparisons with his personal plight. 
There is no increased suffering and he has no more setbacks from the Castle, 
yet his eyes have been opened to a network of other lives enduring frustration 
and longing. Much of the information reaching K. is communicated in 
perlocutionary fashion, and it could be argued that K. does not fully receive 
the benefit of the baffling and paradoxical statements about the Castle until he 
is next faced with having to make a decision about how to continue with his 
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 quest – this comes in the meeting with Bürgel, though there are signs 
beforehand that his commitment to the quest is wavering. 
5.2.5 Consequences (action) 
The relatively unaware person stumbles through life making decisions with 
huge implications, but often without recognizing that they have done so. 
Because they don’t recognize they have made choices, they cannot review or 
change them, so they experience life as though it is directed by forces outside 
their control. As a result, they may end up blaming other people – usually an 
authority such as the government – because they are in a situation they don’t 
like and they feel unable to change it.260 
Before the pivotal scene with Bürgel, K. has issues to resolve at home. It would 
appear that the first flickering of enlightenment has filtered through to K. as 
his actions take on a more conciliatory, less aggressive nature. After his first 
bout of reflection (thanks to the mayor, Gardena and the schoolteacher), K. 
stormed off and became embroiled in difficult scenes with Klamm’s sledge and 
protocol. After Olga’s tale, K. deals with Frieda, Jeremias and an official 
summons using a more measured approach.  
K. leaves Olga’s house at a very late hour, mindful that he will struggle to 
explain his absence to Frieda, but he cannot avoid running into one of the 
‘Gehilfen’. K. arms himself with a stick, showing his previously hostile attitude 
to them, but he is surprised to see a very different looking Jeremias waiting for 
him. The sacked assistant is effectively a ‘walking’ koan, for his transformation 
into an old, weary man from a boisterous youngster has happened in hours. 
K. hears how both Jeremias and Artur were sent by Castle official Galater to 
lighten his spirits, as he has a tendency to take things too seriously: ‘Das 
Wichtigste aber ist, daß Ihr ihn ein wenig erheitert’ (DS 367). They have not 
been sent to help K. in his surveying, but are there to lighten K.’s mood. 
Bridgwater suggests that the assistants are sent out to distract K. in a 
260 Nagapriya, p. 47. 
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 ‘diabolical’ sense, to ensure that he would not find the key to the Castle.261 
This sets the Castle in opposition with K., but a Buddhist view would prefer to 
cast the ‘Gehilfen’ as ‘skillful distractors’, in the same way koans undermine 
K.’s pronounced desire for order and rationality. Their assignment could 
indicate a Zen approach to deflating K.’s self-importance.262 The Castle has 
noted that K. is too wrapped up in his quest: ‘Wie man mir berichtet, nimmt er 
alles sehr schwer. Er ist jetzt ins Dorf gekommen und gleich ist ihm das ein 
großes Ereignis, während es doch in Wirklichkeit gar nichts ist. Das sollt Ihr 
ihm beibringen’ (DS 367-368). 
Things start well as the assistants salute him and remind him of happier 
times as a soldier.263 However, K. ends up treating them like belongings and 
criticises Gardena for issuing orders to them: ‘es sind meine Gehilfen, Sie aber 
behandeln sie so, wie wenn es Ihre Gehilfen, aber meine Wächter wären’ (DS 
86). That they are referred to as ‘Wächter’ suggests that it is also their role to 
keep K. ‘awake’, in the sense of not deluded (like Josef K.’s ‘Wächter’). Their 
koan-like antics, however, fail to deflect K. from forming attachments; for 
example, they spend most of the time during the meeting with the mayor 
playing with piles of documents, hinting that perhaps K. should not waste 
much energy taking on the local bureaucracy. When they finally give up their 
job, it is because K. is unable to take a joke: ‘Was haben wir denn getan? Ein 
wenig gescherzt, ein wenig gelacht, ein wenig Deine Braut geneckt’ (DS 367). 
K.’s attitude towards Jeremias changes and he no longer treats his 
former assistant as an annoyance. The damage has already been done, 
however, for Jeremias has stolen Frieda from him (closing the personal route 
to Klamm), and Artur has returned to the Castle to file a complaint (which 
261 Bridgwater, Kafka’s Novels, p. 329. 
262 ‘A positive attitude doesn't mean just thinking good thoughts. It means not getting caught 
up in the seriousness of everything we do, hear, see, feel and relate with.’ Kongtrül, p. 93. 
263 ‘In Erinnerung an seine Militärzeit, an diese glücklichen Zeiten, lachte er’ (DS 31). 
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 blots K.’s official copybook). Nevertheless, it would be wrong to see this 
consequence of K.’s behaviour as karma, in the sense of a deserved 
punishment. It is a Western misconception of the force of karma to see it as 
‘poetic justice’, as if the universe made sure that miscreants would always be 
brought to book for their sins, even if God shirked this responsibility. This 
Westernised notion of karma satisfies the need for a ‘meaningful’ order in the 
world that has a personalised face, as opposed to a natural order that simply 
exists in itself rather than as a safety net to reassure the fragile human ego 
that virtue and goodness will be rewarded. For Buddhists, karma operates 
strictly under the rules of Dependent Origination, which essentially states that 
‘because this happens, that happens’. It is cause-and-effect but without the 
value judgment, a crucial difference which sets Buddhist philosophy apart 
from others. Karma is not the moral police or a spiritual magistrate, 
considering the worth of our lives, but a set of scientific scales weighing up the 
sum total of positive and negative energy that we release into the world. 
Karmic energy turns the wheel of samsara, causes us to be reborn in life after 
life or moment after moment, so the path to nirvana (no more rebirth) is paved 
accordingly with more or fewer karmic stepping stones. If we act without ego, 
without thought of self, our action is free of karmic residue and the wheel of 
life will turn more slowly until it grinds to a halt. The greater our self-ishness 
(and the cardinal karmic sin is anger), the deeper the karmic footprint. So K.’s 
inability to laugh at the ‘Gehilfen’ and their playfulness has resulted in 
negative consequences, but this is not ‘by design’ of the Castle and is 
attributable to K.’s own conduct. 
Barnabas arrives to curtail the discussion with Jeremias, and K. learns 
that he has been summoned to see Erlanger, another of Klamm’s secretaries. 
With his fortunes on the wane, K. jumps this time at the chance of official 
contact with the Castle and hurries off. This chapter shows a subtle thawing 
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 in K.’s attitude which can be detected through both illocutionary and 
perlocutionary communications. The surprising confrontation with a 
transformed Jeremias causes K. to cast away the stick intended to administer 
a beating; the news from Barnabas (no doubt thrilled to have delivered a 
‘proper’ message), generates more enthusiasm in K. than the meeting with 
Momus did, hence K. appears minded to make improvements to his situation 
in terms of both ‘Leben’ and ‘Amt’.  
At the Herrenhof K. rushes through the crowd of waiting villagers to get 
to his appointment, but he then spies Frieda and so he must face the 
consequences of past actions, the neglect of his bride. K. appears genuinely 
concerned to win her back and is able to put the imminent meeting with 
Erlanger out of his mind. This is significant for two reasons, because it shows 
that the old desperation to pursue a way into the Castle has been weakened 
and is easily distracted, and it also suggests that K. has started to become 
more focused and mindful of his actions. The benefit of practising meditation 
is that the grasping, thirsty mind is stilled and equanimity can take hold. The 
mind is an unwieldy beast to tame, but the place to start is the present 
moment, to the exclusion of hopes, fears and desires residing in the past or 
future. K. has spent little time in the present until this stage in the novel, 
when he begins to treat each current situation on its own merits. He tries to 
talk Frieda round and, although he fails, he seems at least to engage with her 
as a person in her own right rather than as a trophy. This increased 
mindfulness is evidenced by the fact that he is standing in a corridor waiting 
to see Erlanger, in what could potentially be an important meeting relating to 
his quest, but his attention is wholly devoted to the issue with Frieda. It is 
only when he realises that he has lost her that he turns his attention to 
Erlanger. 
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 5.2.6 Special law (reflection) 
Dogen said: ‘Directly upon encountering the dharma, we will abandon the law of 
the world.’ In other words, once we discover the true order behind the 
appearance of things, our lives will no longer be dominated by the conventional 
values of society – the seeking to outshine, outrace, outgain.264 
The conditions leading to K.’s impromptu meeting with Bürgel are important 
and pave the way for a skillful outcome, allowing K. to achieve some insight 
and make progress in his life, if not his quest. K. has had a long day in the 
village, starting with the commotion in the schoolroom, through the 
arguments with the assistants, the raised hopes with Hans, the widening 
cracks in the relationship with Frieda and ending with the long conversation 
with Olga. K. is tired and the prospect of meeting with Erlanger (achiever) is 
not enough to sustain any enthusiasm or tap into reserves of energy. He is 
consumed by an overwhelming weariness that seems to signal a willingness to 
abandon all the personal and official connections he has striven to make – in 
Buddhist terms he is on the cusp of The Third Noble Truth, which targets 
cessation of attachments. It is from this rich spiritual soil that the seeds of his 
enlightenment will sprout. In order to counterbalance the view that Kafka is a 
pessimistic writer, there needs to be a discernible element of hope in his work, 
some evidence of a change of attitude or approach, and the philosophical 
transformation about to overcome K. is as spectacular as the physical 
metamorphosis that befalls Gregor Samsa. 
From a Buddhist perspective the Bürgel episode takes on great 
importance as a turning point, for it is here that K. is ostensibly offered a 
solution to the impasse, a means of reigniting his misfiring quest, a way out of 
his struggle. In keeping with the bleak, desolate environment that has 
shrouded K. during his stay in the village, Bürgel’s room appears 
264 Henry Shukman in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/escape-rat-race-0. 
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 ‘unbeschreiblich öde’, but significantly K. leaves the barren room without 
taking up the secretary’s offer. This is the dawning of understanding, for K. 
has at least rejected his old modus operandi: no more clutching at straws as 
he effectively renounces his Castle quest. 
There is much in the Bürgel hearing which points to the passing of an 
‘old’ K. and the emergence of a ‘new’ K. For example, we learn that K. has 
stumbled into a meeting with a ‘Verbindungssekretär’. K. has spent most of 
his time in the village trying to cultivate connections – in other words 
‘attachments’ – with the Castle and now an opportunity presents itself 
legitimately. K. does not even have to force the issue, for on learning that K. is 
a ‘Landvermesser’ without ‘Landvermesserarbeit’ the secretary is ready to take 
up the case: ‘Ich bin bereit […] diese Sache weiter zu verfolgen’ (DS 408). 
Bürgel is concerned whether K. is suffering from this problem, but precisely 
when a helping hand seems to be reaching out towards him, K.’s suffering 
starts to fade away: ‘‘‘Ich leide darunter”, sagte K. langsam und lächelte für 
sich, denn gerade jetzt litt er darunter nicht im geringsten’ (DS 409). 
K. is not impressed with Bürgel’s offer, despite the ‘attachment’ 
secretary’s correct assessment of K.’s situation: ‘Sie scheinen schon einige 
Enttäuschungen gehabt zu haben’ (DS 409). Bürgel goes on to suggest that 
the gap between appearance and reality which has plagued K.’s progress so far 
might not be that great: ‘Ich will nicht untersuchen, wie es sich damit 
eigentlich verhält, vielleicht entspricht der Schein tatsächlich der Wirklichkeit’ 
(DS 410). The opportunities now laid at K.’s door are of startling and attractive 
simplicity, and devoid of all the conditions and provisos that have featured in 
the chances set up by Frieda, Gardena and Barnabas, through marriage, 
protocols and letters: ‘Gelegenheiten bei welchen durch ein Wort, durch einen 
Blick, durch ein Zeichen des Vertrauens mehr erreicht werden kann, als 
durch lebenslange, auszehrende Bemühungen’ (DS 410). None of this, 
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 however, convinces K. In marked opposition with his earlier tendency to turn 
every shred of conversation to his own concerns, K. no longer wants to be the 
centre of attention: ‘er hatte jetzt eine große Abneigung gegen alle Dinge, die 
ihn betrafen’ (DS 410). 
Bürgel goes into a long description of the circumstances which must 
prevail if a ‘kleines und geschicktes Körnchen’ can slip through the net and a 
request can be granted. The fact that he outlines point by point the exact 
position in which K. finds himself is lost on K., because he is overcome by 
drowsiness. It is not just ironic that K. dozes through the chance of a lifetime, 
but ultimately salutary. Sleep comes to K.’s rescue here, rather than trips him 
up, or from a Zen viewpoint rescues him by tripping him up. The sleep which 
comes to K.’s aid is completely unlike his ruse ‘den Schlafenden zu spielen’ 
which he tried on arrival in the village. It is also unlike the sleep which 
enveloped him at Lasemann’s when he woke up to find himself slumped on 
somebody’s shoulder. What fills K. in Bürgel’s office is not so much sleep as a 
lucid release from the strains of his quest: ‘K. schlief, es war zwar kein 
eigentlicher Schlaf, er hörte Bürgels Worte vielleicht besser als während des 
frühern totmüden Wachens, Wort für Wort schlug an sein Ohr, aber das 
lästige Bewußtsein war geschwunden, er fühlte sich frei’ (DS 415).265 The loss 
of his ‘self’ consciousness results in freedom, a view which would appeal to 
Buddhist sensibilities.266 
Karoline Krauss picks up on the motif of tiredness in Das Schloß and 
suggests that it is related to ‘the failure of communication’267 and marks K.’s 
265 Bridgwater describes K.’s oncoming sleep as a ‘fading of the consciousness that he has 
been finding so irksome’, in Kafka’s Novels, p. 341. This amounts to a fading of attachment. 
266 K.’s sleep has a clear-sighted, meditative quality: ‘Anything connected with goals involves a 
journey toward somewhere from somewhere. In mindfulness practice there is no goal, no 
journey; you are just mindful of what is happening there.’ Trungpa, The Myth of Freedom, p. 53. 
267 Krauss, p. 55. 
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 ‘abandonment of the quest for absolutes’.268 But ‘failure’ is a negatively 
charged word and a ‘skillful’ Buddhist reading would take the view that K. is 
ready to abandon attachment to self, and his weariness is the precursor to 
cessation.269  
K.’s sleepy withdrawal from the quest is a triumph, not a defeat: ‘Und es 
war ihm, als sei ihm damit ein großer Sieg gelungen’ (DS 415). There is a 
dream sequence where a naked Bürgel struggles to cover his embarrassment, 
‘seine Blößen zu decken’ (DS 416). The fact that the ‘attachment’ secretary is 
exposed suggests that his offer of assistance is bogus (or ‘empty’ to use a 
Buddhist term), which amuses K.: ‘K. lächelte darüber sanft im Schlaf, wie der 
Sekretär aus seiner stolzen Haltung durch K.’s Vorstöße immer aufgeschreckt 
wurde’ (DS 415-416). As the dream unfolds, K. leaves Bürgel behind and 
moves into a great room, ready to meet whatever opponent should challenge 
him. But there is nobody to oppose K., no audience to watch and a shattered 
Champagne glass on the ground, perhaps signifying that K. has now 
progressed to a realm beyond victory and defeat: ‘K. war allein in einem 
großen Raum, kampfbereit drehte er sich herum und suchte den Gegner, es 
war aber niemand mehr da’ (DS 416). This is also very close to Buddhist ideas, 
as the lack of ‘other’ suggests an end to dualistic thinking. 
K. sinks deeper and deeper into sleep, and nods smilingly at Bürgel as he 
is filled with a sense of enlightenment, freed from the struggle that has 
consumed him: ‘zwischen den zuständigen Sekretären auf der einen Seite und 
den unzuständigen auf der andern und angesichts der Masse der voll 
beschäftigten Parteien würde er in tiefen Schlaf sinken und auf diese Weise 
allem entgehn’ (DS 419). As Bürgel’s increasingly impassioned account of how 
268 Krauss, p. 62. 
269 Thomas Cleary discusses the link between giving up attachment and achieving perfect 
insight in his study of the Buddhist scriptures known as the Prajnaparamita (perfection of 
wisdom): ‘By virtue of nonattachment to everything, you should have perfect insight’ (p. 17). 
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 to pierce the Castle’s defences reaches a crescendo, K. is as removed, or 
disengaged, as possible from this erstwhile craving. Bürgel’s concluding 
remark tells K. that any interested party merely has to ask in order to get: 
‘ihre Bitte irgendwie vorzubringen, für welche die Erfüllung schon bereit ist’ 
(DS 424). But K. is now free of such concerns: ‘Mehr hörte K. nicht, er schlief, 
abgeschlossen gegen alles was geschah’ (DS 424). Kuna takes the dark view 
that ‘sleep is a brother of death’, suggesting a grim fate for K.270 Alternatively, 
sleep can be seen as a source of regeneration, a relaxation of attachments and 
therefore a brother of meditation. 
K.’s failure to take up Bürgel’s offer can be read on one level as ironic, in 
that K. was just too tired from all his efforts to grasp the opportunity. This 
would be a very pessimistic view, for it assumes firstly that the offer is genuine 
and secondly that the one-in-a-million chance has now slipped away, 
condemning K. to further struggles down in the village, out of reach of the 
Castle for good. The more hopeful (Buddhist) stance would see K. 
subconsciously reject Bürgel’s offer, in a newfound understanding that the 
offer is spurious: it is one more false dawn and Bürgel cannot actually deliver 
(just wait for the subsequent equivocations and qualifications), or K. has 
finally realised that what he is seeking is itself ultimately a delusion and the 
recipe for discontent. In other words, perhaps he sees, with real insight, that 
the quest to gain existential assurances is in itself flawed, doomed to failure 
and perpetual dissatisfaction. Post-Bürgel, K. disengages himself from the 
quest, never again referring to the Castle or Klamm as goals to acquire, and 
this disinclination has significant Buddhist characteristics: ‘Disenchantment 
is an important step on the way to enlightenment […] which starts with the 
acknowledgment of our own suffering.’271 His focus is trained instead on his 
270 Kuna, p. 138. 
271 Khema, p. 108. 
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 fellow villagers and for the first time he listens to their stories (Pepi, the 
‘Wirtin’) without mixing in his own obsessions and shifting the conversation to 
his own agenda. 
There has been some debate as to whether Bürgel should be considered a 
positive or a negative figure. Politzer classifies him as an ‘Information Giver’, 
specifically ‘the most sophisticated in the long line of Kafka’s doorkeepers’ who 
are there to point the way for frustrated heroes.272 Bürgel tries to enlighten K. 
and in reply to ‘the salvation Bürgel offers him, K. succumbs to sleep’.273 Kuna 
takes the view that K. does not miss anything but makes a conscious decision 
to refuse Bürgel’s ‘mystical union’.274 The only other option for K. would be 
‘tantamount to giving in to death’, and K.’s triumphant dream is then nothing 
more than a caricature with no way of ‘bypassing the problem altogether’.275 
This seems excessively negative for it is just such a ‘bypass of suffering’ that is 
offered through mindfulness and the way of detachment. 
The end of the novel, however, does not arrive with this missed chance in 
Bürgel’s room, but two chapters later, and this suggests that the Bürgel scene 
does not denote a definitive failure. From a Buddhist point of view, there are 
two possible alternatives. First, Bürgel is not an Information-Giver, in the 
mould of the chaplain, but a deceiver (‘fremde Hilfe’) such as Huld or Titorelli. 
He holds out unreasonable hopes and thus K. is right to ignore him. On the 
other hand, Bürgel is indeed an Information-Giver, but of the Zen variety in 
that he speaks in paradoxes and through koans, an ironic ‘secretary for 
attachments’. He offers impossible solutions which bewilder and lead to 
weariness, hence K.’s refusal. Read in this way, Bürgel is successful in 
272 Politzer, p. 257. 
273 Ibid., p. 255. 
274 Kuna, p. 163. 
275 Ibid., p. 164. 
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 stimulating a response of non-attachment in K., an ostensibly ‘irrational’ 
refusal of an easy (but perhaps illusory) answer to his problems. 
Although K. rejects Bürgel, he does not concede defeat or withdraw from 
the village.276 On the contrary, the remaining chapters suggest better social 
integration, an encouraging sign also noted by Krauss, for whom K. is 
transformed into a valued member of the community.277 She goes so far as to 
say that K. ‘renounces his role as land-surveyor’ during the Bürgel scene and 
never mentions it again, thus signifying a development in his subjectivity and 
independence.278 In fact, K. does talk about land-surveying to the ‘Wirtin’ in 
the final scene, but she gets bored listening to his description, which suggests 
that K. offers a detailed technical account of his role. Thus it could be said 
that K.’s metamorphosis is not about greater subjectivity but about increased 
mindfulness, as he abandons his metaphysical quest and knuckles down to 
ordinary village life. 
5.2.7 Letting go (action) 
Student: I have nothing.  
Master: Then throw it away.279 
The most convincing evidence of K.’s burgeoning enlightenment comes post-
Bürgel, as the final part of the novel sees K. acting in a more ‘skillful’ way. His 
interactions with officialdom (Erlanger), the quest (the stray document), a 
potential helper (Pepi) and a disinterested villager (‘die Wirtin’) show the extent 
of his new attitude. 
As if to underline the significance of refusing help from Bürgel, K. 
staggers out of the meeting with the ‘attachment’ secretary and falls straight 
276 Bridgwater sees this differently: K.’s inability to respond to Bürgel is tragic and his defeat 
‘has been seized from the jaws of potential victory’. Bridgwater, Kafka’s Novels, p. 344. 
277 Krauss, p. 87. 
278 Ibid., p. 64. 
279 Timothy Freke in Titmuss, p. 181. 
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 into an appointment with the ‘achievement’ secretary, Erlanger. K. is asked to 
help with the reinstatement of Frieda, and his assistance could have benefits 
for his quest: ‘Ich tue schon viel mehr als nötig ist, wenn ich erwähne, daß, 
wenn Sie sich in dieser Kleinigkeit bewähren, Ihnen dies in Ihrem 
Fortkommen gelegentlich nützlich sein kann’ (DS 428). The idea of ‘achieving’ 
through ‘Erlanger’ is highly ironic and on a par with getting ‘guarantees’ 
through Bürgel. By this time, however, K. is starting to see the light and has 
realised the ‘Nutzlosigkeit aller seiner Bestrebungen’ (DS 429).  
K.’s brief appointment with Erlanger also offers a little cameo on the 
subject of change. The subject of the meeting is how Klamm’s ‘Behagen’ could 
be impaired by the slightest new detail in his routine. Frieda leaves her 
barmaid duties on account of K., and Pepi takes her place. Hence, the 
unexpected arrival of a new serving girl’s hand on Klamm’s beer glass could 
have untold consequences: ‘jede belanglose Veränderung der belanglosesten 
Dinge [kann] ernstlich stören’ (DS 427-428). 
The episode with Erlanger ‘achieves’ koan status in three ways: first, 
there is the nonsense of the all-powerful authorities (which record every 
minute detail of village life in protocols) not knowing that Frieda is already 
back in the tap-room. Second, there is the notion contained at the heart of 
Erlanger’s request, that Klamm ‘might’ be upset or inconvenienced by a 
different serving girl bringing his beer. Of course, it is unlikely that Klamm 
would even notice such a trivial matter, but his minions strive to cover every 
eventuality, an impossible task which recalls Josef K.’s vain attempts to prove 
his innocence in an exhaustive account of his life. The third twist to the 
request is the risibly vague and insubstantial offer of hope dangled before K., 
when he has just turned down Bürgel’s key to the Castle’s inner sanctum. The 
juxtaposition of the offers from Erlanger and Bürgel reveal the intrinsic 
emptiness of attachment to any worldly phenomena. Given the universal 
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 characteristic of impermanence (Erlanger’s ‘jede belanglose Veränderung’), the 
outcome of all self-fuelled desires is inevitably suffering, and hence the 
cessation of craving should extinguish suffering. 
The scene with the ‘Diener’ distributing files is as significant as the 
Bürgel scene because it shows that K. has rejected the path of attachments 
through enlightened choice, not tired resignation. Without this crucial moment 
of evidence, it would be possible to construe K.’s abandoned quest as a 
capitulation rather than conversion, but in fact his shift in attitude is salutary. 
Standing in the corridor observing the attendants distributing files to officials, 
K. has softened his sceptical, antagonistic stance towards officialdom: ‘K. 
betrachtete das alles nicht nur mit Neugier, sondern auch mit Teilnahme. Er 
fühlte sich fast wohl inmitten des Getriebes’ (DS 432). This view contrasts with 
the horror that gripped K. at the thought of being forced into ‘Arbeitersein’ and 
its constricting duties and responsibilities: ‘die Gewalt der entmutigenden 
Umgebung, der Gewöhnung an Enttäuschungen, die Gewalt der unmerklichen 
Einflüsse jedes Augenblicks, die fürchtete er allerdings’ (DS 43). 
K. suffers from tiredness throughout the scenes with Bürgel and 
Erlanger, but he realises that his exhaustion is different to that displayed by 
the officials. K.’s weariness stems from his aimless struggling, but the 
tiredness of the Castle employees exudes a sense of satisfaction: ‘Hier war es 
wohl die Müdigkeit inmitten glücklicher Arbeit, etwas was nach außenhin wie 
Müdigkeit aussah und eigentlich unzerstörbare Ruhe, unzerstörbarer Frieden 
war’ (DS 430). It is also tempting to remember the only work K. does in the 
novel, on the first morning in the school when his diligence and improved 
attitude pass the time and help reconcile with the teacher. 
The transformation is complete when K. witnesses a stray document 
being torn up. Unsure in which file and to which official the paper should go, 
one of the attendants simply destroys it. It crosses K.’s mind that the 
243 
 document could be related to his own case. But whereas the earlier K. would 
have seen injustice and conspiracy, ‘new’ K. is prepared to pardon the 
irregularity, and even goes so far as to think that perhaps it was just his view 
of the event that was skewed: ‘Es war wohl die erste Unregelmäßigkeit, die K. 
hier im Bureaubetrieb gesehen hatte, allerdings war es möglich, daß er auch 
sie unrichtig verstand. Und selbst wenn es eine Unregelmäßigkeit war, war sie 
zu verzeihen’ (DS 439). This is indeed a stunning change in attitude, which 
sees K. echo the mayor’s view that it is impossible to know if the Castle’s 
apparent mistakes really are mistakes.  
This scene would trouble readers from a Judaeo-Christian perspective 
because the lost document will never be recovered, an unfilled gap.280 This 
view, however, bases meaning on the need for a firm foundation and the 
meaninglessness of the Castle is a given, as all phenomena are characterised 
by it. The difficulty is managing transience, and this is best done through 
detachment and mindfulness, as K. has started to do. A more sinister 
interpretation would see a Castle conspiracy, aimed at thwarting K.’s 
progress.281 But this does not tally with K.’s upbeat outlook after the scene; if 
anything, the ‘Diener’ are serving up another koan as they literally shred K.’s 
attachment to the Castle and allow him to move on in life. 
K. is eventually frogmarched away from the hallway and rebuked by the 
landlord for trespassing in such a sensitive area. However, the landlord is 
unaware of the change that has come over K., who calmly and politely explains 
he has just been to a couple of hearings, regrets the intrusion and accepts full 
blame for the incident: ‘Die Erwähnung der beiden Verhöre, gar jenes von 
280 For Krauss, the distribution of files reveals the ‘ultimate uselessness and meaninglessness 
of the Castle’ (p. 72). 
281 Kuna suggests the servant tears up the stray document to exact the ‘Castle’s revenge for 
K.’s unwarranted intrusion’ (p. 168). 
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 Erlanger, und der Respekt, mit welchem K. von den Herren sprach, stimmten 
ihm den Wirt günstig’ (DS 449). 
So what has caused this metamorphosis in K.? There appears to have 
been some kind of awakening from slumber, as if he has emerged at last from 
a great fog of ignorance and delusion. The last chapter of the novel begins with 
the words ‘als K. erwachte’ and it may not be too farfetched to suggest that 
K.’s sleepy impromptu hearing with Bürgel brings down the curtain on ‘old’ 
K.’s life and enables a new K. to step on to the stage. His emergence from sleep 
can be seen as a fresh start in the village, which contrasts starkly with his 
initial arrival: K.’s ‘groundhog days’ are behind him. 
The evidence of K.’s untying of ties, of his systematic cessation of 
attachments, shines through in the two final scenes of the novel, when K.’s 
interaction with other village figures is portrayed. First, he talks with Pepi and 
considers her individual situation by drawing on his personal experience, and 
second he enters into an exchange with the ‘Wirtin’, which is not predicated on 
his personal designs on the Castle. 
After listening to Pepi’s laments about her failed stint in the taproom, K. 
delivers a thoughtful speech about her ill-advised actions and extends the 
criticism to himself. He bookends his words with an important declaration, in 
Buddhist terms: ‘Ich weiß nicht, ob es so ist’ (DS 484/485). Zen master Seung 
Sahn based his teaching on ‘don’t-know-mind’, because he maintained that 
knowledge is one of the last refuges of the self, a safe haven in which we cling 
to our identity. For Krauss these statements point to a key passage in the 
novel because K. admits to lacking ‘objective proof’ and prefers to focus on a 
‘genuine desire for sincere self-determination’.282  
282 Krauss, p. 82. 
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 K. appears to have achieved some measure of understanding about the 
misguidedness of his quest, so he is able to analyse Pepi’s complaints and 
conclude that she is the one who is suffering from self-deception. He explains 
that she simply was not up to the job, and it may not be coincidence that for 
the first time in the novel the term ‘Einsicht’ is coupled with K. in a positive 
manner, suggesting his eyes have opened: ‘Wie klar muß diese Nichteignung 
sein, wenn sogar ich, der Deiner Meinung nach Unwissendste das einsehe’ (DS 
481). Pepi sees only ‘einen Schimmer der Wahrheit’ (DS 480), so now it is K. 
who can rebuke somebody else for their ignorance. 
In a less ‘intentional’ manner, but still with effects reverberating out 
towards other people, K.’s wooing and losing of Frieda cause Pepi first to 
become the new barmaid at the Herrenhof and then to lose her position: ‘Und 
was war daran schuld? K. vor allem’ (DS 455). As well as blaming an 
unsuspecting K., Pepi also blames her youth and inexperience, beyond which 
she cannot expect to progress: ‘sie kenne trotz ihrer Jugend das Leben und ihr 
Unglück sei nur eine Bestätigung ihrer Kenntnisse’ (DS 479). It is at this point 
that a ‘new’ K. shows his hand, as he reveals a level of perception not 
previously apparent before his meeting with Bürgel. K. squarely lays the blame 
at Pepi’s delusions and comes up with an uncharacteristically mature 
assessment of the situation: ‘Du willst immerfort betrogen worden sein, weil 
Dir das schmeichelt und weil es Dich rührt. Die Wahrheit aber ist, daß Du für 
diese Stelle nicht geeignet bist’ (DS 481). This transformation suggests that K. 
has started the process of dissolving his attachments and developing a fresh 
outlook.283 
New ‘enlightened’ K. does not only have words of advice for Pepi: he is 
self-aware enough to include his own behaviour in the criticism. It is not that 
283 Ronald Gray similarly sees the value of K.’s conversation with Pepi because the erstwhile 
headstrong land surveyor appears ‘remarkably calm and sane’, suggesting ‘liberation of some 
sort’ (p. 169). 
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 a defeatist K. has thrown in the towel and yielded to an invincible Castle. He 
now seems able to grasp the idea that the nature of his struggle was deluded:  
Ich weiß nicht ob es so ist, auch ist mir meine Schuld gar nicht klar, 
nur wenn ich mich mit Dir vergleiche, taucht mir etwas derartiges auf; 
so als ob wir uns beide zu sehr, zu lärmend, zu kindisch, zu 
unerfahren bemüht hätten. (DS 484)  
In an interesting parallel, a similar comment is made by Josef K. in Der 
Proceß, when in a rare moment of insight he reflects that he may well have 
gone about his life in the wrong way, grasping (attaching himself to) his world 
‘mit zwanzig Händen’ (DP 308). These contrasting self-evaluations are clear 
evidence that K. has learnt from his experience and had time to adapt, in a 
way that his forerunner ultimately was not able to. 
In the concluding scene, K. comes across as an independent individual, 
no longer buffeted by the vagaries of official approval. Fittingly, he shares the 
stage with the ‘Wirtin’, with whom he has had no specific dealings and from 
whom he can seek no favour, hence they can begin a relationship with a clean 
slate. In his earlier ‘Verbindungen’ in the village, the initial clean slate has 
always been quickly sullied by desires of help (‘fremde Hilfe’) to progress his 
cause. 
When the landlady asks what he does, she gets a simple one-word 
answer: ‘Landvermesser’. K. does not launch into a diatribe about the Castle 
or explore the nuances of whether his role is ‘scheinbar’, ‘wirklich’ or ‘amtlich’. 
K. accepts the role of land surveyor and when the ‘Wirtin’ asks what that job 
entails, his description just raises a yawn. Significantly, we are not given the 
details of the description, because the working practices of a surveyor do not 
define a person, merely add a few brushstrokes to their appearance.  
K. shows that he now understands that to accept he is the land surveyor 
– official or not – is just a convenient means of establishing a temporary, non-
grasping hold on who and what he is. Similarly, the job of being a landlady 
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 does not tell the whole story about the person: ‘Ich weiß nicht, was Du sonst 
noch bist. Ich sehe nur daß Du eine Wirtin bist und außerdem Kleider trägst, 
die nicht für eine Wirtin passen und wie sie auch sonst meines Wissens 
niemand hier im Dorfe trägt’ (DS 492).  
Among K.’s last words in the novel the term ‘Ziel’ crops up again, but this 
time the quest belongs to the landlady: ‘ich sagte ja, daß Du nicht nur Wirtin 
bist, Du zielst auf etwas anderes ab’ (DS 494). At last, K. is beginning to see 
clearly and he scores a direct hit with his observation, so much so that the 
landlady is keen to invite him back to see her. K. is now setting the koans to 
test others, which shows how far he has progressed since his early exchanges 
in the community. 
K.’s week in the village feels longer than Josef K.’s year in Der Proceß, but 
this may be attributable to the varied fronts on which K. was fighting and the 
intake of information, both illocutionary and perlocutionary, that enables him 
to develop as a figure. Josef K. protested his innocence from start to finish, 
with barely a flicker of readjustment in his attitude, despite all the messages 
that were delivered to him, directly and indirectly. His case could have lasted 
twenty years and he would still have failed to register any increased awareness 
of his condition (like Kaufmann Block perhaps). K., on the other hand, though 
in a somewhat different predicament, is constantly re-evaluating his position 
and trying new approaches, which accelerates the passage of time. His wealth 
of experience, both anecdotal (via the lives of other villagers) and personal (via 
his repeated failures) contributes significantly to conquering his ignorance and 
setting him on the path to enlightenment.  
5.3 Sleepwalking into suffering 
The work of Buddhism is to awaken, to come out of the sleepy dreams and 
notions of reality that we hold to be true and replace them with a direct 
experience of what is more accurately occurring. To awaken in this way, we 
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 need to become conscious of what’s actually going on at the very depths of our 
experience.284 
For much of the novel, K. is oblivious to the wider implications of his actions 
as he trawls the village looking for a way into the Castle. His self-centred 
tenacity marks him out as another sleepwalker, a little too self-absorbed to 
notice he is heading for a fall. But where Josef K.’s dream ends in a 
nightmare, K. wakes up from his bubble of self-importance and finds himself 
surrounded by ‘real’ people with lives of their own. He begins to treat them as 
individuals in their own right, a mark of his awakened outlook.  
K.’s self-ishness is the primary feature of his actions throughout the text. 
Attachment (to self) is the cause of suffering, and there is ample evidence of 
K.’s tendency to weave concerns regarding his self into whatever issues are 
being discussed. He cannot listen for long to Gardena’s account of her 
relationship with Klamm without alluding to his own situation: ‘Die Wirtin 
fand es ungebührlich daß sich K. mit seinen Angelegenheiten hier einmischen 
wollte’ (DS 127). K. makes no excuses for leading the story towards his 
personal concerns: ‘ich [muß] bei Klamms Erwähnung immer auch an mich 
denken, das ist nicht zu ändern’ (DS 127-128). Gardena resumes the story of 
her younger days, but it isn’t long before K.’s comments return to matters 
closer to home, as he wonders why she did not ask Klamm about her fall from 
favour: ‘So wären wir also wieder bei Ihnen’ (DS 136). 
In his self-centredness, K. sees links to himself in even the smallest 
details. After his unsuccessful attempt at catching Klamm in his sledge K. 
returns to the inn, but no sooner has he left the scene of his empty triumph 
than Klamm slips out and departs. Momus remarks how Klamm had glanced 
around nervously and K.’s self-preoccupied interpretation is that the official 
284 Will Johnson in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/awakening-direct-experience. 
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 may have been looking for him: ‘Vielleicht hat er mich gesucht’ (DS 173). The 
audacity and farfetchedness of such a claim make everyone laugh. 
Another problem area is K.’s general ignorance. This lack of insight is 
exacerbated by a lack of concentration and mindfulness, in Buddhist eyes key 
attributes for any person seeking the truth. It is foolhardy to declare a goal 
and pursue it blindly and doggedly, regardless of the new circumstances and 
conditions which will invariably arise in a universe characterised by 
impermanence. K. is so fixated on his goal, that he overlooks the means to 
reach it. He stumbles over details, interpretations, assumptions and loses his 
way, because keeping the Castle in his sights is more important than watching 
the road he is travelling on.  
It is not just the Castle hierarchy that tests K.’s powers of focus and 
understanding, because he also falls prey to misinterpretations when dealing 
with the villagers. Gardena gives K. a torrid time in this respect as he 
repeatedly misconstrues what she says, as well as what she doesn’t say. At 
one point his request for permission to ask her a question is met with silence, 
which he mistakenly takes as a refusal: ‘Sie mißdeuten alles, auch das 
Schweigen. Sie können eben nicht anders. Ich erlaube Ihnen zu fragen’ (DS 
129). K. fares little better when Gardena struggles to explain to him how 
cooperating with Momus in compiling the protocol might just lead to some 
kind of link with Klamm. K., however, ‘twists her words’ when he asks Momus 
to confirm that a mention in the report would secure him an audience with the 
official: ‘So ist er immer, Herr Sekretär, so ist er immer. Fälscht die Auskünfte, 
die man ihm gibt, und behauptet dann, falsche Auskünfte bekommen zu 
haben’ (DS 180). 
K. arrives in the village in a state of ignorance and, until the Bürgel 
episode, makes no steps towards enlightenment despite covering a lot of 
ground. In a Buddhist sense, K. errs because he expends all his energy in 
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 trying to ‘know’ the unknowable and grasp the ungraspable. He demands 
recognition and security from the powers that be, but in a world of flux, not-
self and impermanence, no such guarantees exist.  
Gardena dismisses K. as ‘entsetzlich unwissend’ (DS 90), but in spite of 
this criticism K. boasts of his ignorance because it emboldens him to venture 
further than he otherwise would: ‘es hat doch auch den Vorteil, daß der 
Unwissende mehr wagt und deshalb will ich die Unwissenheit und ihre gewiß 
schlimmen Folgen gerne noch ein Weilchen tragen’ (DS 91). Ignorance of 
things not worth knowing is not a disadvantage, and may be beneficial if it 
means our mind is uncluttered with useless facts. But K. wears his ignorance 
like a shield, as if it will protect him from harm and enable him to progress 
untroubled to his goal. 
K. suffers from the results of his ignorance and cravings, but he also 
causes suffering for others through his ill-considered actions. This is 
exemplified by Barnabas and his fragile disposition as a barely-recognised 
messenger. At one point, K. makes plain his dissatisfaction with Barnabas’s 
achievements, but he only learns later from Olga of the detrimental effect his 
criticism has had on the messenger’s fragile sense of self: ‘Diese Worte haben 
ihn um den Schlaf gebracht’ (DS 276). After his meeting with the mayor, K. 
returns to the inn to find out that the otherwise fearsome, confident Gardena 
has taken to her bed because she was afraid K. was going to trouble Klamm. 
K.’s attitude towards relationships is indicative of his acquisitive nature – 
friendships are connections to be gained, support to be accumulated and filed 
as ‘achieved’ (past) rather than nurtured in the present. On his first outing in 
the village K. tries and fails to make friends with the teacher. He experiences 
the need to make new acquaintances, but that just aggravates the situation: 
‘Es zog ihn unwiderstehlich hin, neue Bekanntschaften zu suchen, aber jede 
neue Bekanntschaft verstärkte die Müdigkeit’ (DS 20-21). The term ‘müde’ 
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 appears regularly at points where K. tries to make ‘connections’, and the signs 
of tiredness suggest an inkling of the futility of pursuing attachments – it 
foreshadows the low point of his tenacity in Bürgel’s room. 
During his initial foray into the village when he meets the schoolteacher 
with his class, K. is ‘verblüfft’ when his apparently simple question whether 
the teacher knows anything about the Castle is rebuffed with a reply in French 
to protect the ears of innocent children. Already something is amiss: ‘K. aber 
war zerstreut, durch das Gespräch verärgert. Zum erstenmal seit seinem 
Kommen fühlte er wirkliche Müdigkeit’ (DS 20). 
The terms ‘verblüfft’ and ‘zerstreut’ indicate classic responses to a Zen 
koan and the teacher’s sudden switch into French is enough to annoy K. 
Further investigation offers some insight into the teacher’s behaviour for K.’s 
question to him related to knowledge of the Castle or Count, the supreme 
authority. A Zen master posing the question ‘Who is the Buddha’ received the 
famous answer ‘Three pounds of flax’, which sounds nonsensical but actually 
qualifies as a very adept way of countering a pointless query.285 The Buddha’s 
person, background or knowledge is ultimately irrelevant to the seeker of 
enlightenment, who must chart his own path. The teacher’s French seems an 
equally odd way of deflecting what is to his mind a pointless question. 
Bridgwater picks up on K.’s distractibility (a trait evident in Josef K. too) 
and interprets it as ‘the measure of his moral irresponsibility’.286 However, 
another view is possible which takes it as the characteristic of a mind out of 
control, a self which is slave to its many and varied desires. K. is powerless to 
focus, to become ‘mindful’, because he can never dwell on the task in hand 
and always maintains reference points with past and future. To paraphrase 
285 ‘A monk asked Tozan, “What is Buddha?” Tozan replied, “Masagin!” [three pounds of flax]’. 
Case 12 from the Mumonkan (The Gateless Gate), in Two Zen Classics, p. 179. 
286 Bridgwater, Kafka’s Novels, p. 222. 
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 the advice of the chaplain in Der Proceß, K. cannot see two steps in front of 
him, but in fact is always busy plotting a pathway ten steps ahead, instead of 
considering where he is standing in the present. 
In the final analysis, K. starts off as an obsessive character whose self-
centredness causes his ignorance about the world (Castle) to become 
entrenched, and until the Bürgel scene he struggles to achieve any kind of 
‘Überblick’. Pre-Bürgel, K. cuts an ungracious and suspicious figure as he only 
sees what he wants to see and chooses to overlook everything else. His 
assistants, for example, look very alike but K. cannot be bothered to 
distinguish between them, even though everybody else can manage it: ‘Ich 
sehe nur mit meinen Augen’ (DS 33). He barely considers them people in their 
own right, and he is dismissive of the unpleasantness that attitude may cause 
them.  
K.’s rigidity and inability to adjust to change are at the heart of his 
profound discontent with the life on offer in the village. With tacit permission 
to stay as ‘self-appointed’ land surveyor, K.’s situation is comfortable, but he 
can only accept as ideal the scenario which he has set himself. After a series of 
perlocutionary awakenings, he is able to recognise that satisfaction with his 
situation will be facilitated by dissolving attachments. 
5.4 Conclusion 
There are two ways to take care of your life. You can develop yourself as an 
artist, or you can forget yourself and devote your life to art. That’s a big 
difference. The first is to enslave yourself in your ego. It feels good for a while, 
but it doesn’t last for long. This is to become a host for the guest. The second 
way is to become a host for the host. You must turn your ego into fuel and burn 
your life for the benefit of all beings. You will become a kind of fool. But this is 
the way to find peace.287 
287 Dainin Katagiri in Titmuss, p. 265. 
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 Unlike his fellow protagonists in other stories, the K. of Das Schloß is not 
tortured or executed: he neither drowns nor rots away, indeed he does not die. 
K.’s concerted efforts to gain access to the Castle simply melt away after his 
meeting with Bürgel and the novel ends with him taking part in everyday talk 
with the landlady of the Herrenhof. Whether or not the novel was unfinished or 
even unfinishable, it is noteworthy that K. shows signs of adjustment to a new 
life beyond the Castle-quest. For Cixous, ‘Kafka’s strongest writings are those 
that are unfinished, that he was only beginning, over and over again’, and in 
this sense the novel’s indeterminate conclusion leaves K.’s situation open.288  
K.’s quest is characterised by conflicting references to freedom and 
belonging, painting the picture of a man who is ultimately confused or deluded 
as to what he wants. At the beginning of the novel, K. reveals this inner 
dichotomy to the Bridge Inn landlord, unsure as to whether life within the 
Castle walls might not be too oppressive: ‘Sollte ich z. B. hier unten arbeiten, 
dann wird es auch vernünftiger sein, hier unten zu wohnen. Auch fürchte ich, 
daß mir das Leben oben im Schloß nicht zusagen würde. Ich will immer frei 
sein’ (DS 14). Before his quest has properly begun, K.’s ability to formulate 
such a thought suggests that the seeds of enlightenment are present in his 
mind. Josef K. did not have moments of lucidity (except on the way to his 
execution) and so this early expression of dualistic suffering marks out K. as a 
potential learner. This nascent awareness is not triggered until he meets 
Bürgel and realises that his twin desires of official sanction and personal 
liberty are illusory.  
For those expecting a ‘big’ ending to the novel, the last chapter seems to 
just peter out into a mundane parochiality. There are no fireworks in a 
showdown with the authorities and a distinct lack of blood. The ‘damp squib’ 
288 Cixous, p. 2. 
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 that is provided by a discussion of the landlady’s wardrobe feels like a feeble, 
inconclusive or contradictory finale to the Castle quest, after all K.’s earlier 
efforts. His situation seems unstable, his achievements undefined. In short, it 
is difficult to ascribe a positive ‘meaning’ to the novel, and hence the ending 
gives rise to negative interpretations. 
Kuna feels the work is ‘oriented towards the theme of death’,289 and sums 
up the paradoxical message of the novel as ‘To strive and not to strive’ 
(author’s italics).290 Though K. does not die, his survival reflects a ‘hard-won 
acceptance of the primary condition of human existence: its inevitable end in 
death’, which fits in with Kuna’s overall idea of literature as corrective 
punishment.291  
K.’s survival in itself sets him apart from Kafka’s previous characters, but 
his apparent lack of engagement or ‘fighting spirit’ sits uneasily with 
philosophies based on self-fulfilment. For Erich Heller, the inscrutability and 
impregnability of the Castle mean that the Kafkaesque world becomes a 
‘totally incalculable domain ruled by evil demons’.292 A Zen view would accept 
paradox without frustration, as the ambiguities and non-sense prompt a 
reaction to the instinctive human search for any trace of reason in a confusing 
world. The only death in the novel is the cessation of K.’s quest, or 
attachments. His earlier dependency on the primacy of self in the face of 
universal transience is rejected as deluded and life continues. This is a true 
survival and there is no need to link K.’s ‘surrender’ to death or demons. 
Judaeo-Christian judgments of the novel tend to accentuate the negative, 
as shown by Heller’s remarks: ‘Never before has absolute darkness been 
289 Kuna, p. 169. 
290 Ibid., p. 182. 
291 Ibid., p. 136. 
292 Erich Heller, ‘The Castle: A Company of Gnostic Demons’ in Harold Bloom, ed., Franz 
Kafka’s The Castle (New York: Chelsea House, 1988), pp. 83-84. 
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 represented with so much clarity.’293 This air of desperation may also be 
traced back to the author: ‘Kafka’s energies seem to be exhausted on these 
last pages; eventually the labyrinth succeeded in trapping its own creator.’294 
The image of the labyrinth portrays K. as a victim because he does not choose 
to be trapped in a maze: he either wanders into one unluckily, or is lured into 
one by the (deceiving) governing authority, the Castle. This exonerates K. from 
blame, but does not help find a way out. 
Given such an outlook it is understandable why critics have felt that 
Kafka had written himself into a corner. Ronald Gray, for example, feels K.’s 
denial of Bürgel and the Castle was not brave and heroic but ‘a drifting, 
quietistic absence of self-regard’.295 His largely negative view of the ending of 
the novel has Kafka ‘groping in darkness’ and the ‘tedium of the final chapter’ 
is a result of K.’s ‘weariness of spirit’.296 This conclusion is perhaps inevitable 
for Gray as he sees no ‘guiding centre’ in the novel, and the transformation in 
K. is devoid of virtue or moral progress.297 Although K.’s enlightenment is not 
morally driven, it would be wrong to suggest there is no guidance in the work. 
Throughout K.’s troubles, and in the earlier Der Proceß, a consistent theme of 
suffering through attachment can be detected and the ‘trail of breadcrumbs’ 
left in the texts through paradoxes and perlocutions indicates the dangers of 
ignorance and self-delusion.  
The inconclusive end of the novel would sit uneasily with Western 
readers who value certainty and clarity. Politzer maintains the final scenes ‘do 
not provide us with any new hints about unexpected turns ahead on K.’s 
way’.298 He claims furthermore that K. is no nearer to the truth at any point in 
293 Heller, ‘Gnostic Demons’, p. 83. 
294 Politzer, p. 263. 
295 Ronald Gray, p. 168. 
296 Ibid., p. 168. 
297 Ibid., p. 162. 
298 Politzer, p. 262. 
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 the novel than in the first paragraph, suggesting that ‘it is characteristic of 
Kafka’s labyrinth that one is nearer to truth the instant before one enters the 
maze.299 A Buddhist reading, however, would find significant and unexpected 
change in K. in the scenes with Erlanger, the file distributions and the 
conversations with Pepi and the ‘Wirtin’. It is possible for a reader to get lost in 
key places in Kafka’s labyrinthine narrative, but K. at least shows 
considerable insight in his decision to renounce his fruitless meandering and 
withdraw from the maze. 
Kafka’s ending may not exactly be the stuff of great inspiration or hope. 
But taken in context with the grim conclusions in many of his other stories, 
and set alongside the ‘way’ outlined for Buddhist enlightenment, K.’s survival 
and apparent indifference to his erstwhile existence-affirming quest are highly 
significant. After a seamless, overpowering obsession with claiming his ‘rights’ 
(punctuated only by Amalia’s story), the post-Bürgel K. engages in a number of 
exchanges with villagers without his usual wont of referring everything back to 
his own situation. Early K. was incapable of holding any conversation without 
turning it round to his own Castle-related concerns, so the radical change 
from driven, self-obsessed pretender to humble listener is remarkable.  
The transformation need not be seen as the defeat of a broken man, 
moreover, for the final pages of the novel hardly exude the language of despair 
and resignation.300 K.’s abandonment of his Castle fixation could just be 
construed as the first gentle loosening of his grasp on a misguided 
attachment. The ‘wisdom’ of K.’s detachment offers some evidence that the 
first steps have been made towards enlightenment. 
299 Politzer, p. 281. 
300 Heller maintains readers are ‘terrified by the despair’ of Das Schloß because it tells us no 
comfort can be found in this world. ‘Gnostic Demons’, p. 104. 
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 We see K. arrive in the village as an outsider, restless, aggressive, 
stubborn, self-serving in his determination to claim a direct and meaningful 
place in the Castle. We leave him as a calmer, more even-tempered figure, 
having achieved a measure of integration in the community. The 
transformation was not miraculous, but made possible by a weary rejection of 
craving and attachment, and completed by understanding the folly and 
delusions of his earlier struggle. The story of K. need not be the tale of an 
ordinary man whose dreams are crushed by overpowering forces: it can also 
be seen as the tale of an ignorant man whose suffering is alleviated by the 
power of clear sight. In this respect, the principles underlying Buddhist 
philosophy can provide a useful guide.  
In the quotation heading this section, Katagiri suggests becoming a fool 
is the way to find peace. It is interesting to note that the ‘Wirtin’ has the final 
say on K. in Das Schloß and she is confused by K.’s responses: ‘Du bist 
entweder ein Narr oder ein Kind oder ein sehr böser, gefährlicher Mensch’ (DS 
494). As a ‘Traumwandler’, K. would fit the description of a fool, wandering 
aimlessly without attachments, within reach of peace without knowing it, in 
true Zen fashion. 
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 Chapter 6 Ein Hungerkünstler (collection) 
6.1 Introduction 
Nan-in, a Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868-1912), received a 
university professor who came to inquire about Zen. Nan-in served tea. He 
poured his visitor’s cup full, and then kept on pouring.  
The professor watched the cup overflow until he could no longer restrain 
himself. ‘It is overfull. No more will go in!’  
‘Like this cup,’ Nan-in said, ‘you are full of your own opinions and speculations. 
How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?’301 
The stories published in 1924 under the title Ein Hungerkünstler hold a special 
position in the body of Kafka’s work as his final literary statement. Although 
near to death, Kafka took a close interest in their composition and this 
chapter focuses on how the collection shows developments in his outlook and 
expression when compared with earlier writing. 
To recap, this dissertation challenges the widespread Western view that 
Kafka’s work paints a negative picture of the human condition, condemned to 
an unrecognisable, inhospitable world of suffering devoid of its traditional 
‘landmarks’: God, law, authority, reason. In contrast, I have argued that 
Kafka’s fiction suggests how suffering is invariably self-inflicted through 
attachment and ignorance, and how suffering can be dissolved by letting go of 
fixations through enlightenment. This position bears the hallmarks of 
Buddhist philosophy. 
The four stories in this collection all have links to the theme of 
attachment, but they differ in approach. There is variety in length, narrator, 
tone, focus and outcome, but taken together the stories counterbalance: there 
is an alignment of purpose, namely to expose the suffering that comes when 
the self is taken as the central point of focus for one’s existence, and further to 
301 Paul Reps and Nyogen Senzaki, eds, Zen Flesh, Zen Bones (Boston: Shambhala, 1994), p. 7. 
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 suggest the lack of suffering that would follow once attachment to self has 
been dissolved. 
Chronologically speaking, the earliest works in the collection are Erstes 
Leid and Ein Hungerkünstler (1921/1922). Written in the third person, they 
are both negative stories, inasmuch as the leading characters fare badly, but 
their real pain derives from ignorance rather than sorrow or injury. They lack 
insight, and their fixations distort their outlook and make equilibrium 
impossible. 
Erstes Leid, as the title suggests, investigates the start of the process, 
where a seemingly successful life characterised by achievement succumbs to 
doubt and dissatisfaction. Short in length, the tale describes a moment of 
awareness, but unfortunately not one of enlightenment: like Josef K.’s rude 
awakening, the trapeze artist becomes aware of his (first) suffering.  
Ein Hungerkünstler focuses on the middle and endgame to suffering. 
Even though initially famed and lauded, the hunger artist cuts a dissatisfied 
figure. A downturn in circumstances then sets his life on a downward spiral, 
until he loses fame and celebrity and suffers an ignominious death. He has a 
momentary breakthrough of insight before his death, when he admits that his 
fasting was simply based on lacking appetising food. This realisation is a half-
step on the path to enlightenment, and on a par with Josef K.’s ‘zwanzig 
Händen’. 
The two later stories from 1923/1924 have less distressing elements, 
while retaining evidence of how a self-absorbed outlook contributes to 
suffering. The tone is more constructive and the outcome less traumatic, as 
nobody dies and no tears are shed. There is no celebration, either, because 
that would undermine the overall argument that dualistic ideas of loss/gain, 
good/bad, happy/sad are ultimately unhelpful and usually harmful. In both 
cases the story is recounted through a first-person narrator who is not 
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 (nominally at least) the hero, although they reveal much about themselves as 
the narrative unfolds. Through their first-hand accounts we witness the 
benefits of taking a detached (yet still engaged) view of how obstacles confront 
them. In each story the deluded figure is not the narrator, but a different 
individual (the little woman, Josefine) observed in the throes of ignorance-
fuelled suffering. 
In Eine kleine Frau the little woman is a mysterious figure with unknown 
motives, and the narrator is perplexed by her fixation with him. His sketchy 
account of her side of the story is in keeping with the premise that they are 
more or less strangers – he is not an omniscient narrator with access to her 
inner thoughts. However, he reveals much about himself in the way he treats 
the issue seriously and is concerned about her welfare. As a result, the reader 
is invited to distinguish between the little woman’s confused (unskillful) 
suffering and the narrator’s (skillful) attempts to shed light on the problem.  
In Josefine, die Sängerin oder Das Volk der Mäuse, the mouse narrator 
reveals little about himself specifically, but much about his people, which 
reflects back certain characteristics. By contrast, his subject, Josefine, is 
atypical and very different from the ‘everymouse’ figure he seems to represent. 
The narrator is speaking from a rare position of knowledge, because he has 
clearly known Josefine for a long time and is able to explain how she thinks 
and why she behaves the way she does. The effect of the narratorial stance in 
the last stories sets a tone of sympathetic understanding of the suffering of 
fellow creatures. The Buddha delayed entry into nirvana until he had 
contributed what he could to alleviating the lot of fellow human beings, by 
trying to cultivate insight into the nature of existence. This is not to say the 
first-person narrators are Buddha-like figures, but they do at least show a 
degree of enlightened detachment in the face of suffering, whether personal or 
linked to their species. In a significant departure from the usual suffering hero 
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 in Kafka, they do not bemoan their lot and offer the standard ‘Why me?’ 
lament. On the contrary, they attempt to deal with the situation in a sensible 
manner. Here, ignorance and ‘self’-ishness are displayed by the third-person 
figures, and the first-person commentator supplies the gloss or background. 
By interweaving views of skillful and unskillful attitudes, Kafka can represent 
balanced and unbalanced lives, with the latter exposed to suffering and the 
former marked by equanimity. 
In keeping with the methodology used in the preceding chapters, the 
collection will be examined from two angles: what messages emerge in the 
narrative tightropes and tripwires, as well as an assessment of the degree to 
which the main figures are sleepwalkers in suffering.  
6.2 Tightropes and tripwires 
If your mind is empty, it is always ready for anything; it is open to everything. In 
the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities; in the expert’s mind there are 
few.302 
As regards the illocutionary approach, the stories deliver messages in 
alignment with The Three Universal Characteristics, Dependent Origination 
and The Four Noble Truths. Suffering is evident throughout, and there are 
numerous references to key Buddhist terms such as impermanence, 
attachment, delusion and insight. There is textual evidence to support how the 
self is undermined and how attachment to illusory goals leads to suffering. In 
each story there are characters who struggle metaphorically to keep their lives 
in balance, as if walking a tightrope. The trapeze artist adds a further 
dimension in that he literally has to negotiate a high wire, but it is ironic that 
despite his professional prowess he is just as unable as his fellow sufferers to 
balance the demands of his desires with the realities of existence.  
302 Shunryu Suzuki in Titmuss, p. 78. 
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 In this collection Kafka employs many techniques to bring into relief the 
attitudes and assumptions which weigh down the individual and throw him off 
balance. All four stories set tripwires for characters and readers alike, 
exposing the true shifting nature of reality, as would a typical Zen koan. Three 
stories in the collection, apart from Eine kleine Frau, present situations that 
bear superficially little connection with everyday life: fasting, trapeze acts, 
mouse singing. Readers setting off at the outset of Der Proceß or Das Schloß 
might readily align themselves with noble quests (defending innocence, 
asserting rights) and end up backed into the same corner as the K.s, but they 
will not climb a trapeze, fast for forty days or become a prima donna 
community figurehead. But despite the contextual distance between reader 
and narrative experience, all the stories find a way to disturb readers and 
force them to reconsider the values they subscribe to. 
6.2.1 Erstes Leid 
All becomes unsatisfactory because of grasping and clinging, and all is suffering 
equally.303 
Erstes Leid is marked by a poignancy that is rare in Kafka, which may be due 
to the fact that the sufferer does not inflict pain on those around him. Though 
clearly at fault because of his excessive (unbalanced) preoccupation with the 
tightrope, the trapeze artist comes closest to turning ‘Leid’ into ‘Mitleid’ by 
cutting a pathetic figure rather than an arrogant one. Where Josef K. abuses, 
K. mistreats and Georg Bendemann suppresses, the trapeze artist simply 
withdraws. But like the chains in Aphorism 66, his bid to reach the heights is 
thwarted by down-to-earth practicalities. This lack of balance leaves room for 
illocutionary and perlocutionary messages in the text.  
303 Buddhadasa in Titmuss, p. 39. 
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 From a Western perspective it is tempting to see the trapeze artist’s 
excesses as the veneer on the main subject: art, or devotion to art.304 This 
would sit well given Kafka’s declaration that he was himself made of literature. 
The problem is not exclusive devotion to one’s art (Kafka’s or the trapeze 
artist’s), but one’s appropriation of it to define identity. 
Tightropes 
The theme of suffering (dukkha) is established early on through the title, and 
the theme of attachment is addressed in the trapeze artist’s single-minded 
quest for perfection. Just as there are ‘Wächter’ to watch over Josef K. and 
point him in the right direction, there are ‘minders’ to watch over the trapeze 
artist. However, these assistants are not as helpful as Josef K.’s warders, 
whose advice hints at action which would alleviate his suffering; the trapeze 
artist is surrounded by people catering to his every whim, like the impresario, 
and this means that his delusions are not challenged. In this case the ‘wach’ 
does not suggest wakefulness or enlightenment, but denotes attentive 
dedication to the trapeze artist without evaluating the wisdom of his demands.  
Impermanence (anicca) is represented in the trapeze artist’s world by the 
regular journeys made to other sites. No matter how hard his staff try to 
accommodate him and establish a comfortable environment, everything has to 
be dismantled and reassembled elsewhere. It is impossible to ‘ungestört leben’ 
(DL 318) and the artist fails to adjust, hence the consequences, described as 
‘lästig’, ‘Verlängerung seiner Leiden’, ‘peinlich’ and ‘zerstörend’ (DL 318-
319).305 A comic moment is provided in the way train trips are handled, with 
the trapeze artist riding in the luggage rack: this ‘kläglichem Ersatz’ for his 
304 Ronald Gray suggests the story is about the artist’s struggle for perfection (op. cit., p. 177), 
and Tauber links it with Kafka’s autobiographical critique of his own obsessive perfectionism 
towards writing (p. 190). 
305 The collection is published in Franz Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, eds. Wolf Kittler, Hans-
Gerd Koch and Gerhard Neumann (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1994). All references will be taken from 
this edition and marked as DL, followed by the page number. 
264 
                                           
 beloved trapeze epitomises the lengths to which people will go to preserve their 
attachments.  
The stage set, the story then focuses on the relationship between the 
trapeze artist and one particular member of his crew, the impresario, who 
indulges his star performer’s whims in the name of show business. The 
demand for a second trapeze indicates the artist’s growing craving for 
perfection, and the impresario’s prompt approval reveals his own deepening 
attachment to the artist. There is no insight on the part of the protagonists 
and the suffering created by these desires escalates. On this occasion, the 
impresario allays the trapeze artist’s concerns, but the cost of pandering to 
craving is ‘schwerer Sorge’ (DL 321). The story ends with a burst of three 
questions which by their juxtaposition reflect the impresario’s train of thought 
as he looks on at his charge: ‘Wenn ihn einmal solche Gedanken zu quälen 
begannen, konnten sie je gänzlich aufhören? Mußten sie sich nicht immerfort 
steigern? Waren sie nicht existenzbedrohend?’ (DL 321). He now fears that this 
quest for artistic perfection may spiral out of control into a life-threatening 
obsession. The pursuit of perfection per se is not necessarily ‘wrong’ in 
Buddhist thinking, but if this goal acquires personal significance and is 
associated with part or all of the individual’s identity, the pursuit is 
misguided. It is clear from the trapeze artist’s lament that pushing the limits 
of his art is what fuels his sense of self, and lack of artistic growth equates to 
starving the self of development. The trapeze artist breaks down when he 
perceives the limitations of his working environment, and this illustrates the 
Buddhist notion that craving feeds suffering in a perpetual cycle.306 
After the trapeze artist has been comforted, he goes back to sleep, but 
this calm is ‘scheinbar’ (DL 321). The first ‘Falten’ have appeared on his 
306 Ronald Gray feels Kafka ‘was mocking his own solitude and seclusiveness’ in the caricature 
of the trapeze artist’s suffering (p. 178). This seems harsh and robs the story of any uplifting 
qualities. 
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 ‘glatter Kinderstirn’, indicating ejection from his self-absorbed comfort zone 
(where all his desires could be fulfilled) into unknown territory. The artist lives 
for and within his art, so there can be no dwelling in the past, using a single 
trapeze – ‘wie kann ich denn leben!’ (DL 320). The reference to a child’s 
appearance suggests the artist’s self is undergoing growing pains and 
expanding at a rate which his entourage cannot match. Here is a case of the 
self using art to inflate itself (egotistical), rather than the self giving itself up to 
art (detached). The story ends just as the self-conscious awareness of 
dissatisfaction starts to dawn, and like Josef K. he is ‘verhaftet’.  
Tripwires 
The two main characters advance unhappily along the personal tightropes of 
artistic obsession and paternal indulgence, but do not face any tripwires to 
bring them crashing back down to earth. The reader, on the other hand, 
observes the events from a safe distance on the ground, but is gradually 
drawn towards a point where a koan-style expression upsets expectations and 
triggers a reassessment. 
Erstes Leid starts innocuously with the words ‘Ein Trapezkünstler’ and, 
apart from those familiar with the circus, readers can venture into the story 
safe in the knowledge that the context is ‘another world’ which has little 
impact on their own lives. The opening sentence continues to ‘soften up’ the 
reader by offering the uncontroversial view that the art of tightrope walking is 
‘eine der schwierigsten’ (DL 317): so far, no uncomfortable self-engagement on 
the part of the reader. But the sentence then dangles bait designed to lure 
many an ego, describing how the trapeze artist is characterised by his ‘Streben 
nach Vervollkommnung’, and this pursuit will sound familiar and laudable for 
many Western readers, before the sentence ends with the hook: ‘aus 
tyrannisch gewordener Gewohnheit’ (DL 317).  
266 
 The formulation of this opening line has perlocutionary value in the way 
it engages the reader and draws reaction. The opening phrases discuss artistry 
and lead into ‘Vervollkommnung’, a generally positive notion with no 
connection to suffering or selfhood. The trick comes by developing ‘Streben’ 
until it becomes ‘Gewohnheit’, hence the fixation.  
The story continues on its path, setting out the dangers of being driven 
by self-oriented desires, and carrying in its wake those readers who would 
endorse the ‘noble’ pursuit of excellence. The opening paragraph even closes 
on a note designed to perpetuate the myth of perfection: the artist is an 
extraordinary performer and his supporters understand (‘einsehen’) his quest 
because it does not derive from base ‘Mutwillen’, but rather from loftier, more 
meaningful motives. In the later story, the hunger artist strives to uphold ‘die 
Ehre seiner Kunst’, and here the trapeze artist is applauded for a similar 
dedication: ‘seine Kunst in ihrer Vollkommenheit bewahren’ (DL 318). In this 
way, the absurd practice of deciding to live one’s entire life on the high wire – 
in effect the artist’s drastic attempt to define his singularity by merging ‘art’ 
and ‘self’ – is presented as noble, if idiosyncratic. 
The second paragraph sustains the illusion of acceptability by describing 
the artist’s day-to-day life on the wire as ‘schön’. The opening ‘Doch’ concedes 
that his arrangement is difficult for all concerned, but the rest of the 
paragraph underlines his dedication and the support of his followers. Almost 
halfway into the story, there is no conflict yet and the pursuit of artistic 
perfection remains unchallenged, backed up by the Western idea of self-
fulfilment through continuous development. However, ‘Leid’ is never far and 
the third paragraph introduces it in classic Buddhist fashion, through the 
inevitable truth of impermanence, ‘unvermeidlichen Reisen’ (DL 318). The 
artist lives a conditioned life dependent on a multitude of external factors, like 
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 all other human beings, but life in his self-absorbed bubble cannot continue 
for ever under these controlled conditions.  
The koan now shifts into absurdist mode, to show the risks of aligning 
incompatible entities, such as a finite, imperfect self and the notion of artistic 
perfection. The artist’s reactions to change are both childish and childlike, as 
he makes pouting demands for a second trapeze, sobs at the thought of not 
getting what he wants and is eventually soothed to sleep. The impresario 
becomes a father figure concerned for the wellbeing of his child, moved by his 
tears. Even though he calms the agitated child/artist, he is faced with the 
nagging doubt that accompanies all attachments: the fear of losing possession 
of what one has.  
The story ends by setting out a number of contrasts, to underline the 
idea that the suffering described originates from within the human self, and is 
not caused by a failure to reach ‘targets’. The opening paragraph ends with 
admiration for the artist and his ‘dauernder Übung’ (DL 318), but we close 
with a different image of something everlasting: troubled thoughts of 
inadequacy. It is not just the quest for perfection which knows no bounds, for 
the impresario may now wonder if the artist’s tortured thoughts will also 
‘immerfort steigern’ (DL 321). 
Erstes Leid covers ground familiar to Buddhism in the way it explores 
suffering and selfhood linked by fixations. It adds a perlocutionary layer to the 
overt textual message by twisting the notion of perfection from a noble cause 
to a misguided pursuit, but the absurd extremes to the artist’s behaviour 
make this an unsubtle koan, and therefore unlikely to unsettle the reader in 
the way Der Proceß does. 
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 6.2.2 Eine kleine Frau 
He who knows, does not speak; he who speaks does not know.307 
The theme of balance is just as well represented in the introspective 
ruminations of Eine kleine Frau as it is in the highwire exploits of Erstes Leid. 
The narrator’s mindfulness is impressive as he faces an irrational threat which 
refuses to go away. To his credit, he does not slide into an obsessive battle 
against the little woman, as Josef K. and K. do against their adversaries, but 
he is prepared to examine himself, in case he has contributed to the situation. 
This degree of flexibility and openmindedness is rare in Kafka, and a shining 
example of how to combat suffering by reducing the personal stake in it.  
Tightropes 
The whole of the opening paragraph contains an uncharacteristically (for 
Kafka) detailed description of the little woman of the title, but this is important 
because it sets the scene for the rest of the story. We have a first-person 
narrator and the physical (external) description of the woman underlines the 
fact that he does not know what is going on inside her head. He can report on 
the outside manifestations, but he can only speculate as to the psychological 
or emotional causes of the woman’s behaviour. 
The theme of suffering (The First Noble Truth) appears in the second 
paragraph: ‘[sie] ist mit mir sehr unzufrieden’ (DL 322). This is, however, no 
ordinary instance of suffering because it is repeated several times in the same 
sentence, passing from the irritating ‘immer geschieht ihr Unrecht von mir’, 
through the more serious ‘ich ärgere sie auf Schritt und Tritt’, until the life-
encompassing ‘jedes Teilchen meines Lebens [wäre] für sie ein Ärgernis’ (DL 
322).  
307 Humphreys, Zen Buddhism, p. 160. 
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 This defines the extent of the suffering but not the cause, and as often 
happens with Kafka the hidden trigger drives the narrative. The narrator 
clearly has no idea of the reason for the little woman’s unhappiness, which 
causes him to suffer, but he does explore the notion of ‘Beziehung’, which 
recalls the Law of Dependent Origination: everything must originate from a 
cause. Without a connection (attachment), there should not be any suffering 
and by trying to find the link with his accuser, the narrator is pursuing an 
enlightened approach to the problem, indicated by words such as ‘erkenne’ 
and ‘bewußt’ (DL 323). He is looking for the source of the suffering in order 
that it can be ceased, ‘alles Leid wäre offenbar vorüber’ (DL 323). He cannot 
find the cause in himself, so he wonders whether the woman would then be in 
a position to end the suffering, simply by forgetting he existed. If the 
‘attachment’ is purely on her part, she would unilaterally have the power to 
end the suffering. 
This situation of inexplicable suffering evokes Der Proceß, for we have in 
effect an accused without a charge. The first-person narrator has been singled 
out for censure by the little woman, but no reason is given. She is quite a 
sketchy figure, in the mould of the Court or the Castle, a mysterious force 
which is able to impose by applying pressure to the most sensitive point – the 
self’s sense of worth. The similarities are balanced out by significant 
differences, however: the narrator does not assume, for example, that he is 
innocent but accepts this possibility as an option. He may inadvertently have 
offended her, or she may have over-reacted or mistaken him for somebody 
else.  
The outcome nevertheless is suffering and he must deal with it. Suffering 
is always personal, and the way to defuse it is to cut off the oxygen supply to 
the self. By displaying less attachment and defensiveness regarding his self, 
the narrator is able to pursue a number of solutions to the problems created 
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 by this troubled relationship: approaching the woman directly, considering his 
own behaviour, asking advice from a close friend, and sounding out public 
opinion.308  
As well as displaying a good sense of self-awareness, the narrator 
touches on the crux of the matter: suffering only assumes meaning when 
filtered through the self – it takes a ‘me’, a ‘person’ to experience suffering. He 
arrives at this idea when he argues that the little woman is not concerned 
about him, but is entirely focused on ‘ihr persönliches Interesse’ (DL 323). In 
this respect, he knows how to help her end the suffering and tries to alert her 
to the best way of doing this, but her ‘Aufwallung’ (DL 323) at his suggestion 
that she take this less personally reveals the extent of her self-defensiveness. 
The narrator’s well-intentioned advice marks him out as a ‘Wächter’ to the 
little woman’s ‘Josef K.’, as if Kafka had revisited the arrest scene and 
presented it from a different viewpoint. 
The narrator goes on to explain how the little woman has boxed herself 
into an awkward position: she is too proud to admit publicly that his mere 
existence is tormenting her, but she is suffering too much to say nothing. Her 
case appears to be one of self-delusion, and she is in complete thrall to the 
whims of her self: ‘so täuscht sie sich’ (DL 325).309 She is driven by ‘die 
Leidenschaft des Kampfes’, which is etched into her features, ‘die verdrießlich 
aufgestülpten Lippen’ and ‘dieses um meinetwillen vergrämte Gesicht’ (DL 
328).  
This is in stark contrast to the narrator, who is able to reflect on his 
situation and consider all his options, even the unpalatable ones. He reasons 
that it would be difficult to count on public support and force the woman to 
308 Tauber, however, is unimpressed by the narrator’s ‘prolix reflections’, which contribute to 
the ‘tasteless mass of detail’ in the text (p. 189). 
309 ‘Täuscht’ recalls the chaplain’s warning to Josef K. (DP 292) and Olga’s words about 
Barnabas (DS 285). 
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 back down – the only option is for him to change and adapt to the situation. 
This ability, lacking in virtually all Kafka’s protagonists, save the later K., is 
highly significant and shows a departure from the usual entrenched self-
preoccupation against all better judgment. 
In other words, the narrator shows less attachment to self; he does not 
crave peace, or a solution, or happiness, but is more pragmatic. The problem 
has arisen and although its cause is a mystery this does not deflect the 
narrator from dealing with the matter in an even-tempered way. He is not 
unemotional, as he is clearly upset and troubled by the situation, but the 
disturbance is the backdrop to his decisions and not the driver. 
The narrator has clearly given much thought to the question of how this 
suffering can be ceased. Josef K. always looks for solutions externally, having 
decided that internally there is no fault and nothing needs to be done. This is 
why he fails, but the narrator in Eine kleine Frau rejects the solutions which 
entail external action and settles on a path of introspection. If he cannot 
influence the behaviour or resolve of the little woman and considers it would 
be dangerous to depend on the support of neutrals, he concludes that the best 
option is to deal with the hurt he feels. 
The narrator focuses on his own actions and tries to see how far they are 
rooted in self-interest. His reflections tell him that any developments he has 
seen over the years are not material changes, but are more likely shifts in his 
perception of the situation. As his powers of insight become ‘ruhiger’ (DL 330), 
he is even able to reconcile himself to the fact that there may never be an 
‘Entscheidung’ and this unwarranted suffering may last.  
He admits that such a prospect has unsettled him, and it is not humanly 
possible to remain unaffected by the ‘Grundlosigkeit des Ärgers’ (DL 332). 
However, where the K.s raged defiantly against perceived injustice, the 
narrator here can turn a blind eye to the woman’s fury and ‘ungestört von der 
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 Welt, mein bisheriges Leben ruhig […] fortsetzen’ (DL 333). To the Buddhist 
way of thinking, the ability to lead an untroubled life in the midst of suffering 
shows supreme insight and marks out the narrator as a rare example of a fully 
enlightened character in Kafka’s work. The trapeze artist is knocked off 
balance by the intrusion of the real world into his life, but the narrator here 
has found a way to live ‘ungestört’. 
Tripwires 
The koan effect works well when it touches a raw nerve, such as an apparently 
unjustified attack causing unmerited suffering, and this is the situation which 
confronts the reader in this text. Whereas in Der Proceß Kafka explored the 
descent into ‘self’-defence through Josef K. sinking deeper into the quicksands 
of attachment, in Eine kleine Frau he examines the option of walking away, 
which is a development echoing the closing stages of Das Schloß, when K. 
draws back from the brink. In this respect, the story begins like Der Proceß, 
but ends like Das Schloß.  
The opening perlocutionary salvo is fired in a typically Zen formulation: 
familiar ground into which an unexpected oddity is introduced. Here, a 
seemingly innocuous description of a woman follows the unprepossessing 
story title, launching the narrative in muted tones – no beetle transformations 
or bed-and-arrest scenes here. The unremarkable account of the little woman 
lurches into koan mode with the impression her hand makes on the narrator - 
it is quite like no other hand he has ever seen, but at the same time has no 
distinguishing features: ‘es ist eine völlig normale Hand’ (DL 322). 
The hand is never mentioned again, making this otherwise ‘ordinary’ 
paragraph one of the more bizarre entries in Kafka’s work. In some ways, in 
koan style, it can be seen as an attempt to trigger in the reader the sensation 
of randomness and incongruity, similar to something unfolding in the 
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 narrative. The second paragraph introduces the theme of undeserved 
punishment, and we read how the narrator is confused and upset by the 
apparent suffering he has unwittingly caused a stranger. As readers, we do 
not ‘suffer’ on hearing about the exceptionally normal hand, but we are left 
puzzled by the contradiction. In some ways, the narrator’s view of the woman’s 
hand mirrors her view of his character – there is something peculiar which 
draws the attention, but it cannot be defined. 
Thus, the story opens in koan style, but there is otherwise little at stake 
personally for the reader. The narrator has not introduced himself yet, so no 
‘bonding’ can take place. Similarly, the little woman is described physically, 
but we do not know what she is thinking, so the story progresses without 
‘hooked’ readers.  
This is not to say that there is no perlocutionary activity, but the 
narrative plays with assumptions of logic and juxtaposition by weaving 
through contradictory and misleading statements. Initially, the degree of 
suffering inflicted on the woman is described as ‘Unrecht’ and ‘Ärgernis’; 
furthermore, ‘mag sein’ (DL 322) reveals how the narrator can only speculate 
on the reason for the problem. However, his guesswork proves frustratingly 
unhelpful because he covers such a wide range of possibilities: it may be the 
way he looks (affects her ‘Schönheitssinn’), or the way he behaves (offends her 
‘Gerechtigkeitsgefühl’), or he may have upset some connection with her past 
(‘Überlieferungen’), present (‘Gewohnheiten’) or future (‘Hoffnungen’). In other 
words, no stone has been left unturned and a universe of potential causes for 
her unhappiness is possible. 
In addition to the narrator’s open mind regarding the origins of the 
problem, the stance he adopts vis-à-vis the little woman is thoughtful and 
measured and he is not afraid to do things which ‘go against the grain’: in 
short, he is not governed by self-interest and is able to consider a broader 
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 perspective. The tension between instinctive reaction (such as a self-defence 
mechanism) and a meditative approach is recreated by the narrator’s 
vacillations and reservations before making the enlightened choice. The reader 
must plough through the twists and turns with him and cannot settle. The 
path to clearsightedness is not smooth, and is more than likely littered with 
traps. The narrator’s suffering seeps through the drawn-out ruminations, and 
the reader is carried along on the same journey.  
At one point, for example, the narrator maintains that the little woman 
will not be able to enlist the support of the public against him, but then goes 
on to say that he cannot rest easily. This is because he struggles to feign 
sympathy for her self-imposed torment and this will count against him in the 
court of public opinion. The narrator later concludes that he must be the one 
to change, given her intransigence, and his initial efforts bring him some 
cheer, until he crashes into the brick wall of her dissatisfaction. He then 
consults a close friend who suggests the solution is simple: run away. The 
problem is straightforward, but not that clear-cut, and we are told that 
running away would be a very bad thing to do: as a form of desire (to flee), it 
would create significant negative karma. In his final thoughts, he suggests 
that the general public may hold him in high regard (‘achtungswertes 
Mitglied’, DL 332), but this notion fails to comfort him. Instead, his disquiet 
seems to grow with age, despite his intellect telling him there is nothing to 
worry about. The final, contradictory, word finishes on an upswing, as the 
narrator claims he will be able to lead a quiet life, untroubled by external 
affairs, ‘trotz allen Tobens der Frau’ (DL 333).  
It is as if the little woman is a koan in human form, in the manner of the 
assistants sent to ‘distract’ K. They failed in their mission because K. resisted 
and tried to break them down; the narrator here, however, does not try to 
‘solve’ the conundrum of the little woman but examines himself instead. As a 
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 tightrope walker shifts his weight to stay upright, the narrator adjusts his 
views and assumptions to maintain equilibrium, and steps over the tripwires 
where necessary. 
6.2.3 Ein Hungerkünstler 
Great doubt: great awakening. 
Little doubt: little awakening. 
No doubt: no awakening.310 
Ein Hungerkünstler is the second story in the collection chronologically 
speaking, and it has given rise to discussions on the role of the artist in 
society, studies in self-righteousness, and allusions to religious themes. 
Relevant to a dissertation examining the perils of attachment as a cause of 
suffering, the story exudes ignorance in the figure of the harmless, 
misunderstood but ultimately deluded hunger artist. Riven by contradictions, 
he is passive towards those around him, but aggressive in his ‘art’: his most 
violent expressions come when he is defending his fasting/self, for his art is 
the vehicle in which he defines himself.  
Tightropes 
The Universal Characteristic of impermanence courses through the whole 
story and is particularly prevalent in the opening lines, peppered with terms 
such as ‘früher’, ‘damals’, ‘andere Zeiten’ (DL 333-334). Interest in the art of 
fasting has fallen away to the extent that the buzz of its halcyon days is just a 
memory. The folly of trying to resist the passage of time is hinted at in the 
reactions of adults and children to the hullabaloo surrounding the hunger 
artist: while the younger ones are spellbound by the spectacle, the grown-ups 
often treat it as ‘ein Spaß’ and follow it ‘der Mode halber’ (DL 334). The story of 
Ein Hungerkünstler is of slavery to a fashion. 
310 Stephen Batchelor in Titmuss, p. 116. 
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 Suffering is clear in both physical and spiritual senses. The emaciated 
body with its ‘vortretenden Rippen’ (DL 334) is a picture of unhealthiness, and 
the misery is palpable. There are interesting parallels with the life of the 
Buddha, who spent years as an ascetic in his search for enlightenment before 
finally giving up this method as deluded. Here, however, the hunger artist does 
not give up but keeps going, and in the end it is only lack of time that stops 
him from fasting further. It is also ironic that the hunger artist does not 
understand why he is fasting. The Buddha realised that asceticism was 
misguided and self-ish, broke his fast with a meal, earning the disdain of other 
ascetics, but setting off on the path to insight. The Buddha understood the 
nature of emptiness and not-self, and realised that the self cannot be 
destroyed or starved to death, but rather needs to be ‘discredited’. The self is 
left to exist in its temporary, shifting guises, but loses its power as the force 
which dictates individual behaviour. The hunger artist does not have this 
insight and continues blindly to the end when he crumbles under the burden 
of the quest to find ‘die Speise’ which would satisfy him.  
The hunger artist walks the narrowest of tightropes because of all Kafka’s 
creations he has the clearest view of where he is headed. This is in essence his 
problem: his lack of doubt. The story is a masterstroke as it questions the 
value and purpose of knowledge and achievement, traditional pillars of the 
Western way of life. To improve our lot, we strive to learn more, to go further, 
to probe more deeply. The hunger artist epitomises this stance, relentlessly 
pushing the boundaries of experience: can I fast another day? This only 
succeeds in perpetually moving the destination, adding another link to a 
growing chain. As the ascetic Buddha realised, this pursuit is carried out in 
the name of the self. 
The mental suffering undergone by the hunger artist is much more 
pronounced than the physical hardships. Words such as ‘quälend’, ‘trübselig’ 
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 and ‘entsetzlich schwer’ (DL 335) testify to the torment he faces, not through 
resistance of food, but less tangible matters such as slurs on his integrity. 
There is the irony of the ‘Wächter’ (Kafka’s stories have a lot of them), who are 
engaged to keep a close eye on the hunger artist and make sure he does not 
eat, but he ends up keeping a closer watch on them, making sure that they do 
not look away. This is truly what saddens him for he genuinely does fast 
uninterruptedly, but can never fully convince the watching public of his 
feats.311 His ‘Ehre’ is at stake, and where honour is invoked the self is not far 
behind: with this claim the hunger artist’s self-ishness makes its entrance into 
the story and remains stubbornly centre stage until he is swept away as a bag 
of bones at the close. 
The trapeze artist in the earlier story was equally driven by the 
impossible goal of perfection, but he could at least practise dutifully in the 
vain attempt to marry up his reach and his grasp. The hunger artist shows a 
clever converse to his obsessive cousin, because he is actually already in 
possession of perfection throughout his fasting, but it is his task not to let go. 
The added complication for him is his playing to the gallery: he knows his 
fasting is ‘pure’, but nobody else can observe ‘ununterbrochen’ (DL 337) to 
verify this achievement. The challenge is to convert the inactivity of ‘not eating’ 
into a sideshow, which is tantamount to attempting to enact or stage 
‘emptiness’. No other human being can be his permanent companion, so his 
task is not really to fast for forty days but to keep public interest alive for forty 
days and beyond. His attempts to do so are characterised by humorous 
touches, as we see the hunger artist singing through the night to ‘prove’ that 
he is not eating, only for the guards to wonder at the ventriloquist skills which 
enable him to drink and sing at the same time. His efforts to reward the 
311 Tauber notes that the hunger artist’s achievements are ‘unattested’ and he ‘suffers from the 
fact that he finds no reliable witness’ (p. 192). 
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 ‘Wächter’ with a hearty breakfast after keeping pace with him all night are also 
in vain: onlookers merely interpret the lavish treat as ‘ungebührliche 
Beeinflussung’ (DL 336).  
Between them, the hunger artist and trapeze artist demonstrate the 
impossibility of chasing absolutes: the former fasts perfectly, but cannot 
sustain it permanently; the latter perfects difficult routines, but once 
completed they cannot be repeated and must be escalated in complexity. While 
the trapeze artist commands the full support and respect of his staff, he 
struggles to control the demands of his ego; conversely, the hunger artist is 
totally satisfied with his fasting prowess, but he is doomed to hunger after the 
respect of his public.312 In both cases, suffering turns on unquenchable desire, 
The Second Noble Truth. 
The hunger artist is true to his name, as he is the embodiment of 
hunger, but it is not food he lacks: he craves admiration and in this respect he 
can never be fulfilled. Even at the height of his fame, questions surface about 
the validity of his fasting. His hunger for attention and recognition substitute 
for his discontent: he parades his natural lack of appetite as an art, but he is 
deluding himself and his audience because fasting is actually ‘die leichteste 
Sache von der Welt’ (DL 337) – if he cannot even admire his own feats, how 
can he expect others to do so? This is the reason for his ‘Unzufriedenheit mit 
sich selbst’ (DL 337). He can never reconcile his thirst for recognition for his 
art, and the realisation that his fasting is more artifice than art. 
The hunger artist is held back by the limitations of others. His handlers 
set the fasting time at a maximum of forty days, an artificial ceiling which 
draws Biblical comparisons. The hunger artist believes he can fast through all 
barriers and is being cheated of his rightful accolades, but where Christ 
312 Politzer comments that ‘without (public) acknowledgment perfection will forever be 
imperfect’ (p. 305). 
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 suffered in the desert and resisted temptation, the hunger artist does what 
comes naturally. The sideshow that is put on for the public, in other words, is 
precisely a ‘show’ and inauthentic. The crowds might go away satisfied by the 
spectacle, but the star performer cannot. The hunger artist lives ‘in 
scheinbarem Glanz’ (DL 341), feted by the world but to his own mind 
unappreciated. He would break out into a rage when being misrepresented to 
the crowds, with his fury attributed to hunger-driven ‘Reizbarkeit’. This 
‘Verdrehung der Wahrheit’ (DL 342) would send the hunger artist sighing back 
into the straw at the injustice, but it could equally be argued that his whole 
life is ‘twisting the truth’ because his effortless fasting is not pushing the 
boundaries of human endurance, but simply the height of indulgence. 
The Third Noble Truth concerns cessation of craving, but here there is 
only evidence of perpetuation of ignorance. The main driver in the narrative is 
the ‘Umschwung’ (DL 342, anicca or impermanence) which is the force behind 
all the external changes in the hunger artist’s life. Ironically, the decline in 
interest in fasting satisfies the artist’s wants, while preparing new frustrations 
elsewhere. It is unfortunate for him that he cannot command centre stage any 
more and is out of the limelight. The advantage, however, is that the artificial 
forty day fasting limit need no longer be enforced, because nobody is paying 
attention; the disadvantage is that the increased fasting will not be witnessed 
or celebrated. On joining the circus as a freelance, unshackled from the forty-
day chains of the previous management, the hunger artist vows to astound his 
audience, but he fails to grasp that these are different times and the earlier 
spark of public interest has now faded. Similarly, the hunger artist looked 
forward to the new visitors to his booth, before finally realising his cage was 
merely ‘ein Hindernis auf dem Weg zu den Ställen’ (DL 346), not the 
destination. The hunger artist can never square the circle because his hunger 
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 for external recognition (his ‘Lebenszweck’, DL 345) and inner dissatisfaction 
with the ease of fasting can never be reconciled.  
The hunger artist’s suffering continues because he cannot move with the 
times. He joins the circus, but ends up in a different location with a different 
dynamic, and the relationship between his ‘sideshow’ and public expectations 
alters dramatically. He still craves attention, but whereas before all eyes were 
on him, now they are drawn to his shabby surroundings. The greatest irony 
and insult, and the final hammer blow to his pride, is the board counting days 
fasted – it is no longer kept up-to-date and passers-by are in turns amused 
and unimpressed by the low figure. The talk is of a swindle, when in fact the 
hunger artist has fasted beyond all his previous achievements. The hunger 
artist’s self-delusion reaches its apogee in his demand for respect: ‘die Welt 
betrog ihn um seinen Lohn’ (DL 347). This is clearly ironic retribution for the 
swindle that he keeps hidden, the fact that his fasting is born of necessity and 
not skill or effort.  
The Fourth Noble Truth sets out the path to avoidance of suffering, but 
in this story the hunger artist dies in ignorance. There is regret and an 
admission that he had lived a lie, but there is no enlightenment. The pride has 
gone from his convictions, but he must continue to fast for he has still not 
succeeded in finding ‘die Speise […] die mir schmeckt’ (DL 349).313 The word 
‘schmeckt’ smacks of pleasure and happiness, but for Buddhists the most 
revealing term is ‘mir’: it is personal. With the self in control, we cannot 
extricate ourselves from a life of wants and suffering.  
After he dies, the ‘Aufseher’ calls for ‘Ordnung’ (DL 349), and the arrival 
of the panther hints at the way to a healthier outlook, in spite of the limits of 
physical incarceration. The hunger artist was in an unlocked cage, but refused 
313 Ronald Gray takes this loss of pride as a sign of ‘some spiritual progress’ (p. 180). 
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 to leave, almost mentally imprisoned within his craving. The panther is locked 
up with no means of escape but is the picture of health, suggesting that 
freedom from mental attachments leads to avoidance of suffering. 
This animal is ‘edel’ and spectators flock to see the lifeforce streaming 
from its entire being. In an interesting twist, the hunger artist longed his 
whole life for devoted attention which he could never guarantee, whereas the 
panther inadvertently attracts a public that cannot break its stare. The draw 
appears to be the panther’s natural free spirit or ‘Freude am Leben’ (DL 349), a 
quality carried in its powerful body and teeth; this contrasts with the hunger 
artist’s emaciated figure and unemployed mouth, as well as his utter lack of 
‘Freude am Leben’. The hunger artist and the panther are both driven by 
wants: the difference is that the panther appears to have a ‘healthy’ appetite – 
it is clear and open, it sits in his jaws as a thirst for meat. The hunger artist’s 
want is intellectually determined – he ‘thinks too much’, as Zen master Seung 
Sahn might have said.  
In its own way, the panther offers a metamorphosis of hunger, a 
‘Verwandlung’ truer to Buddhist ideas than that undergone by Gregor Samsa. 
The hunger artist’s raging thirst for satisfaction creates intense karmic energy, 
represented symbolically by the big cat, but the spectators lining up in awe 
outside its cage are there to observe raw nature in its most intense 
incarnation. The human hunger artist offers intensity, but expressed as lack. 
His self-ish longing for an unidentified source of satisfaction is a figurative, 
psychological version of the panther’s literal hunger. The circus would impress 
few spectators by counting the successive days in which the wild creature 
filled its stomach, and similarly the hunger artist fails to engage interest 
beyond a certain point by counting days of fasting. The spectacle of the 
panther’s ravenous appetite is its irresistibility – its force defines the creature; 
the ultimate failure of the hunger artist lies in the self-determined source of 
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 the intensity – his continued hungering depends on the peculiar 
characteristics of his own self. The panther’s hunger is natural and 
uncalculated, emanating from its ‘Gebiß’ rather than its ‘Gehirn’, thus there 
are no mental strings attached to its desires. 
The panther – unlike the hunger artist – is not after acclaim or 
admiration, but just wants food.314 Its self is not defined in relation to others, 
but an amalgam of instincts, needs and wants – a perpetual seething mass of 
desires, but they come, get satisfied and pass. They are not retained as part of 
a willed, conscious definition of an all-embracing selfhood. The panther 
devours its meat without reflection, not conscious of the public, but the 
hunger artist is uncomfortable fasting out of public view because he needs 
accreditation.  
The hunger artist cuts a sad figure because he does not understand – he 
has lived his life in accordance with a particular principle, which raises fasting 
to a fine art. He is happy to dedicate (ultimately sacrifice) his life to this end, 
and this is how the suffering results. A Judaeo-Christian reading might 
admire his steadfast disregard for creature comforts in order to transcend 
earthly limitations. Felix Greß suggests as much as he interprets the hunger 
artist’s fasting as a bid for freedom: ‘Der Preis für den möglichen Űbergang in 
die Transzendenz ist die Selbstzerstörung.’315 But this iron ‘Willen zur Freiheit’ 
is counterproductive to Buddhist thinking, for it is born of selfhood and desire, 
and hence can only cause suffering. 
Tripwires 
A koan works best when there is engagement on the part of the reader or 
listener. The topic of fasting will draw few devotees, but the hunger artist’s 
314 Tauber also sees a positive note in the panther which is self-oriented in its needs, but in a 
natural, instinctive way, through its ‘unquestioning affirmation of life’ (p. 193). 
315 Greß, p. 106. 
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 frustrated thirst for admiration allows identification on a general level for 
paradoxes and contradictions to have some effect. 
The irony and humour in the narrative reinforce the thematic messages 
critical of attachment, but they also serve to undermine the reader’s 
assumptions and value judgments. The story is shot through with a stream of 
contrasts which disorient the reader. Is the hunger artist a martyr to his art? 
Or is his suffering pointless? Is his fasting even ‘art’? Has he been cheated of 
acclaim? Or is he the fraud? The narrator shuttles between extreme positions, 
reporting the frustrations of the hero, but seasoning the sympathy with gentle 
mocking, which leaves the reader in a halfway house.  
A slippery area in the text centres on the notions of honour and fraud, 
two aspects of selfhood: we strive to present a public face to a certain 
specification, editing out unwanted elements. We hear very quickly about the 
hunger artist’s integrity and how he goes to great lengths to prove he does not 
break his fast and swindle his public. However, he has also talked honestly of 
how easy it is to refuse food, and this raises accusations of deception – it is 
either a trick or an illusion on his part to make fasting look easy, or he simply 
never gets hungry. If the latter is true, can his refusal of food actually count as 
fasting? His final confession would suggest that he has a guilty conscience 
about this. Ironically, he does not suffer through hunger, but that is what the 
crowd would like to see, his resolve in the face of pain and adversity. 
The hunger artist complains of a ‘Verdrehung der Wahrheit’ and this 
description can be applied to koans, too. On a couple of occasions, the hunger 
artist is presented to the public in a way which is opposite to his intentions. 
The whole performance marking the end of the fast is carefully stage-
managed, and the impresario even gives his skeletal performer a sneaky shake 
to suggest he is weak from the long hungry period. Similarly, when the hunger 
artist snaps after another comment by an onlooker that his ‘trüber Laune’ (DL 
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 341) is attributed to not eating, he rattles the cage like a wild animal, 
foreshadowing the panther which is about to take his place. This is an 
authentic outburst and not ‘for show’, but the impresario ironically calms the 
man down my declaring the same thing that initially annoyed the hunger 
artist. 
Another perlocutionary technique is the use of questions and 
exclamations in the text. The narrator raises a number of issues in the story: 
some reflect the hunger artist’s thinking, in ‘erlebte Rede’, such as his lament 
that the public imagination cannot stretch beyond forty days; others are 
rhetorical devices which give a more informal feel to the text and draw the 
reader in towards a particular answer, before revealing the inherent 
contradiction or conflict.  
The question ‘Was sollte nun der Hungerkünstler tun?’ (DL 343) comes 
at the first major crossroads in his life, as public opinion begins to change. He 
leaves his impresario for the circus in the first stage of a downward spiral. The 
next eruptions from the text betray the growing desperation of the hunger 
artist: he loses faith in the ability of the public to appreciate his art, ‘was war 
ihnen Hungern?’ (DL 346), and his own ability to explain it, ‘Versuche, 
jemandem die Hungerkunst zu erklären!’ (DL 347). The hunger artist’s 
incredulity at the forty day fasting restriction is indicated by repeating the 
question: ‘Warum gerade jetzt nach vierzig Tagen aufhören? Er hätte es noch 
lange, unbeschränkt lange ausgehalten; warum gerade jetzt aufhören, wo er 
im besten, ja noch nicht einmal im besten Hungern war?’ (DL 338-339). 
6.2.4 Josefine, die Sängerin oder Das Volk der Mäuse 
For a man to think he was born for the sake of name and fame is a tragedy. A 
glance at this thing known as prestige shows it to be thoroughly insubstantial. It 
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 depends on other people having a high regard for one; and it may well be that, 
though no one realises it, this high regard is quite unfounded.316 
As well as being Kafka’s final story, Josefine is special in its attempt to show 
both sides of the attachment/detachment issue. In Josefine there is a 
discontented figure who struggles to endure suffering in the manner of K. or 
the hunger artist: her public simply does not understand her needs or her art. 
In the narrator there is a more enlightened soul who endures suffering with a 
stoic resolve, in the manner of the narrator in Eine kleine Frau or post-Bürgel 
K. It is unusual to see both sides of the suffering conundrum fleshed out in 
such detail. Although the mouse narrator’s voice dominates the text with his 
temperate views, the twin billing shows how the story ‘adds the countertheme 
of society to Kafka’s exploration of the heroine’s character and destiny’.317 
Tripwires 
Josefine is often a bewildering account, with many questions posed by the 
narrator and numerous qualifications and counter-arguments which are 
difficult to follow. It is an uncomfortable read, with a ‘choppy’ narrative that is 
always going back on itself and leaving the reader disoriented. The quick 
succession of tripwires challenges the reader to keep up with the information 
presented and mirrors the dilemmas felt by the mouse folk: how to 
accommodate Josefine despite her foibles. 
The textual incongruities and contradictions might be viewed as ‘poor’ 
writing, but they could also be seen as a Zen masterstroke. Ronald Gray feels 
the writing lacks structure and direction and is a challenge to logic.318 Rather 
than a shortcoming, this would be seen as a success from the Zen viewpoint, 
for it unseats traditional logic and offers a glimpse of the ‘real’ world of flux 
316 Buddhadasa in Titmuss, p. 211. 
317 Politzer sees a balance in the tale, evidenced by the twin billing (pp. 308-09). 
318 Ronald Gray, p. 176. 
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 and non-fixed entities. Kafka recreates in the text the sense of danger and 
unease which underlie life in a community where threats are natural. In no 
way indicative of substandard writing, the complicated passages could 
conceivably represent the pinnacle of Kafka’s perlocutionary expression. 
From the very beginning, the title is confusing because it creates a doubt 
about who the story is about, Josefine or the mouse folk, represented by the 
first-person narrator. The opening paragraph follows up this ambivalence with 
multiple shifts in its stance vis-à-vis Josefine’s importance. The first words 
announce her role as singer, sending out a clear message as to her status 
among the folk and the way in which she is identified. Also, the use of the 
possessive ‘unsere’ suggests that there is only one singer who can occupy the 
role, like a poet laureate. Thus Josefine is effectively introduced to the reader 
in a positive light. This perception must be heightened by the second line 
which associates her song with ‘Macht’. The third line takes her reputation to 
an even higher level, by describing the effect of her song on the listener – 
‘fortreißen’ (DL 350). However, from this lofty position of artistic excellence, 
Josefine’s bubble of perfection is popped when the narrator announces that 
the mice folk do not like music: their tough lives afford little time to enjoy such 
a luxury and they much prefer peace and quiet. The reader experiences an 
abrupt fall, the first in a long series of koan-like about-faces which make this 
story both impenetrable and effective. 
The reader is halfway to the end of the paragraph when the comment 
‘Stiller Frieden ist uns die liebste Musik’ (DL 350) detonates its enigmatic time 
bomb: how can ‘peace’ or ‘quiet’ be classed as music? In classic koan style, the 
idiomatic phrase is crystal-clear in its message that the mice love peace, but it 
is merely masquerading as meaningful, because it soon becomes apparent 
that the story will revolve around the interpretation of music, and how can 
silence be musical? The tale is not entitled ‘Josefine, the silence maker’. 
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 The narrator continues with his characterisation of the mice folk as 
‘unmusikalisch’ (DL 350-351), with the singular exception of Josefine. This 
could prompt a reader investigation into how it might be possible that the 
mice appreciate Josefine’s singing, if they are effectively tone-deaf? The 
narrator wonders how the mice can understand her song and responds with a 
simple answer: her singing is of such beauty that even ‘der stumpfste Sinn’ 
(DL 351) would recognise it. But the combination of ‘verstehen’ and ‘Schönheit’ 
seems an odd mix of the rational and the aesthetic, and the narrator feels this 
answer could only be satisfactory if the mice sensed ‘das Gefühl des 
Außerordentlichen’ (DL 351). Predictably, this answer is then rejected, as it is 
widely accepted ‘im vertrauten Kreise’ that Josefine is not a special talent. 
The narrator tries again with a second question which approaches the 
problem from the opposite direction. Instead of asking what the mice make of 
Josefine, the question focuses on Josefine and whether she can actually sing 
at all. This is an astounding volte-face, given the story’s opening barely two 
paragraphs earlier, when she was introduced as ‘our singer’ and her voice 
possessed ‘Macht’.  
The earlier statement that mice are not musical suggests that they are 
not in a position to answer the question, but now the narrator qualifies the 
unmusical aspect of rodent nature by revealing a musical tradition, so 
perhaps the mice do after all have an idea of what music is. However, before 
the reader can adjust to this sudden admission of a musical legacy, it seems 
the mice still cannot recognise anything special in Josefine: ‘Eine Ahnung 
dessen, was Gesang ist, haben wir also und dieser Ahnung entspricht 
Josefinens Kunst eigentlich nicht’ (DL 351).  
The question is then raised a third time, strengthened by a follow-up 
question wondering whether Josefine’s singing is actually ‘nur ein Pfeifen’ (DL 
351). This is another astounding leap from the initial ‘Macht’ argument, 
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 because Josefine’s powerful art has now been reduced to the squeak any 
mouse can make, without needing any kind of skill. This alters the perception 
of Josefine radically because she now begins to resemble the hunger artist, 
seeking acclaim for doing something which takes no effort. This is discussed 
as ‘Schwindel’ in Ein Hungerkünstler, and alluded to in similar terms here: 
‘Alle pfeifen wir, aber freilich denkt niemand daran, das als Kunst auszugeben’ 
(DL 352). The transformation from figurehead to fraud has been swift and 
sudden, in the best koan manner.319 
But the narrative’s twists and turns have only just started. Not content 
with swapping the initial ‘Macht des Gesanges’ for ordinary whistling, it is 
suggested that even ‘Erdarbeiter’ (DL 352) can whistle better than she can: the 
talismanic singer is outperformed by labourers. At rock bottom, with her art in 
tatters, the narrator now tries to pick Josefine off the floor and reinstate some 
of the earlier mystique surrounding her: ‘Es ist aber eben doch nicht nur 
Pfeifen’ (DL 352). Before the reader prepares for something positive to be said 
about her, however, we are told that from a distance or in a group, her singing 
is inconspicuous. Up close it is a different matter, but in order to discern her 
talent it is necessary ‘sie nicht nur zu hören sondern auch zu sehn’ (DL 352). 
This is another standalone koan-style line which sits squarely in the Zen 
tradition of ‘what is the sound of one hand clapping’, but here it is modified 
slightly to run ‘what does a whistle look like?’. 
This is brief respite for Josefine because the narrator then compares her 
ordinary whistling to somebody cracking nuts and passing it off as art. This 
would clearly be ridiculous, but the narrator nevertheless discusses what 
might happen if the ‘nut cracker’ were to pull off such a feat. This now hints at 
a defence of Josefine, offering to explain how the star performer’s mediocre nut 
319 Ronald Gray finds ‘too many sudden twists of direction’, which make the story a ‘document 
of neurosis’ rather than a work of art (pp. 176-77).  
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 cracking might be a more effective way of communicating the activity by 
making the ordinary seem remarkable in some respect. 
As this tortuous passage comes to an end, we get a closer look at 
Josefine the person. She refuses to accept that her ‘Kunst’ or ‘Gesang’ is the 
same as whistling. Reminiscent of the hunger artist, Josefine craves 
admiration and acknowledgement, but on her terms. The hunger artist lives 
for the acclaim of a public which does not ‘get’ his art, and now Josefine 
counts on the devotion of the mouse folk, but it is the wrong kind of devotion, 
and affords her no satisfaction. She might try to improve her singing in order 
to earn the accolades properly or educate her public (justice); but from a 
Buddhist angle, she should work on reducing her dependency on accolades, 
deserved or not (attachment). 
The narrator now shifts his attention to what happens during Josefine’s 
performances and prepares more puzzles for the reader. Mice folk usually 
whistle when they are happy and might therefore be expected to whistle 
during her shows, but on the contrary we are told the auditorium is 
‘mäuschenstill’ (DL 354). The claim that mice whistle when they are happy 
also seems to contradict the narrator’s earlier assertion that they are at their 
happiest when things are quiet. This prepares the ground for the next koan 
conundrum which turns on the notion of sound and silence: the narrator 
wonders if the mice are enchanted by Josefine’s song or the silence 
encompassing it. But if Josefine is singing, how can there be silence? Silence 
can be defined as the ‘absence’ of sound, so the two are mutually exclusive. 
The narrator explains how a little mouse innocently started to whistle along 
during one of Josefine’s shows, and was hushed by the rest of the audience for 
disturbing ‘die feierliche Stille’ (DL 354), rather than the song.  
After the repeated contrasts between Josefine’s special status and her 
level of talent, the narrator then raises the question on many readers’ lips: 
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 ‘Was treibt das Volk dazu, sich für Josefine so zu bemühen?’ (DL 357). The 
question relates to her singing rather than her character, with the mouse 
people ‘bedingungslos ergeben’ (DL 358) to her. The narrator rejects this, 
however, and states that the mouse folk are not beholden to anybody and it is 
precisely this fiercely independent quality which Josefine fights against.  
True to the pattern of the story, the disclaimer is not long coming: within 
a breath of declaring that ‘bedingungslose Ergebenheit kennt unser Volk 
kaum’, we are told ‘das Volk ist Josefine doch ergeben, nur nicht 
bedingungslos’ (DL 358). This may seem like splitting hairs, but it is an 
extremely significant distinction. In Buddhism, everything is ‘conditioned’ – 
the Law of Dependent Origination underpins all of Buddhist thought in its 
declaration that nothing in the world is absolute. This is another point of 
characterisation on which the mice are distinct from earlier, more intransigent 
figures in Kafka’s fiction, such as the K.s who cling to absolutes such as 
‘innocence’ and ‘truth’ – the mouse folk belong to a new breed of enlightened 
Kafka figures which know when to ‘let go’. Perhaps readers of such a 
labyrinthine text will also learn to ‘let go’ of their expectations of linear, 
rational storytelling. 
The narrator explores further the nature of the connection between the 
mice and Josefine and finds that, despite her controversial behaviour and 
questionable singing, she is still somehow their protégé and the folk are 
responsible for her wellbeing, although it is not clear why: ‘der Grund dessen 
ist niemandem klar, nur die Tatsache scheint festzustehn’ (DL 358). Josefine, 
not surprisingly, refutes this mooted father-child model: ‘sie glaubt, sie sei es, 
die das Volk beschütze’ (DL 359). However, before we can fully digest the 
implications of this reversal, the narrator admits that Josefine has never 
actually said anything of the sort: ‘Aus ihren Augen blitzt es’ (DL 360). 
Whatever she may or may not think, the narrator is clear on his view: ‘Freilich, 
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 sie rettet uns nicht, and gibt uns keine Kräfte’ (DL 360). There follows a long 
description of the stoic qualities of the mice people who are used to facing 
adversity and taking care of themselves. Yet again, a contradiction follows a 
positive statement as the narrator admits that the mice do respond to 
Josefine’s singing in times of trouble. It is not the performance which helps 
them, though, but the ‘Volksversammlung’ (DL 361), as if Josefine provided 
the focal point around which to congregate peacefully and gather strength. 
On several occasions the narrator has insisted on the importance of 
‘Stille’ to the mouse people and downplayed the effect of Josefine’s singing, but 
now after admitting that she does trigger some response he goes further by 
revealing that something in her whistling does indeed penetrate the mouse 
psyche. It is nothing to do with any musical effect, however, for it appears that 
this ordinary whistle is ‘eine Botschaft des Volkes’ and represents ‘die 
armselige Existenz unseres Volkes mitten im Tumult der feindlichen Welt’ (DL 
362). The narrator goes one step further and claims that a ‘proper’ singer 
would not be received as well as Josefine, because a genuine singing 
performance would be completely out of place in times of trouble. Josefine – in 
the opinion of the mice – cannot sing, so her performance can take on another 
meaning, such as the epitome of ‘miceness’. There is a twisted logic to this as 
befits the perlocutionary style, but the reader should note that we have now 
arrived at a position opposite to the opening declaration of the story, where 
Josefine was introduced as the ‘Sängerin’. She has an undoubted effect on the 
mice folk, but she is no ‘Gesangskünstler’ (DL 362).  
A long passage follows describing the ‘Kindlichkeit’ (DL 364) of the mice, 
but they are also ‘vorzeitig alt’, in another koan-style contradiction. Their lack 
of musicality stems from this premature ageing – they have no time to be 
young and playful. In another backhanded compliment the narrator suggests 
that through Josefine the mice can tap into their inner mouse nature, but her 
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 whistling is ‘stoßend’, rather than ‘perlend’ (DL 366). It is just ordinary 
whistling, but detached from its ordinary setting it somehow acquires an 
artistic quality. In another Zen-style formulation, it seems Josefine is special 
through her lack of specialness – in this way she can reflect an accurate image 
of the mouse folk. 
The last part of the story is taken up with Josefine’s attempts to gain 
recognition for her art, which is never forthcoming on the terms she seeks. The 
narrator lists the detail of all her ruses, which are dismissed as ‘Schauspiel’ 
(DL 375), but she is never fully successful. The tale ends with her 
disappearance, which destroys the power she had won over the mouse spirit. 
The tale has now turned full circle to evoke the ‘Macht’ from the start, but 
rather than end in a eulogy for her, we are told that the mice will prevail 
(‘weiterziehen’). 
Josefine is just a small episode in their history and they will get over her. 
The penultimate paragraph lists a flurry of questions in which the narrator 
wonders how the mouse folk will deal with her absence: ‘Leicht wird es uns ja 
nicht werden’ (DL 376). On closer inspection, however, the questions seem to 
answer themselves. To begin with: how can the crowds assemble in silence 
(without Josefine)? Answer, in the form of a question: Wasn’t that the case 
when Josefine was there? Next question: was her ‘wirkliches Pfeifen’ louder 
than how it will be remembered? Answer, in the form of a question: Wasn’t 
that the case when Josefine was there? Another answer, in the form of a 
question: Don’t the mouse folk prefer to respect Josefine’s song as a memory? 
The final paragraph is similarly riddled with contradictions as the focus 
returns to Josefine. She has been ‘erlöst von der irdischen Plage’ (good), which 
was her lot as one of the ‘Auserwählten’ (bad). She will merge into the ranks of 
mouse heroes (good), but the mice have little regard for history (bad). The 
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 narrator closes with a paradox, claiming that Josefine will be forgotten like all 
her fellow heroes. 
Tightropes 
The narrator opens the story by introducing a number of themes (Josefine’s 
art, music, mouse nature) and, significantly, he has given his considered view: 
‘ich habe oft darüber nachgedacht’ (DL 350). This reflection sets him apart 
from characters like Josef K., who spend their time chasing after influence 
despite being advised to think about their own situation. The narrator makes 
no specific recommendations regarding a particular path to tread, but the 
mouse folk’s stoicism suggests Right View and Right Understanding are 
involved. More than any other work, this story is concerned with the path, the 
Middle Way, and there are numerous allusions to how attachments are 
handled with caution.320 
The narrator talks of the attachments of the mouse people, including 
their relationship with Josefine, with a certain clarity and awareness: the 
mouse folk feels obliged to look after her, indulge her even, yet there is a line 
they will not cross. The attachments are social responsibilities and moral 
sensibilities rather than personal bonds. He also hints at the problems faced 
by Josefine as a result of her cravings for recognition and approval.  
The result is the eventual demise/disappearance of the singer and the 
continued existence of the mice community: whatever ‘pull’ Josefine holds for 
them, she cannot exert total control over them. The mouse narrator resembles 
the beleaguered narrator from Eine kleine Frau who ponders his actions 
carefully, and is not led by whim or emotion. The narrator appears to have 
320 Tauber describes the story’s tone as ‘cheerful’, and finds within it ‘a quiet devotion to life’ 
and ‘a quiet meditation’ (pp. 197-98). 
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 some recognition of craving and how it is important to deal with it at the 
source. 
As the title indicates, there is a double focus in the story, with the first-
person narrator giving the perspective of the mouse folk, but Josefine is the 
leading character and centre of attention. For the mouse folk, suffering is the 
general lot of their existence and they seem fairly phlegmatic in the way they 
shoulder hardships. Josefine’s suffering is in contrast intensely personal and 
is more to do with her perception of not being valued enough – this puts her 
directly in line with figures such as the K.s, the hunger artist and the trapeze 
artist. 
If the mouse folk show a tendency to detachment, Josefine provides all 
the examples of behaving with attachment. She craves respect, similar to the 
hunger artist and his demand for recognition. She cannot expect 
understanding from the unmusical mice, so she looks for other ways to exert 
influence.  
One reason why Josefine finds it difficult to earn the admiration she 
craves is that the mice folk are united in their suffering – they share their 
troubles and do not take personal ownership of them, or wear their troubles 
like a badge of honour. Josefine wants to be seen as a kind of saviour, and in 
this role she finds identity or fulfilment. The mice do not need a saviour, 
however, for they have each other, and hence Josefine is more a figurehead or 
symbol for them, rather than a talisman or lucky charm. This sharing of the 
load is also how the mouse folk sees its responsibility towards Josefine – they 
do not interact with her as individuals, but as a group. Although the mice will 
go to great lengths to support and humour Josefine, their efforts are not 
‘bedingungslos’. This is a very Buddhist formulation, because in Buddhist 
thinking nothing can be unconditional. In Western eyes it may be considered 
admirable to describe something as unconditional, such as love, faith or 
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 loyalty. It suggests purity and truth. However, to the Buddhist way of 
thinking, it suggests extremes and slavery, attachment to ideals and 
absolutes, and along this path lies suffering. The mouse folk are all the 
stronger for refusing any form of unconditionality in their relationships. They 
will do what they can for Josefine, but they will not be blinded by devotion to 
absolutes – they will act in accordance to what appears to cause the least 
suffering overall. For this reason, it is useful to view the mouse folk as 
paternalistic towards Josefine for it allows room both for an obligation towards 
her, as well as freedom to dismiss her criticism of them – they just see it as a 
child’s rebellion, testing the boundaries of the relationship, but nothing that 
has to be bowed to. 
Josefine’s performances almost amount to a pretext for the mice to meet 
– in times of trouble they like to gather and Josefine’s singing affords this 
opportunity. She cannot be satisfied by this arrangement because it suggests 
the mice are present in body but not in mind, as they are not an appreciative 
audience. Josefine’s self-obsession often blinds her to this fact, and she is 
easily swayed by hangers-on. 
In some ways the key to the relationship between Josefine and the 
community is succinctly expressed by the narrator’s description of the singer’s 
whistling as a representation of ‘die armselige Existenz unseres Volkes mitten 
im Tumult der feindlichen Welt’ (DL 362). This would explain the folk’s 
‘adoption’ of Josefine as a kind of embodiment of their status as underdog, as 
downtrodden but proud. The fact that she can’t actually sing, and can barely 
even whistle, demonstrates in effect her unmusical nature and therefore 
reflects accurately an important mouse trait. If she were in fact a good singer, 
she could not be adopted as an ‘everymouse’ figure. This is the catch for 
Josefine: she has a straight choice between talent and devotion, but she wants 
both. It is not enough that she is cherished by the people: she wants to be 
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 revered for her art, not for her lack of it. This is galling to her because of her 
attachment to her singing, to her notion of skillfulness.  
In this respect she is very similar to other self-deluding ‘quest’ figures in 
Kafka’s writing: she is fixated on the attainment of mutually exclusive goals. 
As Robertson explains, Josefine is not properly an artist and the mice folk use 
her as a medium through which the ‘individual communicates with the 
communal spirit of his people’.321 The mice have no problem with the seeming 
paradox (koan) of the community’s singer being unable to sing because she 
simply ‘represents’ the people. Josefine misreads her position (koan) by 
assuming that she has become the people’s singer by dint of her artistic 
talents. As her sense of self is linked to her art (not her being), she is exposed 
to continual disappointments. The hunger artist was skewered on the horns of 
this same dilemma, because he was offered the public’s acclaim (though 
transitory) as the greatest faster, but he also craved their understanding of the 
boundless nature of his ‘skill’, which was never to be forthcoming, and in fact 
deep down he realised that his fasting was merely the expression of lack, not a 
triumph of resistance. Here, the comparison with Josefine holds true because 
she also wants recognition for something she does not have. 
The story at one point embarks on a long description of how the mice 
lack a proper childhood – they are pressed into adulthood by the dangers that 
threaten them. This rushed passage out of infancy helps to explain a number 
of their features: they work well together and have little time to allow 
individual personalities to bloom. The implications of this from a Buddhist 
point of view are clear: the lack of a fully formed, self-centred self enables 
them not to get too attached to objects and ideals. They share a collective 
mentality and spirituality that provides the strength and fortitude necessary to 
321 Robertson, Kafka: Judaism, p. 281.  
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 sustain them, when a population of ‘me-driven’ individuals would perhaps be 
easier to crush.  
Josefine has been chosen as the community singer. As a reader, one 
might wonder why the mice need one if they are so unmusical, and by singling 
her out the community has perhaps caused some growth to her self-
centredness – the position has gone to her head. By making her the 
representative of the whole, she is separated from the whole: the way to square 
the circle would only be possible if she understood the role and did not identify 
her ‘self’ with it. This has not been possible with Josefine, hence all the 
character differences – she is individualistic, self-serving and childish (she has 
managed to hang on to her ‘youth’). She also claims to be musical and sees 
herself as a protector of the people, when the narrator talks in communal 
terms of ‘Genossen’ (DL 371).  
This explains the added layer of indulgence towards her, because the 
mice feel guilty about not being able to appreciate her for her art – they can 
only offer her a token, symbolic admiration. All this suffering stems from the 
self being conscious of its separation and seeking to maintain its exclusivity as 
a guarantee of survival. The mice community could not survive as a group of 
individuals, whereas Josefine struggles to survive as one in the collective.  
The story sits firmly in the Kafka tradition of observing the growth pains 
of the self as it struggles to maintain its independence and sovereignty. The 
difference with this story is perspective, because we have a narrator who not 
only suggests the inherent problems of staking claims for selfhood, but 
proposes an alternative where cutting away attachments need not be fatal, but 
can actually result in an enhanced existence in a world that can never be free 
of suffering. 
The story is a study in how to hold on and let go at the same time. The 
mice are devoted to Josefine, but not attached to her; they risk dangers to 
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than the whistling itself; they indulge her childish, work-shy whims as far as 
possible, but are never neglectful of their own responsibilities. In clear 
contrast, ‘Josefine aber gibt nicht nach’ (DL 374). This is in essence the reason 
for her downfall and perhaps by extension the reason for any descent into 
suffering: the inability to let go. 
6.3 Sleepwalking into suffering 
Seeing that all things are transient, we stop craving and clinging to them, thus 
our happy memories and enjoyable day dreams cease to be so compelling.322 
In this collection, there are cases of unskillful self-absorption, where blinkered 
figures accumulate suffering by chasing after shadows, and of skillful 
detachment where enlightened figures strive to minimise suffering by opening 
their eyes. In Erstes Leid, the trapeze artist is focused clearly on his passion, 
but inadvertently sleepwalking his way along the highwire to suffering. He 
could probably walk the wire with his eyes closed, such is his skill, but he 
cannot see the attachment consuming him. In Eine kleine Frau the little 
woman seems to be quite aware of what she is doing, but her unprovoked 
attacks on the narrator and self-centred interests help classify her as the 
sleepwalking type. For his part, the narrator refuses to fall into the trap of self-
pity, thus avoiding the temptation to personalise suffering.  
It is possible to see disturbing elements in the unbalanced figure of the 
little woman, which makes the story potentially depressing, as a variation of 
the ‘Why me?’ lament that is raised when we cannot explain suffering. For 
Ronald Gray, the story is a projection of Kafka’s mental torment and can be 
compared with Josefine, which is taken as a document of neurosis.323 This 
322 Thubten Chodron at www.thubtenchodron.org/DealingWithEmotions/ruminating.html. 
323 Ronald Gray, p. 177. 
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 seems a narrow reading, especially as there are elements to both stories which 
bear the hallmark of a healthy and insightful mind. The enlightened narrator 
figures talk us through how they deal with the hardships that have beset 
them; both the little woman and Josefine then play the role of the deluded 
‘Traumwandler’ (in the mould of Josef K.) who sees phantoms where none are 
present. 
In Ein Hungerkünstler there are parallels between Josef K. and the 
hunger artist. Josef K. is convinced of his innocence (not a trace of guilt in 
him) but he struggles to convey this message to others, until a late flicker of 
awareness reveals his delusions; the hunger artist is equally convinced of his 
innocence (not a trace of food eaten) but he struggles to persuade spectators of 
his integrity, until he too admits he does not deserve admiration. 
The hunger artist can also be twinned with the other deluded performer 
in the collection, the trapeze artist. Both have a very firm grasp of what they 
want to achieve (endless fasting; another wire), but a very poor grip on reality. 
They exist within tightly drawn personal boundaries and have little significant 
contact with the outside world. This confirms their places in a long line of 
Kafka’s sleepwalkers who fail to heed the warning signs around them. The 
trapeze artist is wrapped up in cotton wool by his minders, and the hunger 
artist is wrapped up in straw, but the effect is the same, as they wither away 
in their protective bubbles. 
As in the case of Josef K., it is hard to condemn unequivocally a person 
who is misguided rather than wrong or evil. Who does the hunger artist harm, 
other than himself? Faced with such an ambivalent figure, the Western 
tendency to ‘seek the answer’ is a burden. Buddhist thinking would say this 
approach is in itself misguided, as an activity in propping up the self and not 
leading to enlightenment. Heidsieck suggests that the hunger artist sees 
martyrdom in his quest, and backs this up with Biblical references to Christ 
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 on the cross.324 The trouble with this view from a Buddhist perspective is that 
martyrs by definition are to be admired: their suffering is ultimately not in 
vain for they achieve some other-worldly reward. This is never clear from the 
hunger artist, and by comparing the life-affirming figure of the panther and 
the hunger artist’s pathetic demise one might conclude that the opposite is the 
case – his suffering was completely in vain, as even he himself did not 
understand why he suffered. His suffering is the definition of vanity, an 
obsession with the self. Any kind of attachment to suffering, such as his 
attempt to make a virtue out of necessity, is made to look questionable. 
 From the point of view of characterisation, Josefine, die Sängerin oder 
Das Volk der Mäuse resembles Eine kleine Frau in that there are two ‘poles’ in 
the text that represent different positions: the deluded and the enlightened, or 
the attached and the detached. To be more accurate, it would be misleading to 
talk of opposing positions, as the two sides are not in a battle against each 
other, in the way that the K.s face off against the Court and the Castle. The 
narrator figures have to deal with a thorn in their side, but they do not try to 
eradicate the problem. They try to work through the issues caused by the 
differences, and this is particularly the case with the mouse narrator, as he 
explains the lengths to which the community goes to protect its singer. While 
Josefine joins the ranks of Kafka’s sleepwalkers, the narrators work actively 
and selflessly to minimise the suffering felt by their fellow beings: this is the 
character of the Bodhisattva, devoted to the enlightenment of others.  
6.4 Conclusion 
‘Pray pacify my mind,’ cried a pupil who had waited seven days in the snow 
before gaining admission to the Master’s room. ‘Show me your mind,’ said the 
324 Arnold Heidsieck, The Intellectual Contexts of Kafka’s Fiction: Philosophy, Law, Religion (New 
York: Camden House, 1994), p. 173. 
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 Master. ‘I cannot produce it,’ said the seeker. ‘So; then I have pacified your 
mind,’ said Bodhidharma.325 
Endings of Kafka’s works can be problematic, once the point has been made of 
suffering associated with attachment, because the end of the work can be 
confused with the ‘result’ or the ‘meaning’. If death is the final event, as often 
happens, this can lead to a pessimistic interpretation of the inevitability of 
suffering. There are few texts where Kafka’s protagonists come through 
unscathed or enlightened: K. eventually sees the light and the narrator of Eine 
kleine Frau comes to terms with his issues, but most other major figures fall 
by the wayside. Josefine is a major figure, and she too fails to survive, but the 
mice as a people, as a race, as a collective, are still standing: ‘dieses Volk zieht 
weiter seines Weges’ (DL 376). 
The collection Ein Hungerkünstler does not fit the conventional 
boundaries of the Kafkaesque because there are clear pointers on how to avoid 
suffering. The artist figures end up crying, dying or disappearing, which might 
suggest that there is something life-threatening about art, but it is rather the 
relationship between the individuals and their art that determines their fate. 
When art (trapeze swinging, fasting, singing) is seen as ‘the way’ to enhancing 
or defining the self, suffering will follow because the individual is attaching to 
a particular branch of skill or knowledge in order to arrive at a particular 
destination. In Buddhism, familiarity with the truth of impermanence makes it 
clear that there is no such thing as a fixed destination. The enlightened figures 
do not strive after perfection – artistic or otherwise – but practise awareness. 
The themes addressed by The Four Noble Truths are well aired 
throughout the collection and it is noteworthy, albeit surely coincidental, that 
a different Noble Truth comes to the fore in each of the four stories. The First 
Noble Truth of suffering is clearly the focus of Erstes Leid, as we see the 
325 Humphreys, Buddhism, p. 182. 
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 dawning of the realisation that human existence is never far from sorrow and 
disappointment. The Second Noble Truth relates to the cause of suffering, and 
Ein Hungerkünstler announces in ‘hunger’ the root of the problem. The Third 
Noble Truth focuses on the next step, the cessation of suffering by cutting out 
the source of the attachment, and this is an approach considered at length by 
the narrator in Eine kleine Frau. The Fourth Noble Truth indicates the path to 
a life free of suffering, and the story of the mouse folk and their singer Josefine 
illustrates the chasm between the ‘high road’ of enlightened practices and the 
‘low road’ of self-delusion. 
J. P. Stern describes Josefine as Kafka’s ‘most serene’ story, and it is 
perhaps not coincidental that he detects in the work a quality of ‘awareness’ 
that sets it apart from others. Kafka’s depiction of the mouse folk reveals an 
understanding of a people – rather than an individual – faced with suffering: 
‘The nation […] is not only beleaguered and threatened, but it is aware, 
constantly and almost unremittingly aware, of the threats to its existence and 
survival, and ready to meet these threats.’326 Stern was referring to the Jewish 
nation, but it is not necessary to define what race of people the mouse folk 
represents. After a procession of deluded, blinkered and self-obsessed figures, 
Kafka simply finished his writing with an example of an awakened outlook. 
326 J. P. Stern, ‘Franz Kafka on Mice and Men’ in J. P. Stern and J. J. White, eds, Paths and 
Labyrinths (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, 1985), p. 141. 
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 Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Change in perspective 
Ich glaube, man sollte überhaupt nur solche Bücher lesen, die einen beißen und 
stechen. Wenn das Buch, das wir lesen, uns nicht mit einem Faustschlag auf 
den Schädel weckt, wozu lesen wir dann das Buch?327 
Kafka’s remarks to Pollak in 1904 predate all of his celebrated literature, but 
they are significant because they touch on two key elements of Buddhist 
teaching in a Zen style. The ‘biting’ and ‘waking’ can be seen to represent 
suffering and awakening, and the blow to the head is a favoured tactic among 
Zen masters keen to drum (literally) some enlightenment into their students. 
This dissertation argues that the suffering Kafka went on to portray 
throughout his writing is best understood when it is taken as the ‘Faustschlag’ 
that awakens us, rather than the knockout punch that delivers us from our 
misery. This difference in perspective is made possible by approaching the 
texts from a Buddhist viewpoint, and it allows for a ‘skillful’ interpretation of 
Kafka’s work: suffering is the inevitable effect of personalised attachments to 
actions and thoughts, not the unavoidable consequence of living in a hostile 
world. 
It is interesting to note that this point can also be made in relation to 
how Kafka saw himself as a writer, as well as to what he created. Corngold 
and Wagner find it significant that Kafka referred to himself using the word 
‘Schriftsteller’ rather than ‘Autor’ or ‘Dichter’, because it ‘assigned the function 
of setting down script’ in producing ‘literature’, in preference to the ‘authority’ 
and ‘autonomy’ associated with the other terms.328 Kafka’s choice of term 
works from a Buddhist viewpoint too, as the role of ‘Schriftsteller’ displaces 
327 Kafka’s letter to Oskar Pollak (27 January, 1904), from Briefe 1900-1912, ed. Hans-Gerd 
Koch (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1999), p. 36. 
328 Corngold and Wagner, pp. 110-11. 
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 attention from the person towards the product, whereas the author and poet 
claim ownership and creative rights which contribute to the definition of the 
self. 
To support my thesis that the ‘biting and waking’ aspect of Kafka’s works 
has acquired unnecessarily negative connotations, I have explored two routes 
to developing a Buddhist approach: the illocutionary method, which uses the 
ideas and principles underpinning Buddhist thinking to understand the 
contexts represented in Kafka’s writing; and the perlocutionary method, which 
experiences the textual cul-de-sacs and labyrinths as immediate expressions 
of the underlying emptiness (sunyata) of reality.  
Kafka’s early comments on reading as a means of awakening are 
consistent with the comments later attributed to him by Janouch when he 
assigns the cause of human suffering to ignorance, wandering through life as 
a ‘Traumwandler’. The image of the sleepwalker is useful in finding a different 
way to read Kafka because it embodies a paradox: the idea that we can be 
active, decisive and purposeful, and yet at the same time be ineffective, 
marginal and directionless. As we sleepwalk, we take centre stage in an 
imaginary world that is of no substance; when we wake up, we recognise the 
status of that unreal ‘I’ and its universe. The Buddhist awakening endeavours 
to transfer this realisation of sleepwalking to our ordinary lives, so that we 
become aware that our notions of a fixed self and absolute ideals are figments 
of our imagination. In Buddhist thinking, suffering is certain, but the ‘person’ 
that experiences it is difficult to define and ephemeral. Kafka’s work tells the 
story of how we invert this natural order, by hanging on to our self as certain 
and rejecting instances of suffering as passing afflictions. The wake-up calls 
that shock his fictional characters are designed to ‘short-circuit’ their twisted 
wires of perception and help them access reality beyond the imperfect, 
personalised connection: ‘It is because our way of observing things is deeply 
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 rooted in our self-centered ideas that we are disappointed when we find 
everything has only a tentative existence. But when we actually realize this 
truth, we will have no suffering.’329 
The reason a Buddhist approach to Kafka’s work makes it seem less 
oppressive lies in its commitment to freedom.330 The rejection of a fixed, 
meaningful sense of self sounds bleak, but that is merely the negative flipside 
to the opportunity to be free from attachments. A Buddhist reading of Kafka 
turns on the same flipside, as it is characterised by the same positive outlook, 
to remove the limitations of self-interest and liberate the possibilities of 
impermanence. The problem of finding ‘meaningfulness’ in the gaps and 
contradictions in Kafka’s narratives has often been taken as a reflection of the 
helplessness of the human condition in the face of sinister, overpowering 
forces. From a Buddhist point of view, however, the paradoxes and 
equivocations represent benign obstacles to ‘prevent’ us from trying too hard 
to ‘make sense’, rather than malign barriers to fixing meaning. The literary 
tripwires operate as koans to dissuade us from the unskillful pursuit of 
attachment to meaning. Josef K.’s unwarranted arrest (justice), K.’s dubious 
status (rights), the unexplained suffering of the ‘kleine Frau’ (happiness), the 
infinite frustrations of the circus artists (achievement), Josefine’s singing 
(identity) – their frustrations all have perlocutionary effects that recall anicca, 
anatta and dukkha. 
To the Western mindset, paradoxes are problems to be solved, cases 
where logic loses its way or where conflicting ideas clash: they must be 
accounted for, so as not to disturb the semblance of order – they are tolerated 
but serve to irritate not enlighten. Hence, Josef K.’s unspecified guilt, K.’s 
329 Shunryu Suzuki Roshi in Tricycle at www.tricycle.com/daily-dharma/new-way-observation. 
330 ‘The mighty ocean has one taste, the taste of salt. Just so, the Dharma-Vinaya has one 
taste, the taste of freedom.’ Sangharakshita refers to the Buddha’s own description of his 
teaching (p. 12). 
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 ambiguous appointment, Josefine’s ‘singing’ – these have to be explained away 
to ‘fit’ a meaning, so that there are no ‘loose ends’.  
In Zen koans, however, paradoxes are welcomed because they are 
windows through which we glimpse the underlying truth of emptiness. Rather 
than trying to explain them (and close the windows), they are accepted for 
what they are. Felix Greß remarks on the commitment made by Kafka’s 
characters towards capturing ‘Verhältnisse zum Unsagbaren’,331 but the 
quests after recognition and self-validation are often a double-edged sword 
with harmful consequences if handled improperly. Many figures from Kafka’s 
later fiction, such as the trapeze artist, the hunger artist and the land 
surveyor, set objectives they struggle to define: ‘sie alle streben zu einem 
Unbestimmten, das sie nicht positiv benennen können.’332 Their quests 
exemplify the Western pursuit of meaningfulness, and the unwillingness to 
tolerate paradox. Their failures lead to the Kafkaesque crystallising into a 
description of any inscrutable, insurmountable force that condemns us to 
suffering and death.  
For a Buddhist, however, the quests of Kafka’s later works are 
characterised by delusion not compulsion, and by rigidity not inevitability. 
Josef K. stakes his life on an innocence he cannot articulate; K. struggles to 
enter a domain he knows nothing about; the hunger artist chases after the 
perfect fast which must result in death. Kafka’s heroes strive after something 
they cannot name, and this must qualify as a definition of ‘non-sense’.  
7.2 A new Kafkaesque 
When the Buddha taught, he didn't say that we were bad people or that there 
was some sin that we had committed […] He taught that there is a kind of 
innocent misunderstanding that we all share, something that can be turned 
331 Greß, p. 288. 
332 Ibid., p. 288. 
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 around, corrected and seen through, as if we were in a dark room and someone 
showed us where the light switch is.333 
This dissertation has shown that there is a close correlation between Buddhist 
thinking and the conditions portrayed in Kafka’s fictional world, especially 
from Der Proceß onwards. Both illocutionary and perlocutionary approaches to 
his work support a Buddhist reading, resulting in a strong case for re-
appraising the definition of the Kafkaesque as something that ‘runs counter to 
human directions or goals or aims’ and ‘serves as a form of bedevilment’.334 
For Christian Schärf, Kafka’s late texts explore ‘die Unfähigkeit zu leben’, 
with Das Schloß in particular a novel to end all novels: ‘Das Schloß ist Kafkas 
Todesroman, die Feier seines Verschwindens. Und damit ist der Text schon so 
etwas wie ein Testament, jedoch ein nicht zu entzifferndes.’335 This dark view 
suggests that Kafka’s obsession with writing so consumed him that his works 
represent a kind of literary suicide. The Buddhist view would contrast strongly 
with this because the ignorant failings of his self-obsessed characters, such as 
Josef K. and the hunger artist, are offset by the enlightened breakthroughs of 
his detached stoics, such as K. and the mouse narrator.  
In terms of its themes and contexts, the Kafkaesque is said to describe 
harrowing events and unjustified suffering, but a Buddhist outlook uncovers 
positive alternatives within the illocutionary messages by drawing on 
teachings such as The Three Universal Characteristics, The Four Noble Truths 
and the Law of Dependent Origination. When Josef K. is arrested by a punitive 
Court on an unspecified charge and K.’s appointment is thwarted by an 
inaccessible Castle, the finger of suspicion can be turned on the heroes 
themselves for their attachments and spiritual ignorance. When the trapeze 
artist and the hunger artist endure suffering for their art, it is their self-
333 Chödrön, p. 13. 
334 Karl, p. 757. 
335 Schärf, pp. 187-88. 
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 consuming obsessiveness which drives them into a spiral of dissatisfaction, 
not insufficient equipment or uninspired spectators. When Josefine and the 
‘kleine Frau’ complain they are misunderstood and mistreated, their prickly 
self-defensiveness imprisons them in paranoid isolation, not the thoughts and 
deeds of their fellows.  
As for the expressive elements of the Kafkaesque, the reader suffers 
contradictions, aporia and paradoxes which are taken to represent the hostile, 
chaotic and fragmentary universe we are trapped in, but a Zen approach uses 
this textual and semantic discomfort to flush out the assumptions and 
conventions that govern our lives. When the reader is baffled by Titorelli’s 
insight into the law and the mayor’s account of K.’s appointment, this 
confusion opens a doorway into a place free of idealised notions of innocence 
and justice, rather than confirmation of inescapable defeat. When the trapeze 
artist and hunger artist lie crumpled in their luggage rack or pile of straw, 
their vulnerability reminds us to avoid extreme sensibility. When the first-
person narrators talk of the frustrations prepared by the irascible ‘kleine Frau’ 
and the infuriating Josefine, their calm resolve shows how to rise above the 
vagaries of existence, rather than sink under their weight. 
At the heart of these recast values of the Kafkaesque lies the capacity to 
detach from the demands and conditions of selfhood. This is not defeat or 
surrender, but a simple change in outlook, as exemplified by K.’s victory over 
his self-importance.336 This enlightenment comes in the form of an engaged 
non-attachment, a commitment to work towards a goal without using it to 
define a part of the self. The awakened selflessness shown by K. and the first-
person narrators are not chance aberrations, because they capture the wish 
expressed in one of Kafka’s diary entries about gaining an outlook on life ‘in 
336 ‘All of our tendencies, difficulties, and pain come from self-importance. Clinging to a self is 
a strong habit.’ Kongtrül, p. 58. 
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 der das Leben zwar sein natürliches schweres Fallen und Steigen bewahre 
aber gleichzeitig mit nicht minderer Deutlichkeit als ein Nichts, als ein Traum, 
als ein Schweben erkannt werde’.337 Significantly, this ‘Nichts’ is not a nihilist 
craving for oblivion, but a Zen-like wish for action without karmic residue: 
Etwa als Wunsch einen Tisch mit peinlich ordentlicher 
Handwerksmäßigkeit zusammenzuhämmern und dabei gleichzeitig 
nichts zu tun undzwar nicht so daß man sagen könnte: ‘ihm ist das 
Hämmern ein Nichts’ sondern ‘ihm ist das Hämmern ein wirkliches 
Hämmern und gleichzeitig auch ein Nichts’, wodurch ja das Hämmern 
noch kühner, noch entschlossener, noch wirklicher und wenn Du 
willst noch irrsinniger geworden wäre.338 
Mark Harman takes the ‘paradoxical table’ here to stand for ‘the literary 
works that Kafka will eventually construct and de-construct. His urge to 
create and at the same time destroy certainly anticipates the shape of his self-
obliterating fictions’.339 However, rather than self-obliteration, it would be 
more uplifting (and enlightening) to talk of self-effacement, where detachment 
from one’s work leads to a more positive outcome. 
As Pema Chödrön explains in the quotation heading this section, the 
Buddha did not take the view that people were bad or sinful, but simply that 
they were not properly aware of what they were doing. Similarly, Kafka was 
said to have labelled his fellow human beings as ‘Traumwandler’, suggesting 
that their troubles come from not being ‘awake’. As the Buddha’s teaching was 
intended to illuminate, Kafka’s writing about suffering shows us the light 
switch in a dark room. 
337 Franz Kafka, Tagebücher, eds. Hans-Gerd Koch, Michael Muller and Malcolm Pasley 
(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1990), p. 855. 
338 Ibid., p. 855.  
339 Mark Harman, ‘“Torturing the Gordian Knot”: Kafka and Metaphor’ in Stanley Corngold and 
Ruth V. Gross, eds, Kafka for the Twenty-First Century (Rochester: Camden House, 2011), p. 55. 
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